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ON THE STAGES OF PERCEPTION: TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND THE BUDDHIST ABHIDHAMMA TRADITION*

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Abstract: The nature of perceptual and memory processes is examined in the light of suggested complementarity between introspective and empirical traditions. The introspective material analysed here is that found in the Buddhist Abhidhamma literature of the Pali canon on the stages of perception. Possible psychological and neurophysiological correspondences to these stages are proposed. The model of perception advanced here emphasizes two phases. The first involves sensory analysis and related memory readout. I postulate that this phase is completed when coherence in oscillatory neuronal patterns indicates a 'match' between sensory input and memory readout. The second phase results in consciousness of the object, which comes about when a connection is effected between the representation of the input as generated in phase one and a representation of self (or 'I'). 'I' is itself generated in this second phase in relation to the memory readout of phase one, since this readout includes relevant prior formations of 'I'. It is suggested that 'I' functions in the organization of memory and recall.

I: Introduction

It has been argued by several authors recently that advances in our understanding of consciousness and mind may depend upon a broader view of what constitutes 'acceptable' data than that allowed by the traditional scientific, empirical method. Phenomenological data (Flanagan, 1992; 1995), especially when derived through the discipline of mindfulness/awareness meditation (Varela *et al.*, 1991) should be integrated with data derived from experimentation. Consciousness research demands, as Willis Harman argues, observation which is participatory: 'observation through identification *with*, rather than separation *from*,' as he puts it (Harman, 1993, p. 19).

Of course, a subject like perception inevitably engages any enquirer — even one studying 'objective' data such as neuronal responses — in a degree of 'identification *with*', for both the kinds of research questions asked in the first place and the conceptual lens through which the data are finally interpreted are largely shaped by the researcher's intuitive grasp of the nature of the process. What is special about the recent call to embrace experiential data is the recognition that such an intuitive grasp of processes such as perception, and especially of issues concerning consciousness, may be misleading. Traditional spiritual disciplines have repeatedly claimed that, without appropriate training and discipline, our introspections concerning processes and states of the mind yield delusional results. It follows that those best trained in the skills of scientific enquiry may not always be those most skilled in the art of interpreting their scientific data.

An example from a discussion of dissociative syndromes may serve to illustrate the point. Weiskrantz (1986; 1988) has made the useful point that the deficits observed in cases such as amnesiacs displaying implicit memory function, or blindsight patients, may be attributable to disturbance in a 'monitoring' or 'commentary' system. He further asserts that such a system normally involves the relation of specific images (memory images or visual images, for example) to one's self in some way. As will become clear through the present article, I believe these to be fruitful insights and to point in the direction of a richer theory of the nature of explicit processing than those currently proposed. However, what I believe to be a crucial next step in the argument — namely an analysis of how the sense of self, or 'I', arises from moment to moment — is not confronted. Weiskrantz instead uncritically assumes a common-sense view of self as a 'coherent thing':

> To 'remember' is to enable one to compare past with present, to reflect, to link separate past events, to order them, and *to do so in relation to one's self as a coherent 'thing'* (Weiskrantz, 1988, p. 193, italics added).

Most of the introspective spiritual disciplines would vehemently dispute such a view of self. In particular, the Buddhist doctrine of *anatta* (no-self) asserts that:

> What we call 'I', or 'being', is only a combination of physical and mental aggregates, which are working together interdependently in a flux of momentary change within the law of cause and effect, and that there is nothing permanent, everlasting, unchanging and eternal in the whole of existence (Rahula, 1967, p. 66).

The essence of the *anatta* doctrine is presented in the scriptural formula to be applied to all forms of mentation, 'this does not belong to me, this I am not, this is not my self'. It is specifically any notion of an *enduring* and *continuous* self which is denied according to Buddhist doctrine.

This tension between the view of self as a 'coherent thing' and the Buddhist view of *anatta* surfaces in my discussion of the stages of perception in the present paper. The stages I present are those delineated in the Abhidhamma school of the Pali Buddhist canon. Following a description of these stages, I proceed to consider how we might integrate this Buddhist view with a variety of observations in contemporary cognitive neuroscience including, in particular, neurophysiological data relating to what has been termed the 'binding' problem, and neuropsychological and cognitive data concerning the relation between implicit and explicit processing. Central to this proposed integration is the idea that our immediate sense of selfhood — 'I' — arises in relation to interpretations of ongoing sensory events. As such, and in line with the *anatta* teaching, 'I' is an ephemeral construct having no intrinsic continuity. My interest is focused on the manner in which this construct becomes encoded in memory in relation to other memory traces. It is proposed that the memory representation of 'I' becomes a key functional element in memory processes, underlying the phenomenal sense of the individual being the 'owner' of activated memories[1] and playing a definitive role in voluntary recall. This functional dimension of the role which the representation of 'I' plays in memory is conveyed by terming it an *'I'-tag.*[2]

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[*] Expanded version of a paper presented at the British Psychological Society conference, December 1994, to the symposium of the History and Philosophy Section on *Selfless minds: the Buddhist influence on cognitive science.* I would like to record my thanks to Lance Cousins and Charles Shaw for helpful discussions on the Buddhist material included in this paper.

[1] My formulation of the role of 'I' in memory may be compared with Tulving's view of *autonoetic* (self-knowing) *consciousness* in relation to episodic memory. For Tulving, 'it is autonoetic consciousness that confers the special phenomenal flavour to the remembering of past events, the flavour that distinguishes remembering from other kinds of awareness, such as those characterizing perceiving, thinking, imagining, or dreaming' (Tulving, 1985, p. 3).

[2] In a comparable formulation, Trehub (1991) coined the term 'I-token' to indicate the relationship between the cognitive system and the personal belief system in the brain. In his view, 'discharge of

1/14

To the extent that prior instances of 'I' may be re-activated in subsequent perceptual or thought processes, there is a *semblance* of continuity between previous and current constructions of 'I'. This semblance of continuity does not imply, however, that a continuous self is present, just as the appearance of a moving image on the cinema screen does not imply that the movement is present in the film. The whole question of the compatibility of the Buddhist concept of *anatta* with traditional western notions of 'the self' is a vexed one, and one which I have addressed elsewhere (Lancaster, in press). In brief, I believe that the view of self as a contextual system, as argued by Baars (1988), is consistent with the Buddhist perspective. I argue, however, that this view of Baars may usefully be extrapolated in a more ecological direction, representing a synthesis of Buddhist and other (including western) spiritual traditions.

In focusing in the present paper on the stages of perception, I confront the question of the relation between sensory processes and the arising of consciousness. It has frequently been remarked that perception can proceed effectively without the subject being conscious of sensory input (Claxton, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; Velmans, 1991). However, such cases indicate, more precisely, an inability to reflect on some event, as, for example, when there is no recollection of a period of driving. Does it necessarily follow that sensory processes proceeded at the time without consciousness? As will be discussed below, the Abhidhamma perspective holds that even the very first stages of sensory processing are moments of consciousness,[3] and would therefore suggest that consciousness is present even during a period for which one may have no subsequent memory. It seems to me that we need to clarify our use of the term, consciousness, for the Abhidhamma texts appear to have a different conception of the term than does contemporary psychology.

Block's recent distinction between *phenomenal-consciousness* and *access-consciousness* is helpful in this context (Block, 1995). For Block, phenomenal consciousness is identified with *experience*: 'P-conscious properties include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings, and perceptions' (p. 230). Access-consciousness, by contrast, is representational and functional, that is, its contents participate in reasoning and are reportable. Bisiach (1988) makes a broadly similar distinction between what he calls C1 and C2. The former is phenomenal, concerning the 'raw feels' of experience, whilst the latter 'refers to the access of parts or processes of a system to other of its parts or processes' (p. 103).[4]

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an I-token can be thought of as a neuronal signal of oneself taken as an object' (p. 302), and indexes the personal relevance, or validity, of cognitive propositions.

[3] In Pe Maung Tin's translation of Buddhaghosa's classic Atthasalini (Tin, 1921), the stages of perception are referred to as 'kinds of consciousness'. According to Govinda (1975), they are 'classes of consciousness', and for Rhys Davids (1914), 'moments or flashes of consciousness'. Aung's translation of the *Abhihammattha-Sangaha* refers to the first five stages of sensory processing as follows:

> Consciousness of the kind which apprehends sensations . . . rises and ceases. Immediately after this there rise and cease in order — visual consciousness, seeing just that visible object; recipient consciousness receiving it; investigating consciousness investigating it; determining consciousness determining it (Aung, 1972, p. 126).

[4] An important distinction between Bisiach and Block concerns the status of *representation*. For Bisiach this is not a point of difference between the two kinds of consciousness, since both are representational, a point with which I would agree. For a further analysis of differing senses of the term, consciousness, see Baruss (1987).

2|14

The problem mentioned above might be resolved by suggesting that whilst the Abhidhamma's concern is with phenomenal-consciousness, when we talk about perception occurring without consciousness we mean *without access-consciousness*. As will be discussed in section V, this may not be a merely semantic distinction; but central to the soteriological perspective to which Buddhist texts are directed.

The model presented in this paper attempts to operationalize the arising of access-consciousness. In relation to the stages of perception, I argue that it is only during the final stage, involving the construction of 'I', that access-consciousness arises.[5] In common with general psychological practice, I shall use the single term, consciousness, to refer to the result of this final stage, implying that earlier stages are *preconscious*. Perception as conceptualized here is thus a process which becomes completed as the individual becomes conscious — i.e. in the sense of access-consciousness — of the object. The processes involved prior to this endstage are preconscious in the sense of pre-access-consciousness; they may not necessarily be outside of phenomenal-consciousness. The implication is, of course, that in a situation where phenomenal-consciousness arises *in the absence* of access-consciousness, the sensory data may not be accessible in relation to 'I'. Paradoxically, such preconscious processes may, however, be experienced — that is, they may give rise to consciousness in the strictly phenomenal sense.

It is largely in an attempt to clarify this somewhat paradoxical picture that the stage-by-stage analysis presented in this paper is directed.

II: Perceptual Processes as Conceived in the Abhidhamma Tradition

> The Supremely enlightened One was the first to know the Abhidhamma. While sitting under the Bodhi-tree He penetrated the Abhidhamma. He became the Buddha . . . (Guenther, no date, p. 3).

With this quotation from the *Atthasalini* of Buddhaghosa (fifth century CE),[6] Guenther conveys the centrality of the Abhidhamma tradition in Buddhist teaching. Whether its origin can be traced as far back as implied here is a moot point. The Abhidhamma ('higher teaching') is a section of the Pali canon which is attributable to scholars of the third and second centuries BCE. In this section I will draw largely on translations of the eleventh-century 'Summary of Abhidhamma' (*Abhidhamma-attha-samgaha*) which faithfully condenses and systematizes the fifth century commentarial tradition. The Abhidhamma presents a complex analysis of the nature of mind and metaphysical processes. We may understand its emphasis as instilling in pupils an introspective discipline through which insight is thought to arise.

Central to Buddhist teaching is its conception of momentariness. The seeming continuity of matter and states of mind masks their real nature — that of chains of moments each of which arises, briefly endures, and decays in succession. In the Abhidhamma this theory of momentariness is applied in detail to perceptual and thought processes, which are thus viewed as comprising many subsidiary stages, most of which would be undetected in the untrained mind. Each moment is characterized by a consciousness which arises, performs a given function, then decays, having generally conditioned the rising of the next moment in the sequence. In a complete perceptual process there are said to be seventeen such moments, grouped into a number of stages. Following the initial disturbance of what has sometimes been translated as the unconscious mind (*bhavanga*), which occupies moments one to three, and a turning towards the sense door stimulated (moment four — 'adverting'), a sensation arises in moment five. In the case of visual perception, for example, this stage would be termed 'seeing'.[7] Such 'seeing' is not what we normally mean by the term, for there is no recognition of the object at this stage. It is characterized by a sense of contact between sense organ and sense object, and might be thought of as a consciousness that arises intimating that a formed entity has stimulated the eye. 'The subject *sees* a certain object, as to the nature of which it does not as yet *know* anything' (Aung, 1972, p. 28, emphasis original).

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[5] This emphasis on self as a defining feature of access-consciousness leads to a different view of access-consciousness from that advanced by Block. It is, however, his general point concerning the distinction between forms of consciousness which is important here, not the precise detail of each form. For a critique of Block in terms of the need to include reference to self, see Harman (1995).

[6] The exact dates of this commentator are not known. It is thought that the fifth century is the most likely date. See Griffiths (1986), p. 145, n. 5.

The next stage in the perceptual process — moment six — is termed 'receiving'. This may be understood as reception by that faculty of mind which, in due course, will discriminate and cognize the sensory input. It is said to be characterized by a simple feeling tone, and may perhaps be best thought of as an initial sense of the 'flavour' conveyed by a given sense object, which at this stage is merely 'agreeable', 'disagreeable' or 'neutral'. 'Receiving' is followed by 'examining' in moment seven. During this stage the function of labelling the object is strong. The nature of the object is assessed but there is as yet no reaction to it. Consciousness at this stage has the 'nature of general inclusion' (Guenther, no date, p. 39), which seems to suggest that it is the various associations to the sense object which are being examined, enabling its nature to be established in the ensuing stage of the process.

The next stage — moment eight — is that of 'establishing', which 'determines the nature of the mind's response to the object which has been identified' (Cousins, 1981, p. 33). As Aung suggests, during this stage the definitive properties of the object are separated from the surroundings in order that the object may finally be fully cognized in the ensuing stage. 'Establishing' is described as the 'gateway' to further cognition since it determines the precise bias which will become dominant in the continuation of the mental process. It is important to realize that at no stage up to and including this one of 'establishing' is the subject 'intelligently aware' (Aung, 1972, p. 29) of the nature and character of the object.

From the moment of 'adverting' to that of 'establishing' the process is viewed as progressing automatically. Progress to the subsequent two stages is, by contrast, not inevitable, which allows for the possibility of so-called 'incomplete' cases, to be discussed below.

The next stage is referred to by the Pali term, *javana*, which means 'running'. The term is evidently intended to convey the more active nature of the mind process engaged at this point. In fact, the *javana* thought-process runs generally for seven moments of consciousness. The previous stage of 'establishing' is said to be characterized by a strong presence of drive. It is within the *javana* phase that this drive becomes consummate. In a useful analogy to the intake of food, 'establishing' is equated to smelling the food whilst *javana* is the act of actually eating the food. *Javana* brings about the individual's conceptualization of the event or stimulus which

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[7] In the present discussion I employ the translations as given by Cousins (1981).

3/14

began the process. 'At this stage . . . the subject interprets the sensory impression, and fully appreciates the objective significance of his experience' (Aung, 1972, p. 29). Javana is viewed as a psychologically important stage, in that an individual's habitual ways of seeing things will become incorporated through its function. Moreover, in mundane circumstances the sense of self as subject of the perception is generated, resulting in what to Buddhism is the 'conceit of "I am" ' (Collins, 1982, p. 242).

The perceptual process becomes completed, according to the Abhidhamma, with two final moments of 'registering'. Cousins points out that the precise meaning of the Pali term used here (*Tadarammana*) is 'having the same object' and that the stage, 'may perhaps be seen as fixing the conscious experience of the *javana* stage in the unconscious mind' (Cousins, 1981, p. 28). Collins suggests that, 'In modern terms, perhaps, one might interpret these two moments as the transition from a perception to the (short-term) memory of it; a transition necessary if the event is to be stored in (long-term) memory' (Collins, 1982, p. 243). The relation of the stages of the perceptual process to memory function will be considered in more detail later.

The function of each stage in the process is illustrated by various extended similes, an example being the following. A man is sleeping under a mango tree, with his head covered (moment one). The wind rustles the branches, causing a mango-fruit to fall, grazing the sleeping man's ear (moments two and three). He is aroused from sleep by the sound (moment four — 'adverting'); removes his head covering and looks (moment five — 'sensing'); picks up the mango (moment six — 'receiving'); examines it by squeezing it (moment seven); and recognizes it as a mango by smelling it (moment eight — 'establishing'). He eats it (moments nine to fifteen — *javana*); and savours the last morsels and the after-taste (moments sixteen and seventeen — 'registering').[8]

In assessing the value for contemporary psychology of the Abhidhamma's conceptualization of the perceptual process, the question of validity arises. Were the stages delineated on the basis of immediate experience, for example? In reflecting on this question we must bear in mind that the duration of the moments discerned in the process was understood to be incredibly short. Billions of such moments are said to arise in the time of one lightning flash, and the whole process 'happens in an infinitesimal part of time' (Narada, 1975, p. 33).[9] Whilst the assumed brevity of these moments supports my attempt to see some relationship between this system and proposed 'moments' in cerebral processing within an act of perception, it nevertheless seems doubtful that such incredible feats of introspection as would be required to experience single moments are achievable. It does not follow, however, that the system lacks validity. I am inclined to think that a subtle blend of introspective experience and philosophical analysis underlies the system as presented here. In other words, it is not necessary to accept that a monk may have detected precisely what happened in the first hundredth of a millisecond following stimulation of the retina

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[8] This simile and its exposition may be found in Aung (1972), p. 30; Collins (1982), p. 243; and Tin (1921), pp. 359–60.

[9] According to Collins (1982), commentators calculate a figure of 1/74,642 second per moment. The earliest sources, however, do not assign specific times and one would perhaps be wise to exercise caution over such figures! Nevertheless, the seeming intention of such writings, namely to indicate that through appropriate mental discipline one may become aware of 'moments' normally below the threshold of awareness, is clearly present throughout the Abhidhamma literature.

— and in each subsequent hundredth of a millisecond — for us to view the analysis as potentially valuable to modern psychological attempts to model the perceptual process. In general, the notion that 'snapshots' of mental processes may be witnessed in meditative states as the mind moves towards total stillness is one which appears to accord with many contemporary meditators' experience. A further important point in this context is made by Rhys Davids in her comment that the moments in the sense door process, especially those of examining, establishing, etc., might be 'indefinitely multiplied' (Rhys Davids, 1914, p. 183) when conditions are such that the perceptual process does not proceed in its normal automatic and rapid fashion. It may be, then, that Abhidhamma teachers arrived at their insights in ways analogous to ourselves when we study neurological cases or normal subjects confronted with reduced or illusory inputs: we extrapolate from the abnormal to the normal. Finally, a certain philosophical validity may be claimed, firstly in terms of the logical necessity of each stage, and, secondly, on the basis of consistency with broader Buddhist analyses of processes of the mind. At the least, then, the Abhidhamma tradition merits consideration by psychologists to the extent that its view of perceptual stages, as delineated above, may prove valuable in generating models and framing testable hypotheses regarding the sequence and nature of microprocesses of perception.[10]

A further feature of the Abhidhamma system seems especially relevant to a major topic of contemporary interest for cognitive neuropsychology, namely the nature of implicit processing. In addition to its description of the complete perceptual process — attributable to what is called a 'very great object', the Abhidhamma considers various possible 'fruitless' or 'incomplete' cases, that is, cases in which the process fails to reach moment seventeen. Three such modifications of the complete process are recognized (figure 1). In the case of a so-called 'great object', the process ends after the *javana* moments with no arising of 'registering'. A 'slight object' reaches the stage of 'establishing', without giving rise to the *javana* mind. And a 'very slight' object generates a disturbance of the *bhavanga* (unconscious) mind but fails to bring about 'adverting' to the sense door stimulated.

Figure 1 proposes some possible correspondences between these various incomplete processes and cases described in the psychological literature. Before exploring such correspondences further, I turn first to an analysis of perceptual and memory processes in relation to contemporary psychological data.

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[10] An important consideration is that of the sequential nature of operations in the Abhidhamma tradition. Certainly many brain processes operate in parallel, and in the model to be presented below I conceptualize several of these Abhidhamma stages as effectively coalescing. Whether the point may be resolved by appeal to the classical Buddhist view that what appears as parallel operations are really sequential switchings at an incredibly fast rate, may be doubtful since recursive and parallel neuronal connections are envisaged. Nevertheless, I would maintain that a sequential view where certain key principles of operation come to the fore in turn is realistic. We may envisage the sequence of stages as effectively emerging from a much more interactive substratum of processes, much like the way in which a weather sequence may emerge from a complex and interactive array of factors.

Interestingly, problems associated with a strict interpretation of sequential causation seem to have been recognized by the teachers of the Yogacara school which began to emerge around the second century CE. By positing a 'store-consciousness' where seeds generated by previous actions can 'mature', these teachers introduced the distinctive idea of a consciousness without specific objects and which is not limited to a given sense- or mind-consciousness. The possibility of 'mutual seeding' was envisaged — a concept not unlike that of parallel processing — whereby a diversity of seemingly unconnected effects may become entrained.

4/14


moments of consciousness in Abhidhamma tradition
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16
17
stages in a complete 'sense door' process ('very great' object)
advert
sense
receive
examine
establish
javana
register
proposed equivalents recognised by psychology
forms of incomplete 'sense door' process ('fruitless' cases)
'great'
'slight'
'very slight'
implicit processing in amnesia
subliminal perception implicit processing under anaesthesia
no testable awareness

Figure 1. Sense door process as described in Abhidhamma, indicating the stages in complete and incomplete cases. Possible equivalents in contemporary psychology are indicated.

III: The 'I'-tag Theory of Memory and Consciousness

As mentioned in the introduction, the nub of the 'I'-tag theory concerns, first, the way in which perceptual processing brings about a relation between 'I' and the relevant sensory data and, secondly, the role played by 'I' in memory. It is proposed that consciousness of the object (i.e. access-consciousness — see introduction) arises when cognitive processing brings about a connection between mental representations of the sensory data and a representation of 'I' (Lancaster, 1991). This stage corresponds to that of *javana* in the system of Abhidhamma.

Many authors have stressed the importance of self in relation to consciousness, perception and memory, and my proposals in this regard are not new.[11] Kihlstrom, for example, cites Ernst Claparède and Pierre Janet in support of his argument that, 'When a link is made between the mental representation of self and the mental representation of some object or event, then the percept, memory or thought enters into consciousness; when this link fails to be made, it does not' (Kihlstrom, 1993, p. 152). Claparède (1995) had concluded from his studies of Korsakoff's patients that the critical failure of memory was an inability to integrate memories with the self. What is distinctive in the 'I'-tag theory is the operational approach adopted to the way in which the sense of 'I' arises and to its involvement in the memory process. Whilst Claparède seems to have viewed the self as a stable and continuous entity, the present approach makes no such assumption, emphasizing instead the arising of 'I' in relation to ongoing processing.

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[11] In a recent review, Bogen well captures the emphasis I am placing on the role of 'I': 'The crucial, central core of the many, various concepts of consciousness includes subjectivity, *the ascription of self or "me-ness" to some percept or affect*' (Bogen, 1995, p. 52; italics added). A similar conception, and one which I consider to approach that argued here in terms of the *tagging* of mental contents with an 'I'-quality, may be found in the thought of Karl Jaspers:

> Self-awareness is present in every psychic event. In the form of 'I think' it accompanies all perceptions, ideas and thoughts. . . . Every psychic manifestation, whether perception, bodily sensation, memory, idea, thought or feeling carries *this particular aspect of 'being mine'* of having an 'I'-quality, of 'personally belonging', of it being one's own doing. (Jaspers, 1963, p. 121; emphasis original).

According to the Abhidhamma, what becomes 'registered' in memory is not simply the item perceived but the whole *javana* reaction. Since, in the case of a non-enlightened individual, the latter is said to include the sense of 'I' (or, more correctly, the conceit of 'I am') it follows that *the 'I' that perceived a given item itself becomes incorporated in the memory trace of that item.*[12] The phrase, 'the "I" that perceived' is used since, in line with the teaching of *anatta*, 'I' is viewed not as a coherent and continuous entity but as a cognitive representation, or *model*, arising in the moment.

Again, the argument that 'I' is a cognitive model has been made by others (Blackmore, 1986; Johnson-Laird, 1983; 1988; Oatley, 1988). What I wish to emphasize is the role this 'I' model plays in the overall organization of the mind. Gazzaniga (1985; 1988a; 1988b) has pointed to evidence suggesting that a module of the left hemisphere, called by him *the interpreter*, monitors the output of other brain systems and generates hypotheses to account for them. In this way the brain maintains a certain consistency and coherence in the individual's mental life. Of course, in reality, the hypotheses may be inaccurate, as in the split-brain cases from which Gazzaniga draws his evidence. As Gazzaniga suggests, much of our conscious lives may be understood as more-or-less illusory manifestations of the interpreter's functioning.

I have proposed that the sense of 'I' arises precisely through this system which Gazzaniga has identified (Lancaster, 1991; 1993b). The hypothesis generated by the interpreter in any moment *is 'I'*. 'I' is constellated as a hypothesized causative focus of mental life. To borrow Dennett's phrase, it is 'the chief fictional character at the center of [our] autobiography' (1992, p. 114). I refer to this output from the interpreter as the *unified 'I'*, since this accords with experience: the individual experiences 'I' as a unified entity which seems to cause actions and receive impressions. The real common ground between Buddhism and contemporary cognitive neuroscience is, of course, the recognition that the mind is not as unified as it seems. The 'I' which — according to the theory presented here — is central to consciousness, not only gives what is merely a superficial appearance of unification to our perceptual lives, but also probably plays no role in the initiation of action (Lancaster, 1991; Velmans, 1991). So what is the role played by the unified 'I'? The answer I propose is that it functions as a critical link for memory functions.

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[12] Although this seems to follow from the Abhidhamma material, it should be stressed that it is not an idea I have encountered in Buddhist texts. I suspect that this is because such texts are essentially directed to the moral perspective, viz. progress towards *Buddhahood*, and not towards elucidating aspects of 'normal' perception and consciousness. This is, I think, an important point to be borne in mind when interrelating psychology and Buddhism. Psychology is generally directed to the norm and draws from the abnormal in order to cast light on the normal; Buddhism is directed to the super-norm and draws on the normal to enhance our understanding of ways towards that super-norm. See also section V below.

5/14

Cognitive models concurrently active are presumed to become encoded in memory in association with one another. If — as proposed above — 'I' is a cognitive model active when the individual is conscious of some object, a pen in the field of vision, for example, then the model of the pen will become encoded in association with the model of 'I'. The model of 'I' becomes, as it were, a tag attaching to the model of the pen — hence the term *'I'-tag*. Assuming a non-pathological case,[13] the unified 'I' will be relatively consistent across successive occasions on which the individual encounters this pen. Therefore the association between the pen model and the 'I' model will become especially strong, as indicated by the term 'tag'.

The 'I'-tag is presumed to function in subsequent recognition and recall. A key dimension of recall or recognition is the sense that the remembered item 'belongs' to one, as it were. As Rosenfield rightly comments, '*Every recollection refers not only to the remembered event or person or object but to the person who is remembering*' (Rosenfield 1995, p. 42, italics original). It is proposed that the 'I'-tag gives rise to this sense of familiarity. Indeed, as memories are activated, their 'I'-tags are presumed to feed in to the operation of the interpreter, such that the unified 'I' will be keyed into personal history — a critical element in the status of 'I' as causative focus in the mind. Not only does the 'I'-tag give rise to this autobiographical sense in relation to recalled or recognized events, it may play a further role in recall. The current unified 'I' may effect connection with the 'I'-tag, thereby bringing the associated memory model into consciousness (Lancaster, 1993a). In these ways, then, 'I'-tags form a necessary dimension of the explicit memory system.

According to the present theory, it is these aspects of memory which have been compromised in amnesiacs displaying implicit memory abilities. The relevant observations have been reviewed by several authors (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Roediger, 1990; Schacter, 1987; Schacter *et al.*, 1988; 1993). In brief, such patients are able to respond at relatively normal levels when tested for priming effects such that conscious — or explicit — recollection or recognition is not required. Various theoretical positions have been advanced to account for this dissociation between implicit and explicit memory. Schacter (1989; 1990) argues that the outputs from modules dedicated to processing specific categories of information (e.g. faces, words, etc.) are normally available to a specialized *conscious awareness system*. In cases such as amnesia, the potential for such interaction has been lost; the specific function has become dissociated from the consciousness system. Other authors argue for different memory systems in the brain as an explanation of the distinction between explicit and implicit effects (for recent review see Schacter & Tulving 1994). Whilst not denying the value of thinking in terms of the modularity and diversity of the brain systems involved, my approach is focused more in questioning the nature of consciousness itself, which is essentially by-passed in these other approaches. I posit that the loss of explicit memory function in amnesiacs is specifically attributable to a fault in the 'registering' (to use the Abhidhamma term) of the unified 'I' which seemingly[14] experienced the to-be-remembered material.

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[13] Cases of multiple personality, repression, etc. could be understood in terms of conflicting 'I' models. Nissen *et al.* (1994) make the interesting point that their studies of interpersonality amnesia in a multiple personality case suggest that accessibility of information across personalities depends on the extent to which personality-specific factors become incorporated in memory representations. Whilst simple material requiring no cognitive elaboration brought about implicit effects in a second personality, more complex material requiring interpretation did not. The authors suggest that the way information is interpreted determines how it is represented in memory, which, in turn, determines what recall strategies will be effective.

An approach that bears comparison with that advanced here has recently been advanced by Moscovitch (1994; 1995). He suggests that the consciousness that accompanies perception and thought becomes itself incorporated into the memory trace. On subsequent recall, this consciousness, which has become 'an intrinsic property of the memory trace' (Moscovitch, 1994, p. 1351), is recovered along with the content-related element of the trace. In amnesiac cases, it is this binding of consciousness into the memory which is lost, thereby compromising explicit memory performance. Implicit functions may be maintained in the absence of this consciousness element.

I believe that the arguments marshalled by Moscovitch in support of his proposal equally support the proposals enunciated here. The phenomenology of memory experience as well as the experimental and clinical details all square well with the 'I'-tag theory. I would argue, however, that a problem remains with the notion that 'consciousness' could be 'an inherent property of the memory trace' (p. 1353). Is this view of consciousness as something that can effectively be 'captured' in a memory trace appropriate? Moscovitch seems more guarded when he suggests that it is the 'information that made the experience conscious' (Moscovitch, 1995, p. 278) or 'the neural elements that mediate the conscious experience' (Moscovitch, 1994, p. 1351) which are integrated into the memory trace. The 'I'-tag theory may be thought of as an extension of Moscovitch's approach since it addresses the way in which perceptions or thoughts become conscious in the first place. According to these proposals, it is not 'consciousness' that is incorporated in the memory trace, but the reference to self, which provides for subsequent re-emergence into consciousness of the relevant material within the ongoing dynamic interaction with perception and thought.[15]

Support for the perspective on memory being argued here may be drawn from recent work on infantile amnesia. Howe and Courage (1993) argue that a critical development in infantile memory occurs around two years of age with the development of the cognitive self. The timing of the development of this cognitive self corresponds to the offset of infantile amnesia and the onset of autobiographical memory. The authors propose that the self-concept, or self-schema, acts as a referent around which personally experienced events become organized in memory. In this way autobiographical memory is dependent on the self reaching a 'critical mass', as they put it. Support for the notion that infantile amnesia for events is attributable to an immature sense of self at the time the events occurred comes from a subsequent study in which children's memories for early traumatic events were assessed (Howe *et al.*, 1994). In the case of children under the age of two at the time of the event's occurrence, later coherent recall was absent, even though various behavioural manifestations indicated that some form of memory was preserved. The authors conclude that children whose sense of self was still emerging could not remember the traumatic event in a conscious, coherent fashion.

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[14] It seems to be the case that 'I' perceive the object (or that 'I' think the thought). However, according to the *anatta* perspective, there is no 'I' as subject of that which is experienced. In terms of the present proposals, the unified 'I' comes into being in relation to the object being experienced, and is registered in memory in association with it. It is not, however, a pre-existent subject of the experience. Claxton (1994; 1996) similarly describes the role of the self-system as being an accretion to direct perception. In a recent discussion, which also brings a psychological perspective to bear on Buddhist thought, he suggests how the self-system imposes a layer of processing which is directed towards consolidating its own goals and expectations (Claxton, 1996).

[15] The 'I'-tag proposals may seem somewhat human-centred. However, as argued in Lancaster (1993b), the system is viewed as an evolutionary development from other mammals in which similar memory tagging is thought to operate. Such 'tags' would embody the animal's representation of self in relation to its environment in whatever terms are employed (e.g. spatial). I have argued (Lancaster, 1991) that the interpreter's function is bound up with language, which implies that the generation of the unified 'I' is presumably unique to humans.

6/14



Figure 2. 'I'-tag model of perception and memory illustrating correspondences with perceptual stages described in Abhidhamma.

I will close this section by returning to a question that was posed above, namely what may be the role of 'I'? It has been explained that 'I' functions to enable a particular kind of access to memory. Without 'I', memory would operate in the implicit fashion we observe in amnesiacs: it would directly influence action contingent on external cues only, with no possibility of mediation. Moscovitch captures the point precisely, but I would wish to substitute 'I' for his use of the term 'consciousness' for reasons already explained:

> Consciousness ['I'] may be necessary to allow us to have memories without acting on them and to retrieve them without the need of an external stimulus cue. In this way, we can think about and manipulate memories until we are ready to act (Moscovitch, 1994, p. 1353).

IV: On the Stages of Perception

Figure 2 presents a possible set of correspondences between the stages of the sense door process as understood in the Abhidhamma and processes envisaged as operating within an act of perception. The overall view adopted here is that perception constitutes a reconstructive process in which preliminary sensory analysis activates related memory models. The process is viewed as highly interactive, such that activated memory models may engender modulation of ongoing sensory analysis, which may in turn lead to activation of alternative memory models. Such interaction is heuristic, being driven by the goal of achieving a 'match' between sensory input and appropriate memories. A subsequent stage of the process involves generation of the unified 'I', as discussed in the previous section. It is envisaged that 'I'-tags associated with the activated memories are particularly instrumental in this stage, thereby ensuring reasonable coherence and continuity between successive constructions of the unified 'I'. In the final stage of the process, the model of the current percept is laid down in memory, with the current unified 'I' becoming its 'I'-tag.

It seems likely that neuronal oscillation plays a role in the interactions between sensory and memory activity as envisaged in this model. Several authors have recently speculated that the extensive reciprocal relations between thalamus and cortex underlie the binding of stimulus-processing elements presumed to be necessary for object identification (For recent reviews see Engel *et al.*, 1992; Gray, 1994; Paré and Llinás, 1995; Newman, 1995). In this scheme, coherence in oscillatory patterns from different elements signal that the elements correspond to related stimulus features. Damasio (1989; 1990) argues that such binding mechanisms are integral with memory readout. The *convergence zone* — to use his term — which signals the presence of a given object, may be activated by appropriate input ensembles (sensory) or may itself re-activate those input assemblies by means of oscillatory synchronisation (memory).

It is proposed here that the Abhidhamma stages from 'sense' to 'establish' correspond to the operation of this oscillatory system. I envisage that under normal conditions the four stages indicated are less sequentially distinct than either the Abhidhamma system or the limitations of a diagram such as figure 2 may suggest. Thus, memory models related to the neuronal input model would be activated (corresponding to the stage of 'examine') at the same time as further modulation of the feature analysis networks might be occurring. These networks themselves are characterized by parallel processing, there being multiple topographic maps in the case of vision, for example. As Bridgeman (1992) notes, the brain seems to be characterized by a kind of 'supermodularity' in which many modules work in parallel on the same sensory input, each responsible for a specific aspect of the information. And, returning to figure 2, achieving a 'match' between memory and input is hardly likely to be a distinct stage: memory models are being accessed and feature analysers are being modulated interactively until coherence ('match') is realized. Moreover, contextual information and expectancies will undoubtedly be critically involved. Accordingly, this first phase of the model is characterized by parallel, as well as interactive, processing. Correspondence with the Abhidhamma system may best be thought of in terms of the relative balance between the different stages in experience. We may envisage circumstances in which one or another of these stages is more pronounced, perhaps under abnormal sensory conditions.

The term *neuronal input model* is intended to imply an information-carrying form of some kind. It may be thought of as the informational output from sensory feature analysis systems. The conception advanced by von der Malsburg (1981) of short-lived neuronal assemblies serving in ongoing information processing, may be appropriate here. Certainly transience is important, as high-speed modulation is envisaged to enable fluidity in the perceptual process. Our understanding of the dynamics of neural systems is an area that has benefited greatly from recent developments in investigative techniques, and co-operation between neurophysiologists and physicists may be expected to clarify the nature of such structures (Hardcastle, 1994; McKenna *et al.*, 1994). For our present purposes it is sufficient to emphasize the *role* of the input model, which is to ensure that the central representational process, hypothesized to depend on thalamo-cortical interactions, is able to incorporate available sensory data.[16]

7/14

The second stage of 'receiving' is conceptualized here as sensory data being received into the memory system. Again, in neurophysiological terms, there may be little distinction between stage one and stage two since as soon as signals are relayed to receiving areas, oscillations involving convergence zones (Damasio, 1989; 1990) will be established. This will be the case especially when — as must be the norm — expectancies lead to the advance sensitization of particular feature analysis patterns. Psychologically, however, the distinction between sensory activity and memory (albeit preconscious as in this discussion) is significant. It is only when memory becomes engaged that sensory activity can, as Wittgenstein emphasized, be meaningful. The fact that the Abhidhamma texts speak of feeling tone (Pali, *vedana*) being pronounced at this stage may be of interest in this connection, for the relation between memory and feeling has often been noted.[17]

The statement attributed to the Buddha that, 'depending on contact arises feeling' and 'what one feels, one perceives' (Kalupahana, 1987, pp. 33–4) indicates the centrality of feeling in this scheme of the Abhidhamma. Such feeling can be pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. In the case of an unenlightened person, only the former two apply and they will become converted to attachment or aversion. Kalupahana points out that the Buddha subtly introduces the notion of agency in the above statement. Of course, for Buddhism, as we have seen, there is no self as agent or subject of perception. However, attachment or aversion represents an unskilful response which accompanies the illusory belief in the centrality of self ('what one feels, one perceives'). I believe that this notion of self arising based on feeling may be cited in support of my arguments for the role of 'I-tags' in memory. As soon as any memory is activated, associated memories will also become active. In figure 2 this is illustrated in the next stage where a simplified network of associations is depicted. As discussed earlier, the 'I-tag' is a key element in these associations, and will become engaged in the *javana* stage later. In this scheme, then, feeling — as a trigger to memory associations—is seen to introduce the role of 'I' into the perceptual process. It is important to note in this context that, despite substantive conceptual content, the key dimension of 'I' is the *feeling* of selfhood (see Lancaster, 1991, chapter 5).[18]

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[16] This formulation echoes that of Llinás and Paré (1991) and Paré and Llinás (1995) who argue that the role of sensory data is to modulate an intrinsically-active central process which gives rise to consciousness.

[17] The relation between feeling tone and memory is evident at the neuroanatomical level from the observation that limbic structures are engaged in both functions. Furthermore, the relation is central to the whole edifice of psychodynamic theory. Perhaps the most graphic depiction of the role of feeling in relation to memory is found in the literary sphere, in particular in Proust's epic *Remembrance of Things Past.*

[18] As Kalupahana indicates, the *feeling* of self was never itself derided in the sayings of the Buddha. The target of his criticism was the way in which a view of permanence of self leads to egoism:

As mentioned already, the many associations triggered by memory activity are conceived in figure 2 as corresponding to the Abhidhamma stage of 'examine'. The act of perceiving a given object, for example a pen as depicted in the figure, surely depends on the 'wheel' of associations to the input. Implicit in my perceiving the pen are the associations of ink, writing, and so on, and of course the sense of 'I' indicating that such objects are ones of which I have prior experience. In Abhidhamma terms, this stage is characterized by the function of *recognition* (Pali, *sanna*):

> In the case of a visual impression, we do not perceive 'cup' but only a particular colour and form. The 'cup' is not a visual impression but a concept . . . experienced by way of the mind rather than the eyes. *Sanna* is said to be of crucial importance in this progression from visual impression to experience of a concept. *Sanna* is said to 'label' visual impressions so that they can be recognized later on. In other words, when we 'see' a cup, memory is also involved; our mind searches through past visual impressions which have been labelled by *sanna* (Rowlands, 1982, p. 45).

To illustrate the operation of *sanna*, Guenther cites the example given in the *Atthasalini* of a young deer seeing a scarecrow and forming the impression of a man. Clearly, the basis of such a perceptual judgement must lie in the nature of associations built up through prior experience.

This sequence of stages is completed when the nature of the object is 'established'. The transition from examining to establishing is usefully illustrated by Buddhaghosa. Some children were playing in the road. A coin hit the hand of one of them, who asked what it was. One child said, 'It is a white thing' ('sense'). Another grasped it firmly together with the dust ('receive'). Another said, 'It's broad and square' ('examine'). Another stated, 'This is a *kahapana*', i.e. the name of the coin ('establish'). In other words, the associative stage I have related to 'examine' gives impressions of the properties of the object, whereas 'establish' generates a definitive, or named, decision as to its nature. It involves 'the arranging of the investigated material in such a manner as to constitute it into a definite object' (Aung, 1972, p. 29). I envisage that the many possibilities thrown up by the examination of associations is limited by reference back to the input model. As Sokolov proposed many years ago in his theory of the orientation response, some kind of matching process operates (Sokolov, 1963). I consider that what becomes established in this stage of the process is that which most directly matches the input model. As stressed above, in view of the dynamic and interactive nature of the neuronal responses, this should not be conceptualized as a normally distinct process. If indeed coherence in oscillations constitutes the brain 'language' for these processes, then 'matching' is achieved simply as a kind of input–output resonance, or 'neuronal humming' to use Llinás and Paré's apt metaphor (Llinás and Paré, 1991).

Both Aung and Rhys Davids use the philosophical term *apperception* in their discussions of the *javana* stage. To some extent, this represents terminology which was fashionable in the early part of this century. It may, however, be less useful as a contemporary translation. I am reminded of James' rejection of the term on the grounds that it 'has carried very different meanings in the history of philosophy' (James, 1950, p. 107). Aung notes that, 'Buddhist writers often, in using the word *javana*, are referring to the active or conative factor . . . in the act of cognition rather than to the intellective side of the process' (Aung 1972, p. 247). In her editorial note on Aung's discussion, Rhys Davids suggests that 'apperception' as used by Leibnitz, implying 'I know that I know', comes close to the intended meaning. The proposals advanced here suggest a mechanism whereby 'I' comes into being *in relation to the perceived object*. As the Buddhist view would have it, 'I' is not a pre-existing entity awaiting — as it were — the opportunity to know the percept; rather it arises as a contextually determined feature in the overall responses ensuing from stimulation of the sense organ.

8/14

In the above-mentioned simile of the coin, the *javana* stage is depicted as the child who named the coin, taking it and giving it to his mother who uses it in some jewellery work. I think the idea of the sensory image becoming incorporated in ongoing cognitive activity fits well with this simile. The *interpreter* indeed constructs an ongoing 'work', namely a narrative which places the individual in meaningful contact with his or her world. This corresponds to the Freudian *secondary process*, which is reality-oriented and primarily verbal. The two poles of this narrative are 'I' and the real world. Sensory analysis becomes incorporated in this narrative only to the extent that it can be accommodated within the interpretative framework which seeks to assign causation to one or the other of these two poles. The translation of *javana* as 'running' well conjures up the normally incessant flow of phenomenal experience which arises through the drive of the interpreter to set an egocentric context on the world. It also relates well to the subjective 'running commentary' of thought which seems to form a central dynamic to this flow of experience.

As indicated in figure 1, there are two incomplete 'sense door' processes which are of interest to psychology, that of the 'great' object which reaches the *javana* stage but does not become registered, and that of the 'slight' object which fails to induce the *javana* moments, the process finishing with 'establish'.

The first of these cases seems to correspond to the amnesiac case. The patient is conscious of material presented; in the terms discussed here, the material is incorporated within the interpreter's generation of the unified 'I'. Registering of the 'I' is, however, problematic, with the result that the 'I'-tagging system is corrupted. It seems reasonable to suppose that the modelling and matching processes occurring prior to the *javana* stage themselves give rise to memory activity. Indeed, at the neuronal-systems level such activity is generally considered as constituting key dimensions of memory processing. This would account for implicit memory function, as evident on later testing. Nevertheless, the absence of an 'I'-tag results in failure of explicit recall. Two factors may be critical here. First, the current 'I' is unable to effect connection with the relevant 'I'-tag (i.e. the unified 'I' which had been generated at the time of perceiving the object). In the normal case, such connection is hypothesized to underlie the object 'popping into' consciousness. Second, even if the memory model were activated through another route (e.g. thinking of the face of the experimenter might activate the memory model of whatever had been presented), the lack of an 'I'-tag means that the activated memory

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The feeling of self occurring in the stream of becoming . . . turns out to be an important element in the affirmation of the relation of dependence . . . that exists between a person, his family, nation, humanity, as well as nature. The solidification of this feeling into a 'pure Ego' can interrupt its extension at any level, confining it exclusively to the neglect of every other. As such it can lead to extreme selfishness, to tribalism, to nationalism or to pure altruism. For the Buddha, the so-called self-feeling is dependently arisen, and is therefore contextual, not absolute (Kalupahana, 1987, p. 40).

9/14

model cannot be incorporated into consciousness as generated by the *interpreter*. The activated model floats — as it were — in a kind of 'selfless cognitive space'.

In the case of the 'slight' object, since there is no *javana* process, there will be no consciousness of the object. That is, according to the hypotheses advanced here, the image will not gain access to the unified 'I'. Again, the modelling and matching processes associated with the earlier stages may be expected to give rise to significant cognitive activity. I believe that cases of subliminal perception and learning under anaesthesia could usefully be conceptualized in such terms. It is worth noting in this context that Schwender *et al.* (1994) have recently demonstrated that only when 40-Hz oscillatory neuronal activity was maintained under anaesthesia did patients display any evidence of implicit learning. The hypothesis suggests itself for further examination that the oscillatory activity is a necessary accompaniment of the first phase of the perceptual process, comprising the Abhidhamma stages from 'sense' to 'establish'. Such a hypothesis might be examined in blindsight cases, for example, where it is likely that two factors are involved in relation to stimuli presented in the blind hemifield: a degradation in processing during this first phase, and the lack of any *javana* stage with consequent absence of consciousness for stimulus features.

These brief suggestions concerning 'incomplete' sense door cases highlight the value of the inter-disciplinary approach. Fresh insights may be gleaned through a kind of *triangulation*; and new hypotheses amenable to scientific investigation present themselves. Further testable predictions based on the 'I'-tag theory may be proposed in terms of compromised recall where the nature of 'I' changes between learning and recall. Anecdotal reports, for example, suggest events peripherally perceived during meditation (which seems to bring about an altered sense of self) are more likely to return to consciousness during a subsequent period of meditation than during the intervening non-meditative state. Parallels with mood-dependent memory effects are of interest in this context. Bower (1994), amongst others, has pointed to the relationship between changed mood state and changed self-image. It might be argued that mood-dependent memory effects are derivative, the primary determinant of memory recall being self-image, or 'I'. Clearly, were an empirical investigation to find changes in mood to have a stronger determinant effect on recall than changes in reported sense of self, the present theory would be challenged. Tentative support for the theory may be claimed from the observation that mood-dependent effects seem to be strongest for *autobiographical* or self-generated memories (Eich, 1995), implying that an 'I'-connection in some form is involved.

V: Soteriological Considerations

The primary difference between the view of perception and memory as depicted in the Abhidhamma and that of cognitive neuroscience lies in the former's soteriological perspective. The Buddhist analysis of mind is concerned with the potential for an individual to overcome the habitual mental reactions intrinsic to a mind which has not been disciplined through meditation. As noted earlier, such habitual reactions become incorporated within the *javana* stage of the perceptual process, which is accordingly the critical phase from the soteriological point of view:[19]

> At the moment of deciding [i.e. 'establishing' as used here], there appears to be a choice or free will. If the object is determined wrongly on the false data as being permanent, of the nature of a self, with attachment or ill-will, then the Impulsion [i.e. *javana*] thoughts will be immoral. If the object is determined correctly as being impermanent, without self, with notions of renunciation, love and kindness, then the thoughts that follow will be moral (Jayasuriya, 1963, p. 43).

In other words, the normal flow of automatic categorizations, thoughts and feelings in the *javana* moments can be changed when the individual becomes sufficiently mindful of the 'establishing' moment: 'If, for instance, one meets an enemy, a thought of hatred will arise almost automatically. A wise and forbearing person might, on the contrary, harbour a thought of love towards him' (Narada, 1975, p. 168). The habitual nature of *javana* reactions arise critically in relation to what Buddhism considers to be a mistaken sense of the permanence of things and especially of one's own self. Thus, Narada goes on to quote the Buddha in this context: 'By self is evil done/By self is one defiled/By self is no evil done/By self is one purified.'

Claxton has recently analysed the role of mindfulness meditation in cognitive terms, suggesting that it functions to retrain attention such that one attends to 'the leading edge of consciousness' (Claxton, 1996). For Claxton, the self system is generally incompatible with such a shift in attention since it proliferates extra — and essentially unproductive — processing of stimuli in terms of personal hopes, fears and conjectures. It bolsters the trailing edge of consciousness, as it were. Buddhist practice both undermines the validity of this self system and re-aligns one's focus of attention to the arrival of sensations or thoughts in conscious awareness prior to additional self-related processing. The Abhidhamma illustrates what exactly disciples may expect to observe as they shift the focus of attention progressively earlier in the perceptual or thought process.

According to the present theory, it is precisely the identification with 'I' at the *javana* stage which Buddhist practice is directed to attenuating. Returning to the terms introduced in the first section of this paper, the meditator shifts from a state in which *access-consciousness* is dominant to one characterized by *phenomenal-consciousness*. The generation of the unified 'I' by the interpreter is postulated here as being the defining feature of access-consciousness. Claxton's concept of shifting attention to the leading edge of consciousness is, I think, clarified by this operational approach. The shift in attention he postulates involves a qualitative change in consciousness and not simply a quantitative change in timing. The goal of mindfulness meditation is to promote phenomenal-consciousness — that is, a profound and uncluttered openness to experience. The emphasis in the Abhidhamma texts, noted earlier, on calling all moments of the sense-door process moments of *consciousness* supports this perspective.

As discussed above, 'I'-tags are critically involved in memory recognition and recall. Whatever may actually be involved in the attainment of Buddhahood, it is unlikely to include the complete erasing of 'I'-tags according to the present approach. For, without this 'I'-tag system, memory abilities would be seriously compromised. With the shift to phenomenal-consciousness, there will be detachment from the unified 'I'. In Buddhist terms, one recognizes that any reference to 'I' is 'mere convention'. My conjecture is that the soteriological orientation is not directed to annulling the role of self as viewed here in relation to memory functions but to broadening the contextual reference of 'I'. In this sense *anatta* may be thought of as a relative concept. It is noteworthy in this context that the Buddha apparently sometimes referred to self and sometimes to no-self. According to Nagarjuna:

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[19] In Buddhist technical language, *javana* thought moments are *kammically* active.

> To him who understands the meaning in the teaching of the Buddha and grasps the truth of derived name [i.e. conditioned personality], He has taught that there is 'I'; but to one who does not understand the meaning in the teachings of the Buddha and does not grasp the truth of the derived name, He has taught, there is no 'I' (Quoted in Ramanan, 1975, p. 105).

It is beyond the scope of the present paper to consider the Buddhist teaching on no-self in detail (for a discussion, see Lancaster, in press). My primary purpose has been to establish the minimal claim that the insights into perceptual stages as conveyed in the Pali canon can be helpful in generating models in cognitive neuroscience. At the same time, as Claxton suggests, an influence in the reverse direction should also be contemplated. Spiritual teachers not blinded by dogma have always been open to the philosophical and 'scientific' insights of their day. In our day cognitive neuroscience may have a particular value in refining spiritual views of mind. Meaningful two-way dialogue is the goal. The model I have presented is, I believe, a product of such dialogue. It is not merely a restatement of Buddhist ideas in neuroscientific terms, nor vice versa, but a genuine attempt to synthesise a new perspective on the subject informed through a consideration of these diverse inputs.

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10|14

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11 | 14

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EATING SOUP WITH CHOPSTICKS: DOGMAS, DIFFICULTIES AND ALTERNATIVES IN THE STUDY OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE[1]

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Abstract: The recently celebrated division into 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness is unfortunate and misleading. Built on functionalist grounds, it carves up the subject matter by declaring that the most elusive parts need a fundamentally and intrinsically different solution. What we have, rather, are 'difficult' problems of conscious experience, but problems that are not difficult *per se*. Their difficulty is relative, among other things, to the kind of solution one is looking for and the tools used to accomplish the task. I argue that the study of conscious experience in our scientific and philosophical tradition is a very difficult problem because it has been addressed with inappropriate tools: with harmful long-lasting and inadequate dogmas that have dogged science for centuries. I describe five of these dogmas, which are: (1) the existence of an objective reality independent of human understanding; (2) the subordination of epistemology to ontology; (3) the restricted view of the objectivist–subjectivist dichotomy; (4) the exclusion of the body from the study of the mind; and (5) the idea of explaining the mind in terms of the neurophysiological processes of individual brains.

I claim that conscious experience is not a transcendental, paranatural, mystic or magic phenomenon. It is tractable and approachable with scientific methods. However, one must look not only for non-reductionist views to approach it, but also for views that avoid the dogmas here described. Conscious experience is a living phenomenon and it has to be understood as such. Accordingly, our understanding of it has to make sense at several levels, from evolution to morphophysiology, from neuroanatomy to language. I put forward an approach to conscious experience which is free of the dogmas that make the study of conscious experience so difficult. This view, called ecological naturalism, is a non-functionalist and non-reductive view that provides an naturalistic account of the mind. It also puts special emphasis on irreducible supra-individual biological (SIB) processes that are essential in the realization of mental phenomena and therefore conscious experience.

Introduction

The special issue of the *Journal of Consciousness Studies* (Volume 2, No. 3, 1995) opens with a distinction between two allegedly different aspects of research into consciousness. We are told that there are the 'easy' problems, which deal with finding neuronal mechanisms and explaining cognitive functions, and the 'hard' problem of how any form of neural activity can give rise to the phenomenal experience of consciousness. According to the keynote paper, the 'easy' problems of consciousness 'are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms' (Chalmers, 1995, p. 200). The author argues that there is a certain clarity in how to approach the 'easy' problems whereas the 'hard problem' seem to resist these they must have found that there was nowhere to go with such an experience, finding no resonance in the established structures of our society, not even in their church if they had one. And as a result they may have turned to the nearest sympathetic ear, jumped into the nearest ditch so to speak, and found themselves in a random fringe group. In such a group they may indeed find an element that is missing in more conventional circles: an acknowledgement of the strong experiential resonances that can come from a journey into the dimension of sense. But it seems usually to degenerate into superstition.

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[1] I owe thanks to Walter Freeman, Eleanor Rosch, David Schultz, Eve Sweetser and Heinz von Foerster for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and to Joseph Goguen, Jonathan Shear, Keith Sutherland and Anthony Freeman for helping me in clarifying my ideas through constructive criticism. I would also like to thank Elizabeth Beringer for discussions and support. I am indebted to the Institute of Cognitive Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, and to CSLI at Stanford University, where I benefited from visiting scholar appointments. This work was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation under a fellowship to the author (No. 8210-033279).

Piet: It would be wonderful if alternatives were available, in which a similar sense of meaning could be offered in more down-to-Earth settings. Individuals who were attracted by the particulars of specific sects could of course still turn to those sects. But the majority of seekers who are now turning to sects out of desperation would have an alternative. They could contact a form of sense in their life, not as something to be obtained, but rather as something to be recognized as being already there: one of the three fundamental aspects of reality.

Bas: Piet, once again we are in danger of capitulating to old terminology or even the old ideas themselves. I feel that you are absolutely right in your sentiments, but think of how they could be pigeonholed and misunderstood if they were assimilated to that vast 'inspirational science' literature on the coffee tables of the world. You know how they sound: in the Middle Ages (ancient Greece, the Enlightenment, or whatever the author touts as the Golden Age) we had a unified world view; we lost it and descended into chaos when science, religious wars, and economic upheavals destroyed that unity of tradition; but now science provides us with a new world view, equally coherent, all-encompassing, and secure — so let the Scientific Middle Ages begin!

Piet: And freedom end! That would just be replacing the tribe's old idols by new ones, because we relish the security of being 'in the grip of a world view' as they say. What we want is liberation-philosophy! The point about alternatives is that they present us with choices, and by that I do not mean the choice to be in a position where there aren't any choices anymore. But we can't run before learning to walk. We have to start somewhere.*

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12/14

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DEATH: THE SKELETON KEY OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES?

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Part I: Consciousness and Death

The role of consciousness in contemporary scientific thought is similar to the role of death in everyday emotional life. It is usually ignored or denied outright, frequently obsessed over, and is sometimes the inspiration for uncharacteristic breaches of common sense.

It is time to state the obvious. The problem of consciousness is deeply interwoven with the problem of death. And yet death is rarely mentioned in relation to consciousness studies. Consciousness is the thing of consequence that dies. Surely this explains a great deal of why there is such an energetic conversation about consciousness, and why passions are so often raised concerning a subject whose basic nature is so elusive and disputed.

The spectrum of attitudes in consciousness studies is strikingly similar to the variety of coping mechanisms for the existence of death.[1] There are those who imagine they already somehow possess more knowledge about it than they have means to achieve. There are those who believe nothing can ever be said about it. And then there are those who seem to wish to deny its existence. It is these latter who interest me the most.

Life would certainly be simpler without consciousness. If consciousness did not exist, much of philosophy would not exist. Daniel Dennett, a philosopher who claims not to be conscious, has already announced the end of ontology, and there have been numerous predictions from like minds that other branches of philosophy are mere stand-ins awaiting more developed science.

So why won't consciousness just go away? What gives consciousness legs is the existence of subjective experience, something persistently elusive and of unclear consequence. Interminable constructions of thought and image have been created by countless generations of people in response to what is nothing more than a perfect point, a thing with no quality and no content. It is a tale out of Borges. A shelf of mathematics books devoted to one numeral alone. A vast museum that displays only one pixel.

There is a popular story about a princess who complains that she cannot sleep comfortably because of a single pea buried under layers of mattresses. That pea is consciousness in the sciences.

To consider consciousness by itself is entirely undemanding. It is a pea. There is nothing to describe. An attempt to account for it in context, however, forces the construction of ever shifting, elaborate adventures of thought.

What a temptation it is to dispose of this erratic data point. That is what any first year student of statistics would be taught to do.

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[1] Certainly the fear of death has been one of the greatest driving forces in the history of thought and in the formation of the character of civilization, and yet it is under-acknowledged. The great book on the subject, *The Denial of Death*, by Ernest Becker (1973), deserves a reconsideration. Even as the psychoanalytic tradition seems to be on the wane, this book holds up remarkably well.

Part II: Is Consciousness Larger Than a Pea?

Denying consciousness outright isn't the only way to attempt to dispose of it. Sometimes consciousness is redefined as something so vast and complex that what was originally thought of as consciousness becomes a stray, inconsequential fragment.

It might indeed seem that subjective experience is much larger than a point, containing oceans of diverse quality and content (such as the qualia). Will it still seem so in a hundred years if neuroscience continues to advance? The contents of an impenetrable black box cannot be perceived as having anything but an indeterminate size, and in the case of our minds that size feels huge. But if we are able to eventually understand the mind with finer- and finer-grained precision, its size will become a known quantity. If and when we understand the brain completely, subjectivity will appear to be infinitely small, nothing more than a point which will not go away.

With a sufficiently advanced neurotechnology, it should presumably be possible to reliably and repeatably construct mental phenomena, such as qualia, in detail by setting values in neurons. This would be an experience confirmable by anyone who plays with the gadgets that accomplish it. 'Brainoramas' would no doubt be the new consumer electronics blockbusters; pure experience machines. These machines would not claim to become conscious themselves, but rather would allow human users a precise technological route to controlling the detailed content of their own subjective experience.

A brainorama would consist of three parts. One would be a hat that contains sensors capable of reading and writing the states of each neuron in your brain at a rapid rate. There would also be a display that shows you what's going on in your brain, and allows you to edit it. Connecting these would be a computer capable of recognizing and synthesizing neural patterns. I won't attempt to guess at what future century might be capable of producing this device.

A lazy customer could be given an adventurous experience or deep wisdom, according to the current fashion. One can predict that the use of these machines might follow the pattern set earlier by psychedelic drugs and music synthesizers. Synthetic experiences that were initially fresh and extreme quickly become banal, as intensity is maximized in all directions until it becomes meaningless. Following that will be the realization that 'there is no free lunch', that the construction of creativity in thought, beauty in creation, or depth in character requires as much or more work in the purely informational world of brainorama as it does in real life.

In the end, however, the nature of these exotic new objectively controlled subjective experiences will still remain a nagging mystery. Why must experience be there at all? How can one prove if it is or isn't there? Nothing will have changed in these questions, except that we'll be able to observe the questions themselves as brain phenomena directly for the first time using brainoramas.

Imagine watching your thoughts on the philosophy of consciousness go by on the screen[2] of a brainorama. Suppose you start to think that maybe consciousness is everywhere, and that is why you can't capture it — and at that moment you see a familiar cloudy squiggle in your cortex, above your ear, similar to the last time you

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[2] The screen is what we are most familiar with in 1997, but make no mistake, any upmarket brainorama will actually have a virtual reality interface, so that you find yourself inside a three dimensional representation of your own brain.

13/14

thought the same thing. The pattern recognizer in the brainorama computer catches it too, and a 'Chalmers' alert starts blinking. Instead of thinking from the inside, you decide to use the stylus to sketch some narrower loops on your Chalmers squiggle and feel what the thoughts are like. Suddenly you don't find consciousness credible anymore, and indeed a 'Dennett' alert is flashing on the screen. But thoughts have a way of springing back to their original form, like memory metals. Other parts of your cortex are automatically alerted into action to repair the damage and soon you see your familiar thought squiggles appear on the screen, just as you find yourself thinking, 'But wait a second, consciousness IS there!'[3] I suspect that trying to track down consciousness[4] with a brainorama will feel like trying to find the butterfly whose wing flutterings are to be the cause of a hurricane on the other side of the world.

As you browse through your brain, you are able to see the full extent of your memory. It is as if, after living your whole life inside a great canyon of unknown dimensions, you are able to climb to a lookout point on the rim for the first time. For a moment you are impressed with the vastness of what you see. But soon an overwhelming sense of the finitude of your own brain appears as a particularly murky and awkward squiggle. A blinker signals that you are beginning to think about death.

Part III: A Very Brief History of Death

The nature of consciousness should reasonably be expected to explain the nature of death. For example, if Penrose is right, then consciousness simply ceases when the microtubules dissipate. If Dennett is right, consciousness wasn't there in the first place, so death isn't such a big deal.

The mysteries of death and consciousness are not the same, though. Death cannot tell us as much about consciousness as consciousness can tell us about death. If we knew that consciousness did not survive death, for example, we still wouldn't know what consciousness was before death.

Consciousness has historically been linked with the idea of the soul, primarily in order to substantiate an afterlife. This was not exclusively among excitable religious types. By Plato's account, Socrates' precise mind found subjective experience axiomatic enough to suggest that it must reside in a realm all of its own, which must be revealed in death. Among the religious, of course, consciousness has generally served as an intuitive confirmation of elaborate articulated fantasies of the hereafter, especially in the West.[5] The difference between the religious and the secular has often been no more than the degree of elaboration and specificity in these fantasies.

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[3] You might wonder how you avoid becoming lost in an infinite regress of watching your thoughts of watching your thoughts. That is simple. The brainorama computer is programmed to filter out this kind of resonant feedback.

[4] Just to be clear, I am talking about the 'hard problem' kind of consciousness. The 'easier' kind of consciousness (that anaesthetists can make go away) is undoubtedly localizable, since it is an empirical phenomenon, and it would seem to be primarily associated with the core areas of the brain rather than with the cortex.

[5] Christianity, a post-platonic religion, was primarily founded not on the exceptional emanations of burning bushes, demons, or other extraordinary objects, but on the reports of people of apparently ordinary form, Jesus and Lazarus, who could confirm the continuity of consciousness after death. (While reports of Jesus' life do contain some other supernatural events, like walking on water, these are surely not as vital to the religion.) In Christianity the physical world became more ordinary and the hereafter more baroque, especially as the religion developed over the centuries.

Alas, the fear of death has been exploited to create empires. For this reason, scientists and political liberalizers have often been allied to combat dogmatic religious authority. The twentieth century saw the rise to prominence of a culture that was in large part a reaction against the arbitrary and sometimes exploitative nature of death-denial fantasies.

The reaction took many forms, such as Marxism and positivism. The doubt in perfect rationality that the existence of subjectivity inspires was driven underground. Life was understood essentially as a form of technology; something entirely empirical and subject to manipulation and eventual perfection. However, this barricade meant to contain human ambiguities and passions has instead turned out to be the new obstacle to the psychological acceptance of death.

Part IV: Death-Denial in the Information Age

In the late twentieth century a bizarre and inverted form of death-denial has been gaining ground. It is the ironic grandchild of an earlier generation of rational thought that sought to quell all such sentimentality. In this new fantasy, technology will conquer death.

In the literature of cryonics and nanotechnology one frequently comes across arguments that we are already within shooting distance of the goal. Nanotechnology might be used to create a supercomputer that will quickly figure out how to make nanomachines that can repair the human body and make old age an anachronism. Or cryonics will preserve our bodies until a happy time in the future when they are expected to be thawed by gentle enthusiasts for antiquity. Or, perhaps most tellingly, the contents of our brains will be read into durable computers, so that our minds will continue after our bodies cease to function.

Consciousness is at best a wildcard, and at worst an outright affront to these fantasies. Subjective experience is undeniably present, for those of us who have it, anyway. (I've proposed elsewhere that some philosophers just don't have it. See Lanier, 1995.) It is the only thing that would be just as real if it were somehow shown to be an illusion or a mistake; if it is there in any way whatsoever, it is fully there, undeposable, the most primary thing. And yet it has no definitive measurable effect on anything else. The coincidence of these two qualities makes it awkward. It is utterly unclear how consciousness 'binds' to the empirical universe.

There is absolutely no way to know what the subjective experience of having one's brain state transferred into a computer, leaving the body to be disposed of, or even of being frozen and thawed, would be. Even if these things were tried, those who hadn't themselves had the experience would only be able to rely on the reportage of the purported survivors who did, and the readouts of their brainoramas. The cold truth is that you have to die to test these ideas.[6] The living are unable to know if technological reductions of consciousness are valid.

We have come to the fundamental problem for the new death-denialists: if consciousness exists, then technological forms of avoiding death are absolutely as uncertain as old fashioned death itself. The 'hard problem' kind of consciousness is the enemy of the new death-denial fantasy, and there is no stronger source of passion than the defence of such a fantasy.

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[6] Note that you do NOT have to die to test a Brainorama, so long as you use it gingerly.

14/14

So consciousness is made to not exist. Here is the engine under the hood of consciousness denial. A literature already exists of the new death-denialists. The theorists are Minsky, Dennett, Hofstadter. The authors of new romantic liturgies are Tipler, Moravec and Drexler.

The tragedy of traditional death-denial based on a religious fantasy is that the fantasy must have specific, yet ultimately arbitrary, content. Therefore it is frequently the case that people find themselves holding mutually exclusive death-denial fantasies. This is why traditional religion is divisive. Christianity and Islam cannot both be true in their most literal sense. This provides a potential ethical advantage for the new death-denialists. If people can agree on one simple tenet, that subjective experience, the pea, does not exist, then they can share in the objective world of empirical confirmation on all the other points that matter. They can agree, for instance, on whether a brain has survived its cryo-, nano-, or cyber-transition into immortality.[7]

Nonetheless, the new and old styles of death-denial are even more in disagreement with each other than any old-styled pair have ever managed to be. The chasm between death-denial fantasies provides a worthwhile approach for understanding some of the most frustrating current events. Is it a coincidence that religious fundamentalism is experiencing a resurgence at just the time that science is starting to touch some of the most intimate aspects of human identity? Today's social conflicts are more likely to be about technologies that challenge our definition of death, such as abortion, than about the distribution of wealth.

Although the consciousness community is obscure in the larger scheme of world events, I believe we are on the front lines of a fundamental conflict. The political and social future will be largely determined by the provisional outcomes of conflicts over what are essentially popularized variants of the hard problem.

While I am certainly not claiming that everyone who is not religious is hoping to have their minds transfered to computer disks, I do think that in the consciousness debate we have the most purified form of a new dialectic formed by two opposing death-denial fantasies. One is traditional, sentimental, hysterical and divisive. The other is bland, mechanical and potentially suicidal. No synthesis has yet appeared, however; in the gap discernible between the two is found only a lonely vacuum requiring the superhuman discipline of permanent irresolution.

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[7] This only provides a potential unity in the understanding of facts — it certainly doesn't suggest any unity of motivation. In fact, the cliché would seem to be that conciousness-free people face a crisis of meaning and lack grounds for motivation in any shared direction.

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15/14

Journal of Consciousness Studies

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VOL. 3, NO. 4, 1996

REFEREED PAPERS: SPECIAL ISSUE — THE 'HARD PROBLEM' (PART 4)

290 There Is No Hard Problem of Consciousness — *Kieron O'Hara & Tom Scutt*
303 Should We Expect to Feel As If We Understand Consciousness? — *Mark C. Price*
313 Turning 'The Hard Problem' Upside Down and Sideways — *Piet Hut & Roger Shepard*
330 Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem — *Francisco J. Varela*

REFEREED PAPERS: STANDARD ISSUE

350 'I' = Awareness — *Arthur J. Deikman*
357 Functionalism's Response to the Problem of Absent Qualia: More Discussion of Zombies — *Valerie Gray Hardcastle*

INTERVIEW

374 The Heraclitus of Modern Science
Emilios Bouratinos in conversation with — *Ilya Prigogine*

BOOK REVIEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

379 **H. Kaplan & B. Sadock (ed.),** *Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry* — *Roger Walsh*
381 **Edward Moss,** ***The Grammar of Consciousness*** — *David W. Salt*
382 Conference Announcements
383 Call for Papers
384 About Authors
385 Email and World Wide Web Services

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'I' = AWARENESS

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Abstract: Introspection reveals that the core of subjectivity — the 'I' — is identical to awareness. This 'I' should be differentiated from the various aspects of the physical person and its mental contents which form the 'self'. Most discussions of consciousness confuse the 'I' and the 'self'. In fact, our experience is fundamentally dualistic — not the dualism of mind and matter — but that of the 'I' and that which is observed. The identity of awareness and the 'I' means that we know awareness by being it, thus solving the problem of the infinite regress of observers. It follows that whatever our ontology of awareness may be, it must also be the same for 'I'.

'I'

We seem to have numerous 'I's. There is the I of 'I want', the I of 'I wrote a letter', the I of 'I am a psychiatrist' or 'I am thinking'. But there is another I that is basic, that underlies desires, activities and physical characteristics. This I is the subjective sense of our existence. It is different from self-image, the body, passions, fears, social category — these are aspects of our person that we usually refer to when we speak of the self, but they do not refer to the core of our conscious being, they are not the origin of our sense of personal existence.

> *Experiment 1:* Stop for a moment and look inside. Try and sense the very origin of your most basic, most personal 'I', your core subjective experience. What is that root of the 'I' feeling? Try to find it.

When you introspect you will find that no matter what the contents of your mind, the most basic 'I' is something different. Every time you try to observe the 'I' it takes a jump back with you, remaining out of sight. At first you may say, 'When I look inside as you suggest, all I find is content of one sort or the other.' I reply, 'Who is looking? Is it not you? If that "I" is a content can you describe it? Can you observe it?' The core 'I' of subjectivity is different from any content because it turns out to be that which witnesses — not that which is observed. The 'I' can be experienced, but it cannot be 'seen'. 'I' is the observer, the experiencer, prior to all conscious content.

In contemporary psychology and philosophy, the 'I' usually is not differentiated from the physical person and its mental contents. The self is seen as a construct and the crucial duality is overlooked. As Susan Blackmore puts it,

> Our sense of self came about through the body image we must construct in order to control behaviour, the vantage point given by our senses and our knowledge of our own abilities — that is the abilities of the body–brain–mind. Then along came language. Language turns the self into a thing and gives it attributes and powers. (Blackmore, 1994)

Dennett comments similarly that what he calls the 'Center of Narrative Gravity' gives us a spurious sense of a unitary self:

> A self, according to my theory, is not any old mathematical point, but an abstraction defined by the myriads of attributions and interpretations (including self-attributions and self-interpretations) that have composed the biography of the living body whose Center of Narrative Gravity it is (Dennett, 1991).

However, when we use introspection to search for the origin of our subjectivity, we find that the search for 'I' leaves the customary aspects of personhood behind and takes us closer and closer to awareness, *per se*. If this process of introspective observation is carried to its conclusion, even the background sense of core subjective self disappears into awareness. Thus, if we proceed phenomenologically, we find that the 'I' is identical to awareness: 'I' = awareness.

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[1] I am indebted to David Galin and Eleanor Rosch for their helpful comments during the development and writing of this manuscript.

Awareness

Awareness is something apart from, and different from, all that of which we are aware: thoughts, emotions, images, sensations, desires and memory. Awareness is the ground in which the mind's contents manifest themselves; they appear in it and disappear once again.

I use the word 'awareness' to mean this ground of all experience. Any attempt to describe it ends in a description of what we are aware *of*. On this basis some argue that awareness *per se* doesn't exist. But careful introspection reveals that the objects of awareness — sensations, thoughts, memories, images and emotions — are constantly changing and superseding each other. In contrast, awareness continues independent of any specific mental contents.

> *Experiment 2:* Look straight ahead. Now shut your eyes. The rich visual world has disappeared to be replaced by an amorphous field of blackness, perhaps with red and yellow tinges. But awareness hasn't changed. You will notice that awareness continues as your thoughts come and go, as memories arise and replace each other, as desires emerge and fantasies develop, change and vanish. Now try and observe awareness. You cannot. Awareness cannot be made an object of observation because it is the very means whereby you can observe.

Awareness may vary in intensity as our total state changes, but it is usually a constant. Awareness cannot itself be observed, it is not an object, not a thing. Indeed, it is featureless, lacking form, texture, colour, spatial dimensions. These characteristics indicate that awareness is of a different nature than the contents of the mind; it goes beyond sensation, emotions, ideation, memory. Awareness is at a different level, it is prior to contents, more fundamental. Awareness has no intrinsic content, no form, no surface characteristics — it is unlike everything else we experience, unlike objects, sensations, emotions, thoughts, or memories.

Thus, experience is dualistic, not the dualism of mind and matter but the dualism of awareness and the contents of awareness. To put it another way, experience consists of the observer and the observed. Our sensations, our images, our thoughts — the mental activity by which we engage and define the physical world — are all part of the observed. In contrast, the observer — the 'I' — is prior to everything else; without it there is no experience of existence. If awareness did not exist in its own right there would be no 'I'. There would be 'me', my personhood, my social and emotional identity — but no 'I', no transparent centre of being.

Confusion of Awareness and Contents

In the very centre of the finite world is the 'I'. It doesn't belong in that world, it is radically different. In saying this, I am not suggesting a solipsistic ontology. The physical world exists for someone else even when I am sleeping. But any ontology that relegates awareness to a secondary or even an emergent status ignores the basic duality of experience. Currently, there are many voices denying the dualistic ontology of awareness and contents. For example, Searle attacks mind–body dualism, regarding consciousness (awareness) as an emergent property of material reality. He likens it to liquidity, a property that emerges from the behaviour of water molecules composed of hydrogen and oxygen — atoms that do not themselves exhibit liquidity. 'Consciousness is not a "stuff", it is a *feature* or *property* of the brain in the sense, for example, that liquidity is a feature of water' (Searle, 1992).[2] But liquidity, understandable as it may be from considerations of molecular attraction, is part of the observed world, similar to it from that ontological perspective. To state that the subjective 'emerges' from the objective is quite a different proposition, about which the physical sciences have nothing to say.

Colin McGinn also insists that there is no duality of mind and matter — all can ultimately be explained in physical terms — but he asserts that the critical process by which a transition occurs from one to the other will never be understood because of our limited intellectual capacity (McGinn, 1991). McGinn believes that the observer/observed duality is apparent rather than real; there is a physical transition from the observed to the observer. But the ontological gap between a thought and a neuron is less than that between the observer and the observed; there is nothing to be compared to the 'I', while thoughts and neurons are linked by their being objects of observation, contents of 'I', sharing some characteristics such as time and locality.[3] Granted that a blow on my head may banish 'I', its relationship to the observed is fundamentally different from anything else we can consider. The best that can be said for the materialist interpretation is that the brain is a necessary condition for 'I'.

Confusion about 'I'

One can read numerous psychology texts and not find any that treat awareness as a phenomenon in its own right, something distinct from the contents of consciousness. Nor do their authors recognize the identity of 'I' and awareness. To the contrary, the phenomenon of awareness is usually confused with one type of content or another. William James made this mistake in his classic, *Principles of Psychology*. When he introspects on the core 'self of all other selves' he ends up equating the core self with 'a feeling of bodily activities . . .' concluding that our experience of the 'I', the subjective self, is really our experience of the body:

> . . . *the body, and the central adjustments* which accompany the act of thinking in the head. *These are the real nucleus of our personal identity*, and it is their actual existence, realized as a solid, present fact, which makes us say 'as sure as I exist' (James, 1950).

To the contrary, I would say that I am sure I exist because my core 'I' is awareness itself, my ground of being. It is that awareness that is the 'self of all other selves'. Bodily feelings are *observed*: 'I' is the observer, not the observed.

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[2] Liquidity may not be the best example of emergence; both hydrogen and oxygen exhibit liquidity at very low temperatures.

[3] For an interesting discussion of this point, see William James' essay, 'Does consciousness exist?' (James, 1922).

17|14

Beginning with behavioural psychology and continuing through our preoccupation with artificial intelligence, parallel distributed processing, and neural networks, the topic of awareness *per se* has received relatively little attention. When the topic does come up, consciousness in the sense of pure awareness is invariably confused with one type of content or the other.

A few contemporary psychiatrists such as Gordon Globus (1980) have been more ready to recognize the special character of the self of awareness, the observing self, but almost all end up mixing awareness with contents. For example, Heinz Kohut developed his Self Psychology based on considering the self to be a superordinate concept, not just a function of the ego. Yet he does not notice that awareness is the primary source of self experience and concludes: 'The self then, quite analogous to the representations of objects, is a content of the mental apparatus' (Kohut, 1971).

We see the same problem arising in philosophy. After Husserl, nearly all modern Western philosophical approaches to the nature of mind and its relation to the body fail to recognize that introspection reveals 'I' to be identical to awareness.[4] Furthermore, most philosophers do not recognize awareness as existing in its own right, different from contents. Owen Flanagan, a philosopher who has written extensively on consciousness, sides with James and speaks of 'the illusion of the mind's "I" ' (Flanagan, 1992). C.O. Evans starts out recognizing the importance of the distinction between the observer and the observed, 'the subjective self', but then retreats to the position that awareness is 'unprojected consciousness', the amorphous experience of background content (Evans, 1970). However, the background is composed of elements to which we can shift attention. It is what Freud called the preconscious. 'I'/awareness has no elements, no features. It is not a matter of a searchlight illuminating one element while the rest is dark — it has to do with the nature of light itself.

In contrast, certain Eastern philosophies based on introspective meditation emphasize the distinction between awareness and contents.[5] Thus, Hindu Samkhya philosophy differentiates *purusa*, the witness self, from everything else, from all the experience constituting the world, whether they be thoughts, images, sensations, emotions or dreams. A classic expression of this view is given by Pantanjali:

> Of the one who has the pure discernment between *sattva*
> (the most subtle aspect of the world of emergence)
> and *purusa* (the nonemergent pure seer)
> there is sovereignty over all and
> knowledge of all. (Chapple, 1990.)

Awareness is considered to exist independent of contents and this 'pure consciousness' is accessible — potentially — to every one. A more contemporary statement of this position is given by Sri Krishna Menon, a twentieth century Yogi:

> He who says that consciousness is never experienced without its object speaks from a superficial level. If he is asked the question 'Are you a conscious being?', he will spontaneously give the answer 'Yes'. This answer springs from the deepmost level. Here he doesn't even silently refer to anything as the object of that consciousness (Menon, 1952).

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[4] Robert Forman is an exception. See Forman (1993).

[5] For discussions of this point and its relationship to philosophical problems see Forman (1990b) and Shear (1990).

In the classical Buddhist literature we find:

> When all lesser things and ideas are transcended and forgotten, and there remains only a perfect state of imagelessness where Tathagata and Tathata are merged into perfect Oneness . . . (Goddard, 1966).[6]

Western mystics also speak of experiencing consciousness without objects. Meister Eckhart declares:

> There is the silent 'middle', for no creature ever entered there and no image, nor has the soul there either activity or understanding, therefore she is not aware there of any image, whether of herself or of any other creature' (Forman, 1990).

Similarly, Saint John of the Cross:

> That inward wisdom is so simple, so general and so spiritual that it has not entered into the understanding enwrapped or clad in any form or image subject to sense' (1953).

The failure of Western psychology to discriminate awareness from contents, and the resulting confusion of 'I' with mental contents, may be due to a cultural limitation: the lack of experience of most Western scientists with Eastern meditation disciplines.[7]

Eastern mystical traditions use meditation practice to experience the difference between mental activities and the self that observes. For example, the celebrated Yogi, Ramana Maharshi, prescribed the exercise of 'Who am I?' to demonstrate that the self that observes is not an object; it does not belong to the domains of thinking, feeling, or action (Osborne, 1954). 'If I lost my arm, I would still exist. Therefore, I am not my arm. If I could not hear, I would still exist. Therefore, I am not my hearing.' And so on, discarding all other aspects of the person until finally, 'I am not this thought,' which could lead to a radically different experience of the 'I'. Similarly, in Buddhist *vipassana* meditation the meditator is instructed to simply note whatever arises, letting it come and go. This heightens the distinction between the flow of thoughts and feelings and that which observes.[8]

Attempts to integrate Eastern and Western psychologies can fall prey to the same confusion of 'I' and contents, even by those who have practised Eastern meditation disciplines. Consider the following passage from *The Embodied Mind*, a text based on experience with mindfulness meditation and correlating Western psychological science with Buddhist psychology.

> . . . in our search for a self . . . we found all the various forms in which we can be aware — awareness of seeing and hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, even awareness of our own thought processes. So the only thing we didn't find was a truly existing self or ego. But notice that we did find experience. Indeed, we entered the very eye of the storm of experience, we just simply could discern there no self, no 'I' (Varela *et al.*, 1991).

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[6] For a detailed account see Daniel Goleman, 'The Buddha on meditation and states of consciousness', in Shapiro and Walsh (1984).

[7] The key activity of modern Western psychotherapy is to enhance the experience of the observing self, discriminating it from the contents of the mind. Indeed, Freud's basic instructions on free association bear a striking resemblance to the instructions for *vipassana* meditation (Deikman, 1982).

[8] In Buddhism, the meditation experience may be given different interpretations. Walpole Rahula is emphatic in saying that Buddha denied that consciousness exists apart from matter and therefore rejected the idea of a permanent or enduring Self or Atman (Rahula, 1959). In contrast, D. T. Suzuki identifies the Self with absolute subjectivity (Suzuki *et al.*, 1960). However, both Vedantic and Buddhist commentators agree on the illusory nature of the self-as-thing.

18|14

But when they say, '. . . *we* just simply could discern there no self, no "I" ', to what does 'we' refer? Who is looking? Who is discerning? Is it not the 'I' of the authors? A classic story adapted from the Vedantic tradition is relevant here:

> A group of travellers forded a river. Afterwards, to make sure everyone had crossed safely, the leader counted the group but omitted himself from the count. Each member did the same and they arrived at the conclusion that one of them was missing. The group then spent many unhappy hours searching the river until, finally, a passerby suggested that each person count their own self, as well. The travellers were overjoyed to find that no one was missing and all proceeded on their way.

Like the travellers, Western psychology often neglects to notice the one that counts. Until it does, its progress will be delayed.

Similarly, discussions of consciousness (awareness) as 'point of view' (Nagel, 1986) or 'perspective' do not go far enough in exploring what the 'first person perspective' really is. In my own case, it is not myself as Arthur Deikman, psychiatrist, six feet tall, brown hair. That particular person has specific opinions, beliefs, and skills all of which are part of his nominal identity, but all of which are observed by his 'I', which stands apart from them. If awareness is a fundamental in the universe — as proposed most recently by Herbert (1994), Goswami (1993) and Chalmers (1995) — then it is 'I' that is fundamental, as well, with all its ontological implications. Arthur Deikman is localized and mortal. But what about his 'I', that light illuminating his world, that essence of his existence? Those studying consciousness, who can see the necessity for according consciousness a different ontological status than the physical, tend not to extend their conclusions to 'I'. Yet, it is the identity 'I' = awareness that makes the study of consciousness so difficult. Güven Güzeldere (1995) asks:

> Why are there such glaring polarities? Why is consciousness characterized as a phenomenon too familiar to require further explanation, *as well as* one that remains typically recalcitrant to systematic investigation, by investigators who work largely within the same paradigm? (Güzeldere, 1995.)

The difficulty to which Güzeldere refers is epitomized by the problem: Who observes the observer? Every time we step back to observe who or what is there doing the observing, we find that the 'I' has jumped back with us. This is the infinite regress of the observer, noted by Gilbert Ryle, often presented as an argument against the observing self being real, an existent. But identifying 'I' with awareness solves the problem of the infinite regress: we know the internal observer not by observing it but *by being it*. At the core, we *are* awareness and therefore do not need to imagine, observe, or perceive it.

Knowing by being that which is known is ontologically different from perceptual knowledge. That is why someone might introspect and not *see* awareness or the 'I', concluding — like the travellers — that it doesn't exist. But thought experiments and intropsective meditation techniques are able to extract the one who is looking from what is seen, restoring the missing centre.

Once we grant the identity of 'I' and awareness we are compelled to extend to the core subjective self whatever ontological propositions seem appropriate for awareness. If awareness is non-local, so is the essential self. If awareness transcends material reality so does the 'I'. If awareness is declared to be non-existent then that same conclusion must apply to the 'I'. No matter what one's ontological bias, recognition that 'I' = awareness has profound implications for our theoretical and personal perspective.

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19|14

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FUNCTIONALISM'S RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF ABSENT QUALIA: MORE DISCUSSION OF ZOMBIES

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Abstract: It seems that we could be physically the same as we are now, only we would lack conscious awareness. If so, then nothing about our physical world is necessary for qualitative experience. However, a proper analysis of psychological functionalism eliminates this problem concerning the possibility of zombies. 'Friends of absent qualia' rely on an overly simple view of what counts as a functional analysis and of the function/structure distinction. The level of thought is not the only level at which one might perform a functional analysis; all that is required for some description of a state to be functional is that it be defined in terms of its causal relations. Insofar as functionalism is not restricted to a higher level of analysis (hence, any causal interaction could conceivably be found in a functional description), then successful theories of consciousness should include whatever it is that makes those states have a qualitative character.

Even though we have very little empirical evidence for any essential properties of qualitative experience, we nonetheless know a great deal about when to assign consciousness to others in virtue of adopting an honest functionalist methodology in the study of consciousness. In what follows, I illustrate how functionalism as it is actually practised in the cognitive sciences (and elsewhere) can shed light on the philosophical problem of absent qualia. (This problem is a version of what Todd Moody (1994) calls the 'zombie problem'.) In particular, after discussing more sophisticated versions of the simple intuitive problem, I argue that for persons or objects functionally identical in the relevant way, absent qualia and zombies are not possible.

I: Imagining Zombies: A First Pass at the Problem

In a nut-shell, the absent qualia problem is the following: It seems that we can imagine a possible world physically identical to this one, but in which our possible-world twins, or 'Döppelgangers', have no qualitative properties attached to any of their mental states. Or, put another way, it seems possible that we could be exactly the same as we are now physically, only that we would be zombies.[1] But if our Döppelgangers (or zombie counterparts) need not be conscious, what are we to make of science's *prima facie* entirely reasonable assumptions of materialism and the corresponding token–token identity of mental states with physical ones? Nothing about our physical world, it seems, is necessary for conscious experience.[2]

But, we should beware linking putative imaginability with metaphysical possibility. Notice that the only way for us to imagine the above scenario successfully is if either we

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[1] Güven Güzeldere calls this version of zombiehood a 'physiological zombie' (Güzeldere, 1995, p. 328). This is the strongest possible definition of what a zombie could be. Below I consider the problem of absent qualia as considered from the perspective of a 'functional-zombie', the type of zombie that I take most people to mean when they talk about the problem of absent qualia or zombies.

[2] In this article, I will be using 'consciousness' as shorthand for 'having qualitative experiences'. Perhaps this is an illegitimate use of the term, since consciousness can be used to refer to so much more. However, I take it that the having of qualia is what is primary and most fundamental about our consciousness. I am also going to assume (also probably illegitimately, though see Hardcastle, 1995, and Hubbard, forthcoming, for discussion) that 'qualia' is a well-worked out scientific term such that we have overcome the difficulties discussed by Dennett (1988).

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20|14

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BUDDHIST MEDITATION AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME

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Abstract: This paper first reviews key Buddhist concepts of time — *anicca* (impermanence), *khanavada* (instantaneous being) and *uji* (being–time) — and then describes the way in which a particular form of Bhuddist meditation, *vipassana*, may be thought to actualize them in human experience. The chief aim of the paper is to present a heuristic model of how *vipassana* meditation, by eroding dispositional tendencies rooted in the body-unconscious alters psychological time, transforming our felt-experience of time from a binding to a liberating force.

Time, the devouring tyrant.[1]
Time, the refreshing river.[2]

'I come as Time, the waster of the peoples,' says Krishna in the *Gita* (chapter 11). And human beings, beholding the disappearance of all things beloved into time's ravenous jaws, scanning the ruin left by its ineluctable march, understandably recoil. Anxiety about time haunts human life. It is one of the forms of suffering for which the Buddha, long ago, hoped to offer a remedy. It is my intention in this paper to offer an heuristic account of how Buddhist mental culture (*bhavana*), as cultivated in the Theravadin tradition and usually referred to as *vipassana* meditation, transforms the human experience of time.

I say 'transforms' rather than 'transcends' because my focus in this paper is the process of liberation rather than its putative end. To be sure, Buddhism, like other wisdom traditions, envisions the possibility of a final and complete transcendence of time: the *nibbana* into which a fully awakened being passes at his or her physical death is supposed to end all temporal process. But I am more concerned to describe the path's proximate, rather than its final, results, more concerned with the transformative possibilities of the work than with the transcendental imponderables of its consummation. This is in large part because the achievement of arhathood, without which final *nibbana* cannot be reached, is by all indications extremely rare.[3] The Buddha himself said that the practice of the way was beneficial in the beginning, beneficial in the middle, and beneficial in the end. If so, then perhaps the rarity of the end provides some justification for our dwelling upon the benefits of the long journey towards it.

In most Buddhist lives, then — and here I am limiting the term 'Buddhist' to those who believe that serious engagement with meditative practice is an indispensable ingredient of the way — the benefit of the path lies not in 'transcending' time but in the establishment of skillful relationship to our all-but-ineluctable temporality. Short of *nibbana*, the aim of Buddhist meditation is not to escape time-consciousness but to enter into it with an indescribable intimacy, and thereby to transmute it from a binding to a liberating force, from a devouring tyrant into a refreshing river.

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[1] Traditional expression.

[2] Attributed to W.H. Auden by Joseph Needham (1943).

[3] Cf. King (1980), p. 118.

A Note on Consciousness

One of the greatest introspective psychologists who ever lived, Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, never attempted to define consciousness. He left unanswered the question of whether 'mind' and 'body' are ontologically distinct, explicitly rejecting it as a question that did not lead to edification (*Majjhima Nikaya*, 63). He hinted that such questions could easily become 'a jungle, a wilderness, a puppet show, a writhing and a fetter' (*Majjhima Nikaya*, 72). His primary aim was not to describe consciousness but to change it, to create within it the optimal conditions for the arising of well-being. For this work a basic, tacit understanding of consciousness as a presumably common human medium functioning as an 'awareness of' seemed to be sufficient. Though the early Buddhist tradition was mightily interested in a *taxonomy* of states-of-consciousness, it avoided an ontology of consciousness, preferring instead an heuristic, general picture of its co-operation with other dimensions of the human organism for the purpose of providing theoretical support for the practical work to be undertaken. Nevertheless, a few assertions can perhaps be ventured so as the place the consciousness-discourse of this paper somewhere on the map of the contemporary consciousness studies.

Buddhist psychology is keen to teach its students to regard themselves not as 'minds' or as 'bodies' but as living processes in which both mental and physical forces mutually and ceaselessly interact. Since talk of a 'self' was likely to obscure this way of seeing things, the Buddha abandoned it and instead urged his followers to look upon themselves as ever-shifting precipitates of five co-conditioning factors (*skandhas*): a physical substrate (body), sensations, perceptions, dispositional tendencies and consciousness.

Both in this key Buddhist formula (five *skandhas*) and in the equally important 'twelve links of dependent arising', consciousness is seen as arising dependently out of a complex of factors. Consequently the phrase 'pure consciousness' is, for this lineage of ideas, an oxymoron. Consciousness is always consciousness *of*, since it is precisely the 'of' that, so to speak, brings consciousness into being. Consciousness, in other words, is seen as *conditioned*; therefore, the Theravadin notion of consciousness is farthest away from the mental monist (idealist) outlook that sees consciousness as somehow ultimate.

However, it is equally clear that consciousness is also a *conditioning* factor, that lines of causation run not only to it but from it, and that therefore neither physical monism (i.e. materialism) nor epiphenominalism can claim the Theravadin Buddhist view as theirs. Indeed, it is remarkable that even in the most analytic and reductive phases of this tradition (the Abhidhamma literature), in which a practitioner might begin to think that the Buddha was after all a materialist, commentators never abandon the practice of analysis in terms of both mental and physical factors as if both, at least at the level of conceptual analysis, were irreducibly real.

Therefore, if the understanding of consciousness tacitly assumed in this paper was forced to align itself with one of the contending theoretical positions in consciousness studies, it would, I believe, take up residence in the camp of dualist interactionism, where both 'mind' and 'matter' (whatever they are) are real and that they causally affect one another.

The later tradition, of course, would not remain content with even this provisional, pragmatic dualism. Some Mahayana schools would assert that consciousness was indeed the ultimate reality; others would suggest that mind and matter were, in the last analysis, complementary manifest modes of an ineffable, unmanifest reality. But these propositions are well beyond the scope of this paper.

21/14

A Buddhist Sense of Time: *Anicca, Khanavada* and *Uji*

The doctrine of impermanence (*anicca*) is fundamental to Buddhist practice. This fact is vividly underscored in the Buddha's dying words: 'All formations are impermanent; work out your liberation with diligence.' As frequently as one finds the ocean's taste salty, one finds upon entering Buddhist practice an emphasis on the law of incessant change. In Theravadin meditative traditions, concentrative attainments are finally at the service of *vipassana* or insight, and insight is always into the three marks of existence — impermanence, conditionality (*anatta*) and unsatisfactoriness (*dukkha*). The three marks are correlative and mutually implicatory. Insight into impermanence — an unspeakably intimate awareness of the temporality of all psychic and somatic events — is often the gateway to more comprehensive insight into the other two marks. The Buddha's doctrine of impermanence is as radical as that of any other thinker, Heraclitus' included. You cannot step in the same river twice not only because it is in the next instant no longer the same river, but also because it is neither the same foot nor the same you. Every cell, every atom, every neuron, every nexus and every part of every nexus: changing, changing, changing.

Over the Buddhist centuries, at least two other notions have grown out of *anicca* and added nuance to it. They are: *khanavada* (Pali: instantaneous being or momentariness), probably an early Buddhist attempt to formalize the doctrine of impermanence but which was speculatively elaborated and over-absolutized by the scholastic Abhidharmists; and, on the other side of the Buddhist world a millennium and a half later, *uji* (Jap: being-time) attributed to the Zen master, Dogen. Despite their geographical and temporal distance from one another the notions of *khanavada* and *uji* are close in their attempt to correct the mind's mistaken tendency to overlook the present moment. Perturbed in the midst of its habitual and ceaseless intentional flow toward the future, the mind tends to devalue the present moment and overlook it as but one more moment in the sequence of causal relations, an effect of past causes and a cause of future effects. Our usual sense of the present is of a single moment within a time stream understood to exist 'out there', a container in which events occur. It is precisely this apprehension which is at the root of the problem for, as David Loy (1988) explains,

> . . . *in order for time to be a container, something must be contained within it: objects. And for objects to be 'in' time, they must themselves be nontemporal — i.e. self-existing* [emphasis his]. In this way a delusive bifurcation occurs between time and 'things' generally as a result of which each gains a spurious reality. The first reified 'object' and the most important thing to be hypostatized as nontemporal is the 'I', the sense of [some aspect of the] self as . . . permanent and unchanging. So the objectification of time is also the subjectification of the self which thus appears only to discover itself in the anxious position of being a nontemporal entity inextricably 'trapped' in time (p. 220).

If we accept Loy's reading, then the notions *khanavada* and *uji* can each be seen as conceptual correctives to the 'delusive bifurcation between things and time' that comes about as a result of ontologizing time as a container. For both the early Buddhist doctrine of *khanavada* and the later Japanese Mahayana notion of *uji* suggest that there are no things, but only 'thingings'. Reality is pure process, pure temporal becoming, and *khanavada* can be seen as anticipations of Whitehead's 'actual occasions', those perpetually perishing throbs of experience which are nevertheless the ultimate facts composing the universe in its creative advance. Events, says Kenneth Inada (1974) speaking from the perspective of *khanavada*, do not flow *in* time, but *as* time.

This is Dogen's point as well in his poetic rendition of *uji* (being-time):

> The time we call Spring blossoms directly as flowers.
> The flowers in turn express the time called Spring.
> This is not existence within time; existence itself is time.[4]

Loy's more prosaic instruction well summarizes the transformed notion of time encouraged alike by *khanavada* and *uji*:

> We normally understand objects such as cups to be 'in' space, which implies that they must have a self-existence distinct from space. However . . . the cup is irremediably spatial. All its parts must have some thickness and without the various spatial relations among the bottom, sides, and handle, the cup would not be a cup . . . [T]he cup is space . . . [it]is what space is doing in that place . . .The same is true for the temporality of the cup. The cup is not a nontemporal, self-existing object that happens to be 'in' time, for its being is irremediably temporal. The point of this is to destroy the thought-constructed dualisms between things and time. . . The being-times we usually reify into objects cannot be said to occur *in* time, for they *are* time (Loy, 1988, pp. 220–1).

This may sound at first as if Loy has used the interdependence of time and objects only to deny the reality of objects, while leaving 'time' reified. But the dialectic cuts both ways. To say that there is only temporal process with no nontemporal 'thing' anywhere to 'suffer' it, is actually equivalent to saying there is no time, no container, no reference for temporal predicates. Just as 'Spring' is not a 'time' when flowers bloom, but flowers-blooming *is* Spring, and just as winter is not a time when flowers die but flowers-dying *is* winter, so too 'birth' and 'death' are not times when I appear or I disappear, but I-appearing-disappearing (i.e. changing) every moment *is* birth and death. Says Loy:

> Because life and death, like Spring and Summer, are not in time, they are in themselves timeless. *If there is no one nontemporal who is born and dies, there is only birth and death* [his emphasis] . . . with no one 'in' them. Alternatively, we may say that there is birth-and-death in every moment with the arising and passing away of every thought and act (p. 222).[5]

This is why Dogen, Loy's mentor on these matters, can say: 'Just understand birth and death is itself *nirvana*. . . Only then can you be free from birth and death.'[6] What *khanavada* and *uji* convey, then, is that I am not 'in' time, but rather, I am time. But this

22/14

also means that I am free from time (in its ordinary sense) because to the degree that I viscerally discover that there is no 'I', I also discover that there is no (separate) 'time'. 'Only when time is understood as a determining container of change,' writes Asian philosophy scholar John Koller, 'is there *dukkha.*' He continues:

> However, when time is understood to be simply a *conceptual* ordering of temporality without real power to originate and terminate becoming, one is free from time and bondage to inevitable death. When one transcends the entrapment of concepts and no longer ontologizes conceptual existence, then the conceptual space of time loses its binding power . . . (Koller, 1974).

To the degree that one could spread this intellectual understanding from the psyche's skin to its marrow (for I assume that the reader agrees that even perfect intellectual comprehension can fail to actually transform the way life feels, as it were, from the insides of one's organism) one would discover a new organismic relation to time. Time, the devouring tyrant, would become time, the refreshing river. But this is as easy to say as it is difficult to do. For this spreading cannot be accomplished by an act of will or by the entertainment of ideas. The latter are all too easily swallowed in the stream of consciousness whose deeper currents are vectored by the predispositional tendencies (in Buddhism: *sankhara*) or aptic structures[7] constituting the unconscious. Therefore, Dogen's admonition — '*Just understand* that birth and death is itself *nirvana*' (i.e. that Arising-Passing is all there is) — is deceptive. For the understanding spoken of here, in order to be effective, must penetrate to the precognitive roots of cognition, to that level of organismic feeling that is the vague but primary ground of all our human knowing.[8] Time is to be not only apprehended differently, but *prehended* differently, and the latter requires nothing less than the deconstruction and reconstitution of the hidden roots of conscious awareness-precisely the aim of Buddhist attentional disciplines.

Buddhist Meditation and Time Consciousness

1. Samatha (concentration) and vipassana (insight)

In his *Buddhist Meditation*, Edward Conze (1975) puts it plainly: 'Meditational practices constitute the very core of the Buddhist approach to life' (p. 11). The presumption that the insight gained from such practices is equally disclosed to intellectual analysis, even of the highly refined and subtle sort, seems to be rejected again and again in Buddhist literature. Buddhism's deepest insights are available to the intellect, and powerfully so, but it is only when those insights are discovered and absorbed by a psyche made especially keen and receptive in meditative discipline, that they begin to find their fullest realization and effectiveness.

The various forms of Buddhist *bhavana* begin with an effort toward sustaining nondiscursive attention so as to establish some stability within the mental flux. This practice is called *samatha* (Pali: concentrative tranquility), and it consists of the attempt to train attention to remain steadfastly aware of a given object for longer and longer intervals. This attempt, like any involved in learning a new art, encounters innumerable frustra-

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[4] Masunaga Reiho, *The Soto Approach to Zen* (Tokyo: Layman Buddhist Society Press, 1958), p. 68. My source for this quote and reference was Loy (1988), p. 221.

[5] Loy's nondual deconstruction of time is one of a number of ways that he cuts through the traditional irreconcilability of the great philosophies of flux and the great philosophies of permanence. A brief sampling of his conclusion:

> *The immutability of the Now is not incompatible with change* . . . So Heraclitus/Buddhism and Parmenides/Vedanta are both right. There is nothing outside the incessant flux, yet there is also something that does not change at all: the standing now. What transcends time (as usually understood) turns out to be time itself. This breathes new life into Plato's definition . . . time is indeed the moving image of eternity, provided that we do not read into this any dualism between the moving image and the immovable eternity. In Buddhist terms, life-and-death are the 'moving image' of nirvana. This paradox is possible because, as with all other instances of subject–object duality, to forget oneself and become one with something is at the same time to realize its emptiness and 'transcend' it (Loy, 1988, pp. 223, 224).

[6] In the *Shoji* fascicle of Dogen's *Shobogenzo*. My source for the quote is Loy (1988), p. 222.

[7] 'Aptic structures' is a term used by (coined by?) Julian Jaynes in his *Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* and it accords well with the notion of *sankhara* or predispositional tendencies spoken of in Buddhism.

[8] What is referred to here is, of course, Whitehead's 'perception in the mode of causal efficacy', a pre-conscious and absolutely primary, albeit vague, mode of perception from which is abstracted the clear and distinct sensory data and thought, (i.e. perception in the mode of presentational immediacy) of conscious awareness.

23/14

tions, but depending on factors such as duration and intensity of practice, personal ripeness, and a conducive context for practice, the mind becomes palpably calmer and clearer. Basic concentration (*samatha*), then, is the *sine qua non* of Buddhist attentional practices. Without it, further steps are impossible. With it, one of two basic deployments are possible.

On the one hand, concentration practice can lead to increasingly profound states of absorption called 'jhana'. Buddhist tradition is ambivalent about this route, however, for though it seems to encourage the cultivation of the *jhanas* and to insist on their profundity, it also dismisses them as nonproductive of liberation. For example, scriptural accounts tell us that the Buddha mastered the highest *jhanas* under his first two meditation teachers, but he found that his virtuoso mastery of these rarified states (wherein time is transcended, though only temporarily) could not produce liberating enlightenment; that is, they could only temporarily mask but could not eliminate the poisons of craving, aversion, and ignorance. Therefore, he abandons them, the scriptures say, 'in disgust'.[9] Robert Gimello (1983) makes the point emphatically:

> . . . the ecstatic and unitive experiences [i.e. *samatha* leading to *jhana*] . . .which are just the experiences usually cited by those who aver the essential identity of Buddhist mysticism with the mysticism of other traditions, are shown to have *no liberative value or cognitive force in themselves* (p. 63).

And the learned Buddhist commentator Sangharakshita adds:

> . . . To get 'stuck' in a superconscious state [*jhana*] — the fate that befalls so many mystics — without understanding the necessity of developing insight, is for Buddhism not a blessing but an unmitigated disaster.[10]

On the other hand, concentration can be deployed precisely toward what Sangharakshita has just called 'developing insight'. This cultivation of insight (Pali: *vipassana-bhavana*) is something rather different from what is usually meant by mystical experience or the cultivation of same, and seems to have little to do with the standard categories of mystical literature like 'transcendence', 'union with the ultimate', 'pure consciousness' and so on. Rather, insight (*vipassana*) is a technique of observation in which one learns to observe, within the framework of one's own body and at a level of subtlety that defies description, the nature of mental and physical phenomena. The aim, simply put, is to see viscerally and directly through a highly refined lens that all phenomena share the three 'marks' of existence. Phenomena are without exception impermanent (*anicca*), and therefore contingent (*anatta)*, and therefore intrinsically unsatisfactory (*dukkha*). Testifying to the difference between the cognitive and the contemplative perception of these marks the Buddha's chief disciple, Sariputra, is reputed to have said: 'Those truths of which before I had only heard, now I dwell *having experienced them directly within the body*, and I observe them with penetrating insight.'[11] It is the testimony of the Buddhist psychological tradition that such insight into the real nature of mind–body phenomena can become so penetrating as to lead to the lasting transformation of character and quality of awareness that Buddhism identifies as liberation and beatitude.

2. *Field notes: an intensive vipassana practice period*

In the realm of Buddhist practice the author is neither an expert nor a beginner. He has logged over 3000 hours on that bed of agony/seat of repose known as the meditation cushion, over half of it during intensive practice periods. Of the latter, his most recent stint was a silent 20-day period in the Spring of 1995.

The first seven days of the practice period are devoted to developing one-pointed concentration (*samatha*) so as to sharpen the probe with which one will investigate in succeeding days the fluxing field of events called 'mind' and 'body'. The concentration-object in this particular tradition is the natural flow of respiration as it makes itself felt on the small area below the nostrils and above the upper lip.

One might well imagine how initially difficult it is to feel, even for a moment, the soft, subtle touch of the incoming and outgoing respiration on this tiny area, let alone sustain one's attention upon this phenomenon for an entire hour, hour after hour, throughout the long meditation day. Nevertheless, the combination of silence and serious effort make this difficult task a possible one. For the meditation day consists of 10–12 hours of absolutely still sitting, complemented by continuing efforts to remain acutely aware of the process of respiration while eating, walking, washing and all other non-sitting activity. This makes for a total of 14–16 hours of intensive practice per day. After four or five days, one finds that one's attention is able to remain fixed on this one area of sensation with little or no distraction for large portions of the one to one-and-a-half hour meditation sessions.

To someone who has never deployed his/her mind and body in this way, the whole process may appear slightly insane. Why would anyone with a healthy body and an active mind want to spend seven insufferably long days doing absolutely nothing but trying to remain steadfastly attentive to the upper-lip sensations occurring from moment to moment as a result of incoming and outgoing respiration? Perhaps the best answer to this question is the sports principle: no pain, no gain. One does not enter new domains of human experience by persisting in one's routines, however salutary. In this case, only in this way can the probe of attention be adequately honed for the deep and delicate work it will do in the remaining thirteen days.

This delicate work is insight (*vipassana*). In line with the ancient *Satipatthana Sutta*, the key scripture for the entire Theravada Buddhist meditation tradition, the practitioner now turns his sharpened attention to one of four fields. They are: mental states; mental objects (i.e. thoughts); [general] bodily states; and [particular, discrete] body sensations. For all intents and purposes, these four fields cover the full, fluxing sensorium of the mind–body phenomenon.

The meditator is not asked to directly observe all four of these fields simultaneously, but usually only one. In any case, any one field deeply investigated will automatically involve at least peripheral awareness of the other three, any one of which can be directly focussed upon as prudence sees fit. In the author's case, the particular field chosen for investigation was the field of body-sensations.

The instruction to the meditator, constant for thirteen days, is as follows: to move one's (now rather refined) attention circumspectly from the top of the head to the tips of the toes, and in reverse, minute body part by minute body part, in observe the sensations occurring at these sites. (The bio-psychic assumption here is that where there are cells there are sensations and therefore that sensations are occurring *everywhere* on the body whether or not one's conscious awareness at any given moment is sharp enough to feel them.) But — and this is crucial — this observing must be done objectively, choicelessly, dispassionately, nonreactively. This is the meaning of the dictum that attention must be 'bare'. Objects are to be attended to without evaluation, judgement, or any kind of cognitive or emotive elaboration or selection. Bare attention is the noninterpretive, nonreactive awareness of one's predominant experience mind–body moment by mind–body moment. So for thirteen more days, amid total silence, one 'sweeps' the body with one's bare attention surveying it for sensations (Pali: *vedana*).

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[9] *Majjhima Nikaya*, I.240 ff. Quoted in Thomas (1927), p. 63.

[10] Sangharakshita (1957/1966), p.172. Sangharakshita's full statement on this issue is worth noting:

> In fact, with the sole exception of neighborhood-concentration, though the various stages of *samadhi* are a means to the development of liberating insight . . . they are even as a means not indispensable. Hence two kinds of disciples are distinguished. There are those who attain the transcendental paths (*ariya-magga*) with 'tranquility' as their vehicle (*samatha-yanika*) and those who, on the other hand, attain them by means of bare insight alone (*suddha-vipassana-yanika*), without having passed through any of the *jhanas* (loc. cit.).

[11] *Samyutta Nikaya*, XLVIII (IV). v. 10 (50), Apana Sutta. My source for the quote and reference is Hart (1982), p. 157. Italics mine.

And what sensations does one experience? One experiences innumerable neutral sensations, innumerable unpleasant sensations (i.e. physical pain), and many pleasant sensations ranging from great bodily ease to intense rapture. One also cannot help but notice the other fields as well and how their phenomena too are impermanent. One sees, for example, that one's general mental state, its overall tone, has been in constant flux. The same holds true of mental sensations, i.e. thoughts, ideas and images. In moments of relative distraction they arise countlessly in the mind, run the gamut of emotional colours and intensities . . . and pass away. But what is the purpose of all this infinitely boring and banal observation? One might think that the purpose is to experience those occasional floods of rapture, or those luminous, egoless states in which Nibbanic peace is tasted. But no. Though such states do occur, they are in the context of insight training of no more intrinsic value than are the unpleasant and painful ones, for *all* sensations, including the mental sensations we call thoughts and indeed all the phenomena of the mind–body sensorium, teach but one thing: impermanence (and the other two marks co-implied by it).[12] Is that all? Yes, but it is enough. Should the reader find this hard to believe, s/he should pause to carefully weigh the following words attributed to the Buddha himself:

> The enlightened one has become *liberated . . . by seeing as they really are the arising and passing away of sensations*, the relishing of them, the danger of them, the release from them [emphasis mine].[13]

Insight, then, consists of (1) direct apprehensions at ever subtler levels of awareness that all phenomena within the fluxing sensorium we call 'mind' and 'body' are without exception impermanent — this cannot be stressed too strongly or too often; and (2) in the corresponding transformation of the aptic structures of the unconscious in proportion to the depth and continuity of that apprehension, a transformation that issues in new forms of behaviour and awareness.

What now remains for us to do is to explain how (2) above may be thought to occur. In other words, how is it that the contemplative perception of impermanence yields, in general, a transformation of the unconscious determinants of consciousness, and specifically, a transformation of the human time-sense?

3. *Attention and the transformation of consciousness*

To understand how attentional practices transform the unconscious roots of awareness, we must first picture to our ourselves how those roots come to be. I have written of this elsewhere (Novak, 1987) at the length it requires but must now be content to present only a brief sketch.

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[12] Impermanence always co-implies the other two 'marks of existence', namely, absence of self-subsistence (*anatta*) and lack of lasting satisfaction (*dukkha*).

[13] *Digha Nikaya*. 1. Brahmajala Sutta. My source for the quote is Hart (1982), p. 148.

24|14

Let us recall that we are creatures of desire who enter the world possessed of what Thomas Aquinas called the *desiderium naturale* or Spinoza the *conatus*: a persistent need to preserve and expand our being. The life activities that spring from this fundamental drive we may call the self-project. Every human being longs to be special, to sense itself as a centre of importance and value. This self-project is more or less easily managed during infancy when one lives in a magical, self-enclosed world in which all one's surroundings are extensions of one's own centre. But quite soon the party is over. The individual begins to collide with real existential limits in a world where s/he is decidedly not the centre, and the agonizing struggle for secure, inviolable self-esteem is set in motion.

In order to fulfil the demands of the self-project the growing child learns that it must defend itself against those thoughts and physical sensations which emphasize its contingency and impotence while playing up those thoughts and experiences (i.e. sensations) that enhance the feeling of secure self-possession. By the time one is old enough even to begin to take an objective view of the project, one is already hopelessly enmeshed in it, with little chance to escape its incessant demands. The self-project unfolds into an egocentric system in which one's beliefs, feelings, experiences, perceptions and behaviours are automatically viewed and assessed around one's sense of worth as an individual.

The assessment process, automatic and barely conscious, is basically simple. Experiences (i.e. mental and physical sensations) are reacted to according to whether they expand or diminish one, affirm or negate one's will to be. The psyche becomes a webwork of likes and dislikes, desires and aversions both gross and subtle, which manifest the personality in the same way that black and white dots can create the illusion of a face. Time and repetition harden parts of the webwork into iron necessity. The psyche has become a set of predispositions and automatic response patterns which largely determine the quality of one's interactions with reality. One is involved in a 'personal construction of reality' in which one automatically (and mostly unconsciously) limits, selects, organizes and interprets experience according to the demands of the self-project.

We are suggesting, then, that in the course of human development, a network of psychological structures is built up by many and complex variations on the themes of affirmation and negation of one's will to be. Our long-term desires, aversions, sore spots, fixations — in other words, our deeply habituated predispositions (Buddhism's *sankhara*) — are crucial components of this network. They function as pathways along which our psychic energy travels and the result in consciousness is the endless associational chatter and spasmodic imaginative-emotive elaborations of experience with which we are familiar. Note that there is nothing wrong with emotions as such. They are natural manifestations of real joy and real pain. But our imaginary elaborations prolong the emotive experience into a spasm or cramp that afflicts our entire reception of and response to the world. At our worst, we move from cramp to cramp. In other words, energy that would otherwise be manifested as the delight of open, receptive and present-centered awareness is inexorably drawn to these structures and there is gobbled — dis-integrated — into the imaginative-emotive cinema and commentaries that suffuse ordinary consciousness. The problem here, contemplative traditions say as if with one voice, is habitual inattention, a form of unawareness that permits the automatized structures of the psyche to function unchecked. The longer this process continues the more deeply chiseled the grooves of psychological habit become. The machinery built up by our psychological past runs by itself, disperses our attention down the lanes of our past or catapults it into the streets of our future, and largely determines our states of mind, indeed the very feeling of what it is to be alive.

We can now understand the psychotransformative import of the attentional practices described earlier. The effort to sustain attention while sitting in a still posture and in a stimulus-poor environment opens the practitioner's awareness to the flood of thoughts and sensations that arise impersonally and autonomously from within. The unconscious *ex-presses* itself as the stream of thoughts and images that interrupt the continuity of attention and as the constant play of sensations on the body. But now, in training, as if for the first time, one does not scratch the itch, or move the pained knee, or think the thoughts, or follow the fantasy. One simply establishes and re-establishes attention and with that attention *observes*, impartially and equanimously, the arising and passing of all these phenomena. In other words, thoughts and sensations continue to arise due to the automatism of deeply embedded psychological structures [what we have been calling predispositional tendencies (*sankhara*) or aptic structures] *but their lure is not taken*. In the posture of bare attention, associational chains responsible for all the chatter in consciousness and our constant abduction into the dead past or the unreal future are now deprived of a chance to chain-react. Similarly, body-sensations to which we had formerly blindly reacted with craving or aversion, are now seen in their ephemerality, and with each such 'seeing' the habit-reaction grows weaker. The more acute and sustained bare attention becomes, the more this trend continues.

The systematic deployment of attention, as for example in the insight practice described in this paper, would thus appear to be able to short-circuit the automated process of imaginative-emotive over-elaboration of experience and to reduce the habit-driven reactions to bodily sensations that are the long-term residue of our self-project. And it is precisely here that we must glimpse the attention's potential to effect deep psychological transformation. Just as Freud compared his investigation of the unconscious to the draining of the Zuider Zee or a vast land reclamation project, we may compare insight-practice (*vipassana-bhavana*) to a similar strategy of 'starvation'. The automatized structures of the unconscious need constant diet of energy. But every moment that available psychic energy is consolidated in bare attention is a moment when these automatized structures cannot reinforce themselves. In the dynamic world of the psyche, there is no stasis: if automatized predispositions do not grow more strongly solidified, they begin to weaken and dissolve. When deprived of the nutriment and stimulation formerly afforded them by our distracted states of mind, these automatized tendencies begin to lose their integrity, begin to disintegrate. Energy formerly bound in emotive spasms, ego defence, fantasy and fear now can appear as the delight of present-centeredness. The deconstruction or de-automatization of old unconscious habit-pathways leads to a new reticulation of those pathways and consequently to the general mode of consciousness constellated by them. By eroding the predispositional tendencies built up over time by the self-project one discovers new modes of receptivity, internal freedom and clarity. The mind acquires the new habit of spending less energy on the imaginative elaboration of desire and anxiety that haunt our being-in-the-world. Ideas, images and emotions still arise in the mind, but one is now less easily caught up in spasmodic reactions to them, less easily yanked into the past or flung into the future by their reverberations or associations. They begin to be experienced in their purity and thus 'leave no tracks' as Zen Buddhists are fond of saying. 'Right Mindfulness,' says the Theravadin scholar Nyanaponika Thera (1973, p. 41), 'recovers for man the lost pearl of his freedom, snatching it from the jaws of dragon Time.' Time still passes and one grows old, experiencing decay. But the fear-and-desire bound organism begins to wake up and to taste his/her primordial freedom, begins to find release into the Present, into the inexhaustible aesthetic richness of the fleeting *now*, that intersection of Time and Eternity where the sacred dwells. 'The crush of time,' says N. P. Jacobson (1986) who has written perceptively on these matters,

25/14

> . . . make[s] a shambles of life's rich qualitative flow (p. 42) . . . Buddhist meditation is a discipline that unravels the ego-dominated life by shifting the center of gravity over to the flow of relatively unstructured quality in the passing *now* (p. 63) . . . The whole thrust of the Buddhist orientation is to open our experience more fully to what Northrop has called 'the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum (p. 40) . . . For those who are able through meditation and analysis to maintain their center of gravity in the passing *now* nature confers upon them one sign that they have succeeded. That sign is joy — celebrating the wonder of being every day alive (p. 86) . . . This is what it means to be free, free to celebrate the aesthetic richness which comes as a gift from beyond the claims of the self (p. 38).

Conclusion

Buddhism tames time, then, not by denying its reality but by radically accepting it. Confronted by the jaws of time, Buddhist practice counsels not a retreat but an advance of the body-mind sensorium into the fundamental reality of temporality, the utter impermanence and momentariness of every mental and physical phenomenon. The experiential penetration of the reality of impermanence, by eroding craving, erodes time as well, changing it ripple by ripple from devouring tide into refreshing river, from a binding to a liberating force. When one knows directly that one is nothing but time, one becomes to varying degrees (in spiritual life everything is a matter of degrees) psychoemotionally free from time. One plunges into time's terrible surf only to emerge riding its wake awakened. As the famous quatrain in the *Jataka* tales has it:

Time consumes all beings
including oneself;
[But] the being who consumes time
Cooks the cooker of beings.[14]

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[14] *Jataka*, ed. V. Fausboll (London, 1895/1907), ii. 260. My source for this was Kalupahana (1974).

Prof. Ui determined that the *Upāyakauśalyahṛdayaśāstra* ascribed to Nāgārjuna is not correct in light of his adeptness in the use of logic and knowledge demonstrated in the *Madhyamakakārikā*, *Vigrahavyāvaraanī*, and so forth, suggesting that it may be attributed to some Ābhidharmika coming after the *Carakasaṃhitā*. I am inclined to agree with Vidyabhusana, however, in that the text in question can be attributed to Nāgārjuna. Logical understanding may require some length of time. In his earlier days Nāgārjuna began to master the science of logic on the basis of the logical system compiled in the Saṃhitā. His innovative dialectical method may have been the product of long, arduous search and contemplation. Although the subject matter is beyond this paper, I refer to the insight of Vidyabhusana as well as A. Kunst,11) such that Buddhist logicians revealed an indisputable, common inclination toward the effort of eliminating verbal elements from the syllogistic formula so as to precipitate the purely logical process of the mind, and, that this began with Nāgārjuna's logical and dialectical insight. The text in question seems to bear a hint of that tendency.

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1) "Toward Chronology of the Madhyamaka School," *Indological and Buddhist Stndies* (2nd ed.), Camberra: 1984, p. 507.

2) Cf. *Nagarjnniana, Stndies in the Wiritings and Philosophy of Nāgārjnna.* Delhi: 1982, p. 17, n. 46; p. 122, n. 149. Vidyabhusana's postulation as A. D. 250–320.

3) *Vaiśeṣika Phiiosophy* (R A Smonoqraph), London: 1918. p. 43.

4) Lamotte's French translation *Ta-chih-tn-lnn*, 1970. introduction, 3rd Vol.

5) *Nāgārjuna, The Philos, of the Middlle Way*, SUNY Press, 1986, p. 7

6) Cf. *Si-yu-ki, Bnddhist Recorck of The Western World*, tr. from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang, Delhi: 1981 (originally London, 1884) vol 2, pp. 302–303.

7) Lamotte: *History of Indian Bnddhism from the Origins to the Śaka Era* tr. by Sara Webb-Boin from French, Louvain, 1988; p. 479.

8) "A New Study of Śaka-Kuṣāṇa Period," *BSOAS.*, XV (1953), 80–97; "The Succession of the Line of Kaniṣka", *ibid.*, XX (1959), 77–88.

9) H. Luders: *List of Brahmī Inscriptions from the Earliest Times abont A. D 400 with the Exception of Those of Aśoka*, Varanasi: 1973: p. 103, No. 994.

10) *Pao-hsirg-chêng-lun* (ch 4): Taisho. vol. 32. No. 1656; p. 502b (16–19).

11) Kunst: "The two Menbered Syllogism," *RO* XV (1939-40), p. 76

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26/14

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Pratītyasamutpāda in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*:

How Many Lifetimes?

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Recently I have been preparing an English translation and analysis of the *pratītyasamutpāda* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*. As Matsuda Kazunobu has pointed out in the introduction to his Japanese translation of this section1), as well as in his article on the *Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra*2), one of the most striking features of Asaṅga's treatment of *pratītyasamutpāda* is his arrangement of the members into four groups, two of which can be assigned to one lifetime and two to the next. This system, known as *liang shih i ch'ung* (両世一重), or two lifetimes/single (causation), is a departure from the orthodox Sarvāstivādin *san shih liang ch'ung* (三世両重), or three lifetimes/twofold (causation), system, in which the members are arranged into three groups, with one group assigned to the past life, one to the present life, and one to the future life.

In my research, I was led to a passage in the Sanskrit edition of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* in which the first ten members of the formula are divided among three lifetimes, while the last two members seem to belong to yet another lifetime. When I consulted the various Chinese translations of the *sūtra*, I discovered that there are two distinct versions of this passage. In this paper I shall trace these versions among the various Chinese and Tibetan translations of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. I also hope to show a doctrinal significance in the variation by examining each version in the context of the two lifetimes/single causation and three lifetimes/twofold causation theories. Although my conclusions, based on such a short excerpt from the text, are largely speculative, I believe that the difference between the two versions reflects developments in Yogācāra thought: the earlier tradition may have been a source for the *pratītyasamutpāda* section of the

Abhidharmasamuccaya, while the later tradition seems to have been influenced by the fully developed two lifetimes/single causation theory

I have looked at ten versions of this passage: 1) Dharmarakṣa's Chinese translation (T. 285, p. 476, c. 3); 2) Kumārajīva's translation (T. 286, p. 515, c. 1-2); 3) Buddhabhadra's translation of *Avataṁsakasūtra* (T. 278, p. 559, c. 1); 4) the root text in Bodhiruci's translation of Vasubandhu's commentary (T. 1522, p. 170, c. 1); 5) the text as quoted within Vasubandhu's comment (see 4); 6) Śikṣānanda's translation of *Avataṁsakasūtra* (T. 279, p. 194, c. 2); 7) Śīladharma's translation (T. 287, p. 553, c. 3); 8) the Tibetan translation (Peking Bka'-'gyur v. 24, p. 264, f. 105a, l. 5-7); 9) the Tibetan translation of Vasubandhu's commentary (Peking Bstan-'gyur, v. 104, p. 104m f. 249a, l. 3—f. 256b, l. 3); 10) the Sanskrit text based on Nepalese manuscripts (Kondō edition, p. 101).

In the case of our section of the *sūtra*, texts 2, 3, 4, and probably 1 agree, and I shall refer to them as the first version. Texts 6-10 essentially agree, and I shall refer to them as the second version. Text 5 contains elements of both versions.

If we compare the two versions, we can find two significant differences. The first version explicitly includes *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa* in the future life, while the second omits them from it. Secondly, the final sentence of the first version states that the twelve members are to be assigned to three consecutive lifetimes, while the last sentence of version two implies that *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa* do not belong to the same life as *tṛṣṇā*, etc., and that, therefore, another lifetime is required to complete the chain. Text 5 resembles the first version in including the sentence *yu shih chien yu san shih chuan* (於是見有三 世轉), while it resembles the second version in omitting *āti* and *jarāmārana* from the future life.

In order to understand the significance of this variation, we must first look at the Sarvāstivādin position as found in *Abhidharmakośa* (see chart). According to this system, the past life is the cause of the resultant aspect of the present life (i. e., from *vijñāna* to *vedanā*). The causal aspect of the present life (*tṛṣṇā*, etc.) produces the future life.3) This system, probably

27/19

the most widely known division of the members, appeals to commonsense, suite the contention of the Sarvāstivādin school that past and future really exist, and is at least superficially simple since it does not disturb the order of the members.

In the Yogācāra system, at least in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, the members are quite differently grouped (see chart). The projecting set and actualizing set belong to one lifetime, while the projected set and acutalized set belong to the next lifetime.4) Although Asanga does not say so explicitly, by looking at the *ASBh*5) and the *Savitarkasavicārabhūmi* of *Yogācārabhūmi*6), probably a major source for Asaṅga, we can understand that this system is based on a theory of seeds (*bīja*): the projecting set "plants" the seeds of the next life, i. e., the projected set, while the actualizing set causes the seeds to realize their potential (i. e., to become the next life itself). This interpretation reflects a theory of causation consistent with the theory of *ālayavijñāna* even though Asaṅga does not mention the term.

Comparing the *DBh* first version with the Sarvāstivādin system, we see that they both refer to three lifetimes and that they include the same members in the past life. However, the *DBh* includes only the members from *vijñāna* through *vedanā* in the present; *tṛṣṇā*, etc., which the Sarvāstivādins consider the present-life causes of the future, the *DBh* assigns to the future life itself.

The *DBh*'s groups of past and present members correspond to the *AS*'s projecting and projected sets of members, with the exception of *vijñāna*. However, the position of *vijñāna* in Yogācāra interpretations of *pratītyasamutpāda* is problematic since *vijñāna* is both causal and resultant. According to the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* (成唯識論), Asanga here takes *vijñāna* to be the *karmabījas* comprising *ālayavijñāna*, while he includes the *bījas* of *vipākavijñāna* in *nāmarūpa*7).

The *DBh*'s inclusion of *tṛṣṇā* through *jarāmaraṇa* in the future life, however, is at odds with the *AS* for the same reasons that it disagrees with the Sarvāstivādins: it violates the principle that causal members should

Sarvastivādin System

Past	*Present*	*Future*
avidyā (Ignorance)	*vijñāna* (Consciousness)	*jāti* (Birth)
saṃskāra (karmic Forces)	*nāmarūpa* (Individual Existence)	*jarāmaraṇa* (Old Age and Death)
	ṣaḍāyatana (Six Senses)	
	sparśa (Contact)	
	vedanā (Feeling)	
	tṛṣṇā (Subconscious Desire)	
	upādāna (Appropriation)	
	bhava (Karmic Existence)	

Daśabhūmikasūtra……First Version

Past	*Present*	*Future*
avidyā	*vijñāna*	*tṛṣṇā*
saṃskāra	*nāmarūpa*	*upādāna*
	ṣaḍāyatana	*bhava*
	sparśa	*jāti*
	vedanā	*jarāmaraṇa*

Daśabhūmikasūtra……Second Version

Past	*Present*	*Furure*	*Asyāḥ pravṛttiḥ*
avidyā	*vijñāna*	*tṛṣṇā*	(*jāti*)
saṃskāra	*nāmarūpa*	*upādāna*	(*jarāmaraṇa*)
	ṣaḍāyatana	*bhava*	
	sparśa		
	vedanā		

Abhidharmasamuccaya

Projecting Set (*Lifetime one*)	*Projected Set* (*Lifetime two*)
avidyā	*nāmarūpa*
saṃskāra	*ṣaḍāyatana*
vijñāna	*sparśa*
	vedanā
Actualizing Set (*Lifetime one*)	*ActualizedSet* (*Lifetime two*)
tṛṣṇā	*jāti*
	jarāmaraṇa

28/14

belong to different lifetimes from their results. In this case, the grouping of the causes of the future life together with the future life itself suggests that this passage represents a not completely systematic treatment of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula.

When we come to the second version, we find that *tṛṣṇā*, etc., are no longer grouped with *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa*, which are not, in fact, mentioned by name, although the phrase *ata ūrdhvam* seems to refer to them. As a result, although the terms "past," "present," and "future" appear, there are actually four groups of members, which correspond to the four groups of the *AS*, again with the exception of *vijñāna*.

Vasubandhu's comments on the second version are particularly interesting in that he points out the relative nature of the three times In his discussion of the members assigned by *DBh* to the future, Vasubandhu does not mention the lifetimes by name; he simply refers to a subsequent existence. He states that *tṛṣṇā*, etc., cause production of a new existence, and he implies that this existence is equivalent to *jāti* and *jāramaraṇa*. In this case, Vasubandhu's comment only makes sense in the context of the second version; if all five belonged to the same lifetime, the causal relationship that Vasubandhu attributes to them would be impossible.

Thus the second version, as interpreted by Vasubandhu, is a step closer to the fully developed Yogācāra two lifetimes/single causation theory. Far more than the first, it can support an interpretation consistent with the two-lifetime theory. Therefore, I suggest that the text of the *DBh* was altered for doctrinal reasons shortly before Vasubandhu wrote his commentary or was rewritten under his influence.

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1) Matsuda Kazunobu, "*Abhidharmasamuccaya* における十二支縁起の解釈" (Interpretation of the Twelvefold Chain of Dependent Origination in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*), *Ōtani Daigaku Shinshū-Sōgō-Kenkyū-jo Kenkyū-jo-kiyō* 1, 1983, pp. 29–30,

2) Matsuda Kazunobu, "分別縁起初勝法門経 (ĀVVS) 一経量部世親の縁起説一" (*Ādi-viśeṣa-vibhāga-sūtra: Theory of pratītya-samutpāda as Presented by Vasubanahu from the Sautrāntika Position), Bukkyō-gaku Seminā (Buddhist Studies Seminar: Kyoto, Ōtani University)36, 1982. pp. 40–70.

3) Poussin, Louis de la Vallée, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, v, XVI, Institut Belge Des Hautes Études Chinoises, Bruxelles, V. II, chapter 3, pp. 60-62.
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〈Key Words〉 *Daśabhūmikasūtra, Abhidharmasamuccaya, Pratītyasamutpāda*

(Part-time Lecturer, Bukkyō Daigaku))

NEW PUBLICATION

A THOUSAND TEACHINGS

THE *Upadeśasāhasrī* of *Śaṅkara*

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

Sengaku Mayeda

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29/14

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Indian Epic Hero Bhīṣma and Buddha

Norio SEKIDO

In the fourth chapter of the SDP, verse number 53 has been appeared the name of Bhīṣma ;

adyo vayaṃ śrāvaka-bhūta nātha
  saṃśrāvaiṣyāmatha cāgra-bodhim/
bodhīya Śabdaṃ ca prakāśayamas
  teno vayaṃ śrāvaka Bhīṣma-kalpāḥ//53//[1]

"Now we are, in real, your disciples, taking the voice of supreme enlightenment, and causing all to listen the word of enlightement, for we are pure disciples like Bhīṣma."

But H. Kern claims "Bhīṣma, the son of Sāntanu, was a great hero and sage, and it is by no means impossible that the word used in the text contains an allusion to that celebrated person, Bhīṣma as an epithet of Śiva"[2], and S. Matsunami follows Kern's opinion that it is no example to compare the virtue of śrāvaka in Buddhist scriptures with Hero Bhīṣma in the MBh which is one of the Sanskrit Epic literature. That is why it is no reason to appear Hero Bhīṣma of the MBh in the Buddhist text.

But we can not deny the scripts of the SDP, as far as reading the sanskrit text, the word of Bhīsma is written. It is not rational to deny the facts. If it were mistakes of campiler at the process of compiling, we have to consider of the meaning of mistakes. Fortunately other evidences are available, there are no word for Bhīṣma in the chinese translations, which are of Dharmarakṣita, Kumārajiva, Jñānagupta and others. Now how about Tibetan translations?

de-bas bdag-cag sgrogs-pa mi-bzad ḥdra

These are also no word for Bhīṣma in Tibetan translation, Beijing, Lhasa, Derge, Conne, Nartan edition. But according to Tibetan translators, the

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"Re-Examining the Period of Nāgārjuna:

Western India, A.D. 50-150"

Shohei ICHIMURA

In a recent examination and attempted search for more precise dates of Nāgārjuna, D. Ruegg wraps up the matter in terms of a consensus that the active life of Nāgārjuna may best placed in A.D. 150-200.[1] This general assumption is not to be accepted without challenge, however. Along with S. Vidyabhusana, Chr. Lintner believes that Nāgārjuna may be placed in close proximity to the times of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*.[2] The earliest dates ever postulated for the times of Nāgārjuna were proposed by Prof. H. Ui as A.D. 113 and 213.[3] In addition to the problem of dates, there has remained unresolved an issue regarding Nāgārjuna's traditional background, specifically as to whether the dialectician who wrote the definitive Madhyamaka treatises was one and the same as to the great commentator of the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstra*. In the prewar Era, É. Lamotte voiced the theory that there might have been two Nāgārjunas, one being of the Ābhidharmika training, with the other being a spearheaded Mahāyāna theoretician.[4] In the post-war era, it was A.K. Warder who, in 1952, first expressed doubt as to whether Nāgārjuna was a Mahāyānist, regarding him rather as an Ābhidharmika. Following in his view, very recently D.J. Kalupahana seems to have amplified the doubt in question.[5] In any case, from the foregoing state of affairs, it is apparent that the dates of Nāgārjuna and his tradition have a need for re-examination.

The purpose of this paper is to present a new hypothesis, challenging the hitherto accepted consensus by proposing that times of Nāgārjuna were as much as half a century prior to Prof. Ui's calculation, placing them at A. D. 50-150. Secondly, in challenge to the tradititional acceptance of Nāgārjuna as a product of South India, this paper proposes that his origination was in the border region between Middle India and the south, and

30/14

that his active life was clearly attuned to the historical, cultural and religious context of Western India during the proposed period.

In substantiating the foregoing hypotheses, I ought initially to refer to a very important but enigmatic passage that appears in Hsüang-tsang's records, *Hsi-yu-chi*, to the effect that Nāgārjuna was a contemporary of Aśvaghoṣa, and was himself renowned in Western India.[6] If one should attempt to approximate the dates of Nāgārjuna in conjunction with two hypotheses, i.e. that he shared a period in his earlier life with Kaniṣka for whom Aśvaghoṣa was one of the confidants, and also that he shared a period of his later life with one or more of the Śātavāhana kings, two fairly persuasive conditions should become demonstrably clear: (1) that there should be some time-span between the period of Kaniṣka's suzerainty and that of the political and military rivalry which took place between the Śātavāhana kings and the Śaka Satraps of Western India, both periods nonetheless falling within the range of the possible human life-span, i.e. 70-100 years of age; (2) that while those two political and military contenders are found in the epigraphical records in Western India, especially in those rock-cut temples of the Śaka-Pahlava period, if Nāgārjuna happened to be associated with a Śātavāhana king, Gautamīputra Śātakaṇi (ca A.D. 100-130) or his successor Vāsiṣṭhīputra Pulumāyi (130-159) and wrote the *Suhṛllekha* for either Śātavāhana king, it is indeed possible to hypothesize that Nāgārjuna may also have associated with the great Satrap of Ujjayinī, Rūdradāman (A.D. 130-155), and may have written for him an exhortation on Buddhist doctrines and the principles of governance, the *Ratnāvalī*.

I am of the opinion that the very conception, hitherto taken for granted, of linking Nāgārjuna with South India on account of his association with a Śātavāhana king ought to be changed. Nāgārjuna's native land, as explicated by Hsüan-tsang as well as in the Tibetan tradition, was Vidarbha (Vedalī in *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*), a place located in the border-region between Middle India and the south, i. e. the area irrigated by the river Tāpti, 120 miles south from Ujjayinī and 200 miles northeast of Bombay. Likewise, Southern Kauśala, capital city of the Śātavāhana kings, was only a little south of the border-region identified as ancient Pratiṣṭhāna and present day Paithan on the upper Godāvalī, which the *Geography of Ptolemy* also notes as Baithana (VII, 1, 82), designating it as the royal town of Siriptolemaius (i.e. Śrī Pulumāyi).[7] The locality is only 150 miles east of Bombay. Indeed, it was West India which was the arena of military contests between the Śaka Satraps and the Śātavāhana kings and also the arena of encounter-cum-fusion between the Śaka-Pahlava and Brāhmaṇic cultures.

Since the determination of Nāgārjuna's dates has hitherto been influenced by the dates of Kaniṣka, the period of the latter ought reasonably to be placed in the latter half of the first century in order to coincide with the beginning of the Śaka Era, A.D. 78. On this matter, I refer to A. Basham's most persuasive demonstration in his two related articles.[8] He strongly asserts that the period of Kaniṣka and that of Rudradāman cannot be considered contemporaneous, because both were characters of such high caliber that peaceful co-existence would have been well nigh impossible, and that Kaniṣka's political and military accomplishment ought to be identified with the beginning of the Śaka Era, because Rudradāman's Sanskrit panegyric found in Girnar, Kāthiāwār, the locality known to us for Aśoka's inscription, was identified to have been carved in A.D. 150 in reference to the Śaka Era 72 (or A.D. 150). According to Basham, therefore, the two other datings, A.D. 128 by S. Konow and A.D. 144 by R. Ghirshman cannot be supported, partly for the above reason, and partly because the only occurrence of the Roman title "Caesar" in India, as adopted by Kaniṣka II in Śaka Era 41 (i.e. A.D. 119) in Ara inscription, can only be meaningfully understood in reference to the Romans' victorious conquest over Parthia and so forth under Trajan, which took place in the years of A.D. 113–117.

The dates of Rudradāman as the mid-2nd century A.D. cannot be moved, not only because the Śātavāhana king Vāsiṣṭhīputra Pulumāyi (130–159) is recorded in the *Geography of Ptolemy* (VII, 1, 82) as a king Ptolemaius, ruler of the Deccan in the middle 2nd century A.D., but also because his queen was Rudradāman's daughter.[9] Gautamiputra Śātakarṇi is known to have been a great conqueror, of the Brahmaṇic culture, asserting the social

31\19

system of Varṇas, conducting the rite of Aśvameda, and his early panegyric does not reflect a Buddhist affiliation at all. In the course of military conflict between the Śaka Satraps and this Śātavāhana king over the coastal region, Rudradāman of Ujjayinī made peace with him through a matrimonial alliance by sending his daughter to be the queen to his successor Vāsiṣṭhīputra Pulumāyi, whereas the other Śaka ruler Nahapāna, of the House of Kṣaharāta, in the regions of Mahārāṣṭra and Saurāṣṭra was destroyed by the same king, Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi, in A.D. 124. It was only after this time that Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi's Prākrit inscriptions began to appear in the Buddhist rock-cut temples, recording donations, etc.

If Rudradāman of Ujjayinī, great Śaka Satrap, was indeed the ruler for whom Nāgārjuna wrote the *Ratnāvalī*, then the active times of Nāgārjuna may be identified once and for all, in conjunction with the presence of the Śātavāhana kings, to have been in the first half of the 2nd century in the region of Western India. Rudradāman, however, left no words describing himself as a supporter of Buddhism, perhaps due to the fact that the House of Caṣṭana had been of the Jaina tradition for generations; it is noteworthy that he remained silent about his religious affiliation, including the Jaina. A Sanskrit inscription found in one of the Kāṇheri rock-cut temples [north of Bombay (Lüders, No. 994)], however, implicates Rudradāman's daughter, queen of Vāsiṣṭhīputra Śātakarṇi, as a supporter of the Buddhist community. Despite the fact that the House of Śātavāhana relied on Prākrit for all inscriptions, the queen's record in Sanskrit reflects upon the probable cultural background of Rudradāman's household.

Having determined the times of the two Śātavāhana kings and the great Satrap of Ujjayinī as having been in the mid-2nd century based upon Ptolemy's text, and accepting Basham's theory that Kaniṣka's rule began in A.D. 78, we have a satisfactory chronology for an individual living through those seven or eight decades. The problem still remains two-fold: (1) Why should the earlier life of Nāgārjuna be assumed as contemporaneous with Kaniṣka, the Buddhist poet Aśvaghoṣa, and Caraka, compiler of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*? (2) How might it be substantiated that Nāgārjuna associated with the Śātavāhana kings as well as the Śaka Satrap Rudradāman, recipients of the *Suhṛllekha* and the *Ratnāvalī*, respectively?

Starting with the second question, I ought to point to the doctrinal differences which the respective texts bear in content, and hence the different types of personalities to whom these texts were addressed. According to its content, the *Suhṛllekha* is addressed to a person befitting to the Hīnayāna (Śrāvakayāna) orientation, whereas the *Ratnāvalī* is addressed to a person befitting to the Mahāyāna (Bodhisattvayāna) orientation. Doctrinally, the *Suhṛllekha* can hardly be said to comprise Mahāyāna philosophy, nor even Ābhidharmika philosophy. The contents are anything but abstract or intellectual, being rather very concrete with realistic depictions of the temporary and impermanent nature of life. The doctrines of Skandha, non-self, twelve chains of causation, four noble truths, and eight noble paths are all there, but far more elaborate are the descriptions of the fateful Saṃsāric cycles of life. In striking contrast, all this description is totally absent in the *Ratnāvalī*, and such discussion is replaced by the depiction of the ideal monarch imbued with the quality of the path-finder of Mahāyāna Buddhism and with that of the mythological Cakravartin. Instead of promoting an awareness of Saṃsāric vision as a crucial moment of conversion, the *Ratnāvalī* fosters the insight of Śūnyatā as a crucial moment of conversion. This is the hallmark of the *Ratnāvalī*.

The Girnar inscription, a panegyric of Rudradāman himself (Lüders, 965), carved in Sanskrit on the famous rock of Junāgaḍha, refers to his victorious battles against the Śātavāhana, saying that he twice defeated Śātakarṇi (his son-in-law Śrī Pulumāyi), but on account of the closeness of their relationship, he did not destroy him. The main pupose of his panegyric, however, was to record his deed in restoring Lake Sudarśana, located in Girinagara, bearing the cost of the project from his own treasury. The lake was originally constructed at the time of Candragupta of the Maurya as part of an irrigation system, and was subsequently adorned with conduits by the Yavana (Greek) king, Tuṣāspha, for Aśoka of the Maurya, although it was then destroyed by a flood. As Lamotte puts it, the panegyric is an

32/14

excellent product from the point of view of "the amplitude of its phrasing, the length of its compounds and its figures of style, attaining the level of a kāvya, a literary composition of a learned nature." (*ibid.*, p.583) Only to such a learned scholar and magnanimous ruler could *Ratnāvalī's* analogy of grammatical science have been meaningful as an explication of the importance of Mahāyāna doctrine over that of Hīnayāna.[10] Pāṇini's system of grammar ought to be learned, beginning with the lists of verbal roots (*dhātupāṭha*) and nominal bases (*gaṇapāṭha*), followed by the rules of grammar (*pratyāhārasūtras*), In parallel with this Vajyākaraṇa curriculum, the *Ratnāvalī* depicts the Mahāyāna body of teachings as comprising Hīnayāna teachings within itself as preliminary subjects of study; the latter, not, however, comprising the former. This kind of analogy would certainly not be applied to the Śātavāhana kings who adhered to the use of Prākrit.

The proposed hypothesis, i.e. to correlate the contents of the *Ratnāvalī* and *Suhṛllekha* respectively with the personality of Rudradāman and that of a Śātavāhana king, is a bold attempt. But insofar as the contents of the two texts bear neither outright contradiction between them, nor comprise any of the post-Nāgārjuna doctrines, there should be no serious obstacle to regarding both texts as having been written by Nāgārjuna. The Buddhist Saṅgha in Western India during the Śaka-Pahlava period stood in a somewhat precarious position, situated between the two powerful political contenders. The period was complex. It was a time of confrontation between the Śaka-Pahlava culture imbued with Buddhist religion and the Brahmaṇic culture which had undergone the process of revitalization through the Epic period. According to Vidyabhusana, the region of Vidarbha was the Brāhmaṇic center of culture; it was there that the Purāṇa and Sūtra literatures were compiled, and the pre-Classical *Nyāyasūtra* assembled, as were the other pre-Classical Hindu philosophical texts, It was a difficult time for the Buddhist world in different ways from that of the post-Mauryan dark-age. In this context, a Buddhist theoretician, trained as sn Abhidhamist and faithful to that system of thought, nonetheless gradually developed a new innovative method of propagation through Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Prof. Ui determined that the *Upāyakauśalyahṛdayaśāstra* ascribed to Nāgārjuna is not correct in light of his adeptness in the use of logic and knowledge demonstrated in the *Madhyamakakārika*, *Vigrahavyāvaraant*, and so forth, suggesting that it may be attributed to some Ābhidharmika coming after the *Carakasaṃhitā*. I am inclined to agree with Vidyabhusana, however, in that the text in question can be attributed to Nāgārjuna. Logical understanding may require some length of time. In his earlier days Nāgārjuna began to master the science of logic on the basis of the logical system compiled in the Saṃhitā. His innovative dialectical method may have been the product of long, arduous search and contemplation. Although the subject matter is beyond this paper, I refer to the insight of Vidyabhusana as well as A. Kunst,11) such that Buddhist logicians revealed an indisputable, common inclination toward the effort of eliminating verbal elements from the syllogistic formula so as to precipitate the purely logical process of the mind, and, that this began with Nāgārjuna's logical and dialectical insight. The text in question seems to bear a hint of that tendency.

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1) "Toward Chronology of the Madhyamaka School," *Indological and Buddhist Stndies* (2nd ed.), Camberra: 1984, p. 507.
2) Cf. *Nagarjnniana*, *Stndies in the Wiritings and Philosophy of Nāgārjnna*. Delhi: 1982, p. 17, n. 46; p. 122, n. 149. Vidyabhusana's postulation as A. D. 250–320.
3) *Vaiśeṣika Phiiosophy* (R A Smonoqraph), London: 1918. p. 43.
4) Lamotte's French translation *Ta-chih-tn-lnn*, 1970. introduction, 3rd Vol.
5) *Nāgārjuna, The Philos. of the Middlle Way*, SUNY Press, 1986, p. 7
6) Cf. *Si-yu-ki, Bnddhist Recorck of The Western World*, tr. from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang, Delhi: 1981 (originally London, 1884) vol 2, pp. 302–303.
7) Lamotte: *History of Indian Bnddhism from the Origins to the Śaka Era* tr. by Sara Webb-Boin from French, Louvain, 1988; p. 479.
8) "A New Study of Śaka-Kuṣāṇa Period," *BSOAS.*, XV (1953), 80–97; "The Succession of the Line of Kaniṣka", *ibid.*, XX (1959), 77–88.
9) H. Luders: *List of Brahmī Inscriptions from the Earliest Times abont A. D 400 with the Exception of Those of Aśoka*, Varanasi: 1973: p. 103, No. 994.
10) *Pao-hsirg-chêng-lun* (ch 4): Taisho. vol. 32. No. 1656; p. 502b (16–19).
11) Kunst: "The two Menbered Syllogism," *RO* XV (1939–40), p. 76

<Key Words> Nāgārjuna's Period, A. D. 50–150, West India

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33/14

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Pratītyasamutpāda in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*:
How Many Lifetimes?

Robert KRITZER

Recently I have been preparing an English translation and analysis of the *pratītyasamutpāda* section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*. As Matsuda Kazunobu has pointed out in the introduction to his Japanese translation of this section1), as well as in his article on the *Ādiviśeṣavibhāgasūtra*2, one of the most striking features of Asaṅga's treatment of *pratītyasamutpāda* is his arrangement of the members into four groups, two of which can be assigned to one lifetime and two to the next. This system, known as *liang shih i ch'ung* (両世一重), or two lifetimes/single (causation), is a departure from the orthodox Sarvāstivādin *san shih liang ch'ung* (三世両重), or three lifetimes/twofold (causation), system, in which the members are arranged into three groups, with one group assigned to the past life, one to the present life, and one to the future life.

In my research, I was led to a passage in the Sanskrit edition of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* in which the first ten members of the formula are divided among three lifetimes, while the last two members seem to belong to yet another lifetime. When I consulted the various Chinese translations of the *sūtra*, I discovered that there are two distinct versions of this passage. In this paper I shall trace these versions among the various Chinese and Tibetan translations of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. I also hope to show a doctrinal significance in the variation by examining each version in the context of the two lifetimes/single causation and three lifetimes/twofold causation theories. Although my conclusions, based on such a short excerpt from the text, are largely speculative, I believe that the difference between the two versions reflects developments in Yogācāra thought: the earlier tradition may have been a source for the *pratītyasamutpāda* section of the their mind spoke truths, having grown through the third formulation, with the fourth [formulation] they thought out the name of the milch cow." (As Thieme explains, the name of the milch cow is the mystic expression for the poetic formulation of sacred truth.)

5) 2 : 2 : 9bc *dhíṣ pīpāya... dúhānā dhenúḥ...*
4 : 41 : 5ab *índrā yuvám varuṇā bhūtám asyā́ dhiyáḥ pretā́rā vṛṣabhéva dhenóḥ!*
10 : 64 : 12a-c *yā́ṃ me dhíyam... ádadāta... tā́ṃ pīpayata páyaseva dhenúm*

6) For the "large cow" (*mahī́ gáuḥ*) in 4 : 41 : 5d, 10 : 74 : 4c, and 10 : 101 : 9 as *dhī́*, see Renou, *Études védiques et pāṇinéennes*, vol. 1, p. 10 ; Karl Friedrich Geldner, *Der Rigveda aus dem Sanskrit ins Deutsche übersetzt*, vol. 3 (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 316, note on 10:101:9; Wolfgang P. Schmid, "Die Kuh auf der Weide" (in *Indogermanische Forschungen : Zeitschrift für Indogermanistik und allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft*, vol. 64. Berlin : Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1959, pp. 1-12), p. 4.

7) Gonda, *Pūṣan and Sarasvatī* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1985), pp. 49-50 ; Renou, *Études védiques et pāṇinéennes*, vol. 1, pp. 1ff.

8) Manfred Mayerhofer, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen*, vol. 1 (Heidelberg : C. Winter Verlag, 1992), p. 797.

9) Hans Peter Schmidt, "Is Vedic *dhénā* related to Avestan *daēnā*?" (in *Hommages et Opera Minora : Monumentum H. S. Nyberg*, vol. 2 [*Acta Iranica*, vol. 5]. Téhéran and Liège : Bibliothèque Pahlavi, 1975, pp. 165-79), p. 179.

〈Key Words〉 Sarasvatī, Benzaiten, Vāc, dhī.

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34/14

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An *ātman* by Any Other Name : Two Non-Buddhist Parallels to *antarābhava*

Robert KRITZER

Introduction

In the third chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu, after enumerating the four forms of existence, asks the question, "What is the intermediate existence?" In a long discussion of *antarābhava* (*AKBh* : 120.6-131.2 ; La Vallée Poussin, v. 2 : 31-60), he proves that there is, in fact, an existence spanning the interval between death in one life and rebirth in the next and describes the features of intermediate beings. Vasubandhu explains that, contrary to appearances and to the speculations of some outsiders, it is not an *ātman* that transmigrates but simply the five *skandhas*, the series of which continues uninterrupted in the form of the *antarābhava* before entering the womb from which birth in the next life will occur. Furthermore, he continues, the series, in the form of the *skandhas* of the newborn being, will grow up to acquire *kleśas* and perform *karma*, due to which it will be reborn yet again. This process Vasubandhu calls "the beginningless circle of existence."

Vasubandhu, of course, relies on earlier sources. Most of the details in his discussion can be found in the *Vibhāṣā*, where they are organized quite differently, and many of them can also be found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

In this paper, I shall examine short passages from two non-Buddhist texts, (1) the *Caraka Saṃhitā* and (2) the *Anugītā* of the *Āśvamedhikaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*, both of which describe the transition to the new life in terms similar to those of the *Abhidharmakośa* (and its Sarvāstivādin and Yogācāra predecessors). The crucial difference is that in the two non-Buddhist texts an *ātman* or *jīva* transmigrates, not the *skandhas* in the form of the *antarābhava*. I cannot establish a direct textual connection between the description of *antarābhava* in the *abhidharma* and the passages in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* and *Anugītā*. However, a comparison of these three passages, the resemblances among which have not, to my knowledge, thus far attracted attention, strongly suggests at least some kind of common source. Furthermore, I suggest that the suspicious similarity of the passages is what prompted Vasubandhu to assert that his theory of transmigrating *skandhas* in no way implies *ātmavāda*.

Caraka Saṃhitā 4.2.31-36+41

The passage from the *Caraka Saṃhitā* is from the second chapter of the *Śarīrasthāna*, in which the development of the fetus is explained.

In verse 28 the question is asked: how does the *ātman* transmigrate? In the answer to this question, the text moves from physiology to philosophy or religious doctrine, and in the half dozen verses that explain how the *ātman* moves from one body to the next I find a number of parallels to the *abhidharma* descriptions of the *antarābhava*.

1. In verse 31, the *ātman*, as it travels from one body to another, is said to be accompanied by four subtle elements, namely air, fire, water, and earth. In other words, what transmigrates always has a material component, however attenuated it may be.

In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, as well, *antarābhava* includes material factors; it is described as possessing all the *indriyas* (*AKBh*: 125.7-8; see also *Vbh*: 361c12-21; *YBh*:19.3), which by definition are a very subtle form of *rūpa* called *bhautika*, distinct from tangible matter (*AK* I 35ab; *AKBh*: 13.19-23). Elsewhere Vasubandhu describes the body of the *antarābhava* as transparent or pure (*AKBh*:125.1-2). In these contexts, the word *accha* is translated into Chinese as 極細 (or 最細), which is also used to translate *sūkṣma*.

The *Caraka Saṃhitā* does not explicitly equate the subtle elements with the sense faculties. However, the first chapter of the *Śarīrasthāna* mentions that the sense faculties are comprised of the elements, with a different element predominating in each sense (*CS*4.1.24; *CS* cty: 694.32-34). Therefore, it may not be too farfetched to see a similarity between the transmigrating *rūpa* in the two texts.

2. *Caraka Saṃhitā* 31ab also describes the transmigrating *ātman* as *manojava*, "possessing the speed of mind."

Vasubandhu, too, attributes to the *antarābhava* a magical power of speed, which is produced by *karma* and which enables the *antarābhava* to travel through space (*AKBh*: 125.3-5; See also *Vbh*: 364a23-b7; *YBh*: 19.9-10).

35/14

3. *Caraka Saṃhitā* 4.2.31cd says that, due to the fact that it consists of *karma*, its *rūpa* is only visible to heavenly vision. Whether *rūpa* means "form" or, more technically, "matter," as in Buddhist texts, the meaning of the verse is the same: the subtle elements of the transmigrating *ātman* are invisible to ordinary people.

Similarly, the *antarābhava* can only be seen by other intermediate beings of the same class or by beings who have obtained the heavenly eye through practice (*AKBh*: 124.25-125.1; See also *Vbh*: 364b10-c4; *YBh*: 19.5-6).

4. According to *Caraka Saṃhitā* 4.2.33ab, the body contains sixteen *bhūtas*, four each arising from the uterine nutrients, the transmigrating *ātman*, the mother, and the father. Verse 33cd states that four are inherent in the *ātman*, and that the *ātman* is situated in these four. Which four is not completely clear; for example, Yamashita understands *ātman* here to be the *ātman* of the fetus and the number four to refer to the above-mentioned four groups of *bhūtas* (1998: 166). But I think that this line refers to the *ātman* before it enters the fetus, and that what is being described is a mechanism of mutual dependence, like that of *nāmarūpa* and *vijñāna* in Buddhism, by which the subtle elements of the *ātman* continue to exist between the death of one body and the birth of a new one.

Verse 34 provides further information about the elements coming from the parents: they are the semen (of the father) and the blood (of the mother), and they are made to grow by the elements that arise from the maternal nutrients.

Verse 35ab states clearly what happens to the elements at the moment of conception: the four elements that adhere to the *ātman* and are produced by *karma* enter the fetus. Verse 35cd is not so clear, but I shall attempt a translation: "When the *ātman* goes, that [continuous series of the four elements adhering to the *ātman* (*CS* cty.: 733.14)], which has the nature of being a seed, goes [with it] to the various different bodies" (*CS*4.2.35cd).

Finally, the *Caraka Saṃhitā* takes stock of the new being: "It is well known that the production of the *rūpa* is due to the *rūpa* of the [four elements] consisting of *karma*, while [that of] *manas* is due to the *manas*. The cause of whatever differences in form and intellect exist is *rajas*, *tamas*, and *karma*" (CS4.2.36).

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, on the other hand, explains how the *antarābhava* arrives at the location of the new birth and then describes how it becomes sexually excited by the scene of intercourse. According to Vasubandhu, the *antarābhava* enters the mixture of the semen and blood, then thickens and perishes, and the being is conceived (*AKBh*: 126.25-27; See also *Vbh*: 363b20-27; *YBh*: 24.1-10). Shortly thereafter Vasubandhu raises the question of whether the *mahābhūtas* themselves of the semen and blood through the force of *karma* become the basis for the *indriyas* of the new being, or whether other *mahābhūtas*, supported by these [*mahābhūtas* of semen and blood], arise as a result of actions (*AKBh*:127.3-5). According to the first alternative, which represents Vasubandhu's own opinion, the semen and blood, which lack faculties perish together with the *antarābhava*. Immediately thereafter, the *kalala*, which possesses faculties, appears in the way that a sprout arises after the destruction of the seed (*AKBh*: 127.5-7; see also *YBh*: 24.4-10).

I shall not discuss this very complicated passage at length here, as I have already done so elsewhere (Kritzer 1998). However, I want to point out the similarity between this passage and the *Caraka Saṃhitā* passage regarding the disposition of the material aspects of the transmigrating being: in each case, material elements that are the result of past *karma* join together with the material contribution of the two parents, and this conglomeration acts like a seed in producing the body of the new being.

5. Finally both *Caraka Saṃhitā* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* emphasize the beginningless (but not endless) nature of the rebirth process. *Caraka Saṃhitā* 4.2.42 states: "The beginning [of] this continuity of matter and mind is not mentioned; indeed, it does not exist. Their cessation is effected by the highest resolution and mindfulness, and by the highest understanding."

As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, it is, in fact, at the very end of his discussion of *antarābhava*, and as an introduction to his exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda*, that Vasubandhu says of the new being, "The continuity having grown gradually as it was projected, it again goes to another world due to its defilements and *karma*. Of this nature is the beginningless wheel of existence" (*AK* 3.19; *YBh*: 25.20-21.5).

Mahābhārata (*Āśvamedhikaparvan, Anugītā*) 14.18.4-7

Another text that describes the transition into the new life is the *Anugītā* of the *Mahābhārata*. Although the dates of most of the texts involved are uncertain, we can at least say that the *Anugītā*, like the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, is earlier than the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. As for the relative dates of the *Anugītā*, the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, and the *Vibhāṣā*, I dare not say anything; for my purposes here, it is enough that the ideas in these texts all were current before Vasubandhu.

The passage that I shall examine occurs in a discussion of the relationship between *karma* and rebirth. I am here concerned specifically with an explanation of how the *jīva* enters the fetus.

1. In verse 4, the soul, characterized as being filled with lust and hatred, is said to enter the womb, to which it has been directed by *karma* (*Mbh* 14.18.4). Nothing is said here about the reasons for lust and hatred.

However, it is possible the lust and hatred mentioned here have something to do with the Oedipal feelings attributed to the *antarābhava* in the *Abhidharmakośa*: "There [at the location of the destined rebirth, i. e., the womb of its future mother], having seen the congress of its mother and father, if [the *antarābhava*] is male, it will have a masculine desire for the mother; if female, it will have a feminine desire for the father, and, conversely, [it will have] hatred [for the parent of the same sex]" (*AKBh*: 126.16-18; see also *Vbh*: 363b18-20; *YBh*: 23.3-9).

2. According to verse 5, the soul obtains a body, good or bad, produced by *karma*, in the form of semen that has gone into the mother's womb and mixed with her blood (*Mbh* 14.18.5).

This is similar to the description in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* mentioned in part 4 above, with the difference that, unlike the *antarābhava*, which must perish in the moment before the new being is conceived, the soul, being eternal, simply continues to exist within the fetus.

3. In verse 6, the subtlety and invisibility of the *jīva* are adduced to explain why it is not attached anywhere [i. e., to the body], and the *jīva* is declared to be the eternal *brahman* (*Mbh* 14.18.6a-d). Here, two features of the *antarābhava*, subtlety and invisibility, are attributed to the *jīva*.

4. *Brahman* is furthermore called the seed of all the *bhūtas* and that by which living beings live (*Mbh* 14.18.6ef). Although the exact meanings of the terms *bhūta* and *brahman* here are unclear, in any case the image of a seed appears at precisely the same point in the process as it does in the passage from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* referred to above, i. e., after the merging of the transmigrating entity into the semen and

blood but before the animation of the new being. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, it is simply stated that, after the inanimate semen and blood cease to exist, semen and blood possessing *indriyas* appear. In the *Anugītā*, on the other hand, it is the soul that enters the fetus and provides it with consciousness (*Mbh* 14.18.7).

Conclusion

We have seen some striking resemblances in the discussions of the transmigration of the *ātman* in the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, of the *jīva* in the *Anugītā*, and of the *antarābhava* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, including some provocative similarities in language. Of course, some of this is to be expected: the dates of the texts are not very far apart, their subject matter of transmigration is identical, and many of the shared features may have been commonplaces of ancient Indian cosmology and embryology. Still, it is hard to imagine that the similarities are completely fortuitous. Long ago, Stcherbatsky emphasized the resemblances between the Buddhist doctrines found in the *abhidharma* and Sāṃkhya philosophy (1970 passim). Similarly, elements of Sāṃkhya thought in the *Caraka Saṃhitā* have been noted by many scholars,while it is generally accepted that some form of Sāṃkhya underlies the philosophy of the *Anugītā*. Therefore, it is possible that a common reliance on Sāṃkhya ideas explains the correspondences between the descriptions of transmigration in these three texts.

However, we must not ignore the possibility of influence in the other direction, particularly in the case of the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, which is recognized to be quite eclectic. In fact, Johannes Bronkhorst in a personal communication has identified a number of points that he believes were borrowed from Buddhism by the *Caraka Saṃhitā*.

Most likely, to my mind, is that ideas about transmigration passed back and forth among Buddhist and non-Buddhist authors. For example, the author or the compiler of the *Caraka Saṃhitā* may have been familiar with a text like the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which systematically, and with much medical detail, describes death, the *antarābhava*, and the growth of the new being within the womb. He may have borrowed the general outline of his description of rebirth from the Buddhist text and then adjusted certain terminology to suit his own belief in an *ātman*. Conversely, texts like the *Vibhāṣā* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* or their own sources may have borrowed from earlier medical texts, now lost, or from philosophical texts like the passage from the *Anugītā* discussed above, and replaced *jīva* or *ātman* with *antarābhava*.

37/14

Certainly in the three texts examined in this paper, *ātman*, *jīva*, and *antarābhava* have suspiciously similar functions. As a result, Vasubandhu, who was almost certainly late enough to have known texts like the *Caraka Saṃhitā* and the *Anugītā*, was right to worry that his *antarābhava* might be mistaken for an *ātman*.

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〈キーワード〉antarābhava, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, *Caraka Saṃhitā*, *Anugītā*

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the same view, although *Manas* is not mentioned. In SK, they are the issues from *Ahaṅkāra*. Therefore LAV seems to cite some issue (*vikṛti-*) theory other than the SK's. The similar view is observed in the Gold-Seventy tr. by Paramārtha after SK 26. It describes as a heterical doctrine that five organs of sensation issue from five *Tanmātras*, "the Ear issues from sound *Tanmātra*" and so on. (Taisho, vol. 54, p. 1251c ; Esho Yamaguchi, *The Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Philosophy*, Kyoto 1974, p. 125,127). We can trace another similar kind of view that eleven organs issue from five gross elements (*bhvūtas*), in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* IV *Śarīra-sthānam*, chap. 1, śloka 63 ～ 64 and the *Joyuishikiron-jukki* (*Tch'eng wei louen chou ki* : Taisho vol. 43 p. 252c).

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〈Key Words〉 Sāṃkhya, *vikṛti*, liberation, *Tathāgatagarbha*

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38/14

Taoist Elements in *Further Biographies of Eminent Monks*

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I have searched *Further Biographies of Eminent Monks* 續高僧傳 (T. 2050), compiled by Daoxuan 道宣 (596-667), for Taoist religious themes and images. I have looked for the names of Taoist gods and texts, references to immortals 仙 or the search for immortality 不老長生 (e.g., cinnabar 丹, mushrooms 芝, dietary practices such as abstaining from the five grains 断五穀), and even just the mention of a Taoist 道士. Only a fraction of what I have found can be presented in this short paper.

Overall, in the *Further Biographies* Taoism appears as a rival to Buddhism, a lesser teaching, or outright charlatanism. This is not surprising, given that the biographies cover the period of the Northern Zhou persecution of Buddhism, which (in the Buddhist telling) was instigated by the Taoist Zhang Bin 張賓, abetted by the turncoat monk Wei Yuansong 衛元嵩. We should also remember that Daoxuan was the editor of *Guang hongming ji* 廣弘明集 (T. 2103) and the lesser-known *Ji gujin fodao lunheng* 集古今佛道論衡 (T. 2104), both of which contain Buddhist polemical texts that are sharply critical of Taoism.

In one of Daoxuan's comments (論), where he is assumed to be speaking his own voice, he explicitly criticizes Taoist practices such as abstaining from grains, breathing techniques, and drugs. He writes that it is the fear of death that drives people to practice this perverse magic 邪術 (685b).

Still, Taoist skills are undeniably attractive (and the fear of death is powerful), so we find some monks who try Taoist practices before turning to Buddhism. In fact, Daoxuan's own teacher, Huizhun 慧頵 had hoped to become an immortal, studied Zhuangtze and Laotze 莊老, the Three Caverns 三洞 [Taoist scriptures], the Three Purities 三清 [abodes of the immortals], and more (533c). Similarly, a monk named Hongzhi 弘智 first practiced as a Taoist, stopped eating grains 絶粒, imbibed *qi* 服氣, and hoped to become an immortal. In Hongzhi's case, he succeeded only in losing a

97114

lot of weight. Later a Buddhist tercher told him that food is necessary for life and, further more, the immortals are not real and the Taoist drugs are fraudulent (642a). These two biographies typify Daoxuan's presentation of Taoism as something that is understandably attractive to the ignorant and gullible. As such, Taoism can be no more than a stage in a monk's spiritual development.

In other biographies, the monks have mastered the same skills as the Taoists but spurn these arts as shallow. For example, a monk named Zhixiang 植相 stayed with a Taoist who often showed off his Taoist magic 道術. Zhixiang was completely unfrightened by the large spirit 大神 that the Taoist conjured up one night, and Zhixiang told the Taoist, "What you value is [merely] perverse magic 邪術, not the true Dharma 正法." (Note the use of the same term, "perverse magic," that Daoxuan uses in his own comment. This term appears only one other time in the *Further Biographies*.)

Despite Daoxuan's general rejection of Taoism, a few biographies feature Taoist immortals as heroes. Significantly, these immortals are not the monks themselves, although it could be suggested that the immortals are the true subjects of these biographies. Next I summarize two examples. The Taoist elements are italicized.

(1) Sengming 僧明 (562-642). Miracle-worker 感通. 664b-665a.

... Sengming entered a valley and saw a *stone mortar and a wooden pestle* 石臼木杵. He also saw two men who were very large, cast no shadow, and had *very long eye-brows*. He immediatily bowed to the men. They said to him, "You *stink of grain* 穀臭. Where do you come from?" Sengming replied, "I practice meditation and seek the Way. Although I eat the five grains, I have vowed to become a *True Person* 眞人 (=an immortal)." The men said, "Please wait. We will discuss this together." *All of a sudden, another man came up*. He was very tall and wore *clothes made of tree bark* 樹皮衣. Then all four of them went further, and Sengming suddenly noticed that the valley had changed into a heavenly palace. There were fourteen or fifteen people sitting together, talking and laughing. Later, Sengming tried to return to the valley but could not find the way.

Comments: (a) I suggest that the mortar and pestle symbolize the tools of Taoist alchemy. A mortar 臼 is found only two other times in the *Further Biographies*; one of the other instances occurs in the biography summarized below. (b) There are ways ... Taoist immortal. The long eyebrows and the tree-bark outfit are good indica-

tions that we are in the presence of immortals. Furthermore, the fact that they cannot stand even the scent of grain is a give-away. (c) Immortals can appear and disappear in an instant. (d) Immortals prefer to live in far-away, mysterious places.

(2) Sengzhao 僧照. Miracle-worker 感通. 647a-b.

…In the year 531, Sengzhao entered a tunnel under a waterfall, walked a while, and then came out. After walking some more, he saw three small huts. Grain grew untended all around the huts, and birds were eating the grain. In the first hut, there were shelves of books with yellow covers. In the middle hut, there were *two iron mortars and a cauldron* all covered with dust. There was no evidence of cooking. In the third hut, there was a monk 沙門, sitting upright with his lap filled with dust. There were no other people around. *Suddenly, from out of nowhere*, a divine monk 神僧 appeared. He was about sixty years old. His *eyebrows were more than three meters long* (丈餘) and curled around his ears. He said to Sengzhao, "My fellow practitioners came here to escape the world. One of them [in the middle hut] went out and hasn't come back. The other one [in the third hut] died a long time ago. It seems that he has entered nirvana 入滅定. Didn't you see him just now [in the third hut]? [By the way,] what is the name of the dynasty now?" Sengzhao answered, "Wei 魏." But it becomes clear that the monk mistakenly thinks Sengzhao means the earlier Wei Dynasty (220-265), not the current Northern Wei (386-534). So this Chinese Rip Van Winkle has lost track of at least 266 years (remember, this story is explicitly dated to 531), and he must be about *three hundred years old himself* (though he looks only sixty). The monk gathers grains and makes gruel. He goes to the forest to collect pears and jujubes 梨棗. He gives this food to Sengzhao but *does not eat anything himself*. The next day, after the monk has chanted sutras all night, Sengzhao leaves. Later, just like Sengming, he is unable to find his way back to this special place.

Comments: The old man is always called a "monk" 僧, and Buddhist terms and practices are mentioned. But almost everything we learn about this monk marks him as a Taoist immortal: he is hundreds of years old; he has incredibly long eyebrows; he does not cultivate grain; he doesn't eat ordinary food; he doesn't sleep; his two friends seem to have achieved immortality, one perhaps through elixirs (remember the mortars and cauldron), the other through a physical deathlessness.

As mentioned above, Sengming and Sengzhao are not themselves Taoist immor-

tals. The two monks are merely witnesses, who--to their regret, it seems--cannot find their way back to get a second glimpse of immortality. The immortals are the real stars in these two biographies, with the monks reduced to walk-on roles in their own lives.

There are some biographies in which the monk (or nun, as we shall see) actually does follow Taoist practices and does not reject such practices or outgrow them.

(3) Two unnamed nuns who were sisters. Body-sacrificers 遺身. 683c-684a.

…In the year 630, two nuns set fire to themselves with a large and pious group of onlookers. In preparation for their immolation, the nuns drank fragrant oils and gradually *gave up eating rice*. At the end, they suddenly *stopped eating grains altogether and ate only honey*.

Comments: As other scholars have noted, the various Chinese Buddhist biographical collections state that a few of the monks and nuns who commit suicide (often, but not exclusively, through self-immolation) stop eating grains before killing themselves. In the case of the two nuns above, their choice of honey as their sole food reflects a Taoist influence. From the Buddhist perspective, honey might seem an indulgent choice, too sweet and high calorie. However, from the Taoist point of view, honey makes sense because it is natural and uncultivated by humans.

Conclusion

An examination of Taoist elements in *Further Biographies of Eminent Monks* reveals a spectrum of roles for Taoism in the lives of Buddhist monks. For the most part, Daoxuan is hostile to Taoism. In some cases, Daoxuan extends a grudging tolerance toward Taoist skills. In a very few cases, Taoism receives a sympathetic portrayal, as in the biographies of Sengming and Sengzhao. We might wonder why Daoxuan included this material, which serves only to make Taoism attractive. Here it is well to remember that Daoxuan collected miracle stories and was clearly powerfully attracted to the supernatural (the evidence is all through the *Further Biographies*). Daoxuan himself surely realized that some of the biographies present the immortals and Taoism in a very favorable light--but I guess some stories are just too good to resist.

〈Key Words〉　道宣, 續高僧傳, 道教

40/14

クリシュナムルティの自然観

西尾秀生

1. はじめに

クリシュナムルティ（Jiddu Krishnamurti）は、インドのバラモン出身者では珍しく一切の宗教的伝統や権威を否定する思想家である。彼は聖典、儀礼、偶像、寺院だけでなく、自らの出身であるバラモンの権威さえも認めない。このような立場は、一切のバラモン教の伝統を否定したゴータマ・ブッダの立場と共通している。

クリシュナムルティの自然観を理解するために、彼の神秘体験に触れる必要があるので、神秘体験までの彼の略歴を紹介しよう。クリシュナムルティは、マドラスの北西約200キロにある小さな町マダナパレで、1895年にバラモン階級の家庭に生まれた。８番目の子供であったのでヴィシュヌ神の８番目の化身クリシュナに因んでクリシュナムルティと名付けられた。父親は神智学協会（The Theosophical Society）[1]の会員であり、母親は熱心なヴィシュヌ教徒であった。1909年に父親が神智学協会で働くために、一家でマドラスのアディヤールに引っ越してきた。そこでクリシュナムルティは、会長のベサント（Annie Besant）[2]達によって世界教師（Lord Maitreya）[3]の器として見出された。そして世界教師としての相応しい教育を受けるために、1912年からクリシュナムルティと弟のニティヤはロンドンで教育を受け、1920年からパリでフランス語を学んだ。1922年にニティヤの療養のため共にカリフォルニヤに滞在し、ここでクリシュナムルティに神秘体験が始まった。この神秘体験が彼の自然観に影響を及ぼした。神秘体験とは、究極的な宗教経験であり、少数の人々に起こりうることが宗教学で知られている。[4]仏教の三昧なども神秘体験である。

2. 神秘体験による自然との一体観

クリシュナムルティの思想に決定的な影響を与えたのは、1922年の夏にカリ

The Portrait of Confucianism in *Further Biographies of Eminent Monks* 續高僧傳

Elizabeth KENNEY

In an earlier article for this journal, I examined the treatment of Taoism in *Further Biographies of Eminent Monks* 續高僧傳 (T. 2050), compiled by Daoxuan 道宣 (596-667). I found, as we might expect, that Taoism was often criticized as mere sorcery or as a complete fraud (i.e., it is not possible to become an immoral). Intriguingly, however, in a few biographies, the Buddhist monks encountered remarkable men who are clearly Taoist immortals, although not explicitly identified as such.

In this article, I shift my focus to the depiction of Confucianism in *Further Biographies*. I expected to find little, if any, overt conflict between Buddhism and Confucianism for two reasons. First, a Buddhist might have good grounds for thinking that the basic Confucian concerns scarcely intersect with those of Buddhism, thus minimizing conflict. Along these lines, the rosiest interpretation would view Confucianism and Buddhism as complemetary: Confucianism provides guidelines for political, social and ritual behavior, while Buddhism supplies cosmology and soteriology. The second reason I did not expect to find overt conflict between Buddhism and Confucianism was a political one: Confucianism was securely entrenched in Chinese government and society, and perhaps the Buddhists simply could not afford to challenge its privileged position. Among the "three teachings" (三教, a term used in *Further Biographies*), Confucianism was always in first place; Buddhism and Taoism had to fight it out for second place.

For the most part, my expectations were correct. Confucianism has a low profile in the biographies, and it is usually treated neutrally. But, happily, there were some surprises. In a few biographies, Confucianism is energetically attacked and takes a worse beating than is ever administered to Taoism.

During the sixth and seventh centuries (the period covered by *Further Biographies*), Buddhism and Taoism engaged in a series of polemical attacks against each other. Taoists, Buddhists (and at least one Confucian) composed essays criticizing one or both of the other religions. Some of these writings are collected in another of Daoxuan's compilations, *Guang hongming ji* 廣弘明集 (T. 2103) (in English, see Livia Kohn, *Laughing at the Tao*, Princeton, 1995). Two of the monks in *Further Biographies* were especially prominent in these religious debates, and Daoxuan included their pro-Buddhist essays in *Guang hongming ji*. One of the Monks, Daoan 道安 (exact dates uncertain; biography=628b-630b), wrote *Treatise on the Two Religions* 二教論 (*Guang hongming ji*, 136-143) in 570. The "two religions" are Buddhism and Confucianism, but Taoism is also treated. Daoan's biography includes some references to this essay, including his statement that "Buddhism is the inner (teaching), and Confucianism is the outer (teaching)" 釋教爲内儒教爲外. The other monk, Falin 法琳 (572-670, biography=636b-638c), wrote *Treatise on Destroying Evil* 破邪論 (*Guang hongming ji*, 161-143). These works by Daoan and Falin certainly deserve attention, but in the limited space of this article I will concentrate on references to Confucianism in *Further Biographies* that are *not* part of a Buddhist monk's polished and polemical essay.

In the 700 biographies of different lengths (some are very short), covering 280 Taishō pages, there are about one hundred references to Confucianism, far fewer than to Taoism. Confucian references include: Confucius himself (孔子, 孔丘, 仲尼); Mozi (孟子); the Confucian School or teaching (儒学, 儒宗, 儒教); Confucian "arts" (儒術), which seems to refer to divination; Confucian texts (for example, *Analects* 論語, *Classic of Filial Piety* 孝經, histories [史 or 書], the six classics 六經 collectively or by name, *Odes* 詩 [經], *I Jing* 易 [經] *Record of Ritual* 禮記; Confucian scholars (博士); Confucian ritualists (祭酒).

Some of the Confucian items turn out to be red herrings (yet still somehow intringing): a monk named Jewel Confucian 寶儒 (507a), whose short biography contains no mention of Confucianism and no clue as how how he got his name; a Buddhist temple called the Temple of Benevolence and Filial Piety 仁孝寺; another temple named Filial Love Temple 孝愛寺 (so named because it was the burial place of a certain king's beloved mother).

Many of the other references to Confucianism are of the following sort: monks are said to have come from Confucian families; monks studied Confucianism before Buddhism; or more positively, one monk was benevolent and filial 仁孝 as a child (and this child grows up to be Jingying Huiyuan 淨影慧遠 [see below]). These brief references to Confucianism mostly portray it as a passing phase in a monk's life, an inadequate philosophy that he outgrows. Taoism also is often treated as a limited religion, attractive only to those of immature spirituality. Significantly, Taoism is called "perverse" 邪, but Confucianism is not.

Below I present three "snapshot" examples of different portraits of Confucianism in *Further Biographies*. The three examples, taken together, are representative of the spectrum of images of Confucianism in the biographies, but each example is in itself an extreme case.

Example #1. Peaceful co-existence

The longest and most serious discussion of Confucian doctrine in *Further Biographies* appears in the biography of Jingying Huiyuan, a monk well known for his careful sutra commentaries and his meticulous and voluminous presentation of Buddhist doctrine. But Huiyuan is also known to posterity as a defender of the Buddhist faith against oppression by the state. The Kamakura monk Nichiren, who tirelessly harangued his own government, cited Huiyuan (among other monks) as inspiration. Huiyuan himself did not write about Confucianism or Taoism, so Daoxuan's account is our only source for Huiyuan's views on Confucianism. In 574, Emperor Wu of the Northern Zhou instigated a persecution of Buddhism. He summoned five hundred Buddhist monks, and Huiyuan was the only monk who dared to argue with him. Since an English translation of this debate is available, I will not go into detail here (in English, see Kenneth K. Tanaka, *The Dawn of Chinese Pure Land Buddhist Doctrine*, SUNY, 1990, pp. 25-27; Japanese works include Kamata Shigeo 鎌田茂雄, 中国仏教思想史研究 [1968] and Ocho Enichi 横超慧日, 中國佛教の研究 [1979]). Huiyuan's defense of Buddhism included the following points: (1) Buddhist statues are no less "inanimate" than the images worshipped in Confucian ancestral temples; (2) Buddhism is no more foreign than Confucianism, since Confucius himself came from the country of Lu 魯; (3) Buddhism supports filial piety, just as Confucianism does. Whatever one thinks of these three arguments (and they did not convince the Northern Zhou emperor), there is no mistaking Huiyuan's effort to harmonize Buddhism and Confucianism (at least for the practical aim of averting persecution).

Huiyuan had a disciple named Zhihui 智徽 (559-638, biography =541b-542a), who said, "My mother and father gave birth to my physical body. My dharma teacher gave birth to my dharma body" 父母生吾肉身. 法師生吾法身. Zhihui then implies that true filial piety means gratitude toward one's Buddhist teacher even more than to one's parents. Zhihu thus goes a step beyond his own teacher Huiyuan: it is not just that Buddhism does no conflict with Confucianism (as Huiyuan tried to convince the emperor), but Buddhism has

42|14

deeper understanding of at least one of Confucianism's cardinal tenets, filial piety. Throughout the long history of Buddhism in China, Buddhists have more than once made the argument that all sentient beings have been one's parents so that filial piety should be extended beyond the family, but it is less common to find Zhihui's suggestion that a religious parent deserves more filial respect than a flesh-and-blood parent.

Example #2. Confucianism is the dregs

The exegete monk Huisong 慧嵩 (exact dates uncertain; biography =482c-483b), from remote Turfan, had an older brother who was a Confucian scholar and who did not believe in Buddhism. Huisong speaks of "rotten Confucians" and says that Confucianism is like "dregs" 糟粕. Huisong converts his older brother to Buddhism with one verse from the Abhidharma. In the biography of Huisong's student Zhinian 志念 (534-608, biography=508b-509b), it is said that Huisong was known as, with what must have been delicious irony, "the Confucius of Abhidharma" 毘曇孔子.

In *Further Biographies*, there is only one other occurrence of the term "dregs.". It is again used to denigrate Confucianism, not Taoism (or anything else). In this instance, the meditator monk Benji 本濟 (562-615; biography=578a-b) is described as being well versed in Confucianism from an early age, but he suddenly awakened to the Buddhist truth and saw that Confucianism was the "dregs of the universe" 宇宙之糟粕. Benji became an important disciple of Xinxing 信行, the founder of the Three Levels Sect 三階教.

These two examples of nasty name-calling reflect none of the conciliatory spirit of Huiyuan. They lead into the third example, which describes a Buddhist animosity toward Confucianism that is far beyond mere name-calling.

Example #3. A Confucian Mocks Buddhism and Lives (but not for long) to Regret It

In the biography of the seventh-century monk Huikuan 惠寬 (600c-601b) there is a remarkable story about a skeptical Confucian who gets his just deserts. Huikuan's biography is quite long and full of interesting details, but he, is, I think, otherwise unknown. In 648, a certain man named Song Wei 宋尉 said, "I don't believe in Buddhism. I believe only in Confucianism" 我不信佛. 唯信周孔. Song Wei added sarcastically. "However, I have twice experienced the powers of the Buddha. One time, people were urinating beside my door. So I set out a Buddha [statue], and they stopped. The other time it was winter, and I burned a wooden Buddha [statue] to keep myself warm." When Huikuan heard about these statements, he sent Song Wei a letter. After reading the letter, Song Wei said, "This man of the Way [Huikuan] seems to be a spiritual person. I will test whether has he spiritual powers or not. "So Song Wei used the part of the letter with Huikuan's name and address to wipe himself after defecating. Then his anus (糞門) split open, and he could not stand up. Song Wei cried, "I am dying!" Then he summoned Huikuan to come. Although Song Wei repented his transgressions and made sutras and statues, he died at the next full moon.

This story is at once funny, scatological and surprising. Humorous anecdotes in *Further Biographies* are uncommon but not unknown (and a topic that deserves further study). However, toilet humor is very rare. Daoxuan uses the word "asshole" 糞門 only this once. (Interestingly, the only other example of bathroom humor is aimed primarily at the anti-Buddhist Emperor Zhou and secondarily at Taoists. Let me briefly summarize the story. The monk Tongjin 童進 [659b], who was constantly drunk and whose urine stank, imbibed a poison concocted at the order of Emperor Zhou. Although the poison-brewers had to wear leather clothing and lapis lazuli eye-protectors, Tongjin drank the poison and was unaffected. In fact, he joked as usual and tossed down another ladleful of the poison. Taoists were amazed; they ran in all directions when Tongjin offered them a taste of the poison. Afterwards, Tongjin took a nap on some rocks. He urinated in his sleep, and the urine shattered the rocks. There is more to be said about this story, but it will have to wait for a later publication.)

Turning away from the humor, let us look at the violence in the story about Song Wei and Huikuan. While it is true that the Buddhist monk did not kill the Confucian with his own hands, it is nonetheless surprising to find one of these eminent monks implicated in a murder. After all, the lethal toilet-paper seems like a kind of black magic, and Huikuan did not use any reverse magic to save Song Wei's life, even after the Confucian's conversion to Buddhism.

Huikuan, by the way, suffered no bad karmic consequences from his role in Song Wei's death. When the time came for Huikuan himself to die, many auspicious and dramatic signs appeared: there was a radiance so bright that people thought the temple was on fire; the water in the lotus pond suddenly dried up; red lotuses turned white; blood flowed from a large camphor tree into a river, turning the river completely red; a seventeen-story stupa became taller; a pair of geese appeared mysteriously, cried out, lay on the ground, refused to move, and later followed the funeral procession. Finally, Huikuan's corpse showed no insects, blood or decay.

43/14

There is no case (to my knowledge) in Further Biographies of a Buddhist monk murdering a Taoist. It is striking, if a bit disturbing, to discover that a Buddhist's murderous impulses are aroused by the challenge of a rude Confucian who doubts the powers of the Buddha.

No Hidden Confucians

In my study of Taoists elements in *Further Biographies* I discussed several biographies that featured remarkable men (not the monks themselves) who were not explicitly identified as Taoists, much less as immortals 仙, but who in fact had the characteristics of genuine immortals (living for hundreds of years, having very long hair, not eating regular human food, inhabiting a mysteriously remote valley, appearing and disappearing suddenly, and so forth). Through these cameo roles, Taoists are portrayed very attractively in the biographies. Confucians have no such luck. For one thing, Confucians have no particular "look" and so cannot hide in plain sight. More fundamentally, it may be that Taoist powers and charms were compelling, even to Daoxuan and the monks whose biographies he compiled, but Confucian virtues were less alluring.

Conclusion

This brief study of Confucianism in *Further Biographies of Eminent Monks* illuminates some facets of the Buddhist view of Confucianism in sixth-and seventh-century China. For the most part, Confucianism is depicted as virtuous—but limited. Confucianism promotes tame virtues such as filial piety and benevolence but lacks the profundity of Buddhist doctrine. Nonetheless, in a few of the biographies, the eminent monks seem to have been infuriated by Confucianism (or by a particularly annoying Confucian).

〈Key words〉 道宣, 續高僧傳, 儒教

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Ākṣepahetu and *Abhinirvṛttihetu*: Among the Ten *Hetus* and in Interpretations of the *Pratītyasamutpāda* Formula

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The best known, and probably the earliest, occurrence of a list of ten *hetus* is found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. This list is followed by definitions of the individual causes, which are then assigned to two groups, *janakahetu* and *upāyahetu*, after which they are related to the four *pratyayas*. Finally, three processes are described in terms of the ten causes: a) *laukika bhāva* (with particular reference to grain [*sasyādi*]); b) *saṃkleśa*, which is equated with *pratītyasamutpāda*; c) *vyavadāna*, i.e., *pratītyasamutpāda* in its reverse (*pratiloma*) order (*BBh:* 97-102. ; T. 1579: 501a).

La Vallée Poussin remarks that the order of *hetus* in the *Ch'eng wei shih lun* differs from that in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (La Vallée Poussin 1929 : 456). More recently, Funahashi Naoya (1979), in examining the relationship between the ten *hetus* and the twenty *kāraṇas*, also notes the differences in order between the lists of *hetus* in the *BBh*, on the one hand, and in the *Savitarkasavicārabhūmi* and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*, on the other. The discrepancy is as follow (the numbers indicate the position of each cause in the list of ten): *BBh*--[3] *ākṣepahetu*, [4] *parigrahahetu*, [5] *abhinirvṛttihetu*; *Sav*--[3] *ākṣepahetu*, [4] *abhinirvṛttihetu*, [5] *parigrahahetu*. In this short paper, I hope to show a connection between the different order of the *hetus* in various Yogācāra texts and the development of the Yogācāra interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula.

In his translation of the exposition of *pratītysamutpāda* in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, Matsuda Kazunobu discusses the development of the Yogācāra "two lifetimes/singlefold causation" (二重一世) theory. Although the section on *aṅgasamāsa* in the *AS* is the *locus classicus* of this theory, Matsuda suggests that the *YBh* may contain its forerunners. Matsuda deals with two expositions in particular. He mentions the *śarīra* portion of the *Sav* exposition (*YBh:* 198-203), which is also included in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 827b-828c), but does not analyze it in depth. Instead he turns to a corresponding exposition in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (*ŚrBh:* 384-385), in which two types of causes (*ākṣepakahetu* and *abhinirvartakahetu*, or *abhinirvṛttihetu*) and two types of fruits (*ātmabhāvaphala* and *viṣayopabhogaphala*) are mentioned, and according to which the members from *vijñāna* through *vedanā* are the seeds, in the present life, of *jāti* in the future life (1983 : 30-32). The *śārira* exposition in fact seems to present a very similar system, with certain slight differences in terminology and perhaps a somewhat different mechanism of seed-causation.

44|14

Thus, we can see the terms *ākṣepa* (*ākṣepaka*) and *abhinirvṛtti* (*abhinirvartaka*) occurring with essentially similar meanings in the systematic *YBh* expositions of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, and, as we shall see, they also are found in the fully developed two lifetimes/singlefold causation system of the *AS*. However, there seems to be some development over the course of time; in certain passages (*ŚrBh*, *Vsg*, *Sav śarīra* section) the terms are mentioned as part of an explanation of the process of conditioned origination, while in others (*Sav Pratyayatva* section, *AS*) they appear as the headings of groups under which the members of the formula are enumerated. This suggests to me that the Yogācāra explanation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula in terms of a theory of seed-causation is in the process of being worked out in the earlier passages, while the later passages simply describe the implications of an already systematized theory.

How, then, are the *ākṣepakahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* (or *abhinirvartakahetu*) of the *pratītyasamutpāda* analyses related to *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* in the list of the ten *hetus?* I shall attempt to show a sequence of ideas and texts, but given our lack of certainty regarding the chronology of the *Yogācārabhūmi* texts, my conclusions must be largely speculative.

The earliest interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula in terms of the idea that actions, performed under the influence of *avidyā* condition rebirth, not by directly causing *vijñāna* to arise in the next life, as in the Sarvāstivādin three lifetimes/twofold (三世二重) causation system, but by “planting” a seed that can become actualized in the form of the next life, is perhaps found in a passage from chapter six of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*.1) Although it does not contain the terms *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu*, the approach of this passage is more similar to those of the *ŚrBh* and *śarīra* expositions than to that of the Sarvāstivādin interpretation, and the botanical metaphor that is elaborated on in the *BBh* discussion of the ten *hetus* seems to originate here. Both the *ŚrBh* and the *śarīra* expositions seem to be attempts to explain more systematically the process described in *DBh*, and both expositions take the term *bīja* in a more technical sense. I believe that, in the course of determining exactly how the members of the formula function in causing rebirth, whichever was the earlier of these texts introduced the terms *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* or their variants.

If I am correct then, the *BBh* ten *hetus* passage, in which the description of how the *hetus* function in a botanical context clearly recalls th language of the *DBh*,2) borrows the terms *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihet* from one of the early *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions found in the *YB* Although its definitions of these two causes3) are not exactly the sam as those of *ākṣepakahetu* and the *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* in the *śarīr* exposition, they are generally similar, and the differences can be explaine by the fact that the *BBh* passage, unlike the other two, is not an analys of *pratītyasamutpāda per se* and so does not precisely identify where eac member of the formula functions in the process of causation. Furthermor the fact that *parigrahahetu* comes between them suggests that at the tim of the composition of *BBh* these expositions were not sufficiently estab ished as standard Yogācāra explanations of the formula to render *ākṣep* *ahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* an inseparable pair. The botanical origin of th seed metaphor, which lingers in the *BBh* description of external causality perhaps still overrides the more abstract theory of causality found in th *ītyasamutpāda* expositions. After all, in the physical process whereb

45/14

a seed gains the potential to yield fruit, auxiliary causes such as water clearly work their effects after the planting of the seed in its “unmoistened” state and before its fructification, and the *BBh* devotes considerable space to describing this process. In contrast, the ten *hetus* passage in *Sav* does not refer to botanical development at all.

However, as seed theory was refined, the original metaphor may have lost its force, and even in texts as early as the *ŚrBh* and *Sav*, the term *bija* seems somewhat divorced from the botanical setting. By the time of the *Sav* (excluding the *śarira* portion because it was borrowed wholesale from an earlier source), the distance from its original meaning is even greater, and the remainder of the extensive treatment of *pratītyasamutpāda* found at the end of the *Sav* represents a later stage in the systematization of *bīja* theory. Unlike the convoluted and repetitive exposition of *śarīra*, the remainder of the *Sav* analysis is written in a straightforward *abhidharma* style. Much of this section appears to consist of interpretations of earlier material (for example, the entire *vibhaṅga* portion is a commentary on the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*) in terms of *bīja*. Elsewhere, there are attempts to coordinate already established categories with the *bīja* system. The *pratyaya* portion, for example, in explaining the types of causal relations the various members of the formula can enter into with one another, states that one member cannot be the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) of another because the causal condition of something is always the seed of that same thing.4) The terms *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* come up in further discussion of this point.

Here the two, as they occur in the list of ten causes, are related specifically to the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula: *ākṣepahetu* consists of the members from *avidyā* through *vedanā*, while *abhinirvṛttihetu* consists of the members from *tṛṣṇā* through the *saṃskāras*.5) In the course of showing the connection between the four *pratyayas* and the twelve members of the formula, this brief passage in effect summarizes the lengthy descriptions of *ākṣepakahetu* and *upapattyabhinirvṛttihetu* from the *śarīra* exposition and equates the two with the *ākṣepahetu and abhinirvṛttihetu* of the ten *hetus* system. By this point, the *bīja* interpretation of the formula is so well-established that here, unlike in the *ŚrBh* and *śarira* expositions, the fact that the members from *nāmarūpa* through *vedanā* are in the form of seeds rather than actualized *dharmas* is not even mentioned, a feature this passage shares with the *aṅgasamāsa* section of the *AS*. For the author of this text, the projection and actualization of seeds are the essence of conditioned origination, and thus the terms *ākṣepa* and *abhinirvṛtti* are inevitably found together.

Hence, it is not surprising that, earlier in the *Sav*, in the discussion of the ten *hetus*, the order of the *BBh* list has been changed to bring *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* together. Furthermore, the *Sav* definition of the causes in terms of fifteen *adhiṣṭhānas* places more emphasis than the *BBh* on the relationship between the two types of causes in the rebirth process *ākṣepahetu* is to be understood in terms of the *adhiṣṭhāna* of perfuming (*vāsanā*) because the *saṃskāras*, perfumed by good or bad *karma*, projec new lives in desirable or undesirable existences,[6] and *abhinirvṛttihetu* i to be understood in terms of the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the moist seed (*sābhiṣyan* *dabīja*) because the seed, moistened by *tṛṣṇā*, results in the actualizatio of the projected new lives.[7]

All independent discussions of the *hetus* that I have found in text later than *Vsg* follow the order of the *Sav*. Furthermore, the *Cwsl* doe not mention the different orders of the *hetus*. Thus, change in order the *hetus* seems to have occurred after the *bīja* interpretation of th *pratītyasamutpāda* formula had become systematized to the point at whi each member, except for the purely fruitional *jāti* and *jarāmaraṇa*, wa assigned explicitly to one of the two causes. After this point, while the was no further evolution in the exposition of ten *hetus*, the Yogācā interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* was brought to yet a higher level systematization by Asaṅga, who explained the formula in terms of fo sets of members: that which projects [*ākṣepakāṅga*=*avidyā*, *saṃskār* *vijñāna*] and that which is projected [*ākṣiptāṅga*=*nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatan* *sparśa*, and *vedanā*] at the time of cause, and that which actualiz

46|14

[*abhinirvartakāṅga*=*tṛṣṇā*, *upādāna*, *bhava*] and that which is actualized [*abhinirvṛttyaṅga*=*jāti*, *jarāmaraṇa*] at the time of effect.[8]

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1) *teṣāṃ taiḥ saṃskāraiḥ paribhāvitam avaropitaṃ cittabījaṃ sāsravaṃ sopādanam āyatyāṃ jātijarāmaraṇapunarbhavābhinivṛttisaṃbhavopagataṃ bhavati/karmakṣetrālāyam avidyāṃdhakāran tṛṣṇāsneham asmimānapariṣyandinaṃ dṛṣṭikṛtajālapravṛddhyā nāmarūpāṃkuraḥ prādurbhavati*(*DBh*: 97$^{4\sim6}$).

2) E.g., *yato yataḥ svabījād yasya yasya sasyasya prādurbhāvo bhavati. tad bījaṃ tasyākṣepahetuḥ. pṛthivīvṛṣṭyādikaḥ pratyayo 'ṅkuraprādurbhāvāya parigrahahetuḥ. tad bījaṃ tasyāṃkurasyābhinirvṛttihetuḥ*. (*BBh*: 99).

3) *avidyādīnāṃ dharmāṇāṃ dṛṣṭa eva dharme yāni bījāni jātasya bhūtasyeha. tāny anyajānmikasya jātijarāmaraṇasyākṣepahetuḥ*(*BBh*: 100). *svakasvakam bījam avidyādīnāṃ nirvṛttihetuḥ*(*BBh*: 100).

4) *kena kāraṇena hetupratyayena na pratyayāny etāny aṅgāni/svabhāvabījapratyayaprabhāvitatvād hetupratyayasya*(*YBh*: 215).

5) *katy aṅgāny ākṣepahetusaṃgṛhītāni/avidyām upādāya yāvad vedanā/katy aṅgāhy abhinirvṛttihetusaṅgṛhītāni/tṛṣṇām upādāya yāvad bhavaḥ*(*YBh*: 215).

6) *tatra vāsanāhetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyākṣepahetuḥ prajñāpyate/tat kasya hetoḥ/ tathā hi/śubhāśubhakarmaparibhāvitāḥ saṃskārās traidhātukeṣṭāniṣṭagatiṣu/iṣṭāniṣṭātmabhāvān ākṣipanti.*(*YBh*: 107-108). It seems some what strange to say that the *saṃskāras* are "perfumed"(*paribhāvita*) by *karma*.

7) *tatra sābhiṣyandaṃ bījaṃ hetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyābhinirvṛttihetuḥ prajñapyate/tat kasya hetoḥ/tathā hi/kāmapratisaṃyuktānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ rūpārūpyapratisaṃyuktānāṃ svakasvakād bījāt prādurbhāvo bhavati/tṛṣṇā punar bījābhiniṣyanda ity ucyate/ tatas tayābhiṣyanditaṃ bījam ākṣiptānām ātmabhāvānām abhinirvṛttaye bhāvati*(*YBh*: 108). 8) *AS*: 26; *ASBh*: 31.

〈Key Words〉 *daśahetavaḥ*, *pratītyasamutpāda*, *Yogācārabhūmi*

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47/14

The Ghost at the Table

On the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion

Malcolm David Eckel

RAY HART's "Pilot Study" of religious and theological studies in American higher education (Hart) paints a strange and contradictory picture of the field that makes up the American Academy of Religion. In many respects the field is thriving. The AAR itself has expanded enormously in the size of its membership, the diversity of its programs, and, one might argue, in the vitality with which it raises and pursues the problems and issues in the study of religion. In spite of the caution that seems to overcome the religion professoriate when they are questioned about the future of their field, 46% of the respondents in the Hart report thought that Religious Studies would flourish, 43% thought they would remain in a steady state, and only 8% thought that they would decline. The remaining 3% declined to voice an opinion. With all of the divisions that afflict the humanities in American higher education, a survey showing that nearly 90% of the respondents think their field will at least be able to hold its own, if not improve, has to be taken as a positive sign for the future. Difficulties lurk, however, beneath the statistical veneer.

Ray Hart found (not surprisingly) that his respondents harbored deep uncertainty about the conception of the field itself. Not only was there widespread opposition to a common definition of religion, to a canon of "classical" texts, and to so-called "essentialist" understandings of religion, but there was a sense that the *study* of religion had become fragmented into a series of diverse and dissonant methodologies. Whether this dissonance could be thought of as a state of liminality, for which the promised moment of aggregation lay just around the corner, or should be interpreted

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simply as a state of intellectual chaos and confusion was unclea
But most respondents thought that the theoretical foundations o
the field were in disarray.

The difficulties were particularly sharp when it came to defin
ing the relationship between Religious and Theological Studie
Hart found deep antipathy to Theological Studies in major se
ments of his sample (particularly in public institutions and in pr
vate institutions with graduate programs). Those who identifie
themselves with Religious Studies may have had difficulty definin
what was right about their field, but they knew what was wrong
still included theology. Theology was seen as privileging Chris
anity or Western categories in the study of religion, going beyon
the merely "descriptive" or "explanatory" study of religious ph
nomena, and turning the study of religion into a covert exercise i
propaganda. Some respondents saw this largely as a problem
perception by others outside the field of Religious Studies. On
respondent said, for example, "Many view the study of religion
and preaching as one and the same" (Hart:753). But it was clea
that the problem also lay within departments of Religious Studie
themselves. The majority of respondents in Religious Studies fel
as one person said, that "[t]he study of religion should not be pre
scriptive; the practice of religion is" (Hart:781).

In itself this result is neither surprising nor problematic. Bu
Hart also found that there were other currents within the discipline
that seemed to run in other directions. First, there was a signifi
cant minority within the field of Religious Studies who argued fo
the retention of something like a tradition of "public theology
Hart defined "public theology" as an attempt to go beyond the
mere description of different options in the world's religions to ask
what these options *mean for me, for us?* (Hart:733). The reason
for this position were varied. One person said that the inclusion of
theology within Religious Studies would keep the field "on its toes
with regard to "relevance" (Hart:734). Another said that Religiou
Studies needed the expertise of theology in order to deal with the
question: "what knowledge/understanding is *worth having?*" Bu
the most intriguing arguments grew less from the internal struggle
over self definition within Religious Studies than from the asses
ment of the marketplace outside the field itself. An unnamed
senior scholar expressed the opinion that "it will be fatal in the
field to emphasize research at the expense of teaching," and "wha
attracts students to the study of religion is that they have questions

48\14

about the meaning of their lives, want to know what it is to be human and humane, and intuit that religion deals with such things" (Hart:729).

If this unnamed elder statesman is right (and I suspect that many who have taught large introductory courses in religion will recognize at least some truth in what he says), then the field is in a serious bind. Academic respectability is interpreted as requiring neutrality about questions of value, while the siren songs of the marketplace lure the professor to take a stand. Who will bind Ulysses to the mast when the classroom door is closed and there is no one to report the professor's lapses from objectivity but the fickle and unsteady memory of a group of undergraduates? It is no wonder that one of Ray Hart's respondents suspected that, with Christian theology gone from its central position in many religion programs, faculty members had begun to opt instead for personal "crypto-theologies" and "technologies of self-transformation" (Hart:734). We are left with a pair of questions: Is it possible to discuss meaning and value in the study of religion without lapsing into the homiletical excesses associated (rightly or wrongly) with theology? Is it even desirable?

There is an undercurrent of dissatisfaction in the Hart report not just about the answers to these questions but about the questions themselves. Is it fair to demand that scholars of religion present the data of their field in a purely non-partisan and dispassionate way when other departments in the humanities abound with partisanship? Hart asks quite rightly whether there is any department of literature in the country that is free from passion and partisanship about the value of literature? There is no doubt that the presence of churches, synagogues, temples, mosques, Dharma centers, and ashrams (all with Constitutional guarantees of freedom to exercise their religion) places a particular burden on religious scholarship that would not apply, for example, to departments of philosophy. But does the existence of banks, labor unions, and corporations impose similar restrictions on partisanship in the study of economics? If the situation changed and we promoted a tradition of advocacy in the study of religion, what should be its limits? And by what standards would we adjudicate disputes? The Hart report leaves this reader, at least, with the impression of a field unsettled—unsettled in its answers to basic questions and unsettled in its formulation of the questions themselves.

The Hart study is not likely to be repeated any time soon. If these questions are as important as they seem to be, the individual specializations that have flourished under the umbrella of the AAR should now take up the challenge and examine not only how they define the religious character of their subject but how they orient themselves to it. To put the matter simply, we should ask the specializations what is religious about the traditions they study and what is religious (if it is religious at all) about the way these traditions are studied. I say this out of more than a sense of intellectual curiosity. If there is a single conviction that has animated not only the Hart report but William Scott Green's term of service as editor of the *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, it has been the conviction that the study of religion is not just a series of isolated specializations but is a field with an identifiable subject matter and an inherent logic and purpose. They think of the *study* of religion as a vocation in the sense that Max Weber once thought of the now sadly diminished calling of the politician: they think of it is a sphere of life that one does not merely live *off* but lives *for*. It seems appropriate to raise the questions that they themselves have so often raised by exhortation and example: what is religious about the traditions we study, and what is religious about the way we study them?

The specialization that falls under my purview in this issue of the journal is the study of Buddhism, a specialization that reflects, on a smaller scale, the same organizational strengths and conceptual perplexities that Ray Hart found in the AAR as a whole. On the level of raw demographics, the participation in the meetings of the Buddhism section at the annual meeting of the AAR has shown remarkable growth, especially in the last five years. The last formal report of the Buddhism section (completed in December 1991) showed that attendance at the annual business meeting grew from 60 to 140 in five years. The mailing list grew from 106 to 600 in the same period. The increase in numbers was confirmed by the testimony of many veteran members of the section. The meetings of the Buddhism section of the AAR seem to have become the most useful place in North America for many scholars of Buddhism to connect with colleagues and learn about new developments in the field. It was interesting to note that even many senior scholars, who once disdained the AAR as oriented primarily to the study of Western religions, were making the pilgrimage to the convention to meet with former students and catch the latest trends.

49/14

But the location of the study of Buddhism in the AAR is seldom seriously examined. Is there any reason, other than convenience, to bring scholars of Buddhism together in this academy? Does the study of Buddhism share a common subject matter with other specializations in the AAR? Does it cross-fertilize with other specializations in the material it analyzes or in its mode of analysis? Does it have anything to contribute to others' understanding of the religious dimension of life? And is there anything religious about the study of Buddhism? Does it go beyond the mere production of knowledge to help someone understand what knowledge or understanding is *worth having*? Does it go beyond the description of the world's religions to ask what these options *mean for me, for us*? In other words, does it participate in the discourse that Hart referred to as "public theology?" These are charged questions, but they are lively ones, and they are questions that have deep significance not only for the study of Buddhism but for the AAR as a whole. I am convinced that the study of Buddhism has something important to say about these questions, and that, in the saying of it, the study of Buddhism can contribute the kind of theoretical leadership that until now has been ceded to other fields. But before I talk about another of Weber's cherished concepts, the concept of leadership, let me consider the questions themselves.

WHAT IS RELIGIOUS ABOUT BUDDHISM?

> Is Buddhism a religion or a philosophy? It does not matter what you call it. Buddhism remains what it is whatever label you put on it. The label is immaterial. Even the label "Buddhism" which we give to the teaching of the Buddha is of little importance. The name one gives it is inessential.

These words from the first chapter of one of the most widely read introductions to the Buddhist tradition (Walpola Rahula's *What the Buddha Taught*) should serve as a warning to anyone who expects an easy and unambiguous account of why "Buddhism" (if it is appropriate even to use this name) is religious. There has been an important movement in the modern presentations of Buddhism to minimize and discount the obvious "religious" features of the tradition. We read in Rahula's introduction, for example, "The freedom of thought allowed by the Buddha is unheard of elsewhere in the history of religions" (2) and, "Almost all religions are built on faith—rather 'blind' faith it would seem. But in Buddhism emphasis is laid on 'seeing', knowing, understanding, and not on faith, or belief" (8). Rahula's Buddhism is characterized by rationality, criticism, and direct experience. It has no need and no place for the inspiration of a god or some other supernatural being. It stems from the experience of a human being and calls not for faith but for knowledge and empirical confirmation in the experience of each of its adherents. It is not uncommon to hear that Buddhism is not a religion at all: it is a philosophy or simply a way of life.

It is now well known, however, that the elegance of Rahula's construction of Buddhism is won by deliberately suppressing elements in Buddhist life that do not fit his scheme. He signals as much in a comment that is appended to his discussion of faith: "In popular Buddhism and also in ordinary usage in the texts the word *saddhā*, it must be admitted, has an element of 'faith' in the sense that it signifies devotion to the Buddha, the Dhamma (Teaching), and the Sangha (The Order)." The range of possibilities covered by the terms "popular Buddhism" and "ordinary usage" is not likely to be small or insignificant, but these possibilities drop from view in Rahula's picture of the Buddhist tradition. It is not obvious how "religious" Rahula considers these possibilities to be. The traditions of mythology, symbolism, or worship that may lie behind the word "devotion" never make their appearance. But it is clear that Rahula considers them to belong more explicitly to the realm of religion than to the rational Buddhism that he attributes to the Buddha himself.

Where does Rahula's construction of the Buddhist tradition come from? How authoritative is it for the modern study of Buddhism? In a remarkable act of intellectual archaeology, Richard Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere have traced Rahula's construction of the Buddhist tradition to a series of intellectual and religious struggles that took place in Sri Lanka at the end of the nineteenth century (Gombrich and Obeyesekere; Obeyesekere). With the Buddhist Saṃgha on the defensive under the combined pressure of Christian missionaries and the British colonial administration, a movement arose to state the teaching of the Buddhist tradition in a form that could turn the tables on the Christian missionaries and take control of Buddhist religious education from the colonial administrators. The catalysts for this movement were an unlikely pair of Theosophists from America. Madame Blavatsky and Colonel Henry Steele Olcott arrived in Sri Lanka in 1880, took the five precepts that incorporated them formally into the Buddhist community, and adopted the Buddhist cause.

50|14

Olcott's interpretation of Sri Lankan Buddhism is most evident in *The Buddhist Catechism*, published in 1881, only a year after his arrival. Olcott distilled what he took to be the essence of the Buddha's teaching from English and French translations of the Pali Canon. He was aware that Christian apologists treated Buddhism as a "dark superstition" (Obeyesekere:224), and he responded to the charge in two ways. He argued first that the Buddhist tradition needed to be purified of the superstitious practices that obscured the Buddha's own teaching. His catechism asks: "Are charms, incantations, the observance of lucky hours and devil dancing a part of Buddhism?" (Obeyesekere:224). The answer is: "They are positively repugnant to its fundamental principles. They are surviving relics of fetishism and pantheism and other foreign religions." But he went beyond the defense of a purified Buddhism; he turned the tables on the missionaries and pointed out superstitious aspects of their own doctrines:

> Q. What striking contrasts are there between Buddhism and what may be properly called "religions?"
>
> A: Among others, these: It teaches the highest goodness without a creating God; a continuity of line without adhering to the superstitions and selfish doctrine of an eternal, metaphysical soul-substance that goes out of the body; a happiness without an objective heaven; a method of salvation without a vicarious Saviour; redemption by oneself as the Redeemer, and without rites, prayers, penances, priest or intercessory saints; and a *summum bonum*, that is, Nirvāṇa, attainable in this life and in this world by leading a pure, unselfish life of wisdom and of compassion to all beings. (Obeyesekere:224-225)

Obeyesekere has pointed out that there was more than a little irony in these words. From Olcott's catechism grew the tradition of Buddhist ambivalence (if not outright hostility) toward the concept of religion, but his catechism had a religious origin in Olcott's own liberal Protestant Christian background. He took his challenge to be one of purifying Buddhism by returning to the fundamental teaching of the founder as recorded in its authoritative scriptures. The teaching he found in these texts had much in common with the liberal Protestantism of the late nineteenth century. It was opposed to "superstitious" practices, suspicious of miracles and the supernatural, and respectful of the canons of reason.

Olcott made a particular point of noting that Buddhism was consistent with the teachings of modern science. One is reminded in different ways not only of the "religionless" Christianity of Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer but of the liberal distillation of the teachings of Jesus in Harnack's *Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity)*. The key connection lies less in their particular claims than in their general respect for scripture, their search for the teaching of the founder, and the suspicion of false ultimates that Paul Tillich, in another setting, has referred to as the "Protestant Principle." Is this a "religious" position? It is easy to understand the uneasiness with this word that Olcott bequeathed to his Buddhist successors, but it also is easy to understand that his own work can be understood as the unfolding of a religious impulse whose origin lay as much outside the Buddhist tradition as it did within.

Protestant presuppositions in the interpretation of Buddhism have come under criticism from a number of different directions in recent years. Obeyesekere himself argues that the attempt to fashion a Buddhism that is stripped of the miraculous, the mythological and the supernatural has also undermined the Sri Lankan Buddhist conscience, an argument that has powerful and poignant relevance to the sectarian struggles that now afflict the island. Stanley Tambiah has argued, in exquisite and excruciating historical detail, that the ideological movement to create a modern, purified Buddhism is implicated in the political movement to "purify" Sri Lanka of Tamil influence and has fed the cycle of ethnic violence.[1] On a topic that is less charged politically but significant nonetheless for the study of Buddhist origins, Gregory Schopen has argued that historical studies of Indian Buddhism have been distorted by a Protestant, textual bias (Schopen). Schopen has attempted to redress the balance by examining the non-canonical evidence that has been made available by Indian archaeology.

Some of the most important developments in Buddhist studies in the last decade can be read as attempts to shake off the constraints of "Protestant Buddhism" and work, as Obeyesekere and Tambiah do, with the broader social and cultural understanding of religion that stems from Durkheim and Weber. Tambiah

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[1] Tambiah has given a particularly revealing account of the relationship between Walpola Rahula's construction of a modernist, rational Buddhism and the mobilization of monastic of Buddhist "religio-Patriotism" (Tambiah 1992:22-29).

expressed the scope of this vision of the Buddhist tradition well when he said, "For me, Buddhism is a shorthand expression for a total social phenomenon, civilizational in breadth and depth" (Tambiah 1984). In the study of Buddhism, as in other areas of humanistic and historical studies, this shift of attention involves the deliberate inclusion of sources that previously have been overlooked—sources that stand on the margins of elite culture and sources that involve symbolic and ritual expressions of a "popular" consciousness rather than the culture of an intellectual elite.[2] The change in favor of a broader social and cultural definition of Buddhism also involves a shift in analytical style. The purpose is no longer, as it was for Olcott and Rahula, to distill the "essence" of the teaching by searching the most authoritative canonical sources, but to articulate a full social and symbolic system in the style of Durkheim or Geertz, and to uncover the transactions of power that lie behind the system, as in the diverse tradition that includes figures as different as Nietzsche, Weber, Marx, and Foucault. Examples of the change in Buddhist studies would be John Holt's work on the tradition of Avalokiteśvara in Sri Lanka, John Strong's work on the cult of Upagupta, and Bernard Faure's work on the ritual and symbolic system of Chan and Zen (1991; 1993). I also would include my own recent book on the metaphorical and symbolic expressions of Buddhahood, not as a pure example of the type, but as an attempt to wrest the study of an Indian Buddhist text out of its elite framework and explore its relationship with other symbolic patterns in Indian culture (Eckel 1992).

But some aspects of the Protestant paradigm are difficult to escape, even when the scope of study has deliberately been broadened. A useful measure of how durable Protestant categories can be is José Cabezón's recent book on Tibetan scholasticism. Cabezón clearly situates his work in the field of religion, not just in his choice of subject matter (the comparison of Tibetan scholasticism and medieval scholasticism in the West), but in his choice of concepts. He calls his book an exercise in the "comparative philosophy of religion" (1), he speaks of Buddhist doctrine as a guide to "salvific experience" (33), and he comments on the tendency among Buddhist scholastics to forget "what is arguably the most important of Buddhist tenets, that the ultimate aim is not acquisition of factual knowledge, but of transformative experience" (47-48). We can hear in these words an echo of Frederick Streng's venerable argument that the Buddhist concept of Emptiness is religious not because it has a sacramental or magical function and not because it designates an ultimate reality, but because it functions *soteriologically* to bring about an *ultimate transformation* (Streng). Streng's words themselves are an echo of the famous definition of religion in Paul Tillich's *Christianity and the Encounter of the World's Religions*: "religion is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern." Cabezón adds the concept of "experience" to Streng's definition, an addition that might be questioned not only from the point of view of Streng but from the point of view of Buddhist philosophy.[3] But the significance of Cabezón's words lies less in their precise formulation than in his instinctive return to the Protestant exegesis of ultimates.

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[2] In historical studies I am thinking, for example, of the work of John Darnton and in literary studies of the work of Stephen Greenblatt, behind both of whom stands the commanding presence of Clifford Geertz.

If Protestant understandings of religion still have impact, is there a place for the old metaphor of the distillation of essences? Cabezón would tell us, it seems, that essences have no place at all. He repeatedly disavows the search for an "essential core" (24). But the ghost of the word "essential" hovers over his argument, and occasionally, in an unguarded moment, it has the temerity to take a seat at the table, as in Cabezón's comment that "modern scholarly praxis in the humanities represents the secularization of what is essentially a religious method" (18). What should be done with this unwelcome guest? Certainly one could argue that essentialist thinking in the study of religion has been outgrown, replaced by the study of symbolic systems, structures of domination, and family resemblances. But the durability of the concept stems not merely from a lamentable intellectual reflex. The concept of the "essential" comes back into play whenever someone tries to distinguish what is Buddhist from what is not, what set of practices or habits of mind give the best account of the particular form of Buddhism in question (or of "Buddhism" as a whole), and what aspects of the tradition are important enough to merit further development.

In an article that deserves to be read much more widely in Buddhist studies than it is, Michael Pye has argued that there are

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[3] For an example of an Indian Buddhist critique of the concept of experience, see Eckel (1985).

52/14

important parallels between the struggle over the "essence of Buddhism" and the critical discussion that surrounded Harnack's classic study of the "essence of Christianity" (Pye). Given the historical connections between the concept of Protestant Buddhism and Protestant theology, this is not surprising, but the shape of the discussion still deserves careful study. Pye bases his analysis on Ernst Troeltsch's "Was heisst 'Wesen des Christentums'?" ("What Does 'Essence of Christianity' Mean?"). In this essay Troeltsch argues that the concept of an essence has two inescapable functions in historical studies. It is a *critical principle* that abstracts from the historical manifestations of a tradition and creates a normative image against which concrete historical cases can be compared and evaluated. It also is a *developmental principle* that functions, in Troeltsch's words, as "a driving spiritual force which contains within itself purposes and values and which elaborates these both consistently and accommodatingly" (Pye:15). Pye shows how the concept of an "essential" Buddhism functioned in the works of some of the pioneers of Buddhist studies, including Rhys Davids, Oldenberg, Stcherbatsky, Regamey, and Lamotte, in the same critical and constructive form that Troeltsch discerned in the works of Harnack and his critics. Pye also argues that the concept is inescapable in serious historical study:

> . . . western presentations of the history of Buddhism can only avoid being contaminated by this problem if they restrict themselves to the most minutely circumscribed area of research, and perhaps not even then. Any moderately general account of Buddhism is bound to raise such questions because, as Troeltsch made clear, they are the inevitable concomitant of the historical method itself. They can only be avoided by a relapse into an arbitrary dogmatism which for a westerner would be nothing more than naive posturing. (Pye:30-31)

A striking contemporary example of the search for an essential Buddhism manifested itself at the annual meeting of the AAR in 1993 (although it had been known for several years to specialists in Japanese Buddhist studies). This is the movement called "critical Buddhism" that is associated with the names of Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō at Komazawa University. Stated briefly, Hakamaya and his colleagues claim that the Zen concept of inherent enlightenment (*hongaku shisō*) violates the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of no-self, has been the cause of numerous social problems in Japan, and should be rejected in favor of a return to "true Buddhism." It would be fair to say that these arguments provoked an unusual degree of bemusement and consternation on the part of American Buddhist scholars, bemusement because Zen has functioned for many American scholars as the very measure of an authentic Buddhism, and consternation because the historical method of describing simply "what is there" seems to allows no room for such a bold rejection of tradition. What should scholars of Buddhism do? Should they sit back and watch with amused detachment as others engage in what seems to be a mutilation of the tradition? Or should they drop the cloak of objectivity and take up the struggle?

Not all scholars of Buddhism have sat on the sidelines. In his 1991 lecture on "Buddhism and Nature," Lambert Schmithausen took direct exception to Hakamaya's claim that the doctrines of no-self and dependent origination are the crucial criteria of "genuine Buddhism." The most striking aspect of Schmithausen's reply to Hakamaya is not the intensity of the argument (although that is striking enough) but the complexity of its play on the concept of "essence" in Buddhism. Hakamaya objects to Schmithausen's concept of "nature" precisely because it reminds him of the "self" (or "essence") that must be rejected to preserve a "genuine" (or "essential") Buddhism. Schmithausen cites canonical sources to argue that Hakamaya's view of no-self as the criterion of a "genuine" Buddhism is based on an arbitrary and tendentious construction of the textual evidence. This is the argument of a scholar who is not afraid to do battle with the ghost of essentialism. Or more accurately, this is a scholar who is not afraid to treat the ghost of essentialism as both an enemy and an ally in the struggle to apply Buddhist values to a problem of human life: the preservation of nature (in Schmithausen's sense) and the protection of the environment.

Not every scholar of Buddhism is likely to enter so boldly into the arena of intellectual conflict, but Pye's reading of Troeltsch should show that the sense of criticism and development in Schmithausen's work plays an essential part in the scholarly process if scholarship is to be more, in Pye's words, than "naive posturing." I use the word "essential" in this context deliberately. English, French, and German all permit the word "essential" ("*essentiel*," "*wesentlich*") to mean "necessary" or "important" without reference to an imputed "essence." The study of Buddhism would be much enriched if we could simply take the "essence" out

of the word "essential" and return the word to an honorable place in the vocabulary of scholarship. Cabezón could write a marvelous sequel to *Buddhism and Language* simply by commenting on the claim that "modern scholarly praxis in the humanities represents the secularization of what is essentially a religious method." "Essential" and "religious" in what sense? If "modern scholarly praxis" is essentially (or necessarily) religious, what is the nature of this necessity, and how does this necessity relate to the study of Buddhism? Is it simply a matter of the choice that a scholar like Cabezón makes to locate himself inside the tradition of Western academic discourse, or does the study of Buddhism itself give this "essentially religious" activity a distinctive shape? These questions would require serious scrutiny not only of the subtle ways that Western presuppositions have defined the religious dimension of Buddhism, but the ways Buddhists have cooperated with such a definition and coopted it for their own purposes. They also would require a closer look at the attractions and repulsions of the concept of "Protestant Buddhism" (and also at the "Catholic Buddhism" that lurks, quite appropriately perhaps, in Cabezón's account of Tibetan scholasticism).

To see yet again how important, how complex, and how durable is the search for an "essential" Buddhism we only need to look at the recent work of Tambiah and Obeyesekere. Both approach the Buddhist tradition, in Tambiah's words, as "a total social phenomenon" and are profoundly critical of the essentialism that characterizes some forms of modern, political Buddhism. Tambiah expresses the critical force of his position clearly at the beginning of *Buddhism Betrayed?*

> All too often a certain type of scholarship, especially that purveyed by what I dub the Pali text puritans, has essentialized Buddhism in terms of its "pristine" teachings and has viewed all subsequent historical developments, especially those of a political kind, as deviations and distortions from the canonical form. I have taken the approach that in order to understand Buddhists, I must look not at something reified as Buddhism, but at the universe, as far as possible, through the eyes and practices of Buddhist actors situated in history and in their local contexts. (Tambiah 1992:3)

But both Tambiah and Obeyesekere move beyond the mere criticism of what they see as the excesses of modern political Buddhism to what Troeltsch would have called the *development* of a more positive, tolerant Buddhist social vision. Obeyesekere identifies this as the Buddhism of the heart, associated with "the faith, devotion, miracle, storytelling and parables" that were not, in Obeyesekere's view, "excrescences to a pristine Buddhism," but "existed to some extent in the original doctrinal corpus" (Obeyesekere:229-230). Tambiah identifies it with "the traditional, precolonial galactic polities of South and Southeast Asia" that enabled Sri Lanka to include "diverse South Indian peoples and gods" within the Buddhist fold in a peaceful way and without coercion (Tambiah 1986:140). These visions may be opposed to essentialism in the naive sense of the word (as Schmithausen also was in his critique of Hakamaya), but they still are concerned with the *criticism* and *development* of an authentic Buddhist moral vision.

To argue that something crucial in the Buddhist moral imagination has been lost in the development of a modern, rational Buddhism is to argue that an alternative view of the conscience and society is more essential (in sense of being necessary or important) to the present practice of Buddhist life. This is anti-essentialism in the service of a new vision of essential Buddhism. It is critically self-aware and historically sophisticated, but it deals with essentials nonetheless. It blurs the line between description and evaluation, and it blurs the line between the study of the tradition and the creative renewal of the tradition. Another way to make this point is to say that it pushes Tambiah and Obeyesekere across the line from the dispassionate and objective study of Buddhism as a form of religion to the engaged, committed, *religious* study of Buddhism. It leads, in other words, to the second of my initial questions:

WHAT IS RELIGIOUS ABOUT THE STUDY OF BUDDHISM?

One of the most delightful aspects of the study of Buddhism in the American Academy of Religion is the sense that Buddhist scholars, by and large, are convinced that Buddhism matters. This conviction may not be as great in some as it once was, and it may be tinged with the bitterness of a jilted lover, but one enters the academic gatherings of the Buddhism section with the sense that one is joining a group of people for whom the Buddhist tradition has, once had, or may some day have significant religious meaning. At the AAR this feeling is not always widespread, and it is delightful precisely because of its rarity. It also, of course, is problematic. It opens itself to all of the suspicions that have been directed against theology in the academy. It runs the risk of blurring the line between preaching and scholarship, it becomes prescriptive rather than descriptive, and it confuses the practice of religion with its study. So, while the sense of conviction is palpable, the discourse of conviction is furtive, embarrassed, naive, or, much of the time, entirely absent. When it does manifest itself, as in Hakamaya's claim that "Zen is not Buddhism," it is greeted with a strained combination of dismay and consternation—a sense that something has gone wrong (in method if not in substance), but one is not permitted in public to say how and why.

54/14

I would argue that the moment has come to take a page from Troeltsch and recognize not only that Buddhist scholarship requires discrimination of the essential from the inessential but that this process of discrimination has a right to be both critical and creative. By discriminating the essential from the inessential, it looks critically on the legacy of the past, and by identifying the essential element or elements in a tradition, it looks forward with a vision of what that tradition might become. As Troeltsch said, "To define the essence is to shape it afresh" (Pye:16). I am convinced that the time has come for the study of Buddhism to come of age, to acknowledge that it is involved in a sophisticated process of interpreting, appropriating, and shaping the values of the Buddhist tradition, and to bring this process of interpretation, criticism, and creativity into the discourse of the academy itself.

This is not meant to be a plea for what Pye calls "naive posturing." There is enough of that in the AAR already to sate most appetites. It is plea instead for a thoughtful examination of the *religious* role that the scholarly study of Buddhism plays in the unfolding of the tradition it studies. By religious I mean two things, both of which are laced with ambiguity. It is religious in *location*, in the sense that it places itself, in part, within the tradition that it studies; and it is religious in *orientation* in the sense that it aims, also in part, at goals that it shares with the tradition itself. I say "in part" because it also looks at the tradition from the outside and takes a critical perspective on its construction of its own goals, even though it often is difficult to say at any particular moment in the process of study exactly what is inside and what is outside or what is consistent with a traditional construction of the goal and what is not. Sometimes it makes sense to say (in language that reflects both the paradoxes of the Mahāyāna and the paradoxes of modern historical scholarship) that it is inside precisely to the extent that it is outside and aims at the goal precisely because it deconstructs it. But it cannot fully separate the development of its own discourse from the unfolding discourse of the Buddhist tradition itself. To illustrate what I mean, let me refer to two recent examples of Buddhist scholarship that strike me as playing with great sophistication on the boundary between the language of religious commitment and the language of objective scholarship.

A Sacred Vision of Tibet

On the afternoon in the early winter of 1991 when the celebrated "weeping icon" of St. Irene reappeared at the St. Irene Chrysovalantou Greek Orthodox Cathedral in Queens, New York, an exhibition called "Wisdom and Compassion: The Sacred Art of Tibet" drew to a close at the IBM Gallery in Manhattan.[4] The icon of St. Irene had been stolen five days earlier and was returned in a plain brown wrapper, minus its jeweled frame, just in time to be exhibited at the cathedral's celebration of Christmas. The conjunction of these two acts of exhibition raised fascinating questions about the public display of religious objects, especially objects whose power is associated with a ritualized act of vision, and about the use of such objects in the public discourse of religion, scholarly and otherwise. Why had the icon been stolen? Why had it been so mysteriously returned? What determined its value? What powers did it display? What powers did it confer? And what comparable concepts of power and value were distilled in the text of *Wisdom and Compassion: The Sacred Art of Tibet*, the catalog that now stands as the scholarly record of that remarkable exhibition of Tibetan sacred art (Rhie and Thurman)?

As the icon's story unfolded in the pages of *The New York Times*, the simple drama of theft and return seemed to dissolve into a series of charges and counter charges about the authenticity of the icon and the legitimacy of the group who boasted of its possession. On the Sunday after the icon's return, while the mayor and the speaker of the city council joined a throng of reporters at the cathedral's service of thanksgiving, voices in the Greek community began to suggest that the theft had been staged to draw attention to the cathedral. Behind the suspicions and innuendo lurked a long-standing dispute in the Greek community about the calculation of the religious calendar. The majority of the community had already celebrated Christmas on the 25th of December, while the Old Calendrists who welcomed the icon back into their cathedral were looking forward to Christmas on the 7th of January. It was a great publicity coup (and a delightful challenge to their critics) to celebrate the return of the icon in full view of the city's media during the two-week period when their calendar differed most provocatively from the norm.

Behind the struggle to see and be seen by the media, the mayor, and the city, lay the icon of St. Irene itself, an object that had established its authenticity in the eyes of many of its devotees by weeping on the eve of the Persian Gulf War. Were the tears a sign of the icon's power or a lament over its powerlessness? Or were they a combination of both? Wherever the icon may have stood in the calculus of power, secular or otherwise, there was little doubt in the minds of its devotees about the icon's value. The parishioners of the cathedral had decorated the icon's gold frame with gems, gold and silver rings, bracelets and necklaces. In the theft, almost all of the jewels (worth about $800,000 according to the reckoning of the bishop) were lost. But the value of the icon in the eyes of the parishioners had not been diminished. The loss of the jewels gave them a perfect opportunity to show their conviction that the true treasure of the cathedral was the icon itself.

The controversy in the Greek community about the possession and celebration of the icon would have made a good primer for readers of *Wisdom and Compassion*. The Tibetan art also lent itself to complex messages of vision (what is seen and who sees it), value (sacred and secular), and power (personal, political, curatorial, technological). To understand how complex these messages are, one only needs to ponder the many layers of vision that combined to produce an exhibition of this size. There were the artists who created the artifacts. There were the users who first commissioned the objects. There were the monks who preserved them. There were the collectors whose skill or perseverance brought these pieces to the view of the West. There were the curators who preserved the pieces in their own museums, the curators who gathered them for this exhibition, the officials who provided the space or pronounced their blessing on its use, and finally the viewers who walked through the ordered spaces of the exhibition and used them to construct, however dimly, a vision of the curators' vision of the collectors' vision of the artists' vision of the users' vision of something we call "Tibet."

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[4] The remarks that follow are adapted from my review of Marilyn M. Rhie and Robert A. F. Thurman, *Wisdom and Compassion: The Sacred Art of Tibet*. The review appeared in *Books and Religion*, Spring 1992.

All these levels of vision would reward serious scrutiny, especially the vision of the collectors who brought these objects to the West. But the vision that confronts us most forcefully in the catalog of the exhibition is the vision of the authors and sponsors of the exhibition itself. In a foreword to the catalog, the Chairman of Tibet House, Richard Gere, explained that the exhibition had been planned as a central piece in the 1991 Year of Tibet, and was intended "to bring the world's attention to the richness and uniqueness of Tibet's tragically endangered culture." His depiction of Tibet's "endangered culture" could have been taken straight from the pages of James Hilton's *Lost Horizons*: "Prior to the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, the Tibetans were unusually peaceful and happy. Isolated for centuries from a chaotic world they deeply mistrusted, they developed a wondrous, unique civilization based wholly on the practice of Buddhism's highest ideals. . . . Tibet's importance for our own time, and for the survival of Earth itself, is more critical than ever. Being our most vibrant link to the ancient wisdom traditions, Tibet, and the sanity she represents, must not be allowed to disappear." Gere's words echoed the great myth of Shangri-La: Tibet as the lifeboat of culture, the storehouse of ancient wisdom, and the last great hope of civilization.

The stereotype of Tibet as an unusually peaceful and happy land has a long history in the works of Western travelers and explorers, but it was only in the middle of this century that the myth of Tibet as the bulwark of civilization came truly to flower.[5] In the 1930's, when the residents of Lhasa were looking outward toward the rest of the world, entertaining themselves with film images of Rin Tin Tin and watching the fledgling Tibetan army parade to the strains of "Rule Britannia," travelers began to look to Tibet as a remote and pristine sanctuary, protected from the ills of civilization. As European and American travelers saw their own world descend into the barbarism of the Second World War, they projected their fears about the future of civilization onto Tibet. In 1950, on the eve of the Chinese invasion, Amaury de Riencourt distilled these fears into a single question: "Are the forces of evil going to blow out the faint light which shines on the Roof of the World, perhaps the only light which can guide mankind out of the dark ages of our modern world?" (Bishop:209).

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[5] On the genesis of the myth see Bishop and Lopez.

The organizers of the exhibition of Tibetan sacred art and the authors of its catalog would have liked us to think that the answer to de Riencourt's question is "No." The exhibition and the text that accompanied it led visitors through a process of visualization that culminated in two great sights, one of the temples and monasteries of Lhasa, the other of Shambhala, the mythical kingdom that was the source of Hilton's image of Shangri-La. To achieve this vision, the exhibition followed a three-part pattern of sacred time, with a moment of *origins*, when a pattern of sacred action is established in the life of the founder, a period of *elaboration*, when others attempt to appropriate the pattern of the founder's action in their own experience, and a moment of *culmination*, when the aspirations of the adepts are lifted up and perfected in a heavenly ideal. The first part contained images of Śākyamuni, the Buddha of this historical era, the second images of saints, bodhisattvas, monks and adepts, and the third a series of "perfected worlds" or Pure Lands. The Pure Lands ranged from the paradises of great deities to places in this world that had been sanctified by the practice of great adepts. In this world, one place was worthy of special veneration: the land of Tibet. The authors tell us: "Through Tibet's seventeen-hundred-year association with the Buddha reality, the entire land of Tibet has become the closest place on earth to an actual Pure Land" (Rhie and Thurman:312).

But is this "land of Tibet" meant to be identified with a physical place, or is it another in a series of imaginative projections onto the blank space that used to lie north of the Himalayas on the map of Asia? The authors of the catalog themselves suggest an answer. They say that the Kālacakra maṇḍala, the great ritual device that served as the focal point of the exhibition and also as its central symbol, was meant to "create a sacred space within which the creative imagination can assert its power over substance" (384). The exhibition plays on the relationship between Lhasa the physical place and the kingdom of Shambhala. But, like other acts of Buddhist meditation, it also displaces it, so that the physical site gives way to an act of creative imagination and the perception of a different reality. The authors say that Tibetan art is meant to "open windows from the ordinary, coarse world we know onto the extraordinary realm of pure wisdom and compassion," to liberate

57/14

all beings from suffering, and to bring them "the bliss inherent in enlightened life."

This vision of the function of Tibetan art is reminiscent of the Orthodox description of icons as the windows of heaven, and, like the vision of a Christian icon, it too expresses itself in symbolic transpositions of value. Not only did the exhibition bring together works of great aesthetic and economic value and preserve a record of their presence in a weighty volume, but it led viewers into an imaginative act of donation. At the end of the exhibition, after the scenes of Lhasa and Shambhala, there was a display of two objects originally created to help monks visualize offerings to the deities: a three-dimensional, gilt representation of Mount Meru and a painting of the skull cups, corpses, and other objects precious to the wrathful Mahākāla. The cultivation of wisdom and compassion culminated in a distinctive Tibetan image of value—value that is imaginatively offered and value that is imaginatively gained.

To an eye made wary by the public battle over the icon of St. Irene, the exhibition also carried messages of a struggle for political power. St. Irene may have opened her devotees' eyes to heaven, but she also opened the eyes of the city to the political struggles of the Orthodox Church. The vision of Tibet embodied in the exhibition and the catalog carried a political message that was at least as powerful as the message of the icon's tears. The catalog opened and closed with maps showing the boundaries claimed by the Tibetan government at the Simla Conference in 1914, and the Dalai Lama opened his introductory message with a reference to "independent Tibet." To date the Tibetans have not been able to convince the Chinese either of the validity of these boundaries or of the necessity for an arrangement that can rightly be called "independence," although many in the Tibetan community still hope to tear these aspirations loose from the creative imagination and give them a place in reality. Museums and exhibitions often are used to reinforce and promote particular visions of national identity. One had the impression as this exhibition drew to a close that its sponsors would not have been offended if someone had stood in front of the great painting of Shambhala and thought that this vision called "Tibet" needed to move a few blocks east from a temporary seat in the IBM Gallery to a permanent seat in the United Nations.

This is scholarship in service of a vision that is as much religious as political. While aspects of it may strike the reader as naive, the exhibition and the catalog were superb examples of the marriage of a Western scholarly form to an indigenous Buddhist style of religious expression, in this case religious art as a vehicle for the vision (and visualization) of a world-view. And this world-view is not simply an abstract picture of the cosmos. It includes a commentary on sacred and secular images of material wealth and power, and it attempts to move that wealth and power around to its own advantage. It does not just represent Tibet, it attempts to *create* Tibet, or rather to create the particular image of the strong and independent Tibet that the organizers of the exhibition shared with its Tibetan sponsors. This is a form of creative scholarship that would have been familiar to Troeltsch: it "envisions an essence in order to shape it afresh." Whether one agrees with the political program that it expresses or approves of the way it brings that program to life, one would have to acknowledge that Buddhist studies would be poorer without the boldness and conviction that lay behind its vision of Tibet.

An Epistemological Critique of Zen

If *Wisdom and Compassion* sometimes lacked a sense of irony and self-criticism in the application of its scholarly vision, the same cannot be said of Bernard Faure's remarkable two-volume epistemological critique of Chan and Zen (1991; 1993). Faure is exquisitely aware, in the style of Foucault and Derrida, of the way the objectivity of scholarly discourse is compromised and undermined by its inscription in systems of power and social control. The purpose of his two volumes seems, on the face of it, to be a criticism of various Zen myths about the linear transmission of enlightenment from master to pupil and myths about the "immediacy" of enlightenment experience, but the subtext of the book is a critique of the possibility of constructing any coherent narrative about the Chan and Zen tradition. Faure gives an eloquent expression of his diffidence about the coherence of narrative at the beginning of the first of his two books:

> By providing the lineaments of a narrative, [this book] comes to serve—just like the related notion of immediacy that it subverts—a variety of performative functions distinct from its avowed purpose. When both immediacy and mediation are extenuated, however, the narrative fails and the book has to come to an end. One final disclaimer: the semblance of linearity of the above outline is merely for the sake of the reader's convenience and should not be

58/14

> seen as an attempt to save the harmonious continuity of the Chan/Zen patriarchal lineage or the cohesion of its orthodox teaching. (1991:10)

One is reminded of the diffident voice of Foucault in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, where Foucault spoke of his desire to slip imperceptibly into the lecture and enmesh himself in a nameless voice that had long preceded him, to take up its cadences, and lodge himself in its interstices (Foucault:215).

But the most striking aspect of Faure's text is not its diffidence. As for Foucault, Faure's diffidence carries with it a certain intellectual persuasiveness and power. What is most striking is his insistence in both volumes on the idea that scholarship should be self-consciously performative.[6] Scholarly discourse should not merely say something, it should do something, and, while it does, it should reflect on itself in such a way that it reveals its own rhetorical nature. This stylistic double vision of saying, doing, and unmasking the nature of the doing is characteristic of the style of Derrida and Paul de Man, but Faure also sees it as a characteristic of the performative rhetoric of Chan and Zen. ("Might this be the very aporia of the kōan?" [Faure 1993:150]) His own writing takes on the appearance of a complex interweaving of voices, some Buddhist, some Western, some descriptive, some performative, and all informed by the realization that no realization or rhetorical strategy is definitive or complete. Is this Buddhist? Is it Western? Is it historical argument? Is it the rhetorical play of a Chan or Zen master? Faure seems to say that it is all of these, and by being all of them, something else altogether.

My question is whether this rhetorical play is religious. My answer would be yes, but in a way that shows how complex it is to enact a Buddhist or Western project on the shifting boundaries between two cultures and two styles of academic discourse. Clearly there is a sense in which Faure's text is religious by location. Faure locates himself explicitly in a tradition of Chan and Zen discourse, but does it in a way that criticizes the concept of lineage and the very identity of a single tradition, just as he locates himself inside the discourse of Western historical method, while at the same time unmasking its status as a mode of rhetoric. But is it religious in orientation? Does his argument (if that is what it is) go somewhere? It is important to take his words at face value when he says that he is not attempting to chart the lineaments of a coherent narrative. This is not a book about enlightenment in ten easy steps. But it also would be difficult to deny that Faure constructs a discourse in which the values of truth and freedom play a crucial role, just as Charles Taylor has argued in the case of Foucault (Taylor 1986; 1989:487-489). His book is a working out of the discourse of Enlightenment in both the Buddhist and the Western senses of the word. Whether the orientation toward truth and freedom in the European Enlightenment is religious in nature we can leave to others to decide, but Faure himself shows that the drive toward Enlightenment in Buddhist tradition is embedded in a matrix of narrative and practices that is clearly religious in form. I take Faure's books to be a powerful example of religious scholarship in the best sense of the word: it discerns, it criticizes, and it creates the tradition afresh. It would be difficult to look at or practice Chan and Zen in the same way again after the publication of these fine texts.

CONCLUSION

To conclude let me return to Ray Hart's report on the study of religion. Hart found that there was a deep suspicion of "theology" in the academy, largely because of certain stereotypes about theology as "prescriptive" rather than "descriptive" and as a form of preaching rather than a form of study. Whether we continue to use the word "theology" seems to me to be immaterial. It has obvious disadvantages in traditions such as Buddhism where *theos* is not a significant concern. But I am convinced that the evolution of the study of Buddhism in the last several decades shows how important it is not only to acknowledge the critical and developmental dimensions of religious studies but to encourage their expression. It is not just students who are attracted to religious studies because they "want to know what it is to be human and humane, and intuit that religion deals with such things." There are at least a few scholars of Buddhism who feel the same way. For me the biggest unsettled question in the study of Buddhism is not whether Buddhism is religious or even whether the study of Buddhism is religious; it is whether scholars in this field can find a voice that does justice to their own religious concerns and can demonstrate to the academy why their kind of knowledge is worth having. If they can, Ray Hart's report shows that they would do a great service to the study of religion as a whole.

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[6] He speaks of perlocutionary language in 1991(9) and of performative language in 1993

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59/14

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60/14

/ 199

The Thousand-Headed Person

The Mystery of Hinduism and the Study of Religion in the AAR

Douglas R. Brooks

THE MYSTERIOUS PERSON

> The Person has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet . . . Such is his greatness, and yet the Person is more than this.
>
> –Ṛg Veda, 10.90

FOR THOSE OF US for whom the study of Hinduism and India is a passion and a profession, daily experience offers reminders of the immensity and complexity of the phenomena we encounter and, often by practical necessity, choose to ignore. We are humbled by our subject and occasionally even by one another; few among us presume anything like "mastery." In each other's company we stake out eminently sensible positions, rarely venturing into matters beyond the scope of our immediate expertise, eschewing generalizations for which we know there must be *some* exception. Isn't there always?

Whether we study "Hinduism" at all or only so many Hinduisms is an issue of some significance to ourselves and to the study of religion. Measured in terms of volume and content, our books, articles, and AAR papers suggest that we prefer more data, more "stuff" we haven't heard or considered; for one reason or another, we rarely address the larger issues of theory, identity, and definition. By and large we opt for Hinduisms, each of our own making. Irresolute about defining "Hinduism," or even the value of such an

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61/14

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no. 3

Matching Concepts

Deconstructive and Foundationalist Tendencies in Buddhist Thought

Roger R. Jackson

WHEN INDIAN BUDDHIST TEXTS first were translated into Chinese in the first and second centuries C.E., the Chinese did not have words for many of the concepts they encountered. Here were writings from a totally distinct civilization, that embodied values, a language, and a style of philosophizing that were in most ways radically different from those of China. We should hardly wonder that many Chinese found Buddhism's world-transcending monasticism, elaborate scholastic metaphysics, and fondness for abstract disputation to be utterly alien—and perhaps threatening—to their own concrete emphasis on the establishment of proper social and political relations among the living and proper rites for the dead.

At the same time, many Chinese heard in Buddhist texts echoes of some of their own classics, especially those of Taoism. In particular, the fondness for paradox and negative formulations that dominate the Buddhist Perfection of Wisdom literature recalled for many Chinese both the style and substance of the classics of "philosophical" Taoism, such as the *Tao te ching* and *Chuang Tzu*. Thus, when the process of translating these *sūtras* began, it was natural that the Chinese should seek terminological equivalents for Sanskrit words in their own literature. As a result, a Sanskrit term like *dharma* might be rendered by *tao*, which at other times was used to translate *bodhi* ("enlightenment"), or *yoga; arhant* was translated as *chen jen*, meaning "immortal"; *nirvāṇa* became *wu wei*, "non-action"; and *śīla*, "morality," became *hsiao-hsün*, "filial piety." By the same token, an entire passage of difficult Buddhist philosophizing might be justified or explained simply by a reference to a passage in, say, the *Chuang Tzu* that appeared to convey the same ideas.

This style of translation, appropriately enough, came to be known as *ko-i*, "matching concepts." The Chinese eventually recognized the limi-

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tations of *ko-i*, and the early translations made with the technique were supplanted by the more faithful and careful efforts of later generations. Still, *ko-i* provided an important initial bridge over which Indian Buddhist ideas could, literally, be trans-lated—carried across—into China.[1]

Ko-i is a Chinese term, but the phenomenon is hardly limited to early Chinese Buddhism. Indeed, the process of "matching concepts" is one that inevitably forms a part of any major translation of ideas from one culture to another. This is hardly surprising. Especially at first, members of a particular culture cannot be expected to understand alien ideas except through analogy to concepts they already know. Thus, *ko-i* has been involved (if not invoked) virtually any time the Bible has been translated, whether into Latin, King James' English or Cherokee; and it has come into play to one degree or another whenever non-Western ideas have been brought across into Western languages. An important exercise of the latter sort of translation is occurring even now, as Buddhist texts and ideas increasingly are rendered into Western languages.

The gap between ancient Buddhist and modern Western thought-systems hardly is less wide than that between India and China, so it is understandable that, more often than not, Buddhist thought has been translated and explained in terms of "matching concepts." Thus, we have renditions and readings of all or part of Buddhist philosophy that seek to understand it through one or another Western system or thinker: the Buddha through Hume or William James (Jacobson, Kalupahana 1987), Nāgārjuna through Wittgenstein (Gudmunsen, Thurman), Dharmakīrti through Kant or Quine (Stcherbatsky, Puhakka), tantrism through Heidegger (Guenther), Zen through Meister Eckhart (Suzuki), and so on. The advantages of such an approach in this early stage of cultural transmission are obvious: it permits Western readers to refer to concepts from their own tradition as a way of grounding Buddhist ideas that might otherwise seem utterly incomprehensible. That Indian and Western philosophical traditions have dealt with many of the same issues over the centuries gives an added plausibility to such an approach. The disadvantages, of course, are just as evident: there is a great danger, in any attempt to "match concepts," that the reader will assume that the context of Buddhist philosophical discussions is exactly the same as that of her own tradition, and so to think, for instance: "I understand William James, so I understand Buddhism"; or, even more insidiously: "Buddhism is not so difficult or different: it is just like

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[1] For discussions, see Wright (36-38) and Ch'en (68-69).

62/14

William James." This kind of reductionism makes a caricature of the translation process and inevitably must be overcome if real trans-lation is to occur.

These caveats notwithstanding, I consider here another variation on the game of matching Buddhist and Western philosophical concepts. Although such an exercise is danger-fraught and can be suggestive at best, the similar lines of inquiry pursued by the Indian and Western philosophical traditions make such comparisons possible in principle.

DECONSTRUCTION AND FOUNDATIONALISM

Two concepts have been much discussed of late in both Anglo-American and continental philosophy: deconstruction and foundationalism.[2] Deconstruction, best known through the writings of Jacques Derrida (who himself cites Nietzsche and Heidegger as prime influences),[3] begins as a critique of the idea that there is a privileged authorial point of view to be found in literary texts and ends as an attack on the essentialist, substantialist "logocentrism" of all Western philosophies of "presence." Throughout his or her critique, the deconstructionist generally is careful not to propound any privileged point of view that might itself be regarded as logocentric and hence ripe for deconstruction.

> Theories grounded on presence—whether of meaning as a signifying intention present to consciousness at the moment of utterance or of an ideal norm that subsists behind all appearances—undo themselves, as the supposed foundation or ground proves to be the product of a differential [i.e., self-contradictory] system. . . . But the operation of deconstruction or the self-deconstruction of logocentric theories does not lead to a new theory that sets everything straight.
>
> Even [traditional] theories [that criticize] logocentrism . . . do not escape the logocentric premises they undermine; and there is no reason to believe that a theoretical enterprise could ever free itself from those premises. Theory may well be condemned to a structural inconsistency. (Culler: 109)

Indeed, deconstruction is more a technique than an ideology. It seeks, through a "strategic nimbleness" (Culler: 155) that often resembles word-play, to expose the ideological underpinnings, the limitations, the illogic of all thought and interpretation. It comes, thus, to serve a primarily *critical* purpose in the ongoing conversation of philosophy, to deflate the certainties to which human thought—ever hopeful and ever-self-deluding—is prone.

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[2] Many of the ideas in the next several paragraphs are indebted to Rorty (1979), which first suggested the deconstruction-foundationalism polarity to me.

[3] See Derrida for the classic exposition of deconstruction.

Foundationalism is not, strictly speaking, the "target" of deconstruction; it is a term (coined, it would seem, by its opponents) that has emerged from recent discussions in the Anglo-American tradition.[4] Nevertheless, it does seem to form a kind of natural polarity with deconstruction, to which its assumptions are diametrically opposed. It is that approach to philosophy—rooted in Plato and revived by Descartes—that presupposes that it is both necessary and possible to establish firm ontological or epistemological foundations for the construction of human knowledge.

> Foundationalism . . . refers to the conviction that knowledge as a true and justified belief is based on foundations. Humans have beliefs and opinions that they need to justify if these beliefs and opinions are to become knowledge. A foundation, however, is neither justified by other beliefs nor based upon other beliefs, but rather provides the support for all other beliefs, itself needing no such support. Foundationalism presupposes certain basic truths that can be described either as self-justified (that is, not as justified through something else) or as irrefutable. All other truths are either justified by these basic foundational truths or are foundational in that they are self-justified, irrefutable and justify others. (Fiorenza: 285)

Without these foundations, whether they be Platonic "forms" or a Thomistic God or Cartesian "clear and distinct ideas," knowledge cannot be certain, and the ensuing skepticism and relativism will insidiously erode the meaning of "truth." With these foundations, knowledge is possible, communication can proceed, and the world can be ordered in a meaningful way. Foundationalism tends to be tied historically to a "correspondence" theory of truth, to the belief that true statements are those that correspond to a "way things are" extrinsic to the statements themselves. This, in turn, presupposes that there *is* a discernible "way things are," and that it can be known and expressed propositionally. Thus, foundationalism is a quest for and a confidence in precisely that kind of certainty that deconstruction seeks to subvert.

The overall project of Western thought, as reflected in such seminal

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[4] In those discussions (especially in Sosa, 1980a and 1980b), foundationalism more often is contrasted with coherentism. Alternatively (as in Rorty, 1982), it may be contrasted with pragmatism, though Culler (153-156) insists that deconstruction should not be identified with pragmatism.

82/14

figures as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes and Kant, has tended to be foundationalist, though this foundationalism has periodically been subjected to skeptical or deconstructive attack. In recent times, the attacks have increased, and the history of the last three centuries is one of the steady erosion of foundationalism and its replacement by one or another approach with deconstructive techniques or implications. Certainly today, foundationalism of the traditional variety is in considerable disrepute, and the anti-foundationalist successors of Heidegger and Wittgenstein dominate philosophical discussion. Still, the tension between the two tendencies hardly has been resolved for good, as evidenced by the ongoing and very important debate over "rationality and relativism," i.e., whether cross-cultural understanding is possible without some common fund of human knowledge to serve as a basis for communication, and whether, thus, some form of foundationalism must not, finally, be required. This debate, in turn, lays bare the inherent strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Foundationalism has the advantage of providing secure grounding for communication and "the world," along with the disadvantage that such secure grounding is notoriously difficult to establish—perhaps because of the paradoxes inherent in knowledge itself. Deconstruction has the advantage of dispensing with the ancient but dubious quest for certainty and embracing the limited, interpretive nature of all knowledge, along with the disadvantage of leaving us in doubt as to how any judgments are to be formed on matters of knowledge and morals.

If Western thought is a foundationalist project that no longer has the confidence of its convictions, Buddhism—with its strongly if not unequivocally anti-substantialist tenor—might seem at first glance to be precisely the opposite: an essentially deconstructive movement that has occasionally been infected by foundationalism. This is the view of Robert Magliola, who explicitly links Buddhism with deconstruction, primarily through an analysis of Madhyamaka and Zen.[5]

The deconstruction-foundationalism polarity is useful for interpreting Buddhist philosophy; the terms may not be Buddhist, but the tendencies they describe are very much present in Buddhist thought. However, Buddhism is not so clearly "deconstructive" a tradition as

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[5] Magliola: part 3. It ought to be noted that Magliola (89) agrees that "the dominant forms of . . . Buddhism. . . *are* logocentric in the Derridean sense"—it is primarily in Nāgārjuna and Zen that he finds a "Middle Path, [a] Way of the Between [that] tracks the Derridean trace, and goes 'beyond Derrida' in that it frequents the 'unheard-of-thought,' and . . . allows the reinstatement of the logocentric too" (87).

64|14

Magliola and others have suggested. There are both individuals and movements within Buddhism that are more foundationalist than deconstructive and thinkers and traditions that would be classed as deconstructive have in them strong, unavoidable, elements of foundationalism.

This assertion requires qualification in two ways. First, it is important to note that foundationalism (and, for that matter, philosophies of "presence") in the West generally have been grounded in some ontological or epistemological absolute, such as Being or the Cogito or some transcendental subject. If such grounding is definitive of foundationalism, and if we accept the common, though controversial, assumption that Buddhism denies the existence of any such absolute, then Buddhism cannot be considered foundationalist.[6] If, on the other hand, foundationalism can be described and defended without recourse to such absolutes, then we still can apply the term to Buddhism. The sort of non-absolutist foundationalism I am describing would be marked by its willingness to assert that, e.g., perception and inference can be the "foundations" of objective though not absolute certainty regarding important features of the world. Its denial of *absolute* certainty would distinguish it from classical Western foundationalism, while its assertion of *objective* certainty would distinguish it from either coherentism or pragmatism, which regard "objectivity" far more suspiciously, considering it relative either to particular conceptual schemes or particular human purposes.

Second, even if we admit that "foundationalism" is a term that may be applied to a non-absolutist tradition like Buddhism, we must specify that there are different *types* of foundationalism that may be encountered at different levels of discourse. Specifically, it is useful to distinguish between a "strong" foundationalism (whether "absolutist" or not) that claims that our knowledge *can* be certain, because it is grounded in objectively valid judgments about "the way things are," and a "weak" foundationalism that, while explicitly rejecting any such foundations, turns out to involve unstated (or understated) certainties about the way things are, hence the implicit presupposition of certain foundational facts about the world. It might be objected that such a "weak" foundationalism would be so all-embracing that both our everyday activities and the process of deconstruction itself would turn out to be foundationalist. At the risk of trivializing the meaning of "foundationalism," it is important to observe that there is, in fact, a kind of foundationalism at work in such areas—though it must be remembered that these foundations are not metaphysical absolutes but relatively adequate versions of the world that can in principle be defended by recourse to rational arguments based on some consensus about "the way things are."

The Buddhist tradition includes both deconstruction and foundationalism, and one may understand the Buddhist "middle way" as a dialogue between and balance of the deconstructive and foundationalist poles. I will generally employ this metaphor of "poles" in speaking of the tradition as a whole. When I explore particular positions within Buddhism, the metaphor I will employ is that of "frames." In other words, a particular thinker or school can be located along a generalized continuum that runs from the pole of deconstruction to that of foundationalism, and that thinker or school then may be described more specifically in terms of, e.g., whether it is a primarily deconstructive enterprise that is framed by foundationalism, or a foundationalist enterprise framed by deconstruction.

It might seem that to imagine deconstruction as a "pole" or a "frame" is to misconstrue it as merely one among many philosophical positions, whereas we have seen above that deconstruction is not simply another position, but a technique for exposing the incongruities inherent in any position. It is, thus, a sort of meta-position, not "locatable" in the ways that my metaphors would suggest. Granted, we must be as cautious in applying metaphors as in "translating" philosophical terminology, but I believe that (a) an approach that "deconstructs" all philosophical positions must itself engage in deconstruction from a particular "perspective," and a perspective—even if temporary and itself subject to subsequent deconstruction—is, at least in *some* meaningful sense, a "position"; and (b) even if deconstruction is not described as a "position," it does, at least conventionally, reflect an attitude toward the possibility of grounded knowledge that can meaningfully be contrasted with other attitudes, such as foundationalism. Where a meaningful contrast is appropriate, metaphors such as those I will employ may prove of some value.[7]

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[6] The question whether Buddhism admits an "absolute" has, of course, been much discussed. It ought to be recalled that "absolute" is a Western term, and that its presence or absence in Buddhism will depend in part on the way it is defined. Is an "absolute" a metaphysical entity, an immutable essence? Or is it simply a "limiting principle" of some sort? If it is the latter, then probably no Buddhist tradition lacks an absolute. If it is the former, I think it can be argued that a significant, if not overwhelming, majority of Buddhist traditions are committed, at the very least on

[7] This same problem often arises in discussions of whether the thought of Nāgārjuna (below, 512f.) can really be called "philosophy"—especially since Nāgārjuna himself insists (at *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29) that he has no "thesis" (*pratijñā*) to propose. Nāgārjuna's commentators disagree on how liter-

In what follows, we will look briefly at deconstructive and foundationalist tendencies in the Pāli canon—so-called "early Buddhism"—then examine, in turn, one classically "deconstructionist" Buddhist thinker, Nāgārjuna, and one classic "foundationalist," Dharmakīrti. We also will examine some later Indian and Tibetan attempts to synthesize these two apparently incompatible tendencies. Having seen that Buddhist thinkers, on whichever side of the divide we may place them, in fact combine elements of *both* deconstruction and foundationalism, we may be able to make some concluding observations about the "middle way" in Buddhist thought.

DECONSTRUCTION AND FOUNDATIONALISM IN THE PĀLI CANON

If we see deconstruction as an approach to philosophy that is epistemologically skeptical and ontologically anti-essentialist, there is much in the tradition of so-called "early Buddhism" to justify the claim that Buddhism is a fundamentally deconstructive tradition. This is especially true when we compare Buddhism's ideas not with those of the contemporary West, but with those of the other Indian traditions that co-existed with it and from which, to a degree, it emerged. Buddhism was, to begin with, a śramaṇic movement, one of that minority of groups—the Jainas and Materialists were others—that rejected the authority of the Vedas. Buddhists did, of course, accept the validity of their own scriptures, but they did not regard them as "divine," i.e., the eternal in verbal form, in the way that most Hindus regarded the Vedas. Furthermore, there are a good many places in the Pāli canon where the Buddha severely restricts the number of avenues through which valid knowledge may be acquired. The most famous of these, perhaps, is in his advice to the Kālāmas (*Aṅguttara-nikāya* I, 89) not to be certain in doubtful matters on the basis of report, tradition, hearsay, "proficiency in the collections," logic, inference, considering reasons, reflecting on and approving some theory, concern for propriety or respect for a recluse. Virtually every socially or intellectually-based foundation for knowledge is rejected: socially-based foundations would be any that are derived in any way from the testimony of others, whether because the tradition itself must be accepted or the because the teacher is regarded as uniquely authoritative; intellectually-based foundations would be those that are derived through rational processes. Examples could be multiplied, but it is safe to say that there is a strong element of caution—if not outright skepticism—running through early Buddhist epistemology.

By the same token, early Buddhist ontology is clearly anti-essentialist or, in deconstructionist terminology, non-logocentric. There is no enduring substance to be found anywhere in the phenomenal world through any method of investigation. Thus, the cosmos itself has as neither its source nor its substance any kind of immutable principle, whether it be considered Brahman or Brahmā; on the contrary, it proceeds beginninglessly on the basis of material forces and the *karma* of sentient beings—all of which are transient conditions.[8] Similarly, and even more important, the individual neither has nor is at her core any kind of eternal soul-substance, such as the *ātman* of Hinduism or the *jīva* of the Jainas. Indeed, what we conventionally call a "person" is merely a constellation of five ever-changing aggregates, of matter, sensation, recognition, dispositions and consciousness. These aggregates are exhaustive of the "person." Hence, in an ultimate sense, search as we may for an objective correlative for our term, "I," we only will discover—as when we peel an onion—that at the core there simply is nothing. This point about the absence of enduring self may or may not be—as later tradition claimed—the "central doctrine" of early Buddhism. There can be no doubt, however, that it has been an important idea from the very earliest times, one that is expounded in countless passages in the Pāli canon. To cite just one important example: in the *Milinda-pañha* (section 25), the Buddhist monk Nāgasena argues in detail to the Indo-Greek king Milinda that there exists no "self" apart from the aggregates any more than there exists a chariot apart from the pole, axle, wheels, chariot-body and banner-staff; indeed, the "self," like a "chariot," is merely "a way of counting, a term, an appellation, a convenient designation, a name" (Warren: 132).

There is, thus, a sense in which both knowledge and reality are "deconstructed" by the early Buddhist tradition. At the same time, however, early Buddhism is not utterly deconstructionist; indeed, there are important, if subtle, ways in which it is foundationalist. This latent

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ally this is to be taken. As with deconstruction, it is at least arguable that the "position of no position" still requires a certain perspective and set of assumptions, and so in some sense still is a position. For an interesting recent discussion of this issue, see Thurman (161ff.).

[8] *Nirvāṇa* is—arguably—immutable, hence a candidate for an early Buddhist "absolute"—but it does not serve as the source or substance of the phenomenal world; it is, rather, the radical alternative to the phenomenal world, qualified by characteristics that the phenomenal world lacks—hence immensely difficult to conceptualize or describe for those of us whose knowledge is exclusively phenomenal. For a discussion, see Jayatilleke (chapter VI).

foundationalism begins to emerge when we recall the overall context and purpose of the Buddhist movement: the achievement of *nirvāṇa*. The achievement of *nirvāṇa* is, of course, the "gospel," the "good news," of Buddhism, and it is an important assumption of many—if not all—early Buddhist texts that our success or failure in achieving *nirvāṇa* results from our apprehension or misapprehension of certain crucial features of the cosmos, e.g., the existence or non-existence of a substantial self. *Nirvāṇa* depends, in short, on knowledge. If *nirvāṇa* is possible, and depends at least in part on knowledge of the way things are (*yathābhūtaṃ*), then there must be a clearly identifiable and knowable way that things are. There must, as a result, exist *some* type of knowledge that has universal validity, that can serve as a foundation for our apprehension of the truth. This is where the second part of the Buddha's discourse to the Kālāmas is pertinent. For all his distrust of testimony and reason as sources of knowledge, the Buddha does assure the Kālāmas that one's own experience is a source of knowledge on which one may rely. Thus,

> . . . when you know for yourselves: These things are unprofitable, these things are blameworthy, these things are censured by the intelligent; these things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to loss and sorrow—then indeed do ye reject them, Kālāmas. . . .If at any time ye know of yourselves: These things are profitable, they are blameless, they are praised by the intelligent; these things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to profit and happiness—then, Kālāmas, do ye, having undertaken them, abide therein. (Radhakrishnan and Moore: 346)

There are any number of philosophical questions that this approach may beg, and I will not enter here into the debate as to whether this outlook reflects an early Buddhist "empiricism thesis." It is sufficient for our purposes to indicate that knowledge is an important and necessary element of the path to *nirvāṇa*, and that correct knowledge, based above all on one's own experience, is possible. It may be that the "experience" invoked is of an extraordinary rather than the ordinary kind, perhaps achievable only through meditation. Nevertheless, in early Buddhism there does exist a foundation for correct human knowledge.

Similarly, although early Buddhist ontology has a strongly deconstructive element, not every object of ontological knowledge is regarded with the same suspicion as is the self. Indeed, the Buddha himself makes it clear on a number of occasions that there are objects that he rejects categorically, objects that he rejects or asserts provisionally, and objects that he asserts categorically. It is, for instance, arguable that the general formula of dependent origination (expressed abstractly as "if *x*, then *y*; if no *x*, then no *y*.") though of course asserted to be true *a posteriori* on the basis of the Buddha's experience, functions for many Buddhists very much like an *a priori* ontological principle, serving as it does as the virtually unquestioned basis for explaining all the processes of both *saṃsāra* and the path to *nirvāṇa*.[9] Dependent origination may not involve any kind of essentialism or logocentrism, but it does serve as a principle moore fundamentally "true" than other principles. Similarly, the four noble truths are regarded as being among those objects that the Buddha categorically asserted. In other words, they are true for all people in all times and places. Thus, like the principle of dependent origination, they are foundational truths, not subject to the same type of "deconstruction" as, e.g., Brahmā or the *ātman*. Not only is there in early Buddhism a foundation for knowledge on the subjective side—one's own experience—but there also are objects of knowledge, "truths," that are themselves considered universal and foundational.

66|14

Early Buddhism, despite a certain deconstructive tone, turns out on closer examination to have foundationalist elements as well. Indeed, precisely to the degree that the Buddha claimed to have discovered a *dharma* that was universal, he assumed (a) that there were certain vital truths that had to be known by every sentient being, and (b) that there must exist an epistemological basis for their apprehension. Thus, he could not help but invoke some form of foundationalism. Still, on balance, I think we have to regard early Buddhism as a middle way between deconstruction and foundationalism. There do exist foundational truths and a way of knowing them aright, but the very truths that are known have as an important—if not exclusive—part of their content an understanding that "foundations"—if they are taken as ontologically substantial—are nowhere to be found. There is little evidence that the early Buddhist tradition drew out all the implications of its exercise in deconstruction, but such implications certainly could be drawn in principle. They were, in fact, explicitly drawn by the radical thinkers of the early Mahāyāna, especially the authors of the Perfection of Wisdom *sūtras* and the great philosopher, Nāgārjuna.

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[9] And coming, too, to serve as what has been called a Buddhist "creed," found in inscriptions throughout India: *ye dharmā hetuprabhāvā hetūṃ teṣāṃ tathāgato hyavadat teṣāṃ ca yo nirodho evaṃ vadī mahāśramaṇa* ("Whatever *dharmas* are generated from causes, the Tathāgata has described their [causes], and whatever is their cessation [he also has described]; thus speaks the great recluse").

DECONSTRUCTION AND FOUNDATIONALISM IN NĀGĀRJUNA

If the early Buddhist tradition contains clearly deconstructive elements, but does not follow the deconstructive tendency to its logical conclusion, there would appear to be many instances in Mahāyāna thought where deconstruction is undertaken relentlessly and thoroughly, even to the point where the cosmology and soteriology explicated in the Pāli canon seems to be called into question. Thus, that quintessential Perfection of Wisdom text, the *Heart Sūtra*, states that in emptiness (*śūnyatāyām*)—in reality rightly viewed—there are no five aggregates, or twelve entrances, or eighteen sense-fields, or twelve links of dependent origination, or four noble truths, or spiritual attainment. Similarly, the second-century founder of the Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, uses specific modes of philosophical analysis to negate a variety of Buddhist and non-Buddhist concepts, among them some of the most hallowed and fundamental of notions: causality, motion, time, action, etc. Further, Yogācāra-oriented writings, such as the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and the treatises of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, argue that the "triple world" in which sentient beings live and wander is "only mind" (*cittamātra*), or "only a percept" (*vijñaptimātra*), without any "objective" reality external to the consciousnesses that perceive it.

Finally, the masters of traditions of practice like tantra and Zen often engage in deliberate mockery of concepts that other Buddhists hold sacred, the ultimate expression on this attitude perhaps being contained in such collections of *koans* as *The Gateless Gate*. There we encounter story after story in which conventional Buddhist notions are undercut by the words and actions of Zen masters, whose words and actions are, in turn, undercut by the compiler of the stories, Wu-men, whose comments may be undercut by later commentators, and so on, in an endless and dizzying regress of deconstruction that often leaves the reader—and, no doubt, the meditator—feeling as if she has slipped to the other side of Alice's looking-glass. Here we cannot consider all of these many deconstructive trends in the Mahāyāna but will examine just one, the Madhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna.[10]

There is much dispute over precisely which works attributed to

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[10] There is, in fact, some dispute among scholars as to whether Nāgārjuna ought to be counted as a Mahāyānist—Warder and Kalupahana (1986) are conspicuous in arguing that he should not—but this raises hermeneutical and textual issues beyond the scope of this paper, and does not affect the direction of our discussion.

67/14

Nāgārjuna actually were written by him, but almost all scholars agree that, at the very least, he can be credited with two philosophical treatises in verse, the *Madhyamakakārikā* ("Stanzas on the Middle Way")[11] and the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* ("Averting the Arguments").[12] In these two texts are found probably the most relentlessly deconstructive arguments ever framed by a Buddhist. In the twenty-seven chapters of the *Madhyamakakārikā*, Nāgārjuna demonstrates through a variety of dialectical strategies (most famously the "tetralemma" known as the *catuṣkoṭi*) that concept after concept employed by philosophers in general and Buddhists in particular simply does not stand up to a rigorous analysis, is "empty" (*śūnya*), and therefore must be discarded by the wise. For instance, in the first chapter, Nāgārjuna analyzes causation and establishes that absurd consequences ensue no matter how the process is described. If entities arise from themselves, then we sacrifice the meaningfulness of the distinction between cause and effect, for they would be identical. If they arise from something other, then we are hard pressed to explain how particular effects may be "connected" to particular causes. If they arise from both themselves *and* from something other, then contradictory properties are being illegitimately asserted of one and the same entity. If they arise from neither themselves nor something other, then nihilistic chaos may be entailed. Thus, all possible explanations of causation entail absurdity.

In the twenty-fifth chapter, Nāgārjuna subjects the *summum bonum* of Buddhism, *nirvāṇa*, to a similar analysis. If *nirvāṇa* is said to exist, then it must be an entity subject to production and destruction, but this contradicts the definition of *nirvāṇa* as unconditioned. If it is said not to exist, then its very possibility as a human attainment is being denied, and this is contrary to the "gospel" of Buddhism to the effect that enlightenment is possible. If it both exists and does not exist, then contradictory properties are being asserted of the same concept. If it neither exists nor does not exist, then no meaningful statement is being offered. Thus, *nirvāṇa*, like causation, cannot stand up to analysis. Other concepts are negated because they are relative to one another, like the different aspects of time, motion, or quantity, while still others are denied because they are made up of parts, or are dependent on causes and conditions that are extrinsic to them. By the time one has worked one's way through the major part of the *Madhyamakakārikā*, there seems little of the world left to stand on—the ontological foundations seem to have been utterly deconstructed.

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[11] For an edition and translation of the *Madhyamakakārikā*, see, e.g., Inada.

[12] For an edition and translation of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, see, e.g., Bhattacharya.

If the *Madhyamakakārikā* is Nāgārjuna's great exercise in ontological deconstruction, then his great critique of epistemology is found in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. There, in verses 31-51, he analyzes the concept of epistemological authority (*pramāṇa*), those sources of knowledge such as perception or inference that were taken by virtually all Indian philosophical schools of his time to be the foundations for our understanding of the world. Using a dialectic similar to that employed in the *Madhyamakakārikā*, he demonstrates that if authority is derived from itself, then it will be self-referential and tautologous, whereas if it requires another authority for its validation, then that authority will require a further validating authority, and so on, in infinite regress. Similarly, if an authority is said to prove something that has not already been proved—a standard requirement for a formal inference—then it must forever be separated from the provable, and thus will prove nothing, whereas if an authority proves something that already has been proved, then it will be redundant, and will not prove anything, either. Thus, Nāgārjuna concludes (verse 51), "[a]uthorities are not proven by themselves, by each other, or by other [sources]; there is no existence of authorities through authority-objects or accidentally." Thus, the means of knowing the world, the *pramāṇas*, are vitiated by Nāgārjuna as surely as are the ontological constituents of the world.

It would seem that we have arrived at a deconstructive impasse, where no object or means of knowledge has any foundation, and knowledge itself—including knowledge of the Buddhist path—thus becomes impossible. This, in fact, is precisely the criticism directed at Nāgārjuna by an unidentified opponent at the beginning of the twenty-fourth chapter of the *Madhyamakakārikā*, and it is Nāgārjuna's response to this criticism that makes it clear that his enterprise is not a purely deconstructive one. It must be understood, Nāgārjuna says (24:8), that in teaching the *dharma*, the Buddhas have recourse to two levels of truth, or the utterance of truths from two perspectives: the concealing, or conventional, truth and the highest, or ultimate, truth. The ontological and epistemological deconstruction to which Nāgārjuna has devoted so much effort is his attempt to understand things from the ultimate point of view, i.e., to demonstrate that no entity, concept, or authority can hold up to ultimate analysis, because it cannot be shown to exist *svabhāveṇa*, that is, intrinsically, by its own nature, independently, substantially. Conventionally, all the concepts that Nāgārjuna has analyzed are perfectly valid; they only are negated in terms of *svabhāva*. Indeed, Nāgārjuna points out (24:14), it is only because entities and concepts are empty of *svabhāva* that there even can be a conventional world, for a world in which entities did have *svabhāva* would be a world in which change was impossible, and the world is only comprehensible on the basis of its changes, its differences. Thus, Nāgārjuna not only affirms the conventional world, but actually establishes it through his ultimate-level deconstruction of it! He is quite explicit about this in his own commentary to the final verse of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, where he insists that "[a]ll things obtain for him in whom emptiness obtains, while nothing obtains for him in whom emptiness does not obtain." What, specifically, obtains is dependent origination, which Nāgārjuna already has established (at *Madhyamakakārikā* 24:18 and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 22) as both a basis for and a positive counterpart to the concept of emptiness. Dependent origination, in turn, entails not only the basic principle of causality, but the specific validity of the various conventions of the Buddhist path.[13] That Buddhist path, it is evident, can be completed; there is a *nirvāṇa* at its end. Indeed, *nirvāṇa* is to be achieved precisely through the wisdom, *prajñā*, that comprehends that entities and concepts are empty of inherent existence. Emptiness, it ought to be noted, is an extension of, but by no means a radical reformulation of, the concept of no-self, comprehension of which, we may recall, is an important requisite for the achievement of *nirvāṇa* in the early Buddhist tradition.

Thus, for all his deconstructive rhetoric, Nāgārjuna turns out to be a foundationalist too, for his entire critical enterprise can only finally be understood within the still larger frame of a conventional Buddhist pursuit of enlightenment. In that pursuit, which motivates and shapes Nāgārjuna's entire project, it is assumed that there is an enlightenment to be achieved by sentient beings, that there is a way the world is—empty—that must be known if enlightenment is to be achieved, and that there is a way—intellectual and intuitive *prajñā*—that the way the world is, can be known. Granted, the content that is cognized by one who knows the world as it actually is—emptiness—is the sort of object that, comprehended, may vitiate many of our assumptions about the world and thus lead us to deconstruct it. But if we deconstruct the world utterly, rob it of all its foundations, then we will have misunderstood the Buddha's purpose in teaching emptiness and will have abandoned precisely those cosmological, ontological and epistemological assumptions that are the foundation for our exercise in deconstruction.

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[13] For a discussion of some of the implications of this verse, see Jackson.

Though there is not the space to analyze them separately here, it should be evident, *mutatis mutandis*, that the negative rhetoric of the Perfection of Wisdom *sūtras*, the radical perspectivism of the Yogācāra, and the endless rug-pulling favored by tantric and Zen masters are not any more exclusively deconstructive than Nāgārjuna's analyses, for they, too, must be seen within the larger frame of a quest for a real enlightenment through real knowledge of what is really true about the world. This only can be achieved if there are ontological and epistemological foundations on which we may securely rest; thus, these movements, too, however deconstructive they may appear, presuppose at least a "weak" version of foundationalism.

FOUNDATIONALISM AND DECONSTRUCTION IN DHARMAKĪRTI

The "deconstruction" that is so important a part of the project of Nāgārjuna and other Buddhist thinkers masks an element of foundationalism that implicitly motivates and helps to shape that project. It still may appear, however, that Buddhist philosophy is a fundamentally deconstructive enterprise, in which foundationalism serves as a problematic but peripheral element. But, for a significant number of Indian Buddhist thinkers the establishment of epistemological foundations is a central rather than a peripheral concern. Such foundations arguably are the concern of the architects of the *abhidharma*, from the authors of the Pāli *Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, to the compilers of the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, to Saṅghabhadra and Vasubandhu, to Asaṅga—for what is the *abhidharma* but a foundational description of the elements and categories of existence acceptable to Buddhists? If the point is debatable in regard to the *abhidharma*, it cannot seriously be questioned when we look to the representatives of what sometimes has been called the "Pramāṇa School"—the tradition of Buddhist thought that focused above all on the establishment and delineation of the sources of epistemic authority (*pramāṇa*), without which our knowledge of neither the conventional world nor the salvific truths of Buddhism ever could be established. Although they do not always receive detailed attention in intellectual—let alone popular—histories of Buddhism, such figures as Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti provided both the tools and a major part of the agenda for Buddhist philosophy from 500 C.E. onward, first in the Indian tradition, and then in the Tibetan, where their influence is felt to this day.

From among these figures, Dharmakīrti (6th-7th centuries C.E.) stands out as especially interesting for our present discussion. Dharmakīrti's position in the *pramāṇa* tradition is not precisely analogous to Nāgārjuna's founding role in Madhyamaka, for much of the intellectual groundwork was laid for Dharmakīrti by his great predecessor, Dignāga. Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti has been considered by later tradition to be at least as important a figure as Dignāga; indeed, for the Tibetans, he is more important. More to the point for our concerns, it was Dharmakīrti who pursued the implications of his foundationalism the farthest, seeking not only to establish secure bases of epistemic authority, but to apply those authorities toward the solution of traditional problems in ontology and religious metaphysics. Dharmakīrti begins one of his last and most important works, the *Nyāyabindu*, with the ringing affirmation that "[a]ll successful human action is preceded by correct cognition."[14] The indispensibility of knowledge for the successful completion of human projects, whether secular or religious, entails the necessity of establishing what, in fact, knowledge is, what its types are and how we can determine whether it is delusive or veridical. Thus, Dharmakīrti seeks, in his various works, to determine the nature and possible applications of the sources of epistemic authority, the *pramāṇas*. Indeed, the work considered his masterpiece by later generations makes this evident with its title: *Pramāṇavārttika*, the "Commentary on Authority."[15]

69/14

We may recall that the *pramāṇas* were—at least from an ultimate standpoint—rejected by Nāgārjuna in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī*; Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, seems to have entertained no such doubts about the possibility of establishing the foundations of epistemic authority. Indeed, the entire *pramāṇa* tradition exudes confidence that we can know how it is we know, and that once this is established, there are few areas that our knowledge cannot confidently approach. For Dharmakīrti, as for Dignāga before him, there are two, and only two, epistemic authorities, namely, perception and inference. Of these, perception, which is direct and nonconceptual, is the more basic. There are four different types of perception that are accepted: sense perception, which is the direct, nonconceptual apprehension of a sensory object; mental perception, which is the direct apprehension of a mental moment following on a sense perception; apperception (*svasaṃvedanā*), which is a simultaneous cognition that directly apprehends any sensory or inferential cognition; and yogic perception, which is a direct apprehension of ultimate reality, as, for instance, the four noble truths, or no-self.[16] Just as the subjective side of perceptual knowledge is securely grounded, so is the objective: that which perceptions apprehend are the real "own-marks," or "specific characteristics" (*svalakṣaṇa*) of entities. What is important here is not what these own-marks may be, but the fact that Dharmakīrti assumes that such things exist. This implies that there are actual ontological foundations of the world that can serve as the objects of actual, founded epistemic authorities.

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[14] For a translation of the verse that includes Dharmottara's important commentary, see Stcherbatsky (II, 1).

[15] The title generally is glossed by Dharmakīrti's commentators as the *"Commentary on [Dignāga's Compendium on] Authority."* The *Pramāṇavārttika* has not yet been translated *in toto* into a Western language. The most useful edition presently available is that of Miyasaka, which includes the Sanskrit and Tibetan on facing pages.

Because it is direct and nonconceptual, perception may be the more fundamental of the two authorities; inference is indirect and conceptual, but it is securely founded knowledge, for it is rooted in the positive and negative concomitance between a reason, or sign (*hetu, liṅga*) and the subject (*dharmin*) and predicate (*pakṣa*) of a proposition (*pratijñā*). This concomitance is not merely an arbitrary or purely logical relationship, as it might be in some forms of Western symbolic logic. Rather, it is assured by the fact that it has invariably been *observed* to obtain. The importance of observation for inference is shown by the fact that built into the essential structure of what is sometimes called the Buddhist "syllogism" is the requirement that positive and negative instantiations of the probative concomitance be cited. Thus, it is not sufficient merely to assert that "on that hill (subject), there is fire (predicate), because there is smoke (reason)." The probative concomitance between smoke and fire must be exemplified by adding, "like in a kitchen"—where there is fire—and "unlike in a lake"—where there is none. Thus, inference explicitly invokes and is grounded in perception and ultimately in the direct apprehension of the actual own-marks of real entities. It is for this reason that Dharmakīrti specifies on a number of occasions that valid inferences must be "effected by the force of actual entities" (*vastubalapravṛtta*).[17]

On the basis of such valid inferences, Dharmakīrti believes, we may come conceptually to know truths not only about the everyday world, but also about such great matters as the existence or non-existence of

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[16] See, e.g., Stcherbatsky (II, 25-33). No-self, in fact, is regarded as one the "sixteen aspects of the four noble truths" that must be realized according to several *abhidharma* traditions. Specifically, it is one of the four aspects of suffering, the other three being suffering, impermanence and emptiness.

[17] A discussion of this is found in, e.g., *Pramāṇavārttika, Parārthānumāna* chapter, verses 48-71. See Tillemans (147, note 17).

70/14

the self, the reality or unreality of past and future lives, and the comparative validity of the systems of the great philosophers and religious teachers. Indeed, Dharmakīrti devotes an entire chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika*, that on the "Establishment of Authority" (*Pramāṇasiddhi*) to a systematic attempt to demonstrate that the Buddha is uniquely authoritative for those intent on spiritual liberation. He seeks to do this by proving logically (a) the possibility of the Buddha's having achieved an enlightened state and (b) the validity of what he teaches on the basis of his enlightenment, the four noble truths. This, in turn, entails various subsidiary proofs of, e.g., the non-existence of God, the mind's independence of the body, the limitless expandibility of mental qualities, and the unique soteriological value of the insight into no-self.[18] Whether or not Dharmakīrti succeeds in his demonstration is not the issue here; what is important is that he believes that such a demonstration is possible, and it is possible because it ultimately is rooted in common, securely-grounded *observations* about the way the world actually is.

Dharmakīrti's project seems almost diametrically opposed to Nāgārjuna's: there *is* a way entities actually exist, and it is given to us directly and veridically in the various modes of perception, which are, in turn, the basis for legitimate conceptual knowledge about the world, both the everyday world that is closely related to the senses and the metaphysical world that lies beyond them. Dharmakīrti seems overtly and thoroughly a foundationalist, who could gladden the heart of an Aquinas or Descartes.

It hardly should surprise us, however, that matters are not so simple. Just as there turned out to be elements of foundationalism in Nāgārjuna's enterprise, so, too, are Dharmakīrti's writings—foundationalist as they may seem—shot through with deconstructive elements. To begin with, Dharmakīrti's ontology is fundamentally that of classical *abhidharma* Buddhism and therefore is based on the assumption that nowhere in the cosmos is there to be found an entity that is or has abiding substance (*ātman*). In Dharmakīrti, this assumption is expressed in a number of important ways, e.g., through his defense of a soteriology based on no-self; his insistence that those real, efficient entities that are possessed of own-marks abide only for the shortest conceivable instant (*kṣaṇa*), and then are destroyed; and his assertion that we comprehend classes of objects not through apprehending some inherent universal—for the permanence usually predicated of universals is an impossibility—but through the exclusion (*apoha*) of what is *not* an appropriate classification. All these notions, whatever their philosophical strengths or weaknesses, serve to undermine a substance ontology; and to the degree that they do so, they tend to undermine the absolute certainty with which anything may be said to exist in a particular, definite manner—for such specification often results from conceptual misapprehensions rooted in substantialist assumptions. This last point is certainly arguable, for Dharmakīrti would appear to believe that his non-substantialist ontology does not vitiate his epistemological foundationalism. Indeed, he goes to considerable lengths to demonstrate that it is perfectly compatible with it, and, in fact, the only ontology on the basis of which knowledge actually can be explained.

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[18] The *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* has been translated *in toto* but not published, by Nagatomi, and partially translated by Vetter. A full translation of it, keyed to rGyal tshab rje's Tibetan commentary, will appear in my *Why Buddhism Is True*, forthcoming from Wisdom Publications, London.

Even if the deconstructive effect of Dharmakīrti's non-substantialist ontology is questioned, one finds that another, still more basic tendency toward deconstruction informs his thought: his adherence to the Yogācāra view that all the three worlds are "only a percept" (*vijñaptimātra*).[19] The corollary of this view is the assumption that the mistaken belief in an ultimate duality of subject and object is the basis of our circling in *saṃsāra*, and that the direct realization of their *non*-duality is the essential point to be realized in yogic perception, which is the experience of an *ārya*, who has cut the roots of ignorance and is assured of enlightenment. If the non-duality of subject and object is what must ultimately be realized on the Buddhist path, there is a sense in which ordinary perceptual and inferential knowledge is sublated and relativized, for ordinary knowledge is necessarily dualistic, and such dualism turns out to be without any foundation in ultimate reality. Like Nāgārjuna, Dharmakīrti claims that conventional knowledge has a conventional validity, but is negated by the higher perspective of one who sees things as they ultimately really are. There is a more than incidental element of deconstruction involved in Dharmakīrti's thought.

Our discussion cannot end here, however, for just as the outermost frame of Nāgārjuna's deconstructive project was a type of foundationalism that assumed that there *is* a knowable way things really exist, i.e., as empty; so, too, the outermost frame of Dharmakīrti's project involves a similar perspective. Just as the foundationalism that seems so basic to Dharmakīrti turns out to be sublated in important ways by an ultimate

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[19] See, e.g., *Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣa* chapter, verses 320ff.

71/14

standpoint in which all dualistic knowledge is delusive, so, too, that ultimate standpoint turns out to be sublated by a further foundationalism that structures the entire project. As with Nāgārjuna, this foundationalism assumes that there is a way the world is in the ultimate sense, i.e., only as a percept, and that this way that the world is, can be known authoritatively, e.g., by yogic perception. Thus, both ontology and epistemology, in the final analysis, have foundations, even if the foundational object (non-duality) and subject (yogic perception) represent a radical departure from and perhaps an implicit undermining of the conventional ontological and epistemological foundations that we require in the everyday world.

THE MEETING OF NĀGĀRJUNA AND DHARMAKĪRTI: INDIAN SVĀTANTRIKA AND TIBETAN PRĀSAṄGIKA

Our selection of Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti to represent, respectively, the tendencies toward deconstruction and foundationalism in Buddhist thought is not entirely arbitrary. Although they never used the terms deconstruction and foundationalism, Buddhist philosophers of the later first millennium C.E. recognized instinctively that the two tendencies represented by Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti were in some way of fundamental importance, that neither could be entirely ignored, and that, consequently, both had to be elements of a serious philosophical enterprise. As a consequence, some of the most important thinkers of late Indian Buddhism were explicitly engaged in the attempt to harmonize the deconstruction of Nāgārjuna and the foundationalism of Dharmakīrti. This tendency in turn was adopted by the Tibetan philosophical tradition and has continued as one of the notable features of Tibetan Buddhism until this day.

Nāgārjuna was very suspicious of attempts to establish the traditional foundations of knowledge. Despite his implicit acceptance of some canons of rationality, such as the tetralemma (which itself implied an Indian equivalent of the law of the excluded middle), he avoided argumentation in syllogistic modes and devoted himself primarily to applying a critical, deconstructive dialectic to the propositions of other schools. This approach was adopted and defended by one of the two Mādhyamika traditions that developed in the centuries after Nāgārjuna, the Prāsaṅgika, whose most important representatives were Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. A second group of Mādhyamikas, however, the Svātantrikas, saw the value (and perhaps the necessity) of arguing more

72/14

constructively, and thus concerned themselves not only with the dialectics of emptiness, but with the attempt to establish and build upon epistemological foundations—perhaps in an attempt to secure a solid and specific grounding for conventional truth. After all, Nagārjuna himself had said (*Mādhyamakakārikā* 24:10) that conventional truth was a necessary prerequisite to ultimate truth, but he had said little about the particulars of that conventional truth. If the conventional truth was so important, it needed to be established firmly, and the writings of the members of the *pramāṇa* tradition provided the most promising grounds for such establishment.

Thus, beginning with Bhāvaviveka in the sixth century, and continuing down through such figures and Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, Svātantrika Mādhyamikas deliberately attempted to combine, on the one hand, the Mādhyamika concern to establish emptiness as the ultimate mode of existence of all phenomena and, on the other hand, the *pramāṇa* tradition's concern with epistemic authority and its extension into rational argumentation and philosophical construction. The Svātantrikas themselves evinced at least two different tendencies in their analysis of conventional reality, leading to a later Tibetan division of the tradition into "Yogācāra" and "Sautrāntika" sub-schools,[20] but the main lines of the Svātantrika approach are common to both, and involve "a tendency to reconceive traditional ontological questions in the epistemological form made popular by Dignāga and his successors" (Eckel: 51). Thus, not only might formal inference be applied to the demonstration of the ultimate truth that all entities are empty of substantial existence, but questions of conventional truth would be framed primarily in terms of concepts and issues that had come to the fore in the *pramāṇa* tradition, such as the nature and types of authority, momentariness, causal efficiency, universals and particulars, etc. Further, many Svātantrikas applied themselves not only to the critique of other schools, but also—very much in the spirit of Dharmakīrti—to the positive establishment of a variety of Buddhist philosophical and religious ideas, i.e., to proving Buddhism true through rational argumentation.[21] Whatever their success or failure in balancing two such fundamentally contrasting trends in Buddhist thought, the important point remains that the Svātantrikas attempted to do so, and thus, implicitly, accepted that deconstruction and foundationalism were approaches to knowledge and the world that were not fundamentally at odds.

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[20] See, e.g., Sopa and Hopkins (122-145), and Lopez (299-386).

[21] Especially notable in this regard was Śāntarakṣita, in his *Tattvasamgraha*; this has been trans-

Buddhism died out in India during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but not before the majority of its latter-day systems of theory and praxis had been transplanted to Tibet. Consequently, Svātantrika Madhyamaka was very influential in the formation of Tibetan philosophical attitudes, especially in the early period of Buddhism's spread, during the eighth and ninth centuries. During the later period of Buddhism's spread, from the eleventh century onward, Tibetans increasingly—though not exclusively—tended to consider themselves Prāsaṅgika rather than Svātantrika Mādhyamikas. However, this did not mean an abandonment of the Svātantrikas' epistemological concerns. The study of Madhyamaka and *pramāṇa* developed simultaneously in the Tibetan lineages, and their lines of development tended to converge,[22] to the point where, in the fifteenth-century founder of the dGe lugs, Tsong kha pa, they have become fused into a single intellectual enterprise. That enterprise is nominally Prāsaṅgika, and therefore technically avoids defining conventional *truth* in terms derived from the *pramāṇa* tradition. In fact, however, the dGe lugs account of conventional reality is rooted precisely in that tradition. Study of the works of Dignāga and, especially, Dharmakīrti is a cornerstone of dGe lugs philosophical training, nearly as important as the study of Madhyamaka itself. This, in fact, is the case for all of the major Tibetan schools. They may disagree among themselves over the strength of the connection between conventional and ultimate cognitions, and thus over the importance of rationality for soteriology—to this extent they may be characterized as more or less deconstructive or foundationalist[23]—but they all agree that any substance ontology must ultimately be deconstructed and that secure foundations are available for the establishment of conventional objects and modes of knowledge. Thus, their monastic curricula all include the study of both Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti.

At least one very important line of Buddhist thought, beginning in India and extending into Tibet, explicitly attempted to balance the tradition's contrary tendencies toward deconstruction and foundationalism. Whether this resulted in a sublime harmony of the fundamental poles of philosophical thought or was an ill-conceived attempt to eat one's cake

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[22] On this, see, e.g., van der Kuijp.

[23] From this perspective, the dGe lugs pas would be the most strongly foundationalist, the rNying ma pas the most deconstructive, with the Sa skya pas and bKa'brgyud pas somewhere in between. All, however, contain elements of both.

and have it too, is not for us to determine here; what is important is simply the fact that a major segment of the Buddhist philosophical tradition saw the indispensibility of both deconstruction and foundationalism, and the consequent necessity to include *both* in any serious intellectual enterprise.

DECONSTRUCTION, FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE MIDDLE WAY

Deconstruction and foundationalism form an important, if implicit polarity in Buddhist thought, and almost any Buddhist system of philosophy or meditation may be placed at some point on the spectrum that runs between the two poles. Of the thinkers and schools that we have examined in detail, Nāgārjuna would be found very close to the deconstructive pole, Dharmakīrti very close to the foundationalist pole, and such traditions as early Buddhism, Svātantrika Madhyamaka and the Tibetan dGe lugs somewhere in the middle. The close identification of a thinker or movement with one or another of the poles does not mean the exclusion of the other pole. Even predominantly deconstructive enterprises like Nāgārjuna's have foundationalist elements, and foundationalisms as apparently thoroughgoing as Dharmakīrti's have important deconstructive tendencies built into them. There is no system that does not include both poles. It might well be argued that the Buddhist "middle way" is to be found precisely in any given system's negotiation between deconstruction and foundationalism.

In terms of our other metaphor, that of frames, the innermost frame in a Buddhist system tends to be the "strong foundationalist" assertion of worldly and religious conventionalities. (In the case of, e.g., Dharmakīrti, this is the frame on which our attention focuses.) That frame is surrounded and sublated by a wider frame that involves, in one way or another, the ultimate deconstruction of those conventionalities. (In the case of, e.g., Nāgārjuna, this is our focus.) That deconstructive frame, however, is in turn surrounded by the still wider "weak foundationalist" frame of the essential Buddhist values, which structure the very enterprise of distinguishing between the conventional and the ultimate. The frame metaphor might seem to imply that Buddhism is in the final analysis a type of foundationalism, albeit a "weak" one, but that "outermost" foundationalist frame is itself still subject to further deconstruction. We may imagine that outermost frame corroded by the deconstructive element within it, or we may imagine its being surrounded by still another deconstructive frame.

73/14

Regardless of which metaphor we employ, the relationship between deconstruction and foundationalism in Buddhism is not static, and neither one can finally seal off or exclude the other. Any foundationalist assertion is subject to ultimate deconstruction from a variety of viewpoints: no-self, emptiness, mind-only, and so on. Conversely, any deconstruction presupposes that some conventionalities have enough of a foundation in reality that both the ordinary world and the deconstructive enterprise itself can make some sense. Those foundations are themselves open to further deconstruction, but the deconstruction of them, in turn, involves certain conventional foundations that may themselves be deconstructed, and so on, ad infinitum. It would seem that Buddhism issues in an aporeitic dialectic of endless sublation that only will lead to philosophical and spiritual frustration. However, it may well be that the real source of philosophical and spiritual failure is precisely the attitude that would seek finally to resolve the deconstruction-foundationalism polarity in favor of one or the other. From the Buddhist point of view, this would be a fall to one extreme or the other—and we must recall that one of Buddhism's most basic metaphors is that of holding to a middle between extremes, whether of hedonism and asceticism, eternalism and annihilationism, or, simply, "is" and "is not." The spiritually agile Buddhist walks a difficult tightrope, balancing two truths, holding a pole weighted deconstructively on one end and foundationally on the other, knowing that if her equilibrium is lost, the fall will be a long one.[24] As long as both are under her control, however, passage will be possible and the goal—which is no goal, but a goal nevertheless—will be attainable.[25]

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[24] It might be noted that in many Mahāyāna traditions, a *buddha* is defined cognitively by his or her ability to know simultaneously all conventional and ultimate phenomena, i.e., the two truths; this is an ability that sentient beings, even high-level *bodhisattvas*, lack: they are capable of cognizing only one or the other.

[25] An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium on Buddhist Thought and Culture graciously organized in April, 1988 at the University of Montevallo, Montevallo, Alabama, by Prof. Frank Hoffman. I would like to thank Mr. Patrick Pranke of The University of Michigan for first articulating for me the tension in Buddhist thought explored here; Drs. John E. Thiel, Janet Gyatso and Lynn Stephens for their helpful comments and criticism of that earlier version; and Dr. Nancy McCagney and JAAR's anonymous reader for suggestions regarding a later draft.

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74|14

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75/14

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76/14

WZKS 1998, 42

THE SKANDHAKA OF THE VINAYA PIṬAKA AND ITS HISTORICAL VALUE

*By Torkel Brekke, Oxford**

In the first twenty-four chapters of the Khandhaka section of the Pāli Vinaya Piṭaka we find the account of the enlightenment of the Buddha and the foundation of the Buddhist Saṅgha. This account is undoubtedly old. However, in his book on the original Skandhaka – of which the Pāli Khandhaka is one version – ERICH FRAUWALLNER (1956) believed that the time-span between the death of the Buddha and the composition of the text was at least 150 years. If FRAUWALLNER was right, the author of the Skandhaka would have described events of the distant past. I want to show that the time separating the origins of the Skandhaka from the events that it describes may be considerably shorter than previously assumed. Thus, the historical value of the work is greater than believed by FRAUWALLNER and by historians who have relied on his work. It seems to me that the Skandhaka deserves more attention from scholars who work with early Buddhism.

When I use the term 'Skandhaka' or 'Original Skandhaka' without further specification I refer to a literary work that was composed more than two thousand years ago. I refer to the original form of the text. The term 'Skandhaka', then, is not used for the Skandhaka of any particular Buddhist school. The Skandhaka was composed at a time when there were no Buddhist schools. We know this because the Mahāsāṅghikas include this text in their canon. It must have been composed before the first schism at the Council of Pāṭaliputra where the greater part of the Saṅgha broke away from the Sthaviras, the elders. The Vinayas of six Buddhist schools are preserved. They are the Vinayas of the Sarvāstivādins, the Dharmaguptakas, the Mahīśāsakas, the Pāli school, the Mūlasarvāstivādins and the Mahāsāṅghikas.[1] The Skandhakas of the different schools are very similar in content.

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[1] Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1956: 1ff. Following FRAUWALLNER I use the term 'Pāli school' for the school by which Buddhism was introduced into Ceylon. For an overview of the literature on Vinaya see CH. PREBISH, Recent Progress in Vinaya Studies. In: Studies in Pāli and Buddhism. A Memorial Volume in Honor of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap, ed. A.K. NARAIN. Delhi 1979, p. 302.

The greatest degree of congruence is found between the Skandhakas of the Sarvāstivādins, the Dharmaguptakas, the Pāli school and the Mahīśāsakas.[2] There is no reason to doubt that these Skandhakas have a common ancestor. **FRAUWALLNER** believed that the Vinayas of these four schools are so similar because they are the products of one missionary enterprise, and that their Vinayas therefore can be traced back to the same text which was current at the starting-point of the missions, i.e. Vidiśā.[3] What the Vinayas of these schools have in common, then, can be taken as the original content of this Vinaya of Vidiśā.

According to the Dīpavaṃsa[4] and the Mahāvaṃsa[5], Tissa Moggaliputta, after the third council, sent missionaries to several places. In rock edict XIII, Aśoka says that he has sent his envoys to different peoples. Are the missionary enterprises which are mentioned in the Sinhalese tradition the same as the ones of Aśoka's XIII rock edict? **FRAUWALLNER** identifies the peoples mentioned in Aśoka's edict with the countries in the Sinhalese tradition and concludes that Aśoka must have sent the missionaries, and that this enterprise was the origin of the four schools whose Skandhakas are most similar.[6] However, **FRAUWALLNER**'s theory has been criticized. Firstly, one could doubt **FRAUWALLNER**'s arguments for Vidiśā as the origin of the missions. His arguments are the following:

(1) Mahinda's mother was from Vidiśā, and Mahinda set out from Vidiśā on his mission to Ceylon.

(2) Vidiśā was an important religious center at the time of Aśoka.

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[2] Cf. **FRAUWALLNER** 1956: 2.

[3] See **FRAUWALLNER** 1956: 1–23.

[4] Dv. VIII (p. 53f. = tr. p. 159f.) it is related that Moggaliputta sent Majjhantika to Gandhāra and Mahādeva to Mahisa; Rakkhita is said to have preached the Anamataggiya (i.e. a group of ten *suttas* in the Saṃyutta Nikāya), and Yonakadhammarakkhita another discourse in Aparanta, Mahādhammarakkhita in Mahāraṭṭha, Mahārakkhita in Yonaka country, Majjhima, Durabhisara, Sahādeva and Mūlakadeva in Himavanta, Sona and Uttara in Suvaṇṇabhūmi, and Mahinda on the island of Laṅkā, thereby converting various peoples to Buddhism.

[5] Mv. XII (p. 94ff. = tr. p. 82ff.) gives the account of the mission in greater detail than the Dv. However, the *theras* who are dispatched by Moggaliputta are more or less the same and the places are the same except that Majjhantika preaches in Kaśmīr as well as in Gandhāra. The Mv. also says that Rakkhita, whose area of mission is not specified in Dv. VIII, is sent to Vanavāsa (southern India?). Moreover, Mahinda's companions to Laṅkā are specified.

[6] "If we compare with these data the account of the missions in the Singhalese chronicles, we must at once state that the two sources look at the same things from different points of view. Aśoka speaks of peoples, the missionary account speaks of countries." (**FRAUWALLNER** 1956: 16).

(3) Relics of three of the missionaries have been found in *stūpas* near Vidiśā.

Secondly, the idea that a single missionary enterprise converted all these countries and peoples to Buddhism seems to be an oversimplification[7].

Having identified a Vinaya of Vidiśā, **FRAUWALLNER**'s next step is to clarify the relationship between this and the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins. The Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins differs from the other Vinayas in that it contains a large quantity of fables. **FRAUWALLNER** points to a passage in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa which mentions two Vinayas. One is the Vinaya of Mathurā which includes also the Avadāna and Jātaka. The second is the Vinaya of Kaśmīr which has rejected the Avadāna and Jātaka and contains only the essentials.[8] On the basis of the passage in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa he identifies the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins with the Vinaya of Mathurā and the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins with the Vinaya of Kaśmīr.[9] Having linked the Mūlasarvāstivādins with Mathurā, **FRAUWALLNER** goes on to argue for the independence of this school and its Vinaya from the schools that were the results of the missions, among them the Sarvāstivādins. He also argues that the Mūlasarvāstivādins were a very early school, and that the Vinaya of Mathurā was existing side by side and independently with the Vinaya of Vidiśā[10].

But do the Mūlasarvāstivādins not belong to the same dogmatic tradition as the Sarvāstivādins? **FRAUWALLNER** has foreseen this objection and argues that the foundation of communities based on the Vinaya and the rise of dogmatic schools are two completely different things.[11] Therefore, the Mūlasarvāstivādins can well be a part of a larger school and at the same time be independent in terms of the Vinaya.

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[7] **LAMOTTE** says (1958: 339): "La chronique singhalaise simplifie les faits à l'extrême en attribuant la conversion générale de l'Inde à l'action d'une poignée de missionnaires mandatés par Moggaliputtatissa et en fixant à cet événement mémorable la date précise de 236 p.N. ... Il va sans dire que l'initiative privée joua son rôle dans le mouvement missionnaire; mais l'effort des individus s'estompe devant la force intrinsèque d'expansion de la Bonne Loi qui, pour se manifester, ne demandait que des circonstances politiques favorables. Celles-ci furent réalisées par la création de l'empire Maurya et la conversion du grand empereur Aśoka. Tous les obstacles étant levés, la Bonne Loi fit en quelque sorte tache d'huile, gagnant de proche en proche presque toutes les régions du continent et s'étendant jusqu' à Ceylan." (≈ 1988: 310).

[8] Cf. **FRAUWALLNER** 1956: 26.

[9] Ib. p. 27.

[10] "On the other side, the Mathurā community had nothing to do with these missions. It is an old community, much earlier than Aśoka, and plays an important role already at the time of the council of Vaiśālī." (ib. p. 37).

[11] Ib. p. 38.

78/14

LAMOTTE does not agree that the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins is the Vinaya of Mathurā mentioned by Kumārajīva.[12] He says that the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins was closed much later, offering three arguments:

(1) The Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya contains a prediction about Kaniṣka. The way in which the text treats the great king proves that the text is considerably later than Kaniṣka who, as LAMOTTE suggests, reigned some time during the second century.

(2) The person of Śākyamuni in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya is not the sage of Kapilavastu but rather a superior god.

(3) Fa-hsien who visited India in 402 and 411 in search for copies of the Vinaya, does not seem to have had any knowledge of this Vinaya.

"Pour toutes ces raisons, on ne peut attribuer à cet ouvrage une date antérieure aux IVᵉ-Vᵉ siècles de notre ère"[13].

RANIERO GNOLI adopts a middle position between FRAUWALLNER's view of an early date and LAMOTTE's opinion of the fourth-fifth century as a *terminus post quem* for the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins.[14] On the basis of the text's prediction concerning Kaniṣka and its tales concerning Kaśmīr he believes that the date of the text must be taken back to the time of Kaniṣka[15].

In his analysis of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, J.L. PANGLUNG does not introduce an independent view concerning the dating of the text, but, like GNOLI (1977: XX), he quotes WALDSCHMIDT to show that this Vinaya is a very heterogenous work.[16] The period of compilation was long; the texts which constitute the extant Vinaya were "laid down in different epochs, and subsequently patched up together"[17].

The next step for FRAUWALLNER is to push the origin of the Skandhaka another step back by comparing the Skandhaka of the Sarvāstivādins, Dharmaguptakas, Mahīśāsakas, the Pāli school and the Mūlasarvāstivādins with the Skandhaka of the Mahāsāṅghikas. First, he observes that the account of the two first councils is found in all these works. This shows that these accounts were part of the original Skandhaka. FRAUWALLNER suggests that also the story of the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa was a part of the original work. What about the story of the illumination and the founding of the order? In the case of the Pāli school, the Dharmaguptakas and the Mahīśāsakas we find this tale in the beginning of the Skandhakas, and in the case of the Mūlasarvāstivādins there is a corresponding section in the Saṅghabhedavastu. But FRAUWALLNER is faced with the problem that the story of the illumination and the early history of the Saṅgha seems to be lacking in the Skandhakas of the Sarvāstivādins and the Mahāsāṅghikas; in LAMOTTE's words:

"Dans les deux Vinaya que les traditions indigènes examinées plus haut présentent comme les plus proches de l'antique Vinaya d'Upāli – à savoir les *Vin. des Sarvāstivādin* et *des Mahāsāṅghika* –, il n'y a pas de traces de la biographie initiale du Buddha"[18].

The solution to this is quite simple. The Sarvāstivādins did have an account of these things, but by later tradition it was not regarded as a part of the Vinaya. In the case of the Sarvāstivādins, the Catuṣpariṣatsūtra, the story of the origin of the four assemblies – i.e. the monks, the nuns and the male and female lay-supporters –, belongs to the Dīrghāgama of the Sūtra Piṭaka. FRAUWALLNER believes that it originally belonged to the Skandhaka. The correspondence between the Catuṣpariṣatsūtra and Mahāvagga 1–24 of the Khandhaka of the Pāli school is nearly complete. It seems that also the Mahāsāṅghikas had the Buddha biography and the story of the early Saṅgha. FRAUWALLNER points to a passage of a biography in Chinese which says that the Mahāsāṅghikas had a biography of the Buddha called *ta shih*, i.e. *mahāvastu*.[19] He believes that it originally belonged to the Skandhaka. The important point is that the Mahāsāṅghikas actually had this text like the other schools, because this supposition moves the composition of the biography of the Buddha and the history of the first Saṅgha further back: to the time before the schismatic council of Pāṭaliputra.

The Historical Value of the Skandhaka

WALDSCHMIDT (1951) has done a comparative analysis of the most important part of the Skandhaka, the Catuṣpariṣatsūtra. About the comparison of this account in the extant versions belonging to different Buddhist schools he said the following: "Damit kann die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung der Begründung der buddhistischen Gemeinde auf ein Fundament tieferer Schicht als bisher erreichbar gestellt werden"[20].

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[12] "Quant au *Vin. des Mūlasarv.* qui consacre deux Skandhaka à la biographie complète et suivie du Buddha, il ne provient pas d'une ancienne communauté bouddhique fixée à Mathurā dès le premier siècle du bouddhisme – comme le voudrait M. Frauwallner (p. 37) – mais d'une immense somme de discipline close très tardivement et très probablement rédigée au Kaśmīr pour compléter le *Vinaya des Sarvāstivādin*. Lorsque, dans le passage étudié plus haut, Kumārajīva parle du «Vinaya du pays de Mathurā en 80 sections» il a en vue, non pas le *Vin. des Mūlasarv.*, mais l'antique Vinaya d'Upāli détenu en dernier lieu à Mathurā par le patriarche Upagupta." (LAMOTTE 1958: 196 [≈ 1988: 178]).

[13] LAMOTTE 1958: 727 (≈ 1988: 657).

[14] Cf. GNOLI 1977: XVIff.

[15] Ib. p. XIX

[16] Cf. JAMPA LOSANG PANGLUNG, Die Erzählstoffe des Mūlasarvāstivāda-Vinaya analysiert auf Grund der tibetischen Übersetzung. Tokyo 1981, p. xii.

[17] GNOLI 1977: XX.

[18] LAMOTTE 1958: 195 (≈ 1988: 178).

[19] See FRAUWALLNER 1956: 50.

ANDRÉ BAREAU, who, besides FRAUWALLNER, has done the most thorough analysis of the material of the Buddha-biography and the account of the early Saṅgha as it is contained in the Skandhaka and in passages of the Dīghanikāya, had a more pessimistic view of the value of this material: "L'ancienneté et la diversité de nos sources met en relief cette hétérogénéité et cet émiettement des éléments qui ont servi à composer la biographie du Buddha, et ce double caractère conduit à douter fortement de l'historicité des données qui nous sont ainsi fournies"[21].

OLDENBERG said about the stories connected with the Pāṭimokkha rules: "That the histories, which have in this manner been added to the several rules of the Pâtimokkha, have for the most part been invented, and, moreover, invented in an extremely awkward and conventional way, will be perfectly evident to every one who reads a series of them one after the other"[22].

It should be noted, however, that the Pāṭimokkha rules themselves were laid down very early, supplying us, according to PACHOW[23], with invaluable data for framing a picture of the economic and social conditions of their times.

The accounts of the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga are given the same status as mere inventions as those of the Vibhaṅga by OLDENBERG, but he expresses ambivalence when it comes to the historical value of these texts: "The histories, as a whole, are as undoubtedly pure inventions as those in the Vibhaṅga; this does not, of course, prevent their belonging to the most valuable sources for our knowledge of the life of the ancient Buddhist community"[24].

But if the stories of the Skandhaka are generally inventions like those of the Vibhaṅga, why should the historical value of the former be greater than that of the latter? Now, the essential difference between the Mahāvagga and Cullavagga on the one hand and the Vibhaṅga on the other is, according to OLDENBERG (ib.) that the stories of the latter were added to an original basis of ecclesiastical regulations that had existed for some time, whereas most of the stories of the Mahāvagga

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[20] WALDSCHMIDT 1951: 122 (= 202).

[21] BAREAU 1963: 373.

[22] OLDENBERG 1879: XXII.

[23] W. PACHOW, A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa. Santiniketan 1955, p. 68.

[24] OLDENBERG 1879: XXIII.

79/14

and the Cullavagga were fixed in their context at the same time as the precepts they explain.

Although OLDENBERG was of the opinion that the picture of a point of time in the history of the Saṅgha given by the material of the Skandhaka is more authentic than that given in the Vibhaṅga, he assumes a quite considerable gap of time separating the composition of the Skandhaka from the life of the earliest Saṅgha. Thus, it is hard to see how this material can be of truly great value from OLDENBERG's point of view.

A judgement very similar to that of OLDENBERG on the stories of the Prātimokṣasūtra was uttered by DIETER SCHLINGLOFF[25]: "In einer oder der anderen Geschichte mögen sich Erinnerungen an tatsächliche Vorkommnisse in der Gemeinde niedergeschlagen haben, meist sind die Erzählungen jedoch reine Zweckerfindungen, um die Verordnungen zu motivieren".

SCHLINGLOFF takes the awkward relationship between rules and stories in the Prātimokṣasūtra and the Vibhaṅga as a proof of the considerable distance in time and spirit ("zeitlichen und geistigen Abstand") between the disciplinary codes and the accounts connected with them. However, in the case of the Skandhaka both the uninspired – and sometimes even misunderstood – stories and the valuable legends seem to have some historical value.

As suggested by OLDENBERG's statements, the case of the Skandhaka is different from that of the Prātimokṣasūtra and the Vibhaṅga. Substantial parts of the account give the reader a feeling of authenticity. As opposed to the Vibhaṅga, many stories contained in the Pāli Khandhaka and the Catuṣpariṣatsūtra do not appear awkward, nor do they seem to be mere "Zweckerfindungen". I.B. HORNER said that "the beginning of the Mahāvagga gives not only an impression but an account of an Order expanding and taking shape"[26].

FRAUWALLNER did emphasize the value of the Skandhaka both for the history of the Vinaya and for the history of Buddhism in general.[27] According to him this "text is an inexhaustible mine for the history of Indian culture". But FRAUWALLNER's enthusiasm for the Skandhaka as a historical source is hard to understand in the light of his opinions on the composition of the text. With only one example taken from the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra he claims that he has proved all biographical accounts of the Buddha contained in the Skandhaka to be pure fiction.[28] His conclusion is the following (1956: 163f.):

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[25] Zur Interpretation des Prātimokṣasūtra. ZDMG 113 (1963) 536–551, p. 538.

[26] The Book of the Discipline, tr. I.B. HORNER. Pt. 4: The Mahāvagga. London 1951, p. XX.

[27] Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1956: 131.

"The biography of the Buddha, which forms the framework of the old *Skandhaka* text, is not authentic old tradition, but a legendary tale, the work of the author of the *Skandhaka*. This gives rise to important inferences. As seen above, this biography is the basis of the most famous later biographies of the Buddha, and authoritative texts such as the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra and the Catuṣpariṣatsūtra are drawn from it. But these are the most important sources, upon which we have hitherto based our knowledge of the life of the Buddha. Once we have recognized that they all go back to a legendary tale, which was created only in the 4th century B.C. about one hundred years after the Nirvāṇa, they cease to represent primary sources. They may in future be utilized only in as far as we can recognize in them borrowings from earlier traditions."

If we were to accept this view, the use of the Skandhaka as a source of history would be problematic. Indeed, if the accounts of the life of the Buddha and the early Saṅgha have no foundation in reality, there would be no reason to believe that the Buddha was a historical figure. If the stories of the Buddha lack any reference to actual events, FRAUWALLNER might as well regard these accounts as purely mythical constructions. But there are two arguments against such a dismissal:

(1) The view that the original Skandhaka was the work of one author who created a tale about the Buddha in order to embellish the rules of the Saṅgha is doubtful.

(2) The date of the Skandhaka's composition was probably considerably closer to the life of the Buddha than FRAUWALLNER believed. Therefore, there is no need to assume that the author(s) lacked knowledge of the early Saṅgha and its founder, creating a fictionary biography instead.

The Date and Composition of the Original Skandhaka

According to FRAUWALLNER the composition of the Skandhaka took place between 100 and 160 years after the Nirvāṇa. In the light of more recent research on the date of the Buddha it is difficult to agree with him. Its formation may have taken place so close to the life of the first Saṅgha that the author could have had his information about the subject of his text from the direct disciples of the Buddha. In fact, it

80/14

cannot be totally ruled out that the author(s) of the Skandhaka met the Buddha himself.

Let us sum up FRAUWALLNER's line of argument in his attempt to date the composition of the oldest Skandhaka work[29]:

Firstly, he says, the Skandhaka must have come into being after the Council of Vaiśālī because all the traditions have the account of this assembly as part of the text. Secondly, it must have been composed before Aśoka because the Vinayas of the different schools resulting from Aśoka's missions clearly go back to a common source. Thirdly, the text must have been made before the first schism occurred, because the Mahāsāṅghikas have relied on it. FRAUWALLNER concludes (p. 54): "And thus, if we stick to the most usual traditional dates, its rise belongs to the period between 100 and 160 after the Nirvāṇa".

Obviously, the natural and relevant reference point in the dating of the Skandhaka is the date of the Buddha. When was the Parinirvāṇa? According to the Dīpavaṃsa and the Mahāvaṃsa, 218 years elapsed between the death of the Buddha and the accession of Aśoka.[30] With the date of Aśoka provided by this tradition one arrives at 544/543 B.C. as the date of the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa. When it was realized that there was a discrepancy between the Greek and the Ceylonese sources, the date of the Buddha's death was corrected to 486–477 B.C., and this 'corrected long chronology' was accepted by most modern scholars for a long time.[31] A different tradition met with in earlier Buddhist Sanskrit works and their Tibetan and Chinese translations gives only a hundred years as the time separating the Buddha's death from the consecration of Aśoka.

In 1980 HEINZ BECHERT (1982) showed that the corrected Ceylonese chronology could not be maintained. Neither can we, according to BECHERT, accept the shorter chronology suggested by the Indian sources and its Chinese and Tibetan translations. BECHERT chooses instead to calculate the date of the Nirvāṇa on the basis of the lists of patriarchs and arrives at a period about 85 to 105 years before Aśoka's consecration. He goes on to place the Council of Vaiśālī 40 to 50 years after the Nirvāṇa. In moving the date of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa to some time between 353 and 373 B.C. (taking 268 B.C. as the year of

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[28] Cf. ib. p. 155ff.

[29] Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1956: 42–67, esp. p. 54.

[30] Dv. VI 1: *dve satāni ca vassāni aṭṭhārasa vassāni ca / sambuddhe parinibbute abhisitto piyadassano //*. Moreover, in Dv. VI 19f. we are told that the time separating the birth of Aśoka's son Mahinda from the *parinirvāṇa* of the Buddha was 204 years. — Mv. V 21: *jinanibbāṇato pacchā pure tassābhisekato / sāṭṭhārasaṃ vassasatadvayaṃ evaṃ vijāniyaṃ //*.

[31] See H. BECHERT, The Problem of the Determination of the Date of the Historical Buddha. WZKS 33 (1989) 93–120 and his 'Introductory Essay' to the 'Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV' (DHB I/1–21).

Aśoka's consecration) Bechert feels himself reaffirmed by the works of G.C. Mendis, E. Lamotte, and P.H.L. Eggermont, a "careful reading" of which "should already have shown to the world of scholars that the usually accepted chronology of the Buddha does not stand a critical examination"[32]. In a later article[33], Bechert slightly modifies his dating, giving 80–130 years before Aśoka's coronation as the period within which the Buddha's Nirvāṇa most probably took place. Here he takes Alexander's Indian campaign as the definitive *terminus ante quem*.

The papers from the Fourth Symposium on Buddhist Studies edited by Bechert are more or less concurrent in the view that the date of the Buddha must be moved forward. However, complete unanimity is not reached on the question of how much the date should be altered or what methods should be used in the search for the correct year of the Nirvāṇa. If one tries to extract one acceptable date of the Buddha's death from the different methods and respective results in the papers of the symposium, it seems to me that 400 B.C. is the best approximation. This is the date which has the highest degree of compatibility with the estimations of R. Gombrich[34], H. Bechert[35], A. Bareau[36], G. von Simson[37], H. Härtel[38], L. Schmithausen[39] and A. Hirakawa[40].

What is the significance of the later date of the Buddha on the historical value of the Skandhaka? The later date for the Nirvāṇa has an impact both on our knowledge of the history of North India and on the concept of an 'Axial Age' in the context of World History, Hermann Kulke says. He continues: "Third, we have to reassess the historiographical value of early Buddhist literature in view of Buddha's probable date around 400 B.C.", and "It is self-evident that such a late date of early Buddhist literature changes considerably its historiographical significance and relevance"[41]. For my concern the most important implication of the later dating of the Buddha is that we must place the composition of the original Skandhaka closer to the events it describes. The reason is simple: This work cannot have been composed 100 to 160 years after the Nirvāṇa, and at the same time well before Aśoka. It is equally impossible to maintain the period of 100 to 160 years between the Nirvāṇa and the composition of the Skandhaka, and at the same time hold on to the view that the text was composed before the schism at Pāṭaliputra. However, it is reasonable to maintain Aśoka's time as the *terminus ante quem* for the Skandhaka.

Frauwallner chose the period between 100 and 160 A.N. as the time for the composition of the Skandhaka. He adopted 100 A.N. as the earliest possible date for the Council of Vaiśālī as mentioned in the Ceylonese chronicles and the Skandhaka itself, taking 160 A.N. as the latest possible date for the schism which split the Buddhist community into Sthaviras and Mahāsāṅghikas, traditionally the Council of Pāṭaliputra.

To throw some light on the dating of the Council of Pāṭaliputra, which is Frauwallner's *terminus ante quem* for the composition of the Skandhaka, one can consult A. Bareau[42]. In considering the different traditions concerning this council, he confronts us with four possible dates: 100 A.N., 116 A.N., 137 A.N. and 160 A.N[43], immediately rejecting the two extremes. In the same way as in his article referred to above (n. 36), Bareau makes his choice among the diverging dates offered by the different textual traditions after reflecting on the probability of the time-span separating the Council of Pāṭaliputra from the Council of Vaiśālī:

"Si nous considérons la durée de l'intervalle qu'implique chacune de ces deux dates précises, 116 ou 137 E.N., entre le concile de Vaiśālī et celui de Pāṭaliputra dans la tradition qui nous l'a transmise, c'est-a-dire six ans ou trente-sept ans, c'est bien la seconde qui paraît de beaucoup la plus vraisemblable" (p. 89).

If Bareau is right, Frauwallner could have narrowed his time-span to the period between 100 and 137 A.N., which is Bareau's most probable date for the Council of Pāṭaliputra. Although Bareau is sceptical about the exactness of his sources, he does not seem to question these two dates on which his calculations are based. He concludes:

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[32] Bechert 1982: 36. On p. 13–15 (≈ p. 13f.) Lamotte (1958/88) says that the modern historian could opt indifferently for the long or the short chronology. However, DHB I/7 (= Bechert 1995: 18) Bechert refers to a personal communication of E. Lamotte modifying this view.

[33] The Date of the Buddha – an Open Question of Ancient Indian History. In: DHB I/222–236.

[34] Dating the Buddha: A Red Herring Revealed. In: DHB II/237–259.

[35] See n. 33.

[36] Quelques considérations sur le problème posé par la date du Parinirvāṇa du Buddha. In: DHB I/211–221.

[37] Der zeitgeschichtliche Hintergrund der Entstehung des Buddhismus und seine Bedeutung für die Datierungsfrage. In: DHB I/90–99.

[38] Archaeological Research on Ancient Buddhist Sites. In: DHB I/61–89.

[39] An Attempt to Estimate the Distance in Time between Aśoka and the Buddha in Terms of Doctrinal History. In: DHB II/110–147.

[40] An Evaluation of the Sources on the Date of the Buddha. In: DHB I/

[41] DHB I/100f.

[42] Bareau 1955: 88–111.

[43] Bareau 1955: 88

81\14

"Pourtant, rien ne nous assure par ailleurs de l'exactitude de cette dernière date et nous devons donc nous contenter de penser que le schisme eut lieu dans la première moitié, plus précisément dans le second quart du IIᵉ siecle apres le Nirvāṇa" (ib.).

More important is the date of the Council of Vaiśālī as this was the *terminus post quem* for FRAUWALLNER. There is no complete agreement regarding the date of this council in the different textual traditions: The Vinayas of the Theravādins, Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas and Haimavatas speak of 100 years after the Nirvāṇa, whereas the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinayas give 110; in other sources one of these two dates turns up. Should we trust these dates as FRAUWALLNER does?

A passage in the Cullavagga can be taken as an indication that the time separating the Buddha from the participants of the Council of Vaiśālī was not several generations as stated by both traditions.[44] It says that in Vaiśālī there lived a *thera* called Sabbakāmin who had received ordination 120 years earlier, sharing his 'cell' (*saddhivihārika*) with Ānanda[45].

Obviously, we cannot accept the statement that Sabbakāmin had received ordination 120 years before the council, because then he should have been at least 140 years old.[46] On the other hand there is nothing incongruous about the tradition of his sharing his cell with the venerable Ānanda if we shorten the time-span between the Buddha and the Council of Vaiśālī. This Council might have taken place, say, forty years after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa. When in the later tradition a lapse of one century was introduced between the Nirvāṇa and the Council of Vaiśālī,[47] the redactors of the Vinaya had to manipulate Sabbakāmin's age in order to get things right.

Commenting on the age of Ānanda's disciples who were present at the Council of Vaiśālī, A. HIRAKAWA notes: "If his oldest disciples lived to be over a hundred years old, it is not impossible that some would still be alive a century after the Buddha's death. It seems that it was not unusual for a bhikṣu who lived a regulated existence away from secular life to survive more than a hundred years"[48]. This sounds rather incredible. Moreover, according to Mv. IV 57–59, the elders of the council – Sabbakāmin, Sāḷha, Revata, Khujjasobhita, Yasa, Sambhūta of Sāṇa, Sumana and Vāsabhagāmika – had previously seen the Tathāgata (*diṭṭhapubbā tathāgataṃ*). Again we must reject the possibility that all these *theras* actually were 140 years old, and again we are confronted with two solutions to the problem:

(1) The elders did not know the Buddha. This tradition could have been invented, e.g., to increase the authority of the participants of the council.

(2) The Council of Vaiśālī took place at a time when direct disciples of the Buddha were still alive, say 40 years after the Nirvāṇa. Later, when it was decided that the council had taken place 100 years or more after the death of the master, the redactors had to manipulate the age of the elders to make the numbers go together.

BECHERT puts the question of the date of the Council of Vaiśālī into the context of the later date of the Buddha: "The Council of Vaiśālī may be dated about 40 to 50 p.N. The tradition that Sāṇavāsī, one of the great authorities of this convocation, was a personal pupil of Ānanda, becomes now credible" (1982: 36). However, there is no complete agreement among scholars about how to treat the councils. R.O. FRANKE, for instance, having rejected the historicity of the First Council[49], states: "We may confront the chronicle of the 'Second Council' with even greater indifference. This is not only a merely literary construction; it does not even possess any relevant subject matter"[50].

In his clear rejection of the credibility of the account of both of the first councils FRANKE is more or less alone. According to M. HOFINGER "on peut tenir pour assurée l'historicité du concile de Vaiśālī"[51]. LAMOTTE, on the other hand, concludes his treatment of the subject of the two first councils with some reservation: "Le peu qu'on en a dit suffit à montrer qu'il serait imprudent de se prononcer pour ou contre l'historicité des conciles"[52]. According to BAREAU the indigenous tradition is not to be trusted[53], and all we can say is that the council took place between the Buddha's Nirvāṇa and the first schism. Nevertheless, he dares to conjecture: "Nous sommes donc amenés, sur la foi de ces indices, à placer le concile de Vaiśālī vers la fin du Ier siècle E.N., par conséquent à une date assez proche de l'an 100 E.N. qui est donné par les traditions des Sthavira" (ib.).

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[44] See Cullavagga XII 2,4: *tena kho pana samayena sabbakāmī nāma pathavyā saṅghathero vīsaṃvassasatiko upasampadāya āyasmato ānandassa saddhivihāriko vesāliyaṃ paṭivasati.*

[45] Dv. IV 49f. the same is told of Sāḷha, Revata, Khujjasobhita, Yasa and Sāṇasambhūta who together with Sabbakāmin were *saddhivihārikā therā ānandatherassa.*

[46] Twenty years is the minimum age for ordination as laid down in the Mahāvagga (I 49) and parallel texts.

[47] In their contributions to DHB, both A. HIRAKAWA (cf. n. 40) and G. OBEYESEKERE (Myth, History and Numerology in the Buddhist Chronicles. In: DHB I/152–182) have discussed the tendency in the oral transmission of Buddhist texts to call every long period of time a century.

[48] DHB I/269.

[49] See R. OTTO FRANKE, The Buddhist Councils at Rājagaha and Vesālī, as alleged in Cullavagga XI., XII. JPTS 1908, p.1–80 (= Kleine Schriften, ed. O. VON HINÜBER. Wiesbaden 1978, II/1381–1460). On p. 69 (= 1449), FRANKE says: "Herewith we are rid of the whole question as to its credibility".

[50] Op. cit., p. 70 (= 1450).

[51] See M. HOFINGER, Étude sur le concile de Vaiśālī. [Bibliothèque du Muséon, Vol. 20]. Louvain 1946, p. 159.

[52] LAMOTTE 1958: 153 (≈ 1988: 140).

To sum up, FRAUWALLNER's dating of the Skandhaka cannot be accepted since neither the traditional dating of the Nirvāṇa nor the period of 100 or 110 years between the Nirvāṇa and the Council of Vaiśālī can be retained. Generally speaking, in accepting a later date for the Buddha's death we cannot at the same time uncritically move all events whose dates have been fixed in relation to the Nirvāṇa for the simple reason that they will crash with dates the authenticity of which we are more certain of. On the contrary, when we move the Nirvāṇa closer to Aśoka we also move the life of the Buddha and the foundation of the Saṅgha closer to the composition of the Skandhaka. If BECHERT is right in placing the Council of Vaiśālī between 40 and 50 A.N., the period separating the Nirvāṇa and the composition of the Skandhaka may be not longer than 40 years. This in all probability means that direct disciples of the Buddha lived at the time when the original Skandhaka was composed, so that we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the author(s) of the Skandhaka met the Buddha himself.

So far we have presupposed that the Skandhaka originated after the Council of Vaiśālī. As long as the date of this council has been thought of as settled, the author(s) of the Skandhaka has/have been separated from his/their subject matter by more than a century. We have already seen that FRAUWALLNER's opinion about its date could not be supported. Can we agree with him when he says that the Skandhaka was composed after the Council of Vaiśālī? I see two reasons for not accepting FRAUWALLNER's view without hesitation:

The first and weaker objection that could be made against it is to refuse to believe, like R.O. FRANKE, in the historicity of the Council of Vaiśālī, suggesting that the fictitious tradition about this council originated very early. The fact that its story is found in the Skandhaka would consequently not entail any certain limit of time for the composition of the work.

A second and stronger argument could be made by pointing to the uncertainty surrounding the conjectures on which E. FRAUWALLNER founded his view. A necessary condition for concluding, like he has done, that the Skandhaka was composed after the Council of Vaiśālī is that the work was made by one person within a limited period of time. If one admits the possibility that the Skandhaka was fashioned by different authors over a longer period of time, one must acknowledge the chance that the sections of the Skandhaka dealing with the councils were added after the other parts of the work were finished. Conversely, if one takes the narration of the councils as a proof that the whole of the Skandhaka was composed after the councils, one must accept the condition that the work was composed at a certain point of time, most likely by one author.

OLDENBERG's views were not harmonious with those of FRAUWALLNER. In the introduction to his edition of the Mahāvagga he writes:

> "The account of the Councils follows upon the actual closing chapter of the Vinaya, containing the laws for the Bhikkhunîs. It is evident that this account is written as the conclusion or an appendix to the Vinaya, and that, accordingly, the main substance of the Vinaya laws was not composed later. It remains to be considered whether, at the time the closing chapter was composed, the principal part of the work did already exist as a complete whole, or whether the closing chapter and the other portions of the Vinaya were composed at one and the same time. It seems to me that the first of these alternatives possesses by far the greater amount of probability, not to say certainty."[54]

OLDENBERG goes on to give the reasons for his opinion that the main body of the Skandhaka was composed before the sections dealing with the councils: (1) the redaction of the whole Vinaya is said in the closing chapter to have been made immediately after the death of the Buddha, and (2) the subjects of discussion at the second council are not mentioned in other parts of the Vinaya. After further argumentation OLDENBERG concludes (p. XXXVII):

> "The discussion of the ten propositions is given in the form of an account of the Council at Vesâlî, as an appendix at the end of the Vinaya; this, I think, is the best proof of the fact that when the dispute concerning the ten propositions was being carried on, the Vinaya itself already existed, that IT IS OLDER THAN THE COUNCIL OF VESÂLÎ."

Of course, it is FRAUWALLNER's and OLDENBERG's fundamentally different view on the nature of the Skandhaka and the whole of the Vinaya, which is the source of this radical disagreement. Where do the latter's opinions leave us regarding the question of dating the original Skandhaka and its usefulness for the study of the earliest Saṅgha?

[illegible] la date du concile de Vaiśālī a été fixée, et chez les

According to OLDENBERG its style of composition corresponds so exactly to that of the later written parts of the Vibhaṅga "that it may be assumed with certainty that these texts were composed almost contemporaneously" (1879: XXIIf.). The Skandhaka, then, would not belong to the earliest parts of Buddhist literature, as they would presuppose the existence of the Prātimokṣa rules.[55] However, OLDENBERG bases himself on the chronological system of the Mahāvaṃsa and the Dīpavaṃsa when suggesting a date for the composition of the Skandhaka. He arrives at 383 B.C. as the approximate date of the Council of Vaiśālī and 400 B.C. for the revision of the Vinaya including the Skandhaka (1879: XXXVIIIf.).

FRAUWALLNER's hypothesis concerning the relationship between the Skandhaka and the account of the council is opposed by LAMOTTE (1958: 196 [≈ 1988: 179]): "Et si le récit des conciles se rattacha momentanément à la tradition du Vinaya, il demeure évident, comme le constatait déjà M. Demiéville, que ses rédacteurs n'étaient pas les mêmes que ceux des Vinaya auxquels ce récit est adjoint".

Summing up the above discussion, it is clear that FRAUWALLNER's conjectures concerning the dating of the original Skandhaka are to a large degree invalidated. If one accepts the Council of Vaiśālī as the *terminus post quem* for the composition of the work, its author(s) may have lived 40 years after the Nirvāṇa. Thus, it is not impossible that they were contemporaries of the Buddha. This goes well with the statements in the canonical sources that the participants of this council knew the Buddha and Ānanda. On the other hand, if one does not accept the Council of Vaiśālī as such a *terminus*, the time between the author(s) of the Skandhaka, the Buddha and the earliest Saṅgha is undetermined. We may conclude that by these considerations alone the value of this text as a source in the study of the earliest Saṅgha will not be diminished. The trustworthiness of the textual transmission of later centuries is, of course, another problem.

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[55] Indeed, if we accept OLDENBERG's general view of the documents of history, we should be able to infer the relative lateness of the Skandhaka from the love of details inherent in its precepts: "This is not the only instance in the history of Buddhism, as of history in general, that the further removed, with respect to time, documents, or pretended documents, are, from the events themselves, the more accurate becomes the knowledge they pretend to contain of them" (1879: XXIf.).

84|14

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25/14

VĀKPATIRĀJA'S GAUḌAVAHA

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I

Though the Gauḍavaha of Vākpatirāja (Gv.) was already published in 1887 by PANDIT, reprinted by UTGIKAR in 1927 and again edited by SURU in 1975 (without the support of more than the four manuscripts used in 1887), the text and its author do not receive much attention in most of the handbooks of Indian literature. The only translation made so far is by SURU (1975).

Still the greatness of work and author were rightly emphasized in the mentioned editions; see e.g. VAIDYA's foreword to SURU's edition and translation (p. viii): "Vākpati, no doubt, is a gifted poet, worthy of being ranked with Māgha and Bhāravi. ... He often rises above the usual conventions of classical poets and has something characteristic of his own in delineating natural scenes, countryside, and village folk etc. There is a touch of personal experience in his descriptions".

After its first publication there was some discussion by scholars on particular problems of the text (its missing a subdivision into *sargas*; the absence of clear historical data in the text, e.g. on the events which should have occasioned its name; the puzzling end of the text) which has been very superficially summarized in the handbooks (especially in the smaller ones).

The only extensive treatment is found in WARDER (1983: 401–413) who rather elaborately summarizes the contents and cites quotations from later authors. On the essential problems his comments are very concise, e.g. on the much discussed end of the text which looks like an actual beginning: "... and invites the world to hear. To know what was heard we have simply to turn back to the beginning" (p. 403).

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* This article was originally planned to be my introduction to L. A. VAN DAALEN's translation of the Gauḍavaha. Since the manuscript of this annotated translation in its present form is not ready for publication, I have decided to publish VAN DAALEN's views on the contents, structure and purpose of this text. Lengthy quotations from his articles and unpublished notes have been combined with my own summaries of the issues and with personal remarks. For my obituary of Leen van Daalen see IIJ 37 (1994) 93f.

86/14

WZKS 1992, 36

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WRITING IN INDIA AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE PĀLI CANON

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1. The writing of single and double consonants

1.1. As is well known, the earliest form of the Brāhmī script found in India, that of the Aśokan inscriptions, does not mark double consonants. There are, in the Pāli canon,[1] a number of textual variations showing forms with single or double consonants, which are most easily explained as having been written at some time in such a script. When, in a later form of the Brāhmī script, the facility of writing double consonants was adopted, in places where the metre was of no help in determining the length of a vowel, e.g. in prose or in metrically doubtful positions, a scribe had to decide whether the single consonant in the exemplar, which he was copying, stood for a single or a double consonant. In most cases the context would make this clear, but in passages where both forms could be considered to yield some sort of sense, it was a matter of personal preference which he chose to write or how he chose to interpret. The tradition sometimes remained ambivalent, with both possibilities being handed down to us.

1.2. The writing of single consonants after vowels in metrically doubtful positions would explain how such doublets as *uppacca* and *upecca*[2] could arise.[3] Here we can postulate the existence of an earlier form with single consonants, i.e. **upaca*, which could be palatalised to **upeca*. When the possibility of writing double consonants arose, the tradition interpreted **upaca* as *uppacca* (< Sanskrit *utpatya*) and **upeca* as *upecca* (< Sanskrit *upetya*).

1.3. In a prose passage in the Niddesa[4] we find a long list of adjectives describing ascetic practices, e.g. *hatthivattika* "following the practice of

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[1] The abbreviations of titles of texts are those adopted by the Critical Pāli Dictionary. Other abbreviations: AMg = Ardha-Māgadhī; BHS = Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit; GDhp = Gāndhārī Dharmapada.

[2] Showing the palatalisation of *-a-* > *-e-* before *-c-*. See K. R. NORMAN, Middle Indo-Aryan Studies XIII: the palatalisation of vowels in Middle Indo-Aryan, JOIB XXV (1975/76), pp. 328–42.

[3] See K. R. NORMAN, Elders' Verses (= EV) II, p. 109 (on Thī 248).

[4] Nidd I 89,17–29.

WZKS – Supplementband (1993) 239–249

87|14

elephants". There are variant readings for each epithet, with a single -*t*-, e.g. *hatthivatika* "taking the elephant vow". In Sanskrit we find -*vratika* in such contexts,[5] but since the difference in meaning between *vratika* and *vṛttika* is very small, a scribe faced with a writing system where single -*t*- was written for both *vatika* and *vattika* might have difficulty in deciding which was the correct spelling.

1.4. Where the word *vivattachadda* with double dental -*tt*-, or *vivaṭṭachadda* with double retroflex -*ṭṭ*-, occurs in Triṣṭubh, Jagatī, and Aupacchandasaka Pādas in Pāli, the metre guarantees that the second syllable is long, which confirms the spelling with the double consonant. In Śloka Pādas, in non-metrically determined places, we find that the word has the spelling *vivaṭacchadda* with single retroflex -*ṭ*-. These alternatives could remain because both *vivatta* (< Sanskrit *vivṛtta*) and *vivaṭa* (< Sanskrit *vivṛta*) seemed to make sense in the context.[6]

1.5. Sometimes we find a variation for a word actually appearing in the scribal tradition, e.g. at Th 32,[7] where the Pali Text Society edition reads *nimmissaṃ*, with a variant reading *nimissaṃ*. The first syllable, being the first syllable of the Pāda, is in a metrically doubtful position. In Pāli *niminăti* "exchange" and *nimmināti* "construct" are sometimes confused, possibly for metrical reasons. The same confusion is found in BHS,[8] e.g. at Mvu II 176,12 where JONES emends[9] *nimmin*- to *nimin*-, because Ja III 63,9,10 has *nimini* and *nimineyya*. At Th 32 it seems preferable to read *nimissaṃ*, since "exchange" gives better sense in the context. The word was presumably written as **nimisaṃ* in an earlier version, and since the first syllable is in the uncertain anceps position, either *nim*- or *nimm*- was possible as an interpretation.

1.6. At Sn 763 we find: *santike na vijānanti magā dhammass' akovidā ti*; "(Although it is) in their presence, those not proficient in the doctrine do not understand it, like animals". This is explained (Pj II 510,5–10): *yaṃ attano sarīre tacapañcakamattaṃ paricchinditvā anantaram eva adhigantabbato attano khandhānaṃ vā nirodhamattato santike nibbānaṃ; taṃ evaṃ santike santaṃ pi na vijānanti magabhūtā janā maggāmagga-dhammassa sabbadhammassa vā akovidā*. The explanation given by the commentary is interesting in that it seems to be taking *magā* both as a separate word and also as the equivalent of *magga* in a compound with *dhammassa*. The latter interpretation depends upon the -*g*-/-*gg*- alternation which is only possible in the initial (anceps) position in the Pāda, and is most likely due to a misinterpretation of -*g*- written at a time when double consonants and long -*ā*- were not written. The second explanation was probably helped by the fact that the commentary was uncertain about the metaphorical usage of *magā*. It can, however, be paralleled in AMg, where we find the same idea of ignorant animals, cf. *miyā ayāṇaṃtā*, Uttarajjhayaṇasutta 8.7.

2. The shortening of long vowels

2.1. In the Pāli canon we sometimes find forms where an original long vowel has been shortened.[10] The reasons for this are not always obvious, but some occurrences can probably be explained by stress, accent, or the workings of analogy. Since the failure to mark long vowels is a characteristic of the North-Western Kharoṣṭhī script, it has sometimes been suggested that such forms have been borrowed into Pāli via that script. When in my survey of Pāli literature I dealt with the title of the Mahāsamayasutta of the Dīghanikāya, I considered the relationship between the Pāli form of the title and the Sanskrit title Mahāsamājasūtra. I noted that *samaya* and *samāja* might simply represent a variation of vocabulary.[11] It seemed to me that the suggestion that Pāli *samaya* is to be derived from Sanskrit *samāja* was unlikely, since it appeared that it could only have been transmitted through a written North-Western Prakrit form,[12] and I thought it more likely that the Sanskrit version was an incorrect back-formation from Prakrit. A reviewer,[13] however, pointed out that my suggestion of a change of vocabulary was improbable, and he concluded that it followed that *samaya* in the Dīghanikāya must indeed "rest on a Kharoṣṭhī written form of *samāja*".

2.2. I accept the inadequacy of the evidence for the existence of *samaya* in the desired meaning in Sanskrit, but I am still reluctant to accept that this particular word in Pāli, and others which show shortening of vowels, must be supposed to depend upon a written form in the Kharoṣṭhī script. This would require a belief that the tradition of the

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[5] Cf. Skt. *govratika*, *biḍālavratika*, *cāndravratika*.

[6] The Jain equivalent *viyaṭṭachauma*, in prose, confirms double -*ṭṭ*-. See K. R. NORMAN, The influence of the Pāli commentators and grammarians upon the Theravādin tradition, Buddhist Studies (Bukkyō Kenkyū) XV, pp. 109–23 (p. 110).

[7] See NORMAN, EV I, p. 128 (on Th 32).

[8] See F. EDGERTON, BHS Dictionary, s. vv. *niminăti* and *nirminoti*.

[9] J. J. JONES, The Mahāvastu, Vol. II, London 1952, p. 170, note 3.

[10] See W. GEIGER, Pāli Literatur und Sprache, Strassburg 1916, § 23.

[11] K. R. NORMAN, Pāli Literature, Wiesbaden 1983, p. 39.

[12] NORMAN, ibid., p. 39 note 52. We find *samāja* with the spelling *samaya* in the Shāhbāzgaṛhī version of the Aśokan inscriptions. See E. HULTZSCH, Inscriptions of Asoka, Oxford 1925, Index s.v. *samaya*.

[13] J. C. WRIGHT, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 48 (1985), p. 154.

Theravādin texts was taken from the Magadha area where it presumably originated, to the North-West, where it was written down in Kharoṣṭhī. From there it was taken to Ceylon. This seems to make little sense, in the light of our knowledge about the way in which the Theravādin tradition reached that country.

3. The pronunciation of long vowels

3.1. One problem which requires solution is the question whether the original metrical length is kept in pronunciation, if a script does not mark long vowels. GEIGER pointed out[14] that although long vowels occur only exceptionally in the Brāhmī inscriptions of Ceylon, the shortening of the vowels is merely graphic. This is proved by the fact that there is a difference of development in Sinhalese between historically long and short vowels, despite the fact that they were all written as short in the early Brāhmī script.

3.2. The problem about the length of vowels is complicated by the fact that we cannot be certain whether a vowel is genuinely long or short unless it appears in a metrical text in a position where the metre guarantees the length. Unfortunately, even in these circumstances, we can never exclude the possibility that the lengthening or shortening is for metrical reasons, and in the Pāli canon it is possible to point to examples of a historically short vowel being written as short in a position where a long vowel is required by the metre,[15] as well as to many examples where a vowel which is short historically is actually written as long *metri causa*.[16]

3.3. It has been pointed out[17] that, in a verse which occurs in Pāli in both the Dīghanikāya and the Saṃyuttanikāya,[18] the word *samaya* occurs in a position where the metre requires the second *-a-* to be lengthened to *-ā-*, but the manuscript tradition has preserved a short *-a-*. Even if the metre does require a long vowel, it must be emphasised this does not prove conclusively that the word had a genuine long vowel. It is possible that the earliest version of this verse had *-samaya*, which was pronounced and then subsequently written in some non-Pāli tradition as **-samāya* for metrical reasons.

88/14

3.4. The Kharoṣṭhī script is not the only Indian script in which long vowels were not written. The same is true, as a general rule, of the early Sinhalese Brāhmī script. The belief that *-samaya* stands for **-samāya* (< Sanskrit *samāja*) has led to the suggestion that the form could be due to the fact that it was written in that script. Clearly, this suggestion is theoretically possible. The Sinhalese Prakrit, however, did not turn *-j-* into *-y-*, and if we accept this suggestion we should have to assume that that particular change occurred in a dialect other than Sinhalese Prakrit. We should, therefore, have to imagine that the word *samāja* was changed to **samāya* in Northern India, probably in Magadha, since we find *samāya* in Ardha-Māgadhī, and was then taken to Ceylon in that form. There it was written down as *samaya*, because the Sinhalese Brāhmī script did not write long vowels, and in the particular context we are examining it continued to be transmitted as *samaya*, even though the metre demanded *samāya*.

3.5. I find this development in two stages hard to accept, and (if the derivation really is from *samāja*, about which I still have doubts), I would rather suggest that this miswriting occurred in the same region where the change of *-j-* > *-y-* took place, i.e. in North India. It is noteworthy that the change of *samāja* to *samaya*, if we accept that this was the direction of the development, is one which pre-supposes a written tradition. This is the reason why the Kharoṣṭhī and Sinhalese Brāhmī theories have been suggested, since they are the only Indian scripts known to us which consistently fail to mark long vowels. It seems to me, however, that there is an alternative solution to this problem, namely the possibility that there was a script in use in the Magadha area in pre-Aśokan times, which also failed to mark long vowels. In the Brāhmī script of the Aśokan inscriptions we find that the writing of long vowels, especially *-ī-* and *-ū-*, is sporadic or inconsistent in some areas, and it is possible that in pre-Aśokan times the earlier form of the Brāhmī script was like Kharoṣṭhī and did not write long vowels at all. The way in which long vowels are marked in the Brāhmī script, by adding an extra stroke to the short vowel or short diphthong *akṣara*, also suggests that the writing of long vowels was a later addition to the system.

4. The writing of long and short vowels

4.1. There is some evidence to support the view that in the early form of the Brāhmī script long vowels were not written. For example, when we try to interpret the readings *kamaradu* and *kamaramu* in the

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[14] W. GEIGER, A Grammar of the Sinhalese Language, Colombo 1938, § 8 (p. 14).

[15] See NORMAN, EV I, § 47 and EV II, § 70.

[16] See NORMAN, EV I, § 46 and EV II, § 69.

[17] O. VON HINÜBER, Pāli *samaya* and Sanskrit *samāja*, IIJ 29 (1986), pp. 201–2.

[18] D II 254,7* = S I 26,24*. It is in the proto-Svāgatā metre. See H. SMITH, Saddanīti § 8.7.2,15 (p. 1169). The compound *mahāsamaya* occurs in the same two texts (D II 254,6* = S I 26,23*) and also in Sanskrit, but in a Śloka Pāda in a position where the metre is not decisive.

Gāndhārī Dharmapada (GDhp 63), we are unable, because of the nature of the Kharoṣṭhī script, to decide whether the first part of these compounds stands for *kāma-* or *kamma-*. If we look for parallel or near-parallel passages in Pāli we find that both *kāmarata* and *kammarata* occur.[19] The occurrence of the two forms would seem to be a clear indication that at one time the Theravādin tradition was transmitted through a script which did not write either double consonants or long vowels. Consequently the first part of the compound was written as **kama-*, which could be variously interpreted.

4.2. There is a Pāda in the Pāli canon where the PTS edition reads *sotatto sosīno* and the Burmese edition reads *sotatto sosinno*.[20] That is to say there is an alternation between *-sīno* and *-sinno*, between a short vowel with double consonant and a long vowel with single consonant, preserving the length of the syllable. We may assume that the original reading was **sina*, written in a script where double consonants and long vowels were not written. The commentarial tradition includes the word *himodakena*, which gives the possibility of interpreting **sina* as both "wet" (*sinna*) and "cold" (*sīna*).

5. The writing of *anusvāra*

5.1. It is possible that the so-called ablatives in *-aṃ* in Middle Indo-Aryan may provide additional evidence about early writing systems. It has been pointed out[21] that they may be due to a transmission through manuscripts which, like the script of the Gāndhārī Dharmapada, did not mark vowel length or nasalisation or, like the Brāhmī script of the Aśokan inscriptions, did not do so consistently, so that from the point of view of the written form an accusative and an ablative of a short *-a* stem noun would be identical. It would have been expected that, when a text written in such a manner was rendered into a full orthography, whether at the time of translation into Pāli or subsequently, this would for the most part be done correctly, since the scribe's knowledge of the language would enable him to interpret from the context. Equally, however, it is to be expected that from time to time, either because his attention was wandering, or because the passage was genuinely difficult or ambiguous, the scribe would misinterpret his exemplar, and write *-aṃ* where he should have written *-ā*.[22]

6. The development of writing

6.1. It is accepted by many scholars that the Brāhmī script was adapted from a Semitic script, at some unknown date, but perhaps as early as the 9th century B.C., according to some,[23] although such an early date presents problems, since little is known about the relationship between India and the Near East at that time. According to this view, as the use of the Brāhmī script spread further to the East across India, the script which we call Kharoṣṭhī was also adapted from Aramaic at a later date. Other scholars, relying on the Greek historians, accept that writing, presumably the Kharoṣṭhī script, was in use in North-West India at the time of Alexander, but follow Megasthenes in believing that writing was not used in Magadha in his time. They assume that Brāhmī was the invention of Candragupta's administration, and was devised as a counterpart to Kharoṣṭhī.[24] Against this late date of the invention of writing in India we have to put the suggestion that the Padapāṭha was written down from its beginning,[25] which can hardly be later than the sixth century B.C.,[26] and was probably rather earlier.

6.2. From the point of view of this paper it does not matter whether Kharoṣṭhī is older than Brāhmī. My own view is that it is difficult to accept that Brāhmī was devised as a single complete writing system at one and the same time during the reign of Candragupta. The appearance of the Aśokan Brāhmī script suggests to me that it evolved in a haphazard way, with some of its *akṣaras* being borrowed from some other source. Other *akṣaras* were, I think, invented, presumably by the scribes or grammarians, to serve particular needs.

6.3. If the entire Brāhmī script was the product of the grammarians' theorising about language,[27] then we might have expected that there would have been a greater similarity in the appearance of the characters for sounds of the same class, or a consistent method of marking differences between classes. The *ṭha akṣara* seems to be a *ṭa akṣara* joined to its mirror image; the aspirate *cha* appears to be two *ca akṣaras* joined back to back; the *pha akṣara* is clearly based on *pa* with a curly tail addition. Other aspirate consonant *akṣaras*, however, are not made in the same way. The fact that some aspirate *akṣaras* seem to be derived from their non-aspirate partner suggests to me that the source script did not have, or the language using that script did not differentiate between, aspirate and non-aspirate, and the 'derived' forms were invented because there was a need for them, either immediately upon the adoption of the script or at some later date.

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[19] *kāmarata* at A IV 438,19 and *kammarata* at It 71,16.

[20] We find a Pāda occurring at Ja I 390,31* where Ee reads: *sotatto sosīto*, and Be reads *sotatto sosinno c' eva*. The same Pāda occurs at M I 79,29–30. There the Pāda reads: *so tatto so sīno* (Ee Ce *so*; Se *sosino*; Be *sosinno c' eva*).

[21] JOHN BROUGH, The Gāndhārī Dharmapada, London 1962, p. 79.

[22] BROUGH, GDhp, pp. 266–67 (on verse 292).

[23] See L. D. BARNETT, Antiquities of India, London 1913, p. 225.

[24] See G. FUSSMAN, Annuaire du Collège de France, 1988–89, p. 513.

[25] See J. BRONKHORST, Some observations on the Padapāṭha of the Ṛgveda, IIJ 24 (1982), pp. 181–89 (p. 184).

[26] See J. BRONKHORST, ibid., p. 188.

[27] It is, however, arguable that the grammatical analysis of Sanskrit phonemes, far from producing a writing system, was only possible if a writing system already existed.

6.4. If *tha* is distinguished from *ṭha* by the fact that the former has a dot in the middle of the circle which constitutes the latter, then other dental *akṣaras* might be expected to be differentiated from retroflex *akṣaras* in a comparable way. The way in which the *tha* and *ṭha akṣaras* are distinguished suggests to me that one was derived from the other when the need came to differentiate them. At an earlier stage, the same *akṣara*, i.e. *tha*, was probably used to denote both sounds, which were differentiated dialectally, so that we might have had the aorist endings *-ittha* and *-iṭṭha* or the various MIA forms of the root *sthā* – *thāna* and *ṭhāna*, *thita* and *ṭhita* – represented by the same *akṣara*. Similarly, the *akṣara* for *ṇa* seems to be a secondary form of *na*, which suggests that the *na akṣara* was earlier used for both *na* and *ṇa*.

6.5. It seems to me even less likely that Brāhmī was invented at the time of Aśoka for the specific purpose of writing his inscriptions.[28] The variations in the form of a number of *akṣaras* in the Aśokan inscriptions persuade me that the script had already been in existence for some time to allow time for such variations to have come into existence. If a brand-new script had been invented at the time of Aśoka and circulated through his secretariat to all scribes at all sites, such departures from the circulated norm are unlikely to have arisen so quickly. I would assume that Brāhmī was in the form in which we know it not later than the end of the fourth century B.C.

6.6. The Kharoṣṭhī script does not write long vowels, with a few possible exceptions, when used for Prakrit, but the facility was invented for writing them, and they are found in Sanskrit words in the Niya Documents.[29] Here a curving line was added underneath, sloping to the right, which turned short *-a-*, *-i-* and *-u-* into long *-ā-*, *-ī-* and *-ū-*, and *-e-* > *-ai-*. Doubtless a comparable line would have changed *-o-* > *-au-*, although no word with this character occurs in the Niya Documents.

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[28] Those who claim that Brāhmī was invented to denote Prakrit, and not Sanskrit, must explain how the retroflex *ṣa* evolved, and why it is found in the Aśokan inscriptions.

[29] See No. 511 in Kharoṣṭhī Inscriptions (ed. A. M. BOYER et al.), Oxford 1929, pp. 185–87.

The resemblance to the way in which long vowels are written in the Brāhmī script is very obvious.

7. The Sinhalese Brāhmī script

7.1. The Sinhalese Brāhmī script, as already noted, does not usually write long vowels when it is used for Sinhalese Prakrit, and there is evidence that that form of Brāhmī is an early version of the script, perhaps dating from the time when the use of the extra stroke for indicating long vowels had not yet been devised. It seems not to be derived directly from the Aśokan Brāhmī script, and was probably developed from a version of Brāhmī which was not identical with, and possibly earlier than, the Aśokan variety. For example, the form of the initial *i-mātrā* found in Sinhalese Prakrit inscriptions of the 2nd century B.C. is without Mauryan counterpart,[30] and was replaced by the Mauryan form at some date after the introduction of Buddhism to Ceylon. The earlier form of the script was probably introduced into Ceylon at some date before the time of Aśoka, perhaps when the Indo-Aryans arrived.

7.2. This view of the early introduction of the Brāhmī script into Ceylon would be supported by the recently announced radiocarbon dating of early Brāhmī script in Sri Lanka,[31] which has produced possible dates of 600–500 B.C. for the layer in which sherds inscribed with what appear to be Brāhmī *akṣaras* have been found at Anuradhapura. Since, however, the inscribed sherds are few in number, and intrusion from other layers cannot be entirely ruled out, it would probably be unwise to accept these dates as definitive until either more examples have been found, or an alternative method of dating, e.g. thermo-luminescence, confirms the results. Further systematic enquiry is clearly required.

7.3. The changes which appear in the form of the Sinhalese Brāhmī script from the 1st century B.C. onwards[32] suggest that it was influenced about that time by something more closely resembling the Aśokan type of Brāhmī. It is certain that there must have been a

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[30] For the Aśokan variety of *i-* see C. S. UPASAK, The history and palaeography of Mauryan Brāhmī script, Nalanda 1960, pp. 204–5. The Sinhalese variety consists of a vertical stroke with a dot on either side (see K. R. NORMAN, The role of Pāli in early Sinhalese Buddhism, in: Buddhism in Ceylon and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries [ed. H. BECHERT], Göttingen 1978, pp. 28–47 [p. 31]).

[31] S. U. DERANIYAGALA, Radiocarbon dating of early Brahmi script in Sri Lanka, Ancient Ceylon 11 (1990), pp. 149–68; The proto- and early historic radiocarbon chronology of Sri Lanka, Ancient Ceylon 12 (1990), pp. 251–92.

[32] E.g. the change in the form of the *i-mātrā*, and the replacement of *jh* by *j*, and of *ś* by *s*. See NORMAN, op. cit. (in note 30), p. 31.

91|14

distinction between the script used for Sinhalese Prakrit, which did not write long vowels, and the script used for Pāli texts, which clearly did, at least by the 5th century A.D., as we can tell from Buddhaghosa's comments about pronunciation, which would have been unintelligible if the script he was using could not write long vowels.[33]

7.4. This distinction between the two versions of the Brāhmī script probably arose at some time after the introduction of Buddhism into Ceylon. It would seem likely that when the Buddhist missionaries arrived in Ceylon they found in use there an earlier version of the Brāhmī script, which did not write long vowels and which was perhaps a development of the earlier form of the mainland Brāhmī script whose existence I have postulated. After the arrival of the missionaries a later version of the script, which did have long vowel signs, was introduced into Ceylon, and this was used for writing Pāli texts. It was when the canon was being written down in this later form of the script that there arose the problems of interpretation which I have already mentioned as being due to the deficiencies of the earlier mainland Brāhmī, and doublets such as *kāma-* and *kamma-* came into existence.

8. The adoption of writing for religious purposes

8.1. It might be thought that, since the adoption of writing for sacred texts in India is generally dated rather late, the phenomena I am talking about would in fact have been fixed before that time, and writing is unlikely to be the cause of the variants I have mentioned. It has, however, been pointed out that there is evidence for the writing down of Buddhist texts[34] at a time somewhat earlier than that given in the Pāli chronicles,[35] where it is stated that the canon was written down in Ceylon during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmiṇī Abhaya in the first century B.C. The possibility of an early date for the writing down of Buddhist texts is perhaps supported by the suggestion, mentioned above (§ 6.1), that the Padapāṭha was written down not later than the sixth century B.C.

8.2. To return to the specific example of the title of the Dīghanikāya *suttanta*. We could assume that in an early form of writing the title was given as **Mahasamaya*. If the tradition transmitting the text used a dialect which reduced intervocalic consonants > *-y-*, and employed a script which did not write long *-ā-*, this form of the name was ambiguous. When it was sanskritised, in the North Indian tradition it was interpreted (rightly or wrongly) as standing for *Mahāsamāja*, possibly because the North Indian recensionists were in contact with Middle Indo-Aryan dialects which showed the change of intervocalic consonants > *-y-*, and were therefore well acquainted with it. It is possible that for metrical reasons the word was being pronounced as **samāya*. It was accordingly back-formed (perhaps incorrectly) into Sanskrit as *samāja*. Faced with the word *-samaya* the Sinhalese monks, however, living far away from dialects which changed *-j-* into *-y-*, saw no reason to change the form of the word (which etymologically made some sort of sense[36] in the contexts in which it occurred), and they therefore retained *-samaya* in the texts which they were transmitting.

9. Conclusions

9.1. I would therefore conclude by suggesting that the earliest form of the Brāhmī script did not write long vowels or double consonants or *anusvāra*. A form of this script was probably introduced into Ceylon at some time before the reign of Aśoka. It was also used by the Buddhists in North India for writing down some, at least, of their texts at a time earlier than is generally accepted. Later on, the facility for writing long vowels and double consonants was invented, and it was this later form which after its introduction into Ceylon was used for writing down the Theravādin canon. During the course of this writing down, problems of interpretation arose because of the ambiguity of the script, so that scribes were forced to make decisions about the way in which certain forms should be interpreted. Similar problems must have occurred in North India when the early Buddhist texts were being rendered into Sanskrit, and it is not surprising that some of the solutions arrived at by the Northern recensionists differed from those adopted by their Southern co-religionists.

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[33] See Sp 1399,16 foll.

[34] BROUGH (GDhp, p. 218) refers to the appearance of *va sayati* at Ja IV 494,2*, and compares it with *so vayati* at GDhp 144 and *sa vrajati* at Udāna-v I.26. He maintains that the idea of movement is essential to the verse, which makes it certain that the verb *vraj-* is to be read in this passage. The alternation between *sa va* and *va sa* is more likely to be due to an error in writing rather than to a mistake in an oral tradition.

[35] See Dīp XX 20–21.

[36] There is no reason why the word *samaya* should not have existed in its own right in Pāli with the meaning "meeting". It is possible that it was chance alone which prevented it being adequately attested in this meaning in Sanskrit.

Brohm worked not only with Asians needing advice about American schools, but also with Americans needing advice about what sorts of Asian applicants to accept for what sorts of educational programs. Increasingly, American educational institutions requested Asian applicants to consult with IIE staff members and obtain from them IIE's evaluative report on their qualification, and often also on the quality of the schools where they had been trained. Such requests led Brohm and his associates to a second major achievement: the development of rigorous evaluations of many Asian colleges, their varied curricula, grading systems, scholarly standards, language teaching proficiency, strong and weak departments. Brohm periodically published scrupulously honest, impartial, culturally informed evaluations which enabled American admissions officers to make much more sense of the varient records of Asian institutions, and helped prevent thousands of inappropriate or even disastrous admissions decisions.

The sheer productivity of Brohm's operation was staggering. Although precise records are not available, it is clear that he and his staff conducted well over 10,000 in-depth, searching interviews of Asian applicants to American universities, in addition to offering less formal services to many times that number. During this same period, Brohm conducted or supervised the publication of 135 detailed "institutional profiles" of institutions of higher education in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia -- especially Thailand.

Because of these pioneering efforts, the interaction of American colleges and universities with those of Southeast Asia has been placed on a much more sophisticated level. Because of Brohm's keen interest in the changing needs of Asians, his vast knowledge of Asia's varied human resources, and his utter dedication to helping the right Asian find the right education at the right institution, the lives of countless Asians have been enriched.

Fortunately, much of what John Brohm accomplished was recognized and appreciated during his lifetime. Literally hundreds of Asian intellectuals remember his genuine kindness and reliable assistance with deep gratitude, and found ways to let him know this while he was still alive. But beyond this, his work benefited thousands of others in ways they are not aware of, and could not be.

His was a life well spent.

Lauriston Sharp, Cornell University
Robert B. Textor, Stanford University

92/14

John Blofeld

Among the rarities from whom the Siam Society has benefitted over the years is an English Chinese Buddhist of the Vajarayana school whose passing at the age of 74 on 17 June 1987 is the occasion for this memorial.

John Calthorpe Blofeld also known by his Chinese name, P'u Lutao, was born in England on 2 April 1913. Responding to his calling, he left Cambridge University in 1933 before finishing to begin a total immersion in Chinese ways interrupted when the Second World War broke out in 1939. He then joined the British Army with the rank of captain but at the time there were so few Englishmen who knew Mandarin he was moved from the War Office to the diplomatic service to serve as Cultural Attaché in Chungking from 1942 to 1945. He returned to Cambridge University in 1945-6 to obtain his degree and immediately afterwards returned to China until the victory of the Communists in 1949 led him to leave for Hongkong where he taught at a high school until 1951.

Mr. Blofeld was then persuaded to seek the more congenial Buddhist atmosphere of Thailand and he settled here in 1951. In Thailand, he taught English language and literature at Chulalongkorn University from 1951 to 1961, was Chief of Editorial Services with ECAFE, now ESCAP, from 1961 to 1974 and for the next five years again taught English at Kasetsart and Chulalongkorn Universities. Then free of the need to make a living, Mr. Blofeld devoted himself entirely to his Chinese studies, to lecturing in the United States and Canada and giving seminars on Taoism and Buddhism and to writing. Shortly before his death he completed his autobiography in Chinese now being published in Hongkong and was, until almost the last day, working in Chinese on a collection of old tales recalled from his early days in China.

The Siam Society had the privilege of the membership of Mr. Blofeld in December 1978. Even before joining he had led the Society on a tour of Chinese temples in Bangkok followed by a Chinese lunch reflecting two of his many Chinese interests: religion and food, and had lectured on 8 November 1977 on TAOISM, THE WISDOM OF INACTIVITY. Subsequently, from time to time, he led the Society on tours of Chinese temples in the provinces and in Bangkok.

Mr. Blofeld's achievements, spiritual and cultural, are reflected in the many books he has written, most of them while he was in Thailand. The major works are listed below. In the second edition of his spiritual autobiography THE WHEEL OF LIFE written when he was 59 he summarized as follows the great experiences of his life which in their content and the felicitous manner of their expression give an insight into the warmth of character and sincerity of this extraordinary person:-

My friendship with Tahai and all that emerged from it, including my first initiation at the hands of the Lama we used to call in Chinese Dorje Joonjay;

My holiday on Mount Wu T'ai with its fantastic peaks and flower carpeted plateau where stood a whole galaxy of temples and monasteries inhabited by colourful throngs of recluses belonging to an age gone by;

The months of ardent meditation spent in the palatial halls of Hua T'ing Ssu which, standing amidst the forests of the Western Hills, looked out across the lake to the mediaeval walls and towers of the city of Kunming;

The ceremony in the gloomy Temple of the War God during which I took the oath of blood-brotherhood to Chin P'eishan of the Imperial Clan of Ai-hsin-chieh-lu;

My pilgrimage to the conical mountain of Tashiding, where the roar of the waters and reverberations of the lama's drums merged in the mantra of never-ending sound;

The winter spent in Kalimpong with the Nyingma Lamas and with John Driver, King Punchok and a nearly invisible dog;

My glimpse of Mongolia's lovely land, where Buddhist herdsmen still dwell amidst their herds of yak and horses on the limitless plains of Central Asia, still largely undisturbed by the crudeness of modern man;

My reception by the Dalai Lama, his warmth and sweetness, the scenic grandeur of the mountains and noble courage of the Tibetan exiles.

Towards the end of his life Mr. Blofeld became noticeably more Chinese. His maner became even more courtly and courteous, he dressed nearly always in Chinese fashion and his sparse white beard grew wispy and with his good humour and ready laugh he gave the impression of a sage rather far along the road to spiritual enlightenment. Except for his felicity of expression in English and fondness for an occasional European meal, there was not much of the Englishman left. By then he was spending hours a night studying old Chinese texts and working on his last two works in Chinese. As a Buddhist, death held no fear for him. He was sceptical of what the next life would bring but thought as so many of the Buddhist insights turned out in his experience to be true, those on death and what comes afterwards are likely to be true as well. Having had a full life and having known the inconveniences of old age he accepted the end with equanimity, ready to make the dash for nirvana. John Blofeld was cremated at Wat Hualampong after 7 days of Thai, Chinese and Tibetan rites on 25 July 1987.

93/14

Damnern Garden
Bangkok

BOOKS BY JOHN BLOFELD

		Year
1.	*The Jewel in the Lotus* - Sidgewick & Jackson, London An outline of presentday Chinese Buddhism	1948
2.	*Red China in Perspective* - Wyndgate, London An attempt to explain the reasons for communist success in China.	1951
3.	*The Wheel of Life* - Rider, London; and Shambhala, USA Autobiographical, largely about China and Chinese and Tibetan Buddhism.	1959
4.	*People of the Sun* - Hutchinson, London Life in Siam	1960
5.	*The Zen Teaching of Huang Po* - Rider, London; and Grove press, USA Translation of an 8th century Buddhist classic from Chinese	1958
6.	*The City of Lingering Splendour* - Hutchinson, London Life in pre-war Peking	1961
7.	*The Zen Teaching of Hui Hai* - Rider, London; and Grove Press, USA Translation of an 8th century Buddhist classic from Chinese	1962
8.	*The Book of Change* - Allen & Unwin, London; and Dutton, USA A new translation of the most ancient existing book in the world.	1965
9.	*The Way of Power* - Allen & Unwin, London; and Dutton, USA Tibetan Buddhism with emphasis on meditational techniques	1970
10.	*The World of Buddhism* - Siam Society, Bangkok A pictorial album illustrating Buddhist practice in five groups of countries-Theravadin, Mahayana, Vajrayana, formerly Buddhist countries and those where Buddhism is taking root.	1979
11.	*King Maha Mongkut of Siam* - Asia Pacific Press, Singapore	1972
12.	*The Secret and Sublime* - Allen & Unwin, London; and Dutton, USA	1973
13.	*Beyond the Gods* - Allen & Unwin, London; and Dutton, USA Taoist and Buddhist ways of living	1974
14.	*Mantras* - Allen & Unwin, London; and Shambhala, USA	1976
15.	*Compassionate Yoga* - Allen & Unwin, London; and Shambhala, USA A story of Kuan Yin (Chinese 'Goddess of Mercy')	1978
16.	*Taoism: Quest for Immortality* - Allen & Unwin, London; Shambhala, USA All aspects of Taoism	1979
17.	*Gateway to Wisdom* - Allen & Unwin, London; and Shambhala, USA Taoist and Buddhist meditation practices	1980
18.	*The Chinese Art of Tea* - Allen & Unwin, London; Shambhala, USA	1985

94/14

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BUDDHIST AND DAOIST MYSTICISM IN KÔDA ROHAN'S WORKS

Diana Donath, Köln[1]

Although the well-known Meiji author Kôda Rohan 幸田露伴 (1867-1947) made several successful attempts to join Realism as the main literary trend of his time, the vast majority of his work has to be assigned to the current of Literary Idealism, which means in his case Neoromaniticism and, strictly speaking, Romantic Mysticism.

Japanese literature experts classify Rohan, and particularly his important early work, as belonging to Early Romanticism *(shoki-rômanshugi* 初期浪漫主義). They stress the visionary character[2] of his statements, and they use the special term Literature of Enlightenment *(godô no bungaku* 悟道の文学)[3] to describe parts of Rohan's body of work, a term which, as one of the following examples will demonstrate, is quite appropriate.

Rohan looked at himself as a Realist writer, though. He wrote: "Prose *(shôsetsu)* is fiction, but good prose consists of the collected shadows of reality."[4] Rohan, who himself was an individual in every regard, resisted classification in literary categories, and called his literary principle "the description of the interesting" or of "the inspiring" *(kankyôshugi* 感興主義).[5]

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[1] A shortened version of this essay served as a model for my paper of the same title held at the 8th Conference of the European Association for Japanese Studies (EAJS) in Budapest, Aug. 27-30, 1997.

[2] E.g. Kawamura Jirô 川村二朗 (in "Kansatsu kara genshi e: Kôda Rohan ron", in: Nihon-bungaku-kenkyûshiryô-kankôkai (ed.): *Kôda Rohan / Higuchi Ichiyô*, Yûsei-dô 1982, 3. ed. 1987, pp. 16 and 20) says: "Rohan looks at the world realistically, but he advances to vision ... He describes current affairs realistically, but he leads the reader into a space of free imagination ... into the dimension of infinity ... into the sensation of bodylessness."

[3] E.g. Sasabuchi Yûichi 笹淵友一, quoted by Ikari Akira 伊狩章, *Kôda Rohan to Higuchi Ichiyô*, Kyôiku-shuppan-sentâ 1983/1, pp. 148.

[4] In his article "Kakusha-zappitsu" (in *Yomiuri-shinbun* 1890/2), quoted by Sugizaki Toshio 杉崎俊夫, "Fûryûbutsu-shiron", in: *Taishô-daigaku kenkyû-kiyô* 61, 1975/11, p. 359.

Throughout his whole life, Rohan was looking for the truth behind appearences. His intended aim was to transcend the borders of the narrow, petty, and limited real world and to advance into the universal and the eternal. Particularly in the endings of his novels, his plot often leaves the realm of realism and ends in a seemingly fairytale-like and fantastic miracle, which is full of symbolic and philosophical meaning. In this regard, Rohan is a master of employing nearly imperceptible transitions from realism and everyday-life into fantasy and mystery.

In many cases Rohan's mysticism has religious and philosophical roots: it is sometimes based on or combined with Buddhist or especially Zen-Buddhist themes, and in many other cases it incorporates Daoist thinking. In terms of *Buddhism*, Rohan received a strongly Buddhist education, and deepened his knowledge of philosophical Buddhism through extensive studies of the sûtras.[6] Also, despite the fact that his family, which had belonged to the Nichiren-sect for centuries, converted to Protestant Christianity (by 1889) when Rohan was nineteen years old, and that Rohan married a Christian intellectual[7] in his second marriage (in 1912) and accepted a Christian church wedding ceremony,[8] Rohan himself remained a Buddhist and practiced *Zazen* throughout his life.[9] Many of his

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[5] Quotations from Katanuma Seiji 潟沼誠二, "Kôda Rohan kenkyû josetu: Shoki sakuhin o kaidoko suru", Ôfûsha 1989 p. 129..

[6] Apart from the Lotos-Sûtra *(Hokkekyô,* Skr. *Saddharma-puṇḍarîka-sûtra)* and the group of the Prajñâpâramitâ-Sûtras (esp. the Diamond-Sûtra *Kongôkyô,* Skr. *Vajracchedikâ-prajñâpâramitâ-sûtra,* and the Heart-Sûtra *Hannyashingyô,* Skr. *Prajñâpâramitâ-hṛdaya-sûtra),* these were especially the *Kegonkyô* (Skr. *Avataṃsaka-sûtra)* and the *Ryôgonkyô* (Skr. *Śûraṅgama-sûtra).* Rohan wrote a commentary on the *Hannyashingyô* titled "Hannyashingyô daini-gichû" in 1890. – See Diana Donath, "Kôda Rohan und sein repräsentatives Frühwerk Fûryûbutsu – Ein Beitrag zur Rohan-Forschung", ed. Dieter Born, Bonn 1997, pp. 54, with notes on further literature.

[7] Kodama Yayoko 児玉八世子, app. 1872-1945.

[8] By the famous Protestant preacher Uemura Masahisa 植村正久 (1857-1925), professor at Meiji-gakuin, minister, founder of several churches etc.

[9] See D. Donath, "Kôda Rohan", p. 28 and p. 33.

95|14

novels deal with Buddhist themes, as sometimes hinted at in such titles as *Iṣâna's Garden (Iṣâna no sono* 伊舎那の園, 1915), *Prakṛtî (Purakurichi* プラクリチ, 1932),[10] and others.

But Rohan was also one of the most reputable Meiji experts on *Daoism.* He was a very knowledgable *kangakusha,* and had a special affection for his large neighbouring country China and its culture, and particularly Chinese Daoism matched his own inclination towards mysticism. In his extensive studies he devoted attention to the Daoist classics and standard works,[11] which was unusual at the time. Japanese literature experts call Rohan "a pioneer who japonised Chinese Daoism."[12] There are many novels and scientific or semi-scientific works of his which have titles containing the word Daoism itself,[13] the names of well-known Chinese Daoist saints[14] or the term "saint" *(sennin* 仙人)[15], or Daoist keywords like "mystic" (gen 幻), "dark" (yû 幽), or "strange" (kai 怪).[16]

A few examples may illustrate the synthesis of Rohan's mysticism with *Buddhist thought.* The novel *Clay Doll, Wooden Doll (Dogû-mokugû* 土偶木偶, 1905)[17] is one example, being based on the Indian-Buddhist conception of the circle of rebirths (Skr. *saṃsâra).* Rohan expresses his conviction in the existence of intuitive memories where it is possible to recall a former existence: for a few short moments, with the flashing of one's conscience, or as a déjà-vue experience, or with the eerie sensation of a delicate touch from a different world. The plot describes dreamlike events. The protagonist, called Gen'ichirô 幻一朗 (the name containing the above mentioned Daoist term "mystic" *gen)*, reaches the surroundings of Kyôto in an aimless journey and visits an antique store. He buys the old fragment of a letter, which is attached to a lady's kimono cloth. Back at his inn, he tries to read the faded script of the letter, but a fire suddenly breaks out and the letter burns. Sensing this letter to have been a message from his former life, Gen'ichirô is paralysed with shock. He moves on, and in the dark of night runs into a woman who asks for help against her pursuers. He takes up the fight, only to be defeated and hit unconscious. When he awakes, the woman takes him to her home, where the furniture, as well as the woman herself and her servant, seem increasingly familiar to him. Finally, he realizes that this is his own home from a former existence, and that the lady is his former geisha-mistress who had been separated from him before their planned wedding. She is also the writer of the burned letter. Her identity is proved by a birthmark on her left ring finger.[18] The geisha, obviously the clay doll referred to in the title, promises him a reunion in their next life.[19]

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[10] See D. Donath, ibid., p. 89 resp. p. 93; with notes on further literature.

[11] As Laozi, Zhuangzi, Liezi, Hanfeizi, Guiguzi, Baopuzi, Lü Buwei, and many others. See D. Donath, ibid., p. 25 fn. 54.

[12] See Ikari Akira, *Kôda Rohan to Higuchi Ichiyô,* p. 88.

[13] E.g. *Dôkyô ni tsuite* (1933), *Dôkyô-shisô* (1936). For these and the following titles see D. Donath, "Kôda Rohan", p. 94.

[14] Like Rodôhin (Lü Dongbin; in *Sennin Rodôhin,* 1922), Hakukeshi (Bai Jiezi; in *Hakukeshi-kukô,* 1921), Ôgaifû (Wang Haifeng; in *Katsushinin Ôgaifû,* 1926), and others.

[15] E.g. *Sennin no hanashi* (1922), and others.

[16] E.g. *Gendan* (1938), *Yûhiki* (1925), *Yûgendô-zappitsu* (appr. 1883-1887), *Kaidan* (1928), and others.

[17] See D. Donath, "Kôda Rohan", pp. 85; with notes on further literature.

The next morning, the house has disappeared and Gen'ichirô awakes in a meadow under a tree. A shabbily dressed girl, who is deaf and dumb but the image of his former love, looks at him. Obviously the wooden doll, she has the same birthmark. He takes her back to Tôkyô as his wife; and she recovers from her deaf-muteness. One day, however, they leave their house together never to return.

In an epilogue, Rohan explains in the form of the protagonist's I-narration that the girl's deaf-muteness indicates a half-clear state of consciousness, which is a result of the grief of her former life, which the geisha had ended by comitting suicide after being separated from Gen'ichirô. Rohan explains his notion that the three worlds (the past, the present and the future) do not take place one after another, but exist next to each other as parallel worlds, whose borders are permeable for parapsychologically gifted people. Rohan uses the Buddhist terms "three worlds" *(sanze* 三世; Skr. *triloka)* and "three spheres" *(sangai* 三界; Skr. *traidhâtuka)*, which depict the circle of rebirths. In Japan, according to the popular Buddhist view, these terms contain the "three ages" present, past and future. But of course Rohan knew the original Buddhist meanings of the three worlds or spheres as "the sphere of desires" (Skr. *kâmadhâtu)*, "the sphere of forms" (Skr. *rûpadhâtu)*, and "the sphere of formlessness" (Skr. *arûpadhâtu);* and in the case of these "three worlds" no temporal order is to be assumed. Therefore, Rohan understands the "three ages" as being parallel, and hence questions the idea of time itself. Such philosophical thoughts as these are also addressed in other works of his.

Rohan further incorporates Buddhist thought, in this case Zen-Buddhist thought, in his novel *The Contemplation of a Picture (Kangadan* 観画談).[20] Rohan, who was fifty-eight years old at the time, succeeds in depicting a doubled and enhanced experience of enlightenment, that means an enlightenment in two steps. The protagonist nicknamed "Master Late Bloomer" Taikibansei-sensei 待機晩成先生, after having worked hard and saved money for many years, takes up his planned and much longed-for studies, which ultimately, however, cause him to have a mental crisis. Seeking recovery, he sets out on a hiking tour in the mountains, and during a fierce rain, he spends a night in a remote mountain temple. At the sound of the falling rain he realizes that this monotonous roaring contains all sounds in the world, including men's and animals' voices as well as those mechanically produced, all sounds audible once und now. This intuitive experience of entity fills him with joy and relief, and he falls asleep.

After being awoken, he is brought to a hut higher in the mountains to escape the rising flood of the rain. In the hut, he finds a large painting covering a whole wall, which depicts an idyllic landscape: a city surrounded by mountains, with a river running through it, and with houses and people (perhaps a symbol of paradise, as the depiction of Heavenly Jerusalem in Christianity). He immerses himself into the picture by meditation and goes into it – a way that is common in East Asian painting – and the picture then begins to live. He hears the ferryman cry out "The last call", but before he can answer, the candle in the hut flickers in a draft of cold air, and the lively scene becomes inanimate and turns into a flat painting again. For one brief moment, which contained the essence of his whole existence, he had access to eternity. Through this experience of enlightenment, he recovers mentally and later on, living as a simple farmer, achieves a state of

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[18] Here we can see Rohan's influence on Mishima, who makes this motive the basic idea of his novel-tetralogy *Hôjô no umi*.

[19] A well-known topos in Japanese literature.

[20] See D. Donath, "Kôda Rohan", p. 93; with notes on further literature.

calmness in which it no longer matters to him whether his talents bloom late in life or don't bloom at all.

This spontaneous and brief Zen-Buddhist enlightenment occurs in two steps: at first partially, appealing to the sense of hearing and caused by a weather phenomenon. Then, it takes place on a higher level (figuratively shown, as a place higher in the mountains), appealing to the visual sense and caused by a work of art. This conforms to the traditional value system which places seeing above hearing and art above nature. His return to life as a farmer is equivalent to the Zen-Buddhist thesis[21] that, after the experience of enlightenment, it is possible to renounce entry into Nirvâṇa, and instead to return to everday-life and to be able to repeat the experiences of enlightenment.

As a third example of Rohan's Buddhist founded mysticism I would like to refer to his early work *Fûryûbutsu* 風流佛 (1889),[22] which I have interpreted as *The Kannon Statue Created out of Love*. The novel, which I have translated into German, describes how the young wood carver Shuun 珠運 awakes to love, but is jilted by his beloved. It takes Shuun months of suffering before he is able to transform his pain into creative energy. And then he creates a statue of the Kannon goddess as a naked image of his beloved, and through his strong mental energy he brings the statue to a mystic life, where it seems to speak and move. When Shuun hears that his beloved is going to marry a rich nobleman and will be lost to him forever, he tries to free himself from his unbreakable love by smashing the statue as his beloved's portrait. But he isn't capable of doing so, and tumbles to the floor. At this moment a miracle occurs: the girl appears, embracing him, and he then envisions walking hand in hand with her in a heavenly wedding ceremony above the clouds. The model for this miracle, which surfaces from the earth, is obviously the well-known treasure-pagoda, depicted in the Lotos-Sûtra:[23] the treasure-pagoda surfaces from the earth, with a pair[24] sitting inside, consisting of the historical Buddha Śâkyamuni (who corresponds to the sun), and the so-called "Many-Treasure-Buddha" *Tahô* 多宝 (Skr. Prabhûtaratna; who corresponds to the moon). This correspondence to the sun and the moon refers to the pair of yin-yang *(inyô* 陰陽*)*.[25] This duality is symbolic of the fact that in the end of the novel Shuun and his beloved mystically emerge as a pair, defying and overcoming reality, where they remain separated.

In the epilogue of the novel the Buddhist ideology is shown even more distinctly: the carved Kannon statue, endowed with magic and religious energy, now starts her activity as a goddess. She is depicted naked, but according to the statement of the Kannon's thirty-three bodies in the Lotos-Sûtra,[26] every worshipper can see her in the clothing that matches their own social status and local customs. This means that anyone can address her, and that she is available for everybody. This also alludes to the Buddhist way of visualizing the goddess through meditation.

Typical for Rohan, who is known for his syncretism, is the ironic combination of a Buddhist subject with Daoist adornment: the Kannon goddess, while exercising her religious and magical power, is standing on a white cloud, which is a prominent Daoist symbol.[27]

Concerning *Daoist mysticism* in Rohan's works, there are numerous examples, for Daoist influenced works run through Rohan's creative time virtually from the first to the last work. Rohan's first preserved work (written between 1883 and 1887) with the title *Mystery of the Magic Square (Hôjin hisetsu* 方陣秘說*)*[28] is based on the Daoist magic of the

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[21] As it is expressed in the well-known parable of "Taming the Beef".

[22] See D. Donath, "Kôda Rohan"; notes on further literature see p. 98 fn. 1; translation of the novel pp. 251-328.

[23] Chapter 21; see the translation of the Sûtra by Margareta von Borsig, *Lotos-Sûtra*, ed. Lambert Schneider, Gerlingen 1992, pp. 333.

[24] In Buddhist iconography with its eminent predominance of triads, a portrayal of a couple is very rare.

[25] This means that *Tahô* can be interpreted as a woman.

[26] Chapter 25; see the translation by M. v. Borsig, *Lotos-Sûtra*, pp. 364; see D. Donath, "Kôda Rohan", p. 328 fn. 249. - Among the thirty-three bodies of the Kannon the Lotos-Sûtra also lists her body as a Buddha, hence the term "Buddha" *(butsu)* in the title of the novel is not incorrect for the Bodhisattva *(bosatsu)* Kannon (Skr. *Avalokiteśvara)*.

[27] Originally it was a sign of the victory of Daoism over Buddhism at the prosecution of Buddhists in China in 845. The main Daoist shrines in Chinese cities are often named Baiyunguan 白雲観 after the White Cloud (Chin. *baiyun*, Jap. *byakuun)*.

[28] See D. Donath, "Kôda Rohan", p. 48; with notes on further literature.

98/14

motive of the double. With great effort, Jirô manages to visualize the Demon King or Satan from within himself, that means he makes him appear. In response to Jirô's request for help, the Demon King splits him into two halves. From this point on Jirô has a double called "Same Kind" Dôshu 同種, who is an omnipotent servant for him. This servant, as his evil, devilish part, fulfills all his wishes for luxury and sex through brutality and crime. Jirô, as his good, human part, is plagued by his conscience and gives Dôshu the last order: to petrify him.

In Rohan's novel the contrast between good and bad, as established in the yin-yang-principle, is applied to the divided soul of man, and, with a literary description of schizophrenia, it is drawn close to modern psychiatry. In this novel, Daoist and Shingon-Buddhist mysticism is combined with the Buddhist theory of causality (that means the idea of guilt) and the demand that Buddhism's main evil "greed" (Skr. *tṛṣṇâ)* – the striving for posession and sex – has to be extinguished, which happens in this case through petrification, that means the killing of all desires.

I hope these examples have shown to what extent Rohan's abundant literary fantasy with its inclination towards Romantic Mysticism is rooted in East Asian thought.

VIEWS OF THE COUNTRY, VISIONS OF SELF

Chosŏn Dynasty Travel Records on Chiri-san and Paektu-san

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Introduction

During the Chosŏn dynasty educated Koreans seem to have lived in a divided space. A cleavage opens between the space they inhabited culturally and the space they inhabited physically. This does not merely point at the pervasiveness of Chinese influence, but, more specifically, at a seeming lack of significance of Korean places in literary contexts. I shall use here two examples. One is from my readings of Chosŏn dynasty writings on dreams. The whole philosophical tradition of these writers was Chinese, including the basic notions on what a dream should mean or what the activity of dreaming means. It is surprising, however, that even the physical background of the dreams told often is situated in China. Given the literary and sometimes allegorical nature of these dream stories, this does not mean, of course, that the nightly dreams of Korean literati commonly led them to China. But obviously a Chinese background is one of the elements that can add significance to a dream story. The second example is the novel *Kuunmong* 九雲夢. When I first read it as a student, it struck me as very strange that this novel hailed as the Korean masterpiece of all ages is set in China.[1] But it seemed to me even stranger that the China the novel depicts was so different from the China I had experienced: the distances between places seemed to be much shorter. It was obviously a koreanized China. In reports on travels inside Korea, Korean literati respond to Korean physical space with exactly the same literary tools and the same mind-frame that refer them back to China in

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[1] This is of course true for other fictional texts as well. Wei Xusheng in his study of "Chinese literature in Korea" points out that it will be hard to find another "national literature" with a similarly great percentage of works using a foreign background (*Zhongguo wenxue zai Chaoxian,* Guangzhou 1990, p.287). Needless to say, the terms "national literature" and "foreign" may not be fully appropriate in this case.

Études Asiatiques Vol 52:1 1998 99/14

color plates as well. Béguin's iconographic and stylistic analyses are complemented by substantial bibliography which concludes the catalogue. An appendix with transcription of at least some of the historically significant Tibetan inscriptions on the paintings would have been ideal, alas it is lacking.

These three volumes, so very different in their philosophy, raison d'être and subject, all represent considerable advances in the field of Tibetan art history.

Amy Heller

Kathryn R. BLACKSTONE, *Women in the Footsteps of the Buddha: Struggle for Liberation in the Therīgāthā*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1998. xiii + 185pp. £40.-. ISBN 0-7007-0962-2.

Kathryn R. Blackstone has written a quite outstanding, highly perceptive book. She calls the *Therīgāthā* "an exciting and provocative text,because, it is the only canonical text in the world's religions that focuses exclusively on women's experiences," (p. 1) and further, that it and the *Theragāthā* "are unique in the Pali Canon as descriptions of the quest for liberation of the Buddha's followers." (p. 6) She describes them as "liberation manuals, ... models of the successful quest for liberation that anyone can follow." These are important observations.

The *Introduction* describes the historical setting of *Therīgāthā* and *Theragāthā* and the methodology of the study which is "to uncover the attitudes and assumptions that underly the *Therīgāthā*'s characteristic use of terms, images, events, and situations," and to discern "the specifically feminine perspective the text claims to reflect." (p. 7) *Therīgāthā* and *Theragāthā* are to be systematically compared both qualitatively and quantitatively to achieve this goal.

The first chapter, *The Language of Liberation*, concerns how the texts use technical terminology to define *nibbāna*. Blackstone compares the liberation refrains and comes up with many fascinating observations. She finds that while 76.7% of the *Therīgāthā* refer to the author, only 36.7% of the *Theragāthā* do so. The *therīs* are more likely to talk about their own experiences, while the *theras* are more likely to speak in the abstract. (p. 24) The *therīs* emphasise the conquest aspect of liberation, while the

theras emphasise the attainment aspect. The texts are also different "in their characteristic attitudes towards the religious capabilities of others." The *theras* are more likely to talk in an abstract way about "fools" in poems that generally compare them with the enlightened, while the *therīs* use of this term is more concrete: in conversation or confrontation they use this term to explain that it is foolish not to follow the *dhamma*. *Theras* use this term more frequently. Rather than convert fools, the *theras* condemn them. (p. 33)

Chapter II, *Looking Backward: Attitudes Towards Renunciation* compares the different meaning of renunciation for women and for men: because of women's social situation they had to cope with conflict when they wished to go forth. They also had to cope with being discriminated against once in the *sangha*. In their poems, the *therīs* are more likely to report personal details regarding their previous lifestyle. They provide details of complex social interactions and compassionate relationships with family members. The *theras* are abstract and their accounts are "practically devoid of emotion." (p. 42) *Therīs* report a greater proportion of conversions as part of social interactions, *theras* through being in the Buddha's presence. The *therīs* have a close network of friendship; the *theras* speak in "abstract axioms of how *bhikkhus* should associate with 'good companions' and avoid bad." (p. 56) For the *theras* renunciation is a break with the past, for the *therīs* it is a transformation. (p. 51)

The *theras* often accuse women of being temptresses, but there is only one case in their verses. As Blackstone points out, "the temptation is found only in the *theras*' minds," (p. 53) while there are many more cases of the *therīs* being confronted by men attempting to seduce them.

Chapter III, *Looking Inwards: Attitudes Towards the Body*, shows how in the meditations on the disgusting nature of the body, the *theras* objectify images of the body and project them onto others, namely women. "All of the disgusting bodies contemplated by the *theras* are female" (p. 68) - they are externalised and "other"- while the *therīs* internalise this meditation, and contemplate their own bodies. Men's bodies are never referred to as an attractive snare. *Theras* report the achievement of enlightenment through contemplating a female body, dead, ill and alive; "none of the *therīs* report their attainments as the result of seeing a man, alive or dead." (p. 78)

Chapter IV, *Looking Outward: Attitudes Towards the Physical Environment*, discusses the environment both as a setting and as a symbol, here comparing whether images are used positively, negatively or neutrally.

Blackstone shows a different use of such symbols as the forest that reflect different opportunities: the forest was naturally a more dangerous place for *therīs* to meditate in because as well as the other dangers and difficulties also encountered there by the *theras*, the women might be threatened by lecherous men.

Finally, in Chapter V, *Struggle for Liberation in the Therīgāthā*, Blackstone draws together the information she has so richly compared and contrasted into three categories, "the authors' attitudes towards relationships; the degree of personalization or abstraction they display; and their experiences of, and responses to, conflict." (p. 108) She takes up the point whether the authorship of the *Therīgāthā* is genuinely feminine, and comes to a positive conclusion. Finally she explains that the theme of struggle is more present in the *Therīgāthā* because the decision to be celibate inverted the gender-stereotype. "Instead of being content with the life of a married woman, brightened by the births of sons and overshadowed by the possibility of childless widowhood, these women chose to follow the path of religious renunciation. Instead of centering their lives on the needs of others, they concentrated on their own self-fulfillment." (p. 117)

This book is well served with many tables which make its quantitative aspect easy to assimilate. The table in appendix B, pp. 133-140 is wrongly headed *Therīgāṭhā* and refers instead to the *Theragāthā*.

In her introduction, Blackstone says, "My central focus ... is literally 'liberation': in the Buddhist sense of the term as *nibbāna*, liberation from the cycle of *saṃsāra* and the suffering concomitant with it; and, in the feminist sense, as women's liberation from gender constraints and the oppression they bring." (p. 11) She has admirably fulfilled her goal, and because the tone of the book is always so gentle and modest, the women's appalling additional suffering simply because of their gender comes across with great effect. This is an excellent contribution both to Buddhist studies and to women's studies.

Joy Manné

loc 114

Lars Martin FOSSE: *The Crux of Chronology in Sanskrit Literature. Statistics and Indology. A Study of Method.* Oslo: Skandinavian University Press, 1997. 413 S. (Acta Humaniora ; 21).

Mit Lars Marin Fosses Dissertation wird eine Arbeit dem breiteren indologischen Publikum zugänglich gemacht, die sich im Rückblick wohl als ein Meilenstein in der Indologie erweisen wird. Fosse geht von einem uralten Problem der Indologie aus, nämlich der Frage nach der relativen und absoluten Datierung der Texte der indischen Literatur. Er versucht, aufgrund des Stils der einzelnen Texte diese chronologisch zueinander in Beziehung zu setzen. Stil definiert Fosse als typische Kombination einer grossen Anzahl grammatikalischer Erscheinungen, deren Häufigkeit gemessen und mit den Methoden der Statistik bearbeitet wird.

Diese Fragestellung nutzt Fosse nun aber nicht, um vorzugeben, das Problem der Datierung ein für allemal gelöst zu haben, sondern er benutzt sie als Vehikel, um den Leser sorgfältig in die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der statistischen Methoden im Bereich der Indologie einzuführen.

Gerade in diesem Gebiet steckt die Indologie noch in den Kinderschuhen, wie Fosse im ersten Teil seiner Arbeit vorführt: In diesem Teil geht er auf seine Vorgänger auf dem Gebiet der indologischen Statistik ein. Das Vorgehen von Arnold, Wüst, Morton Smith, Trautmann, Yardi und Pandit (um nur die Wichtigsten zu nennen) wird detailliert geschildert und die Stärken und Schwächen ihrer Arbeiten aufgezeigt.

Im zweiten Teil entwickelt Fosse seine Konzepte von Stil, Sprachentwicklung und Textüberlieferung. Überzeugend stellt er dar, wie sich im Stil eines Textes verschiedene Einflüsse überlagern können: Sprachgeschichte, Textgenre, Kompilation von Texten verschiedenen Stils und Veränderung des Stils durch die Abschreiber machen es schwer, einen Text aufgrund stilistischer Kriterien genau zu datieren. Fosse geht darum zum Vornherein davon aus, dass sich seine Texte nicht präzis datieren lassen. Er spricht von einem age slot (Zeitraum), in dem der Text entstanden ist und der durch zwei Daten, dem frühest und dem spätest möglichen, festgelegt ist.

Mit dieser theoretischen Vorgabe wendet sich Fosse im dritten Teil der eigentlichen Statistik zu. Fosse hat für seine Arbeit 66 verschiedene Beispiele (sog. Samples) aus 23 verschiedenen Werken zusammengestellt. Alle diese Samples sind genau 1000 Wörter lang (auch wenn sie damit mitten im Satz beginnen oder enden). Dialogpassagen, Stotras und Zitate

become full members of the community. The number of renouncers being scarce, nothing prevented the *Kāmaḍ bhekh* of householders from appearing as a true sub-caste or *jāti*.

Recently, in order to sustain their claims, the Kāmaḍ have founded an association called *Kāmaḍ samāj sansthān*.[94] Social concerns aside, the aim of this association is also to try to bring back to life the cultural and religious heritage of their ancestors. This ambitious project has, so to speak, forced out of their retreat many of those who had preferred – at various periods of history – to conceal their identity under the better sounding titles of *Nāth* or *Gosāīn*. Sharing a number of customs, rituals, beliefs and myths with Shaiva ascetics, Kāmaḍ claimed that they originated from the Nāth tradition, a separate branch of which they formed. The question was how their originality should have been defined and what was the "historical" reason for this rupture with the *Nāth panth*.

As a Kāmaḍ informant confessed to us one day: "after all, we do not know where we come from . . .". However, contemplating the erection of an imposing shrine which would be a token of the revival of his tradition, he wondered what could be the main symbol of this temple – a symbol which would distinguish the religious heritage of the Kāmaḍ from that of other communities, including the Meghwāl. It could not be Rāmdeo's footprints or image, since the cult of the Pīr of Ruṇichā was no longer their privilege. So what? After a short silence, it is not without emotion that we heard him declare what appeared indeed as a luminous revelation: ". . . but of course! Kalki . . . the image of the *Nikalank avatār*!".

Note on Transliteration

When not specified words have been used in their Hindi form which is nowadays the most frequent; Rajasthani terms are marked -r.- and Sanskrit words -s.-

All these words have been transliterated as follows:

- long vowels bear a horizontal line;
- a dot indicates retroflexal consonants;
- u = short oo.
- Hindi nasal vowels are indicated as *an*, *on* . . .
- other letters as in English.
- the diphthong *ev* has been transcribed as *eo* (as in *Rao*, *Deo*).

To simplify the system no distinction has been made between the different "sh" sound, as in *shishya* and *shatkon*, nor between the sounds "ri" in *Rishi* and *riwaz*, marked in Sanskrit (Hindi and Rajasthani) by different letters.

Arabic and Persian words are spelled as in the sources we are quoting.

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[94] Founded in July 1990, its seat is located at Bhīlwāṛā (Rajasthan).

101/14

*A Review Article**

Dating of the Historical Buddha

L. S. COUSINS

In the fifteenth century the author of the Blue Annals wrote: "In general (it must be observed) that there exists a great disagreement in the statements of scholars regarding the years of the Birth and Nirvāṇa of the Teacher."[1] Presented with well over a thousand pages on the subject in two volumes (with a third to come), one might be excused for supposing that not much has changed in the last half millennium. In fact that would be somewhat illusory. Even if we have not yet been able to fix the exact dates of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, considerable progress has of course been made, as even a cursory look at the traditional dates of the past makes quite clear.

Within the Eastern Buddhist tradition of China, Vietnam, Korea and Japan (especially the latter two countries) the traditional date for the Mahāparinibbāna (death) of the Buddha was 949 B.C., although a variant giving 878 B.C. is also possible. Earlier and down to the fifth century A.D. a date of 686 B.C. seems to have been fairly common. Although they may in part have been motivated by a desire to place the Buddha earlier in time than Lao-tse, these and other such dates were created by relating such events in the life-story of the Buddha as the earthquakes mentioned in various texts to phenomena found in Chinese records – a clear enough testimony that no very definite chronological information was brought to China by the early Buddhist missionaries.

In the Northern Buddhism of the Tibeto-Mongolian cultural area the Mahāparinibbāna was officially dated to 881 B.C., although other ninth-century dates are also known. This is based upon the, probably mythical, chronology of Shambhala associated with the Kālacakra system. At an earlier stage Tibetan authorities seem to have tended to dates in the twenty-second century B.C., the origin of which is not clear. Both Chinese and Tibetan scholars were, however, well aware that many other dates had been advanced. This is in sharp contrast to the Southern Buddhist tradition, which has retained no memory of any disagreement over the basic chronology of events since the Buddha's lifetime. (There have of course been slight differences as to the exact moment at which the year one commences.) The era they preserve places the Buddha's Mahāparinibbāna in 543 B.C. This is certainly much closer than the more widely accepted of the alternatives; so it is not surprising perhaps that it has tended to spread in modern times: it seems to have been adopted in

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* A review article of *The Dating of the Historical Buddha. Die Datierung des Historischen Buddha*. Edited by Heinz Bechert. 2 Vols (of 3). (Symposium zur Buddhismusforschung, IV, 1–2) pp. xv + 525; x + 530. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991–2. DM 310, 256.

[1] *Blue Annals*, p. 22 (cited Symp. IV, 1, p. 399).

JRAS, *Series* 3, 6, 1 (1996), pp. 57–63

Vietnam and Indonesia as well as by such modern organizations as the World Fellowship of Buddhists. There is some evidence also to suggest that it had been widely accepted in Kashmir, India and Nepal in the last period of Buddhism there (after the twelfth century or earlier).[2]

The volumes reviewed here stem from a conference held near Göttingen in 1988 under the auspices of Heinz Bechert. Indeed the modern revival of interest in this topic is very much to the credit of Bechert who wrote a number of articles on this subject prior to the conference.[3] Undoubtedly, even without the further source materials promised for the final volume, this is a major contribution to research in the field and for a long time to come will be essential for any serious study of pre-Mauryan chronology or early Buddhist history.

In fact these volumes are not limited to the specific question of the date of the Buddha. A proportion (over 120 pages) is devoted to the history of research while another large section (about 60 pages) reprints a number of relevant sources, some of them not otherwise conveniently accessible. A considerable space is in effect devoted to the history of the use of the various chronological systems in particular Buddhist countries. This is certainly of great interest for the history of Buddhism in various areas, but no doubt the greatest interest lies in the papers which relate directly to the dating of the Buddha.

The history of research

A valuable and detailed paper by Sieglinde Dietz surveys the history of research (Symp. II, 2, pp. 11–83). It is clear that from 1687 (Couplet) onwards scholars gradually became aware of the main traditionally-espoused dates and by the beginning of the nineteenth century had, not surprisingly, begun to favour the seemingly more reasonable dating found in the Pali sources which underlie the Southern Buddhist tradition. As these became better known and as the Greek synchronisms which fix the dates of the Mauryan Emperors Candragupta and Aśoka to within a decade or two became more firmly established, problems appeared. Indeed, already in 1836 G. Turnour, the translator of the *Mahāvaṃsa*, recognized that the Pali sources place the Mauryan rulers some sixty years too early.

Subsequently in the course of the nineteenth century a number of dates in the fourth and fifth centuries B.C. were advocated by various scholars, notably a date proposed by T. W. Rhys Davids of "within a few years of 412 B.C." to which we will return. In the last decades of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century, however, a consensus gradually formed that the Buddha died towards the beginning of the fifth century B.C. – the dates most often cited are 483 or 486 B.C. In part this was because it became clear that the longer dating could be supported by data from the *Purāṇas* and by Jacobi's evaluation of the Jain evidence.

Also important here was a Chinese source: the so-called "Dotted Record" of the fifth century A.D. which seemed to present an independent dating for the Mahāparinibbāna

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[2] In the present volumes see: Symp(osium) IV, 1, pp. 344–57; 359–61; 398–9; 409–11; Symp. IV, 2, pp. 266–8 (nn. 15 and 17); 271 n. 42.

[3] Bechert, H., "The date of the Buddha reconsidered", *IT* (1982), pp. 29–36; "A remark on the problem of the date of Mahāvīra", *IT* (1983), pp. 287–90; *Die Lebenszeit des Buddha – das älteste feststehende Datum der indischen Geschichte?* (Göttingen, 1986); "Remarks on the date of the Historical Buddha", *Buddhist Studies* (1988), pp. 97–117.

102/114

around 486 B.C. Already, as is made clear in Hubert Durt's survey of the Japanese and Korean data, some Japanese scholars had from the eighteenth century onwards begun to favour a date based upon the Dotted Record and information about the Record was communicated to Max Müller as early as 1884 by B. Nanjio. Another paper by Erhard Rosner refers to Yü Cheng-hsieh who in 1813 put forward the first century B.C. for the birth of the Buddha, erroneous no doubt but a clear enough indication of the critical trend developing.

At all events the consensus developed above was to remain overwhelmingly dominant in European[4] and South Asian scholarship for the first half of the twentieth century. I exclude from consideration the more fantastic Indian chronological speculations documented in otherwise interesting papers by Jens-Uwe Hartmann and Gustav Roth. (There are equally fantastic pseudo-historical works in European literature too – e.g. the entertaining books on Atlantis, Mu, etc. by such writers as Donnelly, Churchward, Scott-Elliot and the like – we don't usually treat them in a survey of serious scholarship!) There has been perhaps slightly more variety in Japanese scholarship (surveyed by Hajime Nakamura), but there too the dating of the Buddha's death to the first quarter of the fifth century remained fairly standard.

More recently, doubts have gradually increased. Three reasons may be adduced for this: 1) a growing sense that such an early date does not fit well with the archaeological data; 2) a gradual recognition that the Dotted Record may be of Sinhalese origin and hence not fully independent from the Southern tradition; 3) a fuller awareness of the existence of a considerable number of largely Sarvāstivādin sources which date the accession of Aśoka around one hundred years after the Mahāparinibbāna as opposed to the 218 years of the Pali sources. This was first perhaps expressed by Étienne Lamotte who in his highly influential history placed the previous consensus and the Sarvāstivādin sources on an almost equal footing, distinguishing between the long chronology (i.e. the corrected version of the Southern Buddhist tradition) which places the death of the Buddha in c. 486 B.C. and the short chronology i.e. the Sarvāstivādin which places the same event in c. 368 A.D. In fact, Lamotte does then adopt the long chronology: "comme hypothèse de travail,"[5] although he may have favoured a later dating in his last years.

The chronological systems in use in Buddhist countries

Space obviously would not permit a full review of the wide range of papers included in these volumes. Let us then simply note that the Tibeto-Mongolian data is thoroughly reviewed in articles by Günter Grönbold, Claus Vogel, Per Kvaerne, Klaus Sagaster, Eckart Zabel, Champa Thupten Zongtse (in Tibetan) and a rather fully annotated paper by Seyfort Ruegg. Central Asian and Iranian data is looked at by Klaus Röhrborn, Werner Sundermann (two papers) and Klaus Schmidt. In addition to the papers already mentioned,

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[4] There were a few hold-outs, notably E. J. Thomas.

[5] Lamotte, E., *Histoire du bouddhisme Indien, des origines à l'ère Saka*, Bibliothèque du Muséon, vol. 43 (Louvain, 1958), p. 15. The origin of the expression "working hypothesis" in this context is usually attributed to Max Müller. (He applied it to the date of Samudragupta). However, the *OED* attributes its first use in English to R. H. Hutton in 1871.

Eastern Buddhist matters are covered by Herbert Franke, Lewis Lancaster and Bhikkhu Pāsādika (Vietnam).

There are also two papers concerned with the "Axial Age Theory" derived from the ideas of Karl Jaspers and a comparative paper concerned with parallel issues in early Greek history. Most of the above contributions represent a high standard of scholarship. I have more doubt in the case of some others. Let us simply note the over fifty pages devoted to the rather improbable, if erudite, speculations of P. H. L. Eggermont and the doubtful attempt of A. K. Narain to revive the old theory that there is a date in one of the inscriptions of Aśoka (MRE I).

The conclusions of these volumes on the date of the Buddha

A number of contributors attempt to assess the most likely date for the Buddha by the use of indirect evidence as to Indian cultural history. Bechert has placed thirteen contributions under this section heading and sums up the result as follows:

> . . . the conclusion seems unavoidable that all major sources of indirect evidence point to later dates of the Buddha than those suggested by the corrected long chronology. (Symp. IV, 1, p. 11)

This seems to slightly overstate the case as not all the contributors propose any dating and others have worded their position very cautiously. It might be better to say that the overall tendency is to conclude that there is at minimum no objection to a later date. Undoubtedly the archaeological evidence as presented here by Herbert Härtel and in part by Hermann Kulke is the major factor tending to support a later date. It is not however clear whether it is as yet overwhelming. The other contributions which seem to support a late date are those by: Georg von Simson, Oskar von Hinüber, Siegfried Lienhard (around 400 B.C. with a margin of about twenty years), Wilhelm Halbfass and, rather cautiously, Lambert Schmithausen.

Turning to the ten papers which Bechert classes as dealing directly with the evaluation of the Indian tradition, seven seem to present a viable case. At the extremes: Gen'ichi Yamazaki defends the long chronology, while none of the other contributions in this section envisage a date before 420 B.C. Akira Hirakawa defends the short chronology and Heinz Bechert himself sets a range from 400 B.C. to 350 B.C. but a "somewhat later date is not inconceivable." (Symp. IV, 1, p. 236); no other contributor (except Eggermont) seems to propose a date after 380 B.C. Hajime Nakamura, K. R. Norman, and Richard Gombrich all propose dates within the range suggested by André Bareau: around 400 B.C. with a margin of twenty years on either side. Expressing this in other terms, the Buddha's period of teaching activity was in the second half of the fifth century B.C., perhaps extending into the first quarter of the fourth century.

It is worth noting that this is quite close to being a "median chronology" i.e. halfway between the short and the long chronology. Perhaps after all the difference between the short and the long chronology may in origin have simply amounted to whether 150 years was rounded down to a hundred or up to two hundred i.e. a difference in literary conventions.

103/14

The Rhys Davids-Gombrich thesis

In a paper read to the Royal Asiatic Society in 1874 and subsequently published in his *On the Ancient Coins and Measures of Ceylon*, T. W. Rhys Davids put forward an argument on rather different lines, as mentioned above. He interprets some of the information given in the oldest of the Ceylon chronicles in Pali, the *Dīpavaṃsa* in a way different both to the tradition of the chronicles and to the understanding of later scholarship. Partly because of the development of the consensus mentioned above and partly also because his interpretation of the *Dīpavaṃsa* was based upon manuscript materials and seemed to be superseded by the editions and translations of Wilhelm Geiger, the views of Rhys Davids were subsequently disregarded.

His position depends upon the interpretation of the list of five Vinaya authorities prior to Mahinda in the third century B.C. as giving data on their ages at death rather than on their number of years as a monk. The latter interpretation gives the traditional 218 years down to the accession of Aśoka i.e. the long chronology, but contains a number of problems. Indeed it has been generally recognized that a succession of five is too short for the long chronology. The alternative gives a shorter period of about 150 years.

Richard Gombrich has now developed a similar theory, based upon the same proposition but with a more detailed and somewhat modified argumentation. In his version the accession of Aśoka took place after 136 years. (I have elsewhere suggested some further minor changes.[6]) Gombrich's arguments have undoubtedly shown that the data in the *Dīpavaṃsa* on the lineage of the teachers is impressively consistent when interpreted in this way. He is certainly right to argue that the lineage is a succession of teachers expert in the Vinaya and not a succession of individuals with some institutional authority. No doubt too he is correct in pointing out that the existence of other lists of such teachers with different names, as found in various non-Pali sources, is in no way in contradiction. There would have been many such pedigrees for different pupil-teacher lines.

If the general arguments of the Rhys Davids-Gombrich thesis are correct, and they may well be, then the overall picture must be something like the following: when the creators of the Sinhala chronicle tradition attempted to work out a chronology, they had basically two sources of information for the period prior to Aśoka. One was a lineage of teachers with ages at ordination and death. They must also have had some kind of brahmanical king-list, of the sort preserved for us in various *Purāṇas*, perhaps derived from diplomatic links with North India. (We know from Megasthenes that such lists were current in Mauryan governing circles.) The long chronology as we have it is the result of combining the two sources with adjustments to make them fit.

Plausibly, then, the oldest Sinhala tradition is that of the lineage of teachers. How old is that? It may of course go back to the arrival of Buddhism in Ceylon in the third century B.C. and have then been compiled on the basis of information handed down intact from the time of the Buddha. Unfortunately, there is no way of proving that at present. Since the last book of the *Vinaya-piṭaka* the *Parivāra* or "Appendix" already gives the list of the teachers together with a list of subsequent Vinaya authorities in Ceylon which terminates around the first century B.C., it must be relatively early and may well have been current by that date i.e. by the time at which the Pali Canon was set into writing.

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[6] Cousins, L. S., "The 'Five Points' and the origins of the Buddhist schools", in *The Buddhist Forum*, ed. T. Skorupski, ii (London, 1991), p. 59f.

Most probably then it represents the oldest attempt at a dating known to us. It seems quite possible that Ceylon which was a major trading area around this period may have been one of the main centres of South Asian Buddhism during some periods after the end of the Mauryan dynasty. Indeed prior to the Kuṣāṇas Anurādhapura and the Suṅga and Sātavāhana capital of Vidiśā (with which the Buddhism of Ceylon appears to have had some links) were quite possibly the two chief focal points of Buddhist activity for a while. If so, it is not at all surprising that the Sinhala texts should preserve earlier Buddhist traditions linked to the dynasties of North and Central India. Heinz Bechert, however, takes a rather different view.

Bechert's arguments

These two volumes contain around 66 pages of editorial material and substantial contributions from Bechert; so his views are quite well represented. A part of his argument is simply to make the point that the former general acceptance of the (revised) long chronology is a thing of the past. This is clearly the case.

In a different area, however, it seems to me that his position is more debatable. He writes:

> I am also convinced that the "short chronology" represents the earliest Buddhist chronology found in our sources. This does not, however, imply that it represents reliable chronological information. (Symp. IV, 1, 8)

On the face of it this seems much more doubtful. Lewis Lancaster in his contribution points out that short chronology sources appear in Chinese translation from A.D. 306, while the long chronology appears first in a text translated between 265–317. (Symp. IV, 1, 455f.) Short chronology sources are more numerous, but since this simply reflects Sarvāstivādin influence it does not take us much further.

The primary reason for Bechert's belief does appear to be his acceptance of the claim that there is evidence for the presence of the short chronology in ancient Ceylon, specifically in the *Dīpavaṃsa*. I have elsewhere[7] argued that this is mistaken and must refer the reader there for the full arguments. In brief there are two passages which can be taken as supporting the short chronology (and many that do not.) The second of these (Dīp V 55–9) concerns the prophecy of the arising of Moggaliputta Tissa "in the future, in 118 years". Bechert, and several predecessors, take the prophecy as by the Buddha. However, he does not take account of the parallel passages (Dhs-a 3–4; 6; Sp 35ff.) which make it clear that it is a prophecy given by the Elders of the Second Council. Indeed the fact that immediately after the prophecy the *Dīpavaṃsa* itself refers to the death of those elders (V 60) makes it sufficiently certain that it is recounting the same story. The problem is perhaps a result of the insertion of a section on the history of the eighteen schools at the beginning of chapter five (i.e. vv. 1–54) immediately before the prophecy. This has separated verse 55 from the description of the second council at the end of chapter four.

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[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 55–7.

104/14

Bechert is clearly mistaken in this case, but his second example is little more plausible. In a prophecy of the Buddha concerning the Third Council and the advent of Mahinda we meet the same figure of 118 years immediately after a mention of the First Council (Dīp I 54–5). Most scholars have taken the view that there is a lacuna of some sort here and lines referring to the Second Council have dropped out.[8] This seems likely to be the case, since there is specific reference to the *third* council (*tatiyo saṃgaho*) – it does not seem very probable that anyone argued that the Third Council was only eighteen years after the Second which is traditionally dated to 100 B.C. or slightly later.

In any case, even if the text is taken as it stands, it would not prove Bechert's contention in the sense intended. He suggests that the passage in question will originate from a non-Mahāvihāra tradition (Symp. IV, 1, 344). However, the non-Mahāvihāra schools, notably that of the Abhayagiri monastery, were precisely those most influenced by North Indian traditions and the passage in question could then derive from Sarvāstivādin sources i.e. it would not be evidence of an independent Sinhala version of the short chronology.

In conclusion

It is clear that if the objective of these volumes was to find absolute proof as to the exact date of the Buddha, then they would have failed. No method or evidence we have at the present is sufficient to establish that to the strictest standards of evidence. What certainly has been done is to firmly dethrone the old consensus – it is not impossible that the long chronology may yet be rehabilitated, but someone will have to undertake the task. From the point of view of reasonable probability the evidence seems to favour some kind of median chronology and we should no doubt speak of a date for the Buddha's Mahāparinibbāna of c. 400 B.C. – I choose the round number deliberately to indicate that the margins are rather loose.

It follows that the date of Mahāvīra and of kings such as Pasenadi or Bimbisāra must be correspondingly brought down, as they are part of the same historical context. Probably also the date of the Upaniṣads must be later and possible connexions with the Greek world must be rethought.

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[8] Most clearly expressed by Gombrich: Symp. IV, 2, p. 239 n. 12.

autumn leaves" in her own travel poems—like him, she will pursue the discipline of poetry even after taking vows. Moreover, Nijō claims that the scroll she saw provided at least part of the inspiration for her memoir; it was the impetus for her to leave behind a record of her travels, as a model for others to observe. The scroll's impact was thus not only personal but also literary: the "text" of the scroll (its words and images) shaped the "text" created by Nijō, which in turn informed subsequent "readings" of the recluse ideal, including our own.

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105/14

JOSEPH D. PARKER

The Hermit at Court: Reclusion in Early Fifteenth-Century Japanese Zen Buddhism

The decades around the year 1400 saw a rapid increase in recluse poetry and painting by Japanese Zen (C. Ch'an) Buddhist monks active in the large complexes of the *gozan* or Five Mountain temple system, which comprised one of the central cultural and social institutions of the Muromachi period.[1] Contrary to what we might expect, however, virtually all of the producers of this recluse literature and art did not reside in mountain hermitages far from court society, but lived in the *gozan* monasteries right in the capital. If these monks were so devoted to the life of reclusion seen in their art, why did their lives center on the cultural, social, administrative, and even economic business of the large metropolitan monasteries at the pinnacle of the *gozan* system?

One answer to this question can be found in the secondary scholarship on Japanese *gozan* monks, which often contrasts them with those Zen monks who practiced a "pure" form of Zen.[2] In this scholarship, the literary, artistic, social, and other advisory activities of the *gozan* monks at the shogunal and imperial courts are generally characterized as secularized and corrupt. These activities were then contrasted with the practices of "pure" monks who diligently practiced meditation while living in huts or small temples secluded in the mountains far from Japanese court society. Rather than reviewing this familiar if simplistic description of Japanese

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[1] An excellent introduction to the history of and life in the Japanese *gozan* temples can be found in Martin Collcutt, *Five Mountains: The Rinzai Zen Monastic Institution in Medieval Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1981).

[2] This distinction is surprisingly widespread in twentieth-century Japanese scholarship on Zen, where it is defined differently by different scholars and has had a pervasive influence on Western-language scholarship. See, for example, Tamamura Takeji, *Gozan bungaku*, rev. ed. (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1966), pp. 198–200, and Imaeda Aishin, "Chūsei Bukkyō no tenkai (sono ni)," in Akamatsu Toshihide, ed., *Nihon Bukkyōshi II, chūseihen* (Tokyo: Hōzōkan, 1967), p. 167.

Journal of Japanese Studies, 21:1
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106/14

Zen, to which I will return later, I will only point out here that these "pure" Zen monks included perhaps most if not all Chinese Zen monks and only those Japanese monks working outside of the *gozan* temples, except for a few monks associated with Daitoku-ji which eventually left the *gozan* system.

This dualistic contrast of the pure and the corrupt among late medieval Zen monk recluses is in many ways comparable to models and patterns of reclusion in other periods of Japanese history. Mezaki Tokue's distinction between *shukke* and *tonsei*, to choose one influential definition, describes the recluse or *tonseisha* as an individual who sheds the bonds of secular society and yet does not enter the Buddhist institution for specialized study or administrative duties.[3] In this conception of reclusion, the "true" recluse is identified in terms of a rejection not only of society at large but also the Buddhist institution itself, an institution Mezaki associates not with the realization of enlightenment but with such activities as specialized textual study and temple administration.

Implicit in both Mezaki's conception of reclusion and in the scholarship that contrasts "pure" Zen with *gozan* Zen is a particular model of Buddhist and possibly also Taoist conceptions of the sacred. This conception of the sacred locates reclusion, which is closely associated with the highest ideals of the religious tradition, in a sacred realm transcendent to the profane world constituted by the major institutions that made up Japanese society, such as the imperial court, the shogunate, and also the Buddhist church. According to this model, Buddhist insight is best found by leaving these institutions and engaging in religious practice outside of the secular world of ordinary society, including even the Buddhist monastic order.

As we shall see, however, many of the *gozan* Zen monks from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries explicitly rejected any conception of reclusion that contrasted a sacred realm of transcendence with ordinary life in society. While they discussed conceptions of the sacred and of Buddhist religious ideals, conceptions that closely resemble the map of the sacred implicit in the work of Mezaki and others on reclusion, the *gozan* monks explicitly disagreed with it. This raises an important interpretive problem: how to respond when we find we are employing a conception of the sacred that is explicitly rejected by the individuals we are studying. While I do not expect to answer this larger problem here, I would like to examine it in relation to our thinking about medieval Japanese reclusion, and in the context of the religious ideals and conceptions of the sacred that are implicit in that theme.

The Gozan *Zen Conception of Reclusion*

An important example of early Muromachi period (1333–1573) Japanese interpretations of reclusion can be found in the writings of Taihaku Shingen (1357–1415), one of the most important Japanese *gozan* Zen monks of the first two decades of the fifteenth century. Some of the clearest examples of his thinking about the life of the hermit-recluse can be found in prefaces he inscribed on many of the earliest extant ink paintings done in Japan on the topic of the recluse's hut. Some of the more important extant paintings of recluse hermitages that Taihaku inscribed include "New Moon over a Brushwood Gate" in the Fujita Museum (Fig. 1) and "Small Cottage by a Mountain Stream" in the Konchi-in subtemple of Nanzen-ji (discussed below), and "Plantain in Evening Rain" in a private collection.[4] In a preface written on a no longer extant landscape painting, entitled "Preface to [a Painting of] a Place Surrounded by Screens of Verdure,"[5] Taihaku describes the experiences of a now virtually unknown fellow monk, Murō Yūsho (active c. 1415–50).[6] Taihaku tells us that when Murō retired to a retreat in a crowded area of the capital below Kiyomizu, he had the name "Place Surrounded by Screens of Verdure" inscribed on a plaque and hung under the eaves.

Taihaku's preface records that one day an unidentified visitor dropped by the retreat and complained about the name Murō had given his retreat, a name taken from the Chinese recluse poet tradition. The visitor pointed out that while Murō was indeed living near a mountain, just outside his gate the dust rose from the busy roads, the residences of commoners covered the ground, and innumerable eaves of pavilions and towers could be seen. The visitor then argued that this could not be the residence of a "person of the mountains" (J. *sanjin*), and suggested that Murō was "stealing the name of a recluse." In the visitor's criticism we see the contemporary conception of a recluse as one who lives far from the wealth,

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[3] See Mezaki's article, "Aesthete-Recluses During the Transition from Ancient to Medieval Japan," translated by Matthew Mizenko, in Earl Miner, ed., *Principles of Classical Japanese Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 152–53. Mezaki's views are further developed in his *Shukke Tonsei* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1976), pp. 6–9.

[4] These paintings and their inscriptions are translated into modern Japanese and discussed in Shimada Shūjirō and Iriya Yoshitaka, eds., *Zenrin gasan: chūsei suibokuga o yomu* (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1988).

[5] Uemura Kankō, ed., *Gozan bungaku zenshū* (Tokyo: Shokabō Shoten, 1906), Vol. 3, p. 2233. Hereafter this work will be cited as *GBZ*. For a complete annotated translation of this preface, see Joseph D. Parker, "Playful Nonduality: Japanese Zen Interpretations of Landscape Paintings from the Ōei Era (1394–1427)" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1989), pp. 315–20.

[6] Virtually all that is now known about Murō, who later went by the name of Daiyū Yūsho, is that he was abbot of Kennin-ji and Nanzen-ji sometime between the years 1430 and 1450, and subsequently retired to the Unmon-an *tatchū* subtemple at Nanzen-ji.



Figure 1. New Moon Over a Brushwood Gate. Dated 1405. National Treasure. 129.2 × 31.0 cm. Fujita Museum, Osaka.

power, and busy affairs of life in the capital, an image of reclusion that is perhaps comparable to the conception underlying Mezaki's modern distinction between *shukke* and *tonsei* discussed above.

In Murō's reply we find a conception of reclusion that is quite different from that of Mezaki, Tamamura, Imaeda, or other modern interpreters of Japanese culture. Murō begins by distinguishing between "traces" (*shaku*) and the "mind" (*shin*) and arguing that his visitor is only interested in traces while Murō's own reclusion is of the mind. Through allusions to several hermits in Chinese history he then points out that, while some individuals have indeed made pretense to the life of a recluse for their own advancement in prestige or even political office, there is also precedent for being a genuine hermit even while living in the capital, examples of which he names "the recluses of the mind." Murō then goes on to describe the natural scenery of his own travels throughout Japan and to claim that he has "attained [these beautiful places] in his mind." Having internalized the natural world, Murō claims that he can then sit silently in his new retreat even while surrounded by scenes from the bustling capital, and yet they will not hinder his Buddhist insight by becoming sensory afflictions. Murō counters his visitor's complaints, then, with a conception of reclusion based not on the location of the hermitage in some sacred space, but on an internal state of mind that preserves the Buddhist religious values of the natural world for an individual even when physically living in the midst of secular society.

Murō's conception of the recluse calls into question the clear distinction made by both his visitor and by many modern scholars between the secular world of ordinary society and the sacred realm of the pure, secluded life in the natural world. The relationship between sacred and profane seen in Murō's conception of reclusion has a distinguished heritage in both the Buddhist religious tradition and in Chinese religious and intellectual history. Moreover, the Japanese *gozan* monks were clearly aware of this heritage and took these orthodox models as a foundation for building their own conceptions of the recluse. Two central examples from this heritage were particularly important to the Japanese *gozan* monks: the Chinese conception of the "hermit at court" and the Mahayana Buddhist theory of nondualism. A brief look at these two themes will help us develop some implications of the early fifteenth-century Japanese conception of the recluse.

The "Hermit at Court" Theme in China and Japan

The first important model used by the Japanese *gozan* monks to integrate secular society with the sacred realm of the natural world centers on the theme of "the hermit at court." The notion of a hermit who lives in the capital and participates actively in court society and politics has deep roots in Chinese religious and intellectual history, an area that has received relatively little attention in the twentieth-century study of the Japanese recluse tradition. While there may have been little awareness of the Chinese recluse tradition in some periods of Japanese cultural history, the Muromachi *gozan* monks clearly took China as the primary if not the sole focus for their own thinking on reclusion. The earliest examples in Chinese intellectual history of this conception of reclusion can be found in the *Tao-te Ching* and the *Chuang-tzu*,[7] two texts studied widely in the Japanese *gozan* temples. For example, the *Tao-te Ching* states, "Cultivate it in the hamlet/ And its virtue will endure;/ Cultivate it in the state/ And its virtue will abound;/ Cultivate it in the empire/ And its virtue will be pervasive."[8]

The notion of the "hermit at court" first become widely influential in late third and early fourth-century China, when it centered on a reinterpretation by Kuo Hsiang (d. 312) and Wang Pi (226–49) of the concept of the recluse in the *Chuang-tzu*. These thinkers reversed the praise in the *Chuang-tzu* for the man who left government service and held up as their ideal individuals who no longer distinguished between the mundane world and the realm of transcendence.[9] For example, Kuo Hsiang commented on a passage in the *Chuang-tzu* about a man who "embraces the ten-thousand things" by describing his own sagely ideal: "Although the sage is in the midst of government, his mind seems to be in the mountain forest. . . . His abode is in the myriad things, but it does not mean that he does not wander freely."[10] This description of the sage as active in government would echo throughout Chinese intellectual history.

A revival of the "recluse at court" theme that was more important for the Muromachi Japanese *gozan* monks, however, centered on Chao Meng-fu (1254–1322) and his contemporaries in the early Yuan dynasty (1279–1367), who were faced with the difficult question of service in the government of a non-Han Chinese people. As a member of the Sung Imperial family, Chao received much criticism for his willingness to serve under the Mongols. As a result, Chao seems to have felt the need to affirm his sense of morality during his own lifetime through recourse to the "hermit at court" motif in a painting of Hsieh K'un (280–322), a recluse, high-ranking official, and contemporary of Kuo Hsiang.[11] Chao's own attitude toward his decision is expressed in a later eulogy for an unknown friend, "In order to feel content in your own mind remain unperturbed, without desire for riches and glory, and your neighbors will praise your goodness. This is what 'reputation' means. Why must one seclude himself in craggy caves, conceal his footsteps in forest and mountain, in order to achieve purity?"[12] The colophons written by his immediate contemporaries, and by Ni Tsan (1301–74) and other scholars of the mid- and late fourteenth century, show a sympathy and understanding of Chao's response to the call to government office.

The most important inscription for understanding Yuan interpretations of the "recluse at court" is one written by Wang Ch'i (fl.c. 1290–1310), a scholar-poet who may have also been friends with Chao. Like the colophon by Chao's longtime close friend, Yao Shih (d.c. 1318), Wang emphasized the parallel between Chao and the high-ranking fourth-century official, Hsieh K'un, in his inscription:

> When Ku [K'ai-chih] painted Hsieh [K'un's] portrait, he positioned him among crags and rocks. People asked him the reason, and he replied, "[Hsieh K'un] himself claimed that his 'single hill' and 'single stream' were superior [to another minister's]; therefore this gentleman should be placed among hills and streams." When contemplating his excellence in purity and elegance, it deserves to be admired, but he could also remain faithful as a minister. . . . Several hundred years later, it is the old gentleman of the Snowy Pine Studio [Chao Meng-fu] whose mind understood and whose spirit communed with [Hsieh's].[13]

For them, as for Chao Meng-fu, the spiritual purity associated with the landscape could be preserved even while serving in government office.

We find the Japanese references to the notion of the "recluse at court" scattered through *gozan* Zen writings of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Gidō Shūshin (1326–89), who was perhaps the most important Japanese *gozan* monk of the second half of the fourteenth century and one of Taihaku's teachers, frequently used the theme "hermit at court," together with closely related themes such as "the hermit in the marketplace [or city]."[14] We also see in his poetry and painting inscriptions such statements as "forested mountains are not always far from the human world" and "Where in human society can we not make our hut?"[15]

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[7] See Ishida Yoshisada, *Chūsei sōan no bungaku*, rev. ed. (Tokyo: Kitazawa Tosho Shuppan, 1976 [1970]), p. 90.

[8] *Tao-te Ching* 54, cited in ibid., note 8, p. 266; translation by D. C. Lau, *Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching* (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 115.

[9] Feng Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, translated by Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), Vol. 2, pp. 234–36.

[10] Wing-tsit Chan's translation cited in Tu Wei-ming, "Profound Learning, Personal Knowledge, and Poetic Vision," in Shuen-fu Lin and Stephen Owen, eds., *The Vitality of the Lyric Voice: Shih Poetry from the Late Han to the T'ang* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 8–10. See also Shou-chien Shih, "The Mind Landscape of Hsieh Yu-yu by Chao Meng-fu," in Wen Fong et al., *Images of the Mind* (Princeton: The Art Museum, Princeton University, 1984), pp. 239–40.

[11] This figure painting is now in the Elliott collection at Princeton University and depicts Hsieh K'un in an archaic landscape setting. (Published with English translations of several of the colophons by Shih, "The Mind Landscape of Hsieh Yu-yu by Chao Meng-fu," pp. 238–54 and cat. no. 6, pp. 280–83.)

[12] Manuscript from the Taipei National Palace Museum; translated by Shih, "The Mind Landscape," pp. 238–39.

[13] My translation modifies Shih's in "The Mind Landscape," p. 242.

We find reference to the case of Chao Meng-fu's willingness to serve in government in a preface written by Ishō Tokugan (1359–1437), a close friend of Taihaku Shingen, on a no-longer-extant painting attributed to Chao.[16] In his preface, Ishō describes how a friend of his had named his study using a line from T'ao Ch'ien's (365–427) poem "On Drinking Wine," and how this image of reclusion had been praised in poems by a number of visitors. Ishō then argues that even though Chao Meng-fu stayed in office, he too was someone who could live a life of reclusion as depicted in T'ao's poem, based on their common interest in study and the expression of the fruits of their study in the arts. Through this study, Ishō indicates, people like Chao Meng-fu were able to express themselves in the arts without falling into error, and so could achieve the high spiritual status of the recluse T'ao Ch'ien even while holding official office. Taihaku Shingen and his friend Murō Yūsho, then, are joined by Gidō Shūshin and Ishō Tokugan in arguing that it is possible to live the pure life of a recluse, comparable in virtue to even that of the famous recluse poet T'ao Ch'ien, while remaining active in human society.

Two Buddhist Models of Sacred/Profane Nonduality

In contrast to the theme of "the hermit at court," two other important models used by the Japanese *gozan* monks to integrate secular society with the sacred are found not in the Chinese classics and political theory, but in the Mahayana Buddhist tradition. One formative Mahayana discussion of the movement beyond discrimination of the sacred and profane, a discussion well known in the Muromachi Japanese *gozan* temples, is the "Dharma Gate of Nonduality" chapter of the *Vimalakīrti Sutra*.[17] In this chapter, Vimalakīrti debated the meaning of nonduality with Mañjuśrī and other bodhisattvas, and the various bodhisattvas each in turn gave an interpretation of this teaching. One characterization of nondualism is given by the bodhisattva Nārāyana: "To say, 'This is mundane' and 'That is transcendental' is dualism. This world has the nature of voidness, so there is neither transcendence nor involvement. . . . Thus neither to transcend nor to be involved, . . . this is the entrance into nonduality."[18] Later on in the chapter, the bodhisattva Ratnamudrāhasta characterized his insight, "It is dualistic to detest the world and to rejoice in liberation. . . . Liberation can be found where there is bondage, but where there is ultimately no bondage, where is there need for liberation?"[19]

These two bodhisattvas explicitly reject characterizations of the sacred as transcendent, or as something that can be separated from the profane. In this text we find that only through this nondualism can the highest Buddhist truth be realized, an ideal exemplified through Vimalakīrti's own lifestyle as a merchant, political leader, and regular participant in other institutions central to the secular world. However, in a manner that closely parallels that of the hermit at court theme discussed above, this Mahayana Buddhist characterization of religious insight does not differentiate the sacred and secular, as do many modern Japanese and Western scholars, but explicitly associates the two realms as both essential to the highest levels of religious insight.

Buddhist nondualism of the sacred and profane is of course not peculiar to the *Vimalakīrti Sutra* and can be found in a number of other Mahayana texts and schools.[20] In the Zen sect, the nonduality of the transcendent and mundane is found in several texts from both its earliest and classical T'ang periods, including the so-called *Collected Sayings of Bodhidharma*, the *Êrh-ju ssŭ-hsing lun*, and the classical *Record of Lin-chi*.[21] This theme finds its most important early Zen sectarian development in the teaching of enlightenment as the "ordinary mind" (C. *p'ing-chang hsin*, J. *heijō shin*), developed by Ma-tsu Tao-i (709–88). This tradition of identifying the highest religious ideal with the mundane world of ordinary life explicitly rejects any attempts to locate experience of the sacred anywhere outside of ordinary experience.

Taihaku Shingen and his contemporary *gozan* monks used this theory of nondualism widely. Taihaku himself used the phrase "dharma gate of nonduality" in a eulogy in which he described the deceased individual as having "awakened to the nondifferentiation of the principle of the sacred and the profane, and known of the fundamental identity of birth and death, the gate of nonduality."[22] The name "nondualism" (J. *funi*) was also taken as a Buddhist name by the monk Kiyō Hōshū (c. 1361–1424), a close contemporary of Taihaku's and fellow student of Gidō Shūshin's, who became the teacher of such important figures as Zeami Motokiyo (1363–1443) and Ichijō Kanera (1402–81), and editor of influential editions of *The Blue Cliff Record* (C. *Pi-yen Lu;* J. *Hekiganroku*) and Chü Hsi's (1130–1200) commentaries on the Four Books. For Taihaku and other *gozan* monks in the early Muromachi period, nonduality included the nonduality of birth and death, as well as the sacred (*shin* or *shō*) and the mundane (*zoku*).

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[14] See, e.g., his "Preface to Collected Poems and Songs on the Eight Views of Great Compassion," *GBZ*, Vol. 2, p. 1710.

[15] From his poem on "White Clouds and Cinnabar Canyons," *GBZ*, Vol. 2, p. 1610; modern Japanese translation by Tamamura Takeji, *Gozan shisō*, Vol. 8 of *Nihon no Zen goroku* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1978), pp. 214–16; English translation in Parker, "Playful Nonduality," p. 308.

[16] The preface was originally inscribed on a no-longer-extant painting attributed to Chao, though Ishō questions the attribution in his preface. See Tamamura Takeji, comp., *Gozan bungaku shinshū* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1967–72), Vol. 2, pp. 779–80.

[17] Robert Thurman, trans., *The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti: A Mahayana Scripture* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976), pp. 73–83.

[18] Ibid., p. 74.

[19] Ibid., p. 76.

[20] The terms I have been translating as "sacred" (*shin* or *shō*) and "profane" or "mundane" (*zoku*) of course have a long history in the Buddhist tradition and do not always carry the connotation of sacred and profane as they do here. For a good sense of the range of meanings of these terms, see Nakamura Hajime, *Bukkyōgo daijiten* (Tokyo: Tokyo Shokan, 1981), pp. 784c–85a.

[21] See for example Yanagida Seizan, ed., *Daruma no goroku*, Vol. 2, in Vol. 1 of *Zen no goroku* (Tokyo: Tsukuma Shobo, 1968), p. 31, and Ruth Fuller Sasaki et al., trans., *The Recorded Sayings of Ch'an Master Lin-chi Hui-chao* (Kyoto: The Institute for Zen Studies, 1975), e.g., pp. 9–11.

Buddhist nondualism and the teachings of Vimalakīrti were of interest to Taihaku and his contemporaries for some of the same reasons that had made the sutra appeal to centuries of Buddhist laity, monks, and nuns in both China and Japan: Vimalakīrti's activity in the samsaric world of suffering, sentient beings. The ability to live in the mundane, samsaric world while practicing correct Buddhist insight would have been of great interest to the Japanese *gozan* monks, and would have been essential to them in their relations with lay patrons and other disciples who were also powerful figures in the secular world.

The final theme important in the Japanese *gozan* monks' thinking about the identity of the highest levels of religious practice with ordinary reality is seen in their image of the eccentric Pu-tai (J. Hotei). Pu-tai was known to the Japanese Zen monks through the popular series of the "Ten Oxherding Pictures," which are a set of drawings and explanatory inscriptions describing the ten stages of spiritual progress for the Zen mendicant. The inscriptions to one of the earliest extant Japanese examples of a complete group of the Oxherding series have been preserved in the calligraphic hand of Zekkai Chūshin (1336–1405), an important leader in *gozan* circles and another of Taihaku's teachers.[23] The final stage in the series by Zekkai follows the traditional text closely in depicting Pu-tai as an enlightened sage who, after passing through the various levels of religious progress beyond the ordinary world returns to the bustling marketplace, dressed in ragged clothes and laughing wholeheartedly. This conception of the sacred as ultimately realized in the mundane world of ordinary society was widely influential not only among the *gozan* monks, but also among their influential patrons, the Ashikaga shoguns themselves.[24] For both the Japanese *gozan* monks and their influential patrons, Pu-tai was an image of the highest level of spiritual practice, in which the practitioner returns from seclusion in the mountains to the world of human society.

The significance of the Oxherding series for understanding Japanese reclusion and Buddhist conceptions of the sacred is seen when the mendicant in the pictures passes through several intermediate stages where he is shown residing in a thatched hut secluded in the mountains (Fig. 2). These stages correspond to conceptions of the sacred as outside the profane realm of human society held by other members of Japanese culture, as well as conceptions shared by a large number of modern students of Japanese and



Figures 2 and 3. Ten Oxherding Pictures (Nos. 7 and 10). Fifteenth Century. 14.0 × 14.0 cm. Shokoku-ji, Kyoto.

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[22] *Taihakū oshō goroku*, pp. 39b–40a, undated manuscript, National Diet Library.

[23] The Zekkai inscriptions are preserved in the collection at Shokoku-ji, though the original paintings are not extant, and his inscriptions are now paired with a series of illustrations possibly from the fifteenth century.

[24] An extant painting of Hotei by the shogun Ashikaga Yoshimochi (1386–1428) is reproduced in Matsushita Takaaki and Tamamura Takeji, eds., *Josetsu, Shūbun, San'ami*, Vol. 6 of *Suiboku bijutsu taikei* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1978), pl. 1.



Figure 3. See Figure 2.

also Chinese culture. Yet in the final stage of these pictures the mendicant does not remain secluded in his mountain retreat, but instead returns to the busy world of mundane human affairs (Fig. 3). Here we find a conception of Zen practice central to the Mahayana Buddhist tradition that suggests the monks should go beyond a life of reclusion far from human society and return to the busy, dusty world of the court.

Reclusion and Gozan *Life in the Capital*

Their interest in the Pu-tai cycle of religious practice was for the Japanese *gozan* Zen monks of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries only one aspect of the larger issue of the most appropriate attitude to take for the Zen practitioner while active in the samsaric realm of contemporary political and social relationships. For the Japanese *gozan* monks, such activity was grounded in the nondualism of the sacred and profane. This is the conception of reclusions that formed the basis for the early Muromachi

monks' vision of the natural landscape in their poetry, prose, and inscriptions on paintings. It was also the basis for their appropriation of the theme of the "hermit at court" from Chinese intellectual history that I discussed above.

We can see the close relationship of the "hermit at court" theme to the Zen use of Mahayana nondualism in another preface inscribed by Taihaku Shingen in 1413 on an extant landscape painting in the Konchi-in subtemple of Nanzen-ji, "Small Cottage by a Mountain Stream"[25] (Fig. 4). In the inscription Taihaku alludes to two famous recluses from the Chinese poetic tradition, T'ao Ch'ien and Wang Wei (701–61).[26] He asks rhetorically whether there was any difference between the viewer and these two recluses, to conclude that they are only as distant from each other as lips are from teeth. Using an argument identical to the one his friend Murō used in the passage discussed earlier, Taihaku indicated how the seeming distance from the sages of the Chinese past was to be overcome: "This is to be attained in the mind, and not objectified externally."[27] Earlier in the preface Taihaku had explained what he means by "attain in the mind and not objectify externally" by referring to the concrete context in which the painting was produced.

Taihaku tells his readers that a fellow Zen monk from Nanzen-ji by the name of Junshi Haku (complete name unknown) (d.u.) had named his study "[Small Cottage] by a Mountain Stream," even though he lived at the major *gozan* temple, Nanzen-ji, in the Japanese capital. He characterizes this "attaining in the mind" with "a gate like the marketplace, but a mind like water." Through resisting the common-sense impulse to objectify the Chinese recluses outside the mind or see them as different from the self, Taihaku argues, the Japanese *gozan* monks could themselves join in the spiritual freedom of reclusion while still residing in the capital. If the painting was understood in terms of "attaining in the mind," Taihaku concluded, "is it only [the recluses of] the bamboo hermit [Wang Wei] or peach blossom spring [T'ao Ch'ien]?" Through his rhetorical questioning Taihaku raised the possibility for his readers that they could achieve the spiritual freedom of the great recluses while remaining active in contemporary society, politics, and culture.

If they were to attain such heights of religious insight and cultural expression while living in the metropolitan *gozan* temples, Taihaku argues,

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[25] This preface is not found in Taihaku's extant literary collection, but is transcribed and translated into modern Japanese by Ōnishi Hiroshi in Shimada and Iriya, eds., *Zenrin gasan*, p. 216ff. A modern English translation can be found in Parker, "Playful Nonduality," p. 309ff.

[26] While it is not clear if Taihaku's allusion was to Wang Wei, since he simply said "the bamboo hermit of the T'ang," he was clearly alluding to some hermit.

[27] Shimada and Iriya, eds., *Zenrin gasan*, p. 216ff.



Figure 4. Small Cottage by a Mountain Stream. Dated 1413. National Treasure. 101.5 × 34.5 cm. Konchi-in, Kyoto.

112/14

it would be through Zen practice which attained this subjectively in the mind and did not objectify anything outside the self. When dualistic distinctions of the sacred and profane were avoided, Taihaku believed that the *gozan* monks could realize the sacred realm of the Chinese recluses even while living in the mundane world of the Japanese capital. The importance of this nondualism for the monks can be seen when considering the concrete context in which they produced paintings and inscriptions, where they lived as abbots of the metropolitan *gozan* Zen temples in the capital and as central figures in the artistic and social circles that included the most powerful individuals in the country.

Since twentieth-century discussions of the recluse have tended to focus on biography at the expense of interpretations of the theme, it may be useful before concluding to introduce the known biographical information of the monk on which we have centered our discussion so far, Taihaku Shingen.[28] The first information we have of Taihaku's life is that he served in the Unmon-an subtemple of Nanzen-ji as an attendant to Taishin Sōi (1321–91), who in turn was a disciple of the greatly learned Japanese poet-monk Sesson Yūbai (1290–1346). Unlike his teacher Sesson, Taishin had not traveled to the mainland, but he had studied widely with the leading *gozan* intellects of his day and also with the Chinese monk Tung-ling Yung-hsing (d. 1365; arr. J. 1351).

We also know that Taihaku later studied under two of the most important Japanese *gozan* monks of the second half of the fourteenth century: Gidō Shūshin, teacher and advisor to the shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358–1408) and to the linked verse poet and author of important aesthetic treatises Nijō Yoshimoto (1320–88); and Zekkai Chūshin, the influential poet who had spent a decade on the mainland with contacts at the highest levels of early Ming (1368–1661) religious and cultural circles. Together Gidō and Zekkai were the most important teachers in Zen Buddhism and in things Chinese of the leading figures of the next generation of Japanese *gozan* Zen monks. It may have been when studying under Gidō in Kamakura in the early 1380s that Gidō wrote a painting inscription to Taihaku that praised his literary talent.[29] What we can glean from this information suggests that Taihaku was educated in the major *gozan* temples by the very best available Japanese and also Chinese teachers of his day.

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[28] My sources for the biography below are, unless otherwise noted, the entry on Taihaku in Tamamura Takeji's *Gozan Zensō denki shūsei* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1983), p. 400, and Taihaku's own writings in his *Gabi ashūshū*, in *GBZ*, Vol. 3, pp. 2217–66, and in *Taihaku oshō goroku*, undated manuscript, National Diet Library, *passim*.

[29] One of the earliest *shigajiku* poem and painting scrolls, "The Small Hermitage of Hidden Orchids," includes an inscription written by Gidō for Taihaku. The date suggested by Shimao Arata for this scroll is the early 1380s in his article, "Shoki shigajiku no yōsō—Kūgeshū ni mieru Unjuzu shigajiku o chūshin to shite—," *Bijutsushi*, Vol. 114 (May 1983), p. 101.

There do not seem to be any other datable records of Taihaku's activities until 1405 when, in an unusual appointment for a monk who had not yet held any significant *gozan* temple office, Taihaku became the head of the Nanzen-ji subtemple Unmon-an where he had studied under Taishin.[30] The following year marked the beginning of a series of appointments Taihaku received as an abbot in the *gozan* temple hierarchy. The first was as abbot of Hōrin-ji, a *shosan*-level temple in Harima whose first abbot Sesson Yūbai had been appointed by the influential Ashikaga supporter Akamatsu Norisuke (1311–71). Then only two years later Taihaku was promoted to the abbacy of the nearby *jissatsu* temple, Hōun-ji. Finally, in the year 1411 Taihaku was appointed abbot of one of the most important temples in the nation, the *gozan* temple Kennin-ji. After presumably a brief tenure in this position Taihaku returned again to the Nanzen-ji subtemple Unmon-an to retire and eventually die at his retreat Daidō-ken in the eighth month of 1415.

The official career of this monk is fairly typical of his *gozan* contemporaries.[31] The monk began his religious training in the large Kyoto *gozan* monasteries. This early period was followed by abbacies often during the monk's mid- to late 40s in the *shosan*- and *jissatsu*- level temples, temples generally located in regions relatively far from the capital but many times associated with a regional warrior important to the Ashikaga government. The height of the monks' careers as religious leaders and temple administrators often came during their early to mid-50s when they received appointments as abbots in the most important of the metropolitan *gozan* monasteries, i.e., those temples at the top of the official ranks of the *gozan* temple system.[32]

Unlike many of his contemporaries, Taihaku died relatively young, however, and as a result was appointed as abbot of only one of the major *gozan* monasteries and was able to remain active at the highest level in the social, cultural, and religious circles of the capital for only a relatively brief period. Some of his contemporaries retired after a series of usually brief appointments[33] as abbots of the highest-ranked *gozan* monasteries, and then were able to enjoy several decades of quiet study, meditation, and social, political, and cultural activity at the highest levels of contemporary court and shogunal society while residing in a retreat located in a subtemple of one of the major metropolitan *gozan* temples.

During his lifetime Taihaku distinguished himself in the eyes of his later contemporaries through his mastery of Chinese parallel prose and most notably a highly sophisticated aesthetic theory, surpassing even Gido's learning in this respect.[34] His collected writings reveal wide learning in Buddhist and Neo-Confucian texts, as well as in *Yi ching* studies and the writings of the Sung and Yüan dynasty Chinese literati. Taihaku was also quite active culturally, participating in linked verse meetings and joining his fellow monks at Chinese poetry meetings to inscribe prefaces and poems on a substantial number of ink paintings of flowers, figure subjects, and landscapes. Perhaps only his early death prevented him from possibly going on to more extensive contact with the shogun and other influential individuals in contemporary Japanese society and politics.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to return to the issue raised at the beginning of the article: How do we understand medieval Japanese reclusion, particularly when our modern interpretive categories seem to contradict those of the texts we are reading, or when they were explicitly rejected by the individuals we are studying? As we have seen, Taihaku and his contemporary *gozan* Zen monks clearly rejected the conception of the recluse as one who lived outside of the capital, a conception that is quite influential in modern Japanese and Western-language scholarship on reclusion. In place of this model for the recluse, Taihaku suggests a model where the recluse ultimately returns from the sacred realm of the natural world to the secular realm of society, a model derived from the two honorable traditions of the Mahayana Buddhist theory of nondualism and the Chinese theme of the hermit at court. Fourteenth- and fifteenth-century *gozan* Zen interest in this particular model of reclusion clearly grew out of the lives they were leading in the metropolitan *gozan* monasteries, lives that inevitably entailed considerable involvement in secular society. Although this conception of the recluse clearly differs from the notion of reclusion we may be accustomed to using, we must be careful that this difference does not lead us too quickly or too easily to privilege one conception of reclusion over another.

There are several possible conclusions we can draw from the tension between differing models of reclusion. First, we can reject one in order to affirm another as somehow closer to Buddhist truth. However, this alternative is problematic, since choosing to favor one position over another forces us to side with one group of Buddhist thinkers and oppose another, and cannot lead to an even-handed reading of Buddhist history. Instead, I would suggest that we consider modifying the conception of reclusion that we have been working with to guide our thinking and reading of medieval Japanese texts. Such a revised conception of reclusion would include a plurality of different and perhaps even conflicting conceptions of reclusion and of the sacred, and a plurality of possible alternative paths leading to Buddhist insight that were found in Muromachi Japan. An awareness of these different models can help us as modern readers of these texts to recognize the complexity of the tradition presented to us by the medieval Japanese thinkers and poets through their writings. The subsequent movement away from perceptions of medieval Japanese reclusion as forming a unified tradition may also lead us to further questioning of our own analytic categories in order to see whether they are appropriate to the texts we are reading.

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[30] Kageki Hideo, *Gozan shishi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kasama Shoin, 1979), p. 335.

[31] A sense of the biographies of a large number of Japanese *gozan* monks can be gained by reading in Tamamura's biographical dictionary, *Gozan Zensō denki shūsei.*

[32] A discussion of the evolution of this temple system and its relation to the Ashikaga *bakufu* may be found in Colcutt's *Five Mountains*, esp. pp. 109–15.

[33] An indication of the length of these appointments can be gained from the time between the appointment of the eighty-first (in the third month of 1409) and ninetieth abbots (Taihaku, in the eighth month of 1411) of Kennin-ji; in this fifteen-month period, eight different abbots were appointed, for an average term of less than two months each.

[34] I am indebted to Shimada Shūjirō for pointing this out to me in a personal conversation in 1987.

PITZER COLLEGE

114/14

Review Section

Postwar Japan as History. Edited by Andrew Gordon. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993. xii, 496 pages. $60.00, cloth; $17.00, paper.

Reviewed by
JAMES R. BARTHOLOMEW
Ohio State University

This is a big, important book. It is one of the first historical—as opposed to social scientific—treatments of postwar Japan in English, even counting books conceived and marketed as textbooks. It has 16 substantive chapters, one jointly authored, together with an introduction and a conclusion by the editor; and the 17 contributors include a number of the leading American scholars in Japanese studies today. It is not without some lacunae and a few faults. But taken as a whole, it is an impressive scholarly achievement and merits close attention by anyone who teaches anything about, or maintains a serious interest in Japanese history and society since 1945.

Essays by John Dower, Bruce Cumings, and Carol Gluck seek to provide historical context for the topical essays that follow. Dower emphasizes the defining roles in postwar history of the San Francisco System (referring to the 1952 peace treaty terminating the Occupation and establishing the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) in Japan's foreign relations and the 1955 System (the merger of two parties to create the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] which was still dominating domestic politics at the time this book appeared). He reminds us that almost no one in the early 1950s expected Japan even to find significant markets in major Western countries, let alone emerge as a global economic power. And he offers perhaps the most succinct explanation in the book for the extended hegemony of the LDP, namely that the "consolidation of [its] conservative power coincided with full recovery from the war and the onset of commercialized mass culture" (p. 18).

Cumings and Gluck both address an important, common issue, even

Journal of Japanese Studies, 21:1
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115/14

G. VICTOR SŌGEN HORI

Teaching and Learning in the Rinzai Zen Monastery

Popular images of Japan tend to cluster around two conflicting cultural stereotypes. One depicts Japan as a ritualistic, rule-governed, hierarchical society where obsession with preserving traditional form and with conformity to group goals stifles individual creativity. The other pictures Japan as the repository of a mystical culture that produces gentle, creative, slightly foolish sages. These two stereotypes clash. How can one society be both? A closer look at teaching and learning in the Japanese Zen monastery allows us to see how ritual formalism coexists with mystical insight.

I propose to divide the spectrum of human learning into three domains: (1) ritual formalism, (2) rational teaching and learning, and (3) mystical insight. In modern Western society, we have focused upon, and greatly developed, what I have labeled rational teaching and learning, but we seem to have less interest in, or confidence about, the two ends of the spectrum. A Japanese Zen monastery, on the other hand, substantially discounts rational teaching and learning and teaches both ritual formalism and mystical insight. In fact, it teaches mystical insight by *means of* ritual formalism.

By "ritual formalism," I am stretching one term to cover several kinds of behavior: repetition, rote memorization, behaving according to traditional prescription. In ritual formalism, students imitate form without necessarily understanding content or rationale. They are instructed in "what" to do, but given very little instruction in "why" and "how" to do it.

By "rational teaching and learning," I refer to that pattern of education in which a teacher of a body of knowledge and/or skills usually formulates

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I wish to express my appreciation to the following people: to Thomas Rohlen of the School of Education, Stanford University, both for inviting me to the Conference on Teaching and Learning in Japan and for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper; to the other conference participants for several days of rewarding intellectual discussion and good fellowship; to the Department of East Asian Studies at Brown University for inviting me to give a presentation of some of the ideas in this paper; and to the referees and editors of *The Journal of Japanese Studies* for very helpful criticism.

Journal of Japanese Studies, 20: 1
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its general principles, even if crudely, and then through instruction seeks to transmit an understanding of those general principles to the students. Instruction is usually by verbal explanation, demonstration, conducting drills, or some combination of these and other techniques. It is not part of rational teaching and learning to teach students to perform tasks without an understanding of general principles (the "reason why"), nor is it part of rational teaching and learning to expect the student to perform the required particular tasks without prior instruction.

I am using the term "mystical experience" to refer to that moment when one experiences oneself as no longer fundamentally distinct from the objective world, when there occurs a breakdown in the usual distinction we make in ordinary life between the self as subject of experience and the world about us as the object of experience. I make no judgment about whether that experience is in some sense genuine or false. My description of mystical experience in these terms no doubt presupposes some hidden assumptions to which someone will object. If this essay stimulates such criticism, it may then be necessary to rethink this definition.[1]

I was first struck by the connection between the formalism of rote learning and the spontaneity of insight long before I entered the Zen monastery. As a graduate student in philosophy, I taught propositional logic to first- and second-year university students and noticed that the class divided into two groups, those who could solve the logic problems and those who could not. Those who could solve them started by memorizing the basic transformation formulae of propositional logic. These formulae are to propositional logic what multiplication tables are to arithmetic or the basic equivalence equations are to algebra. Having committed these formulae to memory, these students were thereby able to solve the logic problems because they could "just see" common factors in the equations and then cancel them out, or could "just see" logical equivalences. However, the other students, those who had not committed the transformation formulae to memory, were more or less mystified by the problems though many made serious attempts to "reason" their way througn. Some of these latter students said that the ability to solve such problems was like musical ability, that successful problem solvers had a special ability to "just see" the answer to the logic problems just as people with musical ability can "just hear" when a note is flat or sharp. And they excused themselves by saying that they had not been born with that particular gene. But in fact, those who had done the rote memory work had developed logical insight, while those who had not developed logical insight were the ones who had skipped the rote memory work thinking they could reason their way through the logic problems.

If you can calculate in your head

$$\frac{25 \times 500}{50 \times 10} = 25$$

you can do so because you have already memorized the multiplication tables and can "just see" that 50 × 10 is the equivalent of 500 and that therefore 500 and 50 × 10 can be cancelled out of the top and bottom of the fraction. Without this piece of rote memory, the insight in "just seeing" would not be possible. To one who has not memorized the multiplication tables, the ability to "just see" the answer here must seem exceedingly mysterious, something like mystical insight. Much the same can be said for the ability to "see" a solution in algebra and all other forms of mathematics and, indeed, in many other forms of organized learning. Spontaneous insight is built on rote learning. Chains of logical reasoning in turn are made up of links, connections, which were first seen in small moments of insight but which over time have become the "just obvious."

It is a long way from logic problems in a philosophy classroom to the Zen Buddhist monastery. Teaching and learning occur in both places but they are directed toward quite different goals. Education in the school classroom is directed toward giving students knowledge and skills, but it is not primarily concerned with developing a certain kind of personal character or religious outlook. A monastery, on the other hand, is deliberately trying to develop a certain kind of religious person and transmits a body of knowledge and skills as a means to that end. Yet despite the distance between these two kinds of teaching and learning, I believe there is a connection. Rote repetition and memorizing on a larger and institutional scale grows into ritual formalism in the Zen Buddhist monastery, while the logical insight of the philosophy classroom expands into what I call mystical insight.

Thus, the connection between ritual formalism and mystical insight,

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[1] Part of my purpose in this paper is to demystify the notion of "mystical insight." The rhetoric of both the Rinzai Zen monastery and Western language descriptions of Zen describe *kenshō*, the Zen experience, as if it were totally transformative of the human experience, as if its genesis were completely indescribable in words. There is a point to this rhetoric; but one should not get carried away by it. The entire monastery *kōan* curriculum operates on the assumption that beginning monks start with a slight insight which further training systematically deepens and makes intelligible. The training system presupposes, although this is never expressed in so many words, that Zen mystical insight is in some sense connected to ordinary experience (negation is a kind of connection) and that there is a logic to its development. I have not considered what bearing my description of Rinzai monastic life has on any of the issues raised in the recent scholarly debates over the nature and existence of mystical experience. See Wayne Proudfoot, *Religious Experience* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Steven Katz, ed., *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Steven Katz, ed., *Mysticism and Religious Traditions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Robert Forman, ed., *The Problem of Pure Consciousness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

117/14

which I will attempt to describe in this paper, is matched by a connection between rote memorizing and logical insight in the academic classroom:

Ritual Formalism	Rational Teaching and Learning	Mystical Insight
Rote Memorizing	Reasoning	Logical Insight

In the "just seeing" of logical insight, a logical formula shifts position across the subject-object line in experience. At first, the logic formula is the object of my attention, a piece of information I try to memorize just as I do a line from the multiplication tables. But in the experience of "just seeing," the logic formula is no longer the object I am *attending to;* it becomes part of what I, as subject of experience, am *attending with.* The logic formula becomes, so to speak, part of the conceptual lens through which I now look at the objects to which I am attending. Logical insight is not mystical insight, of course, but the two share family resemblances: what was once an object of experience becomes (part of) the subject of experience. And in this paper, I hope to show a further resemblance: that both the logical insight of the philosophy classroom and the mystical insight of the Rinzai monastery are taught through ritual formalism.

Right from the beginning, some people will not want to agree with this thesis, not because they have data and survey results that support a different conclusion, but because the very idea of teaching by rote repetition offends their moral sensibilities. Those who advocate rational teaching and learning affirm that schools should not teach students to memorize facts merely to regurgitate them on tests. The educational mission must be to teach students to "analyze," "explain," "articulate," "generalize," "contextualize," and "apply to concrete situations." Education should treat students not as mere recorders of data but as creative, rational beings and autonomous individuals. Rote methods are blamed for making classroom education boring for children and for deadening their innate creativity. Given freedom, children will find the learning process intrinsically interesting and will enthusiastically teach themselves, so it is said. I remember a traditional Japanese tea ceremony teacher saying, "Don't ask questions. Just do it this way for three years and you will know." Many educators are offended by such ritual methods which seem to demean the students' sense of self-esteem and belittle students' confidence in their own ability to understand. The moral vision of the student as an autonomous individual full of rational and creative potential continues to propel educational theory. But when this moral vision causes people to reject rote teaching methods out of hand, then moral vision blinds rather than illuminates.

These are dangerous waters, I realize, for I am talking about what distinguishes the culture of Japan from that of the West. In recent years, the ideas of "culture" and "cultural difference" have been considered intellectually suspect. Critics say either explanations in terms of culture really explain nothing at all ("Such and such way of doing things is typically Japanese"), or such explanations reify culture, creating the illusion of an "ethno-centric, culture-bound notion of common moral impulses, common values, located like a little pacemaker in each person's heart"[2] in a society. In addition, these days, any item of cultural difference is liable to be taken by *Nihonjinron* theorists as further evidence of the uniqueness of the Japanese race. Not surprisingly, in reaction, there are now many people who are impatient with discussions of how different Japanese culture is. Nevertheless, everyone who has lived and worked in a Japanese group knows without a doubt that the Japanese group does function differently. I write this description of monastery life to try to describe that difference, but I realize that many will find "naive" or "implicit" theories here and take me to task for taking sides in these intellectual and ideological disputes. Here, let me just make a small defensive move against possible critics.

Negative characterizations of Japanese culture are subject to accusations of "Orientalism" or "Japan-bashing," and positive characterizations to accusations of playing into the hands of *Nihonjinron* theorists. But let us draw a distinction between the truth of a statement and its ideological use. The statement "What's good for General Motors is good for the United States" is ideological; it is uttered to enhance the economic and political position of General Motors. But just because such a statement is patently ideological does not mean it is false. As a matter of economic fact, it may just be true that what is good for General Motors is, at a certain historical period, good for the American economy. My overall conclusion in this paper is that the Japanese Zen monastery employs a style of teaching and learning not found, to the best of my knowledge, in the West. While recognizing that such a conclusion can be used ideologically, I would hope that ideological argument does not prevent us from first trying to assess its truth.

In 1976 I was ordained as a Zen Buddhist monk and for 13 years from 1977 to 1990 lived, worked, and practiced in Rinzai Zen Buddhist monasteries and training halls in Japan. In this essay, I write not as a scholar-observer bent upon maintaining "objectivity" (I do not believe such a thing exists) but as a practitioner speaking from within the tradition. Please pardon my use of very general words like "the Japanese" and "Westerners" as if there were no individual differences among the members of these groups. Each instance of these terms should be prefaced by some quantifier like "a few," "many," or "most." But to do this could invite a challenge to show statistical evidence—evidence that does not exist.

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[2] Eric Wolf, "Inventing Society," *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1988), p. 755, quoted in Robert J. Smith, "Something Old, Something New—Tradition and Culture in the Study of Japan," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Nov. 1989), p. 722.

Also, I use male pronouns throughout and write as if only men engage in Buddhist practice. It is manifestly not true that only men engage in Buddhist practice; it has not been true of Buddhist practice in Japanese history and especially it is not true now of Buddhist practice in the West. But Rinzai Zen monasteries for women no longer exist in Japan. Sōtō Zen nuns have reestablished monastic practice for women but, according to a recent study, theirs is a very different style of teaching and learning.[3] Unfortunately, it does seem that at present only men engage in the style of teaching and learning depicted in this paper.

Temples and Monasteries[4]

Japanese Zen Buddhism divides into three schools, the Sōtō School, the Rinzai School, and the Ōbaku School. Sōtō Zen is by far the largest school with almost 15,000 temples spread across the country. Rinzai has fewer than 6,000 temples and Ōbaku has fewer than 500. There is consequently no single temple which represents all of Japanese Zen nor is there any single priest who heads up the entire priesthood. The Rinzai Zen temples are further divided into 16 lineages, each led by a head temple called a *honzan* (literally "main mountain") which is usually a large temple with a prestigious history. The local Zen temple is normally a branch temple (*matsuji*) of a *honzan*. The larger *honzan* maintain monasteries (*semmon dōjō*, "halls dedicated to training," or *sōdō*, "monks' halls") where the next generation of priests receives its training. A few *honzan* are large enough to support more than one monastery.

In order to become the resident priest of a temple, a monk is required to spend some time in training at a monastery, the exact duration to be determined by local tradition and *honzan* regulations. Most monks probably spend between one and three years at a monastery but some manage to get away with shorter stays. On the other hand, a priest of one of the Daitokuji *honzan* temples is required to have at least five years of monastery training behind him. A Rinzai Zen monastery then functions somewhat like a Christian theological seminary by training monks for parish priesthood. However, the ethos and style of training make it a very different place. The Zen monastery has a reputation for fierce discipline. For those associated with it, it embodies the essence of Japanese manhood, fierce samurai loyalty, unswerving dedication, and strength of character.

The monastery itself is under the sole direction of the Zen Master, called *rōshi* (literally "aged teacher"). Under him are the monks, who are divided into two unequal halves. The larger half, called the *dōnai* ("within the [meditation] hall") includes all monks who for that term have no office, along with a few officer monks associated with the *dōnai*. Chief of these is the *jikijitsu*, head of training. The smaller half is the officers' quarters called the *jōjū* (literally "permanently resident") which includes the cooks, attendants to the *rōshi*, and other officers.

In Rinzai Zen, monastic practice is centered around *zazen* (meditation) and the *kōan*, a paradoxical problem assigned by the *rōshi* to the monk to be used as the focus of concentration during meditation. The monks meet daily with the *rōshi*, in a one-to-one meeting called the *sanzen* to present their response to the *kōan*. Other formal teaching includes the *rōshi*'s regular lectures. Although there is a great deal of rhetoric about Zen understanding being beyond books and texts, right from their first year Zen monks are studying a text called the *Zenrin kushū* (Zen phrase collection) as part of their *kōan* practice. In the advanced stages of *kōan* practice (which most monks do not experience because they leave at less advanced stages), monks spend a great deal of time researching Zen and other texts in order to compose essays in Japanese and poetry in classical Chinese which they write in brush and submit for approval to the *rōshi*.

This description so far may give the impression that the monks are engaged in a quite ordinary style of teaching and learning, but it is not so.

Teaching Without Teaching[5]

A new monk arriving at the gate of a Japanese Zen monastery is called a *shintō* (new arrival). Once admitted to the monastery, the *shintō* has much to learn. Immediately, he must learn monastery routine: where things are kept, what happens when, who is responsible for what. He must learn proper language, deportment, attitude, and pace. He must memorize sutras and ceremonial procedure. He must learn how to do *zazen* and how to penetrate the Zen *kōan*. After an initial period of six months to a year, he will be assigned to one of the offices such as *tenzo* (cook), *enzu* (vegetable gardener), *densu* (keeper of the shrine), or perhaps even *sannō* (attendant

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[3] I would like to thank Paula Arai Wang for several conversations regarding Sōtō Zen monasticism for nuns and for letting me preview several chapters from her dissertation, "Innovators for the Sake of Tradition: Zen Monastic Women in Modern Japan" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1993).

[4] For a fuller description, see T. Griffith Foulk, "The Zen Institution in Modern Japan," in Kenneth Kraft, ed., *Zen: Tradition and Transition* (New York: Grove Press, 1988), pp. 157–77.

[5] For descriptions of Zen monastic life, one may consult D. T. Suzuki, *The Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk* (New York: University Books, 1965), and Satō Giei (drawings) and Nishimura Eshin (text), *Unsui: A Dairy of Zen Monastic Life* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1973). Suzuki's description of Zen monastic life, however, is so idealistic as to be misrepresentative.

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to the *rōshi*). If he remains at the monastery for many years, he may in time become a *yakui* (senior officer), one of the group of head monks who hold the positions of senior responsibility, which include *jikijitsu* or leader of training in the *zendō* (meditation hall), *fusu* (administrator), and *daiten* (head cook). A monk constantly moves back and forth between the officers' quarters and the communal *dōnai*, usually spending one term (a half year) in office and then one term in the *dōnai* concentrating on meditation. During his entire career, the monk is constantly learning.

Ancient tradition rests heavily upon new monks. The *rōshi* and older monks remind the new arrivals that the robes, rituals, sutras, language, personal relations, and the entire life of Zen training itself date back to the ancient past and that the new monks must do their share in preserving this ancient tradition against the encroachments of modern life. Much of a monk's life consists of committing sutras and Zen texts to rote memory, practicing traditional forms of ceremony and ritual, and in general eating, dressing, speaking, and living in a style reminiscent of medieval Japan. One could then be pardoned for thinking that teaching and learning in a Buddhist temple consists of nothing more than exercises in rote memory and formalized ritual. But in the Rinzai Zen monastery, Zen monks are expected to learn the ancient tradition without really being taught.

Twice a year offices change. At seven o'clock on the evening before the day of the change, the names of the new officers are announced. At eleven o'clock the following morning, the new officers take over and from that moment forward are on their own. The brand new cook must prepare nourishing and tasty meals for 20 monks every day; the brand new keeper of the shrine must perform all the detailed ritual and ceremony for the many sutra services; the brand new attendant to the *rōshi* must heat the *rōshi*'s bath to just the right temperature and iron his laundry just so. But there is no break-in period when the old officer shows the new officer what to do; the incoming officer cannot apprentice himself to the outgoing officer to learn the ropes. The new officer must perform his duties without receiving prior instruction.

If the new *tenzo*, or cook, makes a mistake in the ringing of the gong which calls everyone to meals, a senior monk will surely give him a tongue-lashing in front of everyone. The cook will be criticized if the rice is too hard, the soup is too salty, the vegetables have been cut too small, the tea is lukewarm, the faucet is left dripping. If the monks eat up all the food he has served, he must scurry around and cook more food while the monks wait impatiently at table. If he makes too much food, he is forced to eat all the leftovers. After the meal is over, one of the head monks may further criticize him for not using the heaps of cabbage sitting ripe in the fields, or for overcooking the squash, or for always making the same few dishes. He may choose to criticize the cook in private or to humiliate him

in public. The new cook suffers this constant harassment until he can cook properly, manage the kitchen without making mistakes, and use all the temple's food supplies resourcefully. He is greatly motivated to learn all this as soon as possible.

Let us call this method of teaching "Teaching Without Teaching." At first glance, this may not seem to be a teaching method at all. Some observers here will only see a form of hazing, an initiation ritual for inducting new members into a group. If the goal is to teach the new cook how to do his job, there seem to be much more direct and efficient methods of teaching. For example, if we were teaching a new officer "rationally," perhaps a week or so before the change of office, we would have the incoming officer apprentice himself to the outgoing officer. The outgoing officer would explain in careful detail the various tasks as he performed them on the job and gradually during the week would allow the new officer to try his hand at each task. By week's end, under the watchful eye of the outgoing officer, the new officer would be trying to do all the jobs by himself. Here emotional tone is a factor. A skillful instructor would try not to embarrass or humiliate the new officer since he believes that students learn better in a supportive atmosphere where they feel accepted and can maintain self-dignity. Most certainly, the outgoing officer would not engage in any deliberate verbal and physical abuse of the new officer. Let us call this rational, reasonable way of teaching "Teaching By Teaching."

Opposite or Complementary?

These two styles of teaching, Teaching By Teaching and Teaching Without Teaching, are not so much opposite as complementary. Similar elements—person and task—are present in both teaching situations. But what one teaching method emphasizes the other ignores. Teaching By Teaching is task-oriented, aiming to get the task done in the most efficient way possible; it trains the person only as much as is required by the task. On the other hand, Teaching Without Teaching is the opposite, or shall we say, complementary. It takes as its ultimate goal the training of the person. It is person-oriented; teaching how to do the task is only a means to the goal of the spiritual training of the person.

In the Rinzai Zen monastery, the daily meditation and meetings with the *rōshi* over the Zen *kōan* provide the main focus for this training, but all activities in the daily life of the monastery—chanting the sutras, growing vegetables, sweeping the garden, cooking, etc.—are nevertheless systematically used as arenas of Zen practice. The entire regime of monastery life is not task-oriented but person-oriented, done not just to get the work done, but to help monks test and train their powers of egoless concentration, so that they may eventually achieve awakening or enlightenment.

Monastery-style Teaching Without Teaching thus does not, on the surface, seek to find the most efficient or convenient way of doing the job. In fact, in order to test the monk, Teaching Without Teaching deliberately requires that the jobs be done in what appear to be inefficient or inconvenient ways. Thus the cook has no budget for shopping and is expected to make his meals entirely from the vegetables that grow in the garden and from whatever donations of food the monastery has received. He may not use the conveniences of electricity or gas but instead must cook everything over a wood fire. If he wants hot water, he first brings water from the well in a bucket, pours it into a cauldron, and lights a fire under it; 20 minutes later he has hot water. Some few concessions to modernity have been made. A pump and faucet have been attached to the well so that hauling up water by rope is no longer necessary. Most monasteries probably have refrigerators now and vacuum cleaners as well. But nevertheless monastery life is still deliberately kept at a fairly primitive level: no heat in the winter, no chairs to sit on, no money to spend, no flush toilets, no creature comforts—all this creates an appropriate ascetic environment and gives the monks more room to use their ingenuity in resourceful ways.

In rational Teaching By Teaching, on the other hand, once a person is designated to do a job, that person is encouraged to do it in the most convenient and efficient way possible. Thus the modern cook uses not only gas and electricity but also microwave ovens, refrigerators, automatic potato peelers, electric vegetable choppers, dishwashers, and, of course, the cook also submits an ever-increasing budget to maintain all this mechanical support. Little thought is given to what effect such mechanized convenience has on the cook as a person, his resourcefulness and self-discipline when using scarce ingredients, his respect for the tools he uses daily, his awareness of the farmers who grew his produce, his attitude toward the people whose food he prepares, or his mindfulness as he chops carrots.

Although Teaching Without Teaching offers no advance instruction and leaves the monk on his own, the monk cannot do anything he wishes. He must maintain the traditional formalized ritual life of the monastery. The monastery system prescribes precisely what the monk is required to do but gives little direction on why or how to do it. Since he receives no instruction, the monk must constantly use his own insight and intuition, be original and resourceful, in maintaining that prescribed form. How does one get both the spinach and the noodles cooked ready to be served at exactly 10:20 A.M. A novice would cook one, wash out the cauldron, and then cook the other. But under the pressure of a tight schedule, the monk suddenly realizes that he can cook the spinach in the still hot, leftover water from the noodles and save himself 20 minutes. Every monk who has spent time as cook will have tried and abandoned the standard cookbook way of slicing radishes. The cookbook says to first cut off the leaf and stem and then slice thinly. But it is impossible to slice the entire radish this way since one cannot slice the part held by the fingers of the left hand. Before the monk gets scolded for serving radishes sloppily sliced, he will have seen some better way of slicing radishes (retain the leaf and stem and use it as a handle) which will slice the radishes thinly as required by tradition, use the radishes more efficiently, and get the food on the table on time.

Despite the ritualized form of monastery life, efficiency thus is very highly valued. And every cook is under great pressure to devise ever more efficient ways of work. Constantly he is scrutinizing every step of his actions, asking is it faster to reverse the order of these two jobs, can I use the residual heat from this fire for some other task, do I get a better cut if I hold the blade of my knife this way, and so on. Although "what" he is required to do is prescribed for him, the cook subjects every detail of "how" he does the task to minute examination in a constant search for improvement.

The term I am using, ritual formalism, includes a variety of activities: repetition, rote memorization, behaving according to traditional prescription, and more. Common to these various activities is the idea that the performers are imitating form without first learning why or how those activities are to be done. But although the very notion of ritual seems to imply the unthinking repetition of tradition, the Zen monastery requires its monks to carry on that tradition while at the same time refusing to teach it to them. The monastery deliberately does so intending to create monks who are innovative and resourceful. The monastery teaching tradition ridicules the *tanpankan*, "the fellow carrying a board" on his shoulder who thus can see only one side of things, and instead urges monks to develop *rinki ōhen*, "on the spot adaptability." Under this system of training, each monk develops his own untraditional solution to maintaining the traditional, his own original way of continuing the established convention. Necessity is the mother of invention, but in a Japanese Zen monastery, maintaining ritual form is the unexpected father of insight.

Confucianism I: Motivation

Few Zen monks question why Zen monasteries teach in this way. For them, it is just the tradition. But I have met two older priests who have reflected on the matter. They quote Confucius:

> The Master said, Only one who bursts with eagerness do I instruct; only one who bubbles with excitement do I enlighten. If I hold up one corner and a man cannot come back to me with the other three, I do not continue the lesson. (*Analects*, VII, 8)[6]

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[6] Arthur Waley, trans., *Analects of Confucius* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1938).

In this passage Confucius is teaching a student how to lay out a field plot and insists that having shown the student where to lay out the first corner, the student should have enough initiative and resourcefulness to determine the other three on his own. Older Zen priests who are familiar with the Confucian classics go on to quote further passages such as:

> He hears one part and understands all ten. (*Analects;* V, 8)

In the Zen temple, colorful traditional verses are often quoted to express the same point:

> With a good horse, does one need to use even the shadow of a whip?

Seeing just the shadow or hearing just the sound of the whip, a good horse will at once know the rider's wishes and begin to gallop.

In other words, the key factor in successful teaching and learning is not so much the ability of the teacher. It is whether or not the student is strongly motivated and has initiative.

> The Master said, If a man does not continually ask himself 'What am I to do about this?, what am I to do about this?' there is no possibility of my doing anything about him. (*Analects*, XV, 15)

I once heard the priest of a Zen temple say, "That new disciple is no good. You have to tell him everything."

Here one may object that only a few students are clever enough, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, to deduce the entire plot in the teacher's mind after detecting one clue. Most students just simply are not that intelligent, it will be said. But Teaching Without Teaching insists that the ability or inability of the student to understand all ten parts from seeing only one part is not merely a matter of native intelligence, about which nothing can be done; it is also a matter of motivation, and there is much that we can do to motivate the student. Thus, the fundamental problem facing a teacher is not in teaching the content of any lesson but in motivating the student to seek for himself. The entire discipline of monastery teaching and learning is constructed upon this assumption, that true teaching and learning cannot occur while the student remains a passive recipient of the teacher's instruction but occurs only when the student is actively motivated to learn.

An American friend of mine in Japan took lessons to learn how to dance and chant *nō*. She found that when she did not practice and walked mechanically through the steps and movements, the teacher merely said, "Fine, fine," with no further comment. But when she put effort into her chanting and danced with intensity, then the teacher suddenly came forward full of criticisms, "This is wrong, that is no good, do that again but slower," and so on. In very similar fashion, the *rōshi*, like the *nō* teacher, reserves his criticisms only for those of his monks who make effort, but that is because for him the other, passive, students present him with no opportunity to teach.

The learning process is student-initiated not only when senior monks teach junior monks the concrete tasks of monastery life, but also when the *rōshi* trains the monks in the *kōan*, the practice which is often thought to be the mystical heart of Zen. By the nature of the case, the *rōshi* cannot teach the point of the *kōan* to a monk. He could of course merely tell the monk the traditional answer to the *kōan*, in the same way that a tax accountant informs his client that his total tax for the year is $5,231. But just as the tax client does not know why his tax is $5,231, so also the monk would not understand why that answer was a correct response to the *kōan*. He must see for himself the connection between *kōan* and answer. If the monk makes no effort and listlessly proffers only "I don't know" at his encounters with the *rōshi*, the *rōshi* cannot direct him in any way. Only when the monk first makes great effort, and concomitantly makes many mistakes, does the *rōshi* have any opportunity to teach the monk. The *rōshi* is likened to a bell. First one must strike it.

The *rōshi*'s teaching consists primarily in motivating the student and very little in teaching the content of the *kōan*. He assigns the monk a *kōan* such as "Two hands clap and there is a sound; now, what is the sound of the single hand?" and gives no hints about how this question is to be answered. The monk usually meets the *rōshi* over the *kōan* twice a day; during intensive retreats they meet three, four, and even five times a day. Very quickly the monk exhausts his list of possible replies. The *rōshi* continues to pressure the monk to bring an answer. He sometimes ridicules the monk, sometimes presents a stony face, sometimes ignores the monk. He scowls, he jeers, he feigns astonishment at the stupidity of the monk. But he is relentless in demanding an answer. The monk feels cornered and helpless; he is confused; he vows to make a great effort and when his efforts yield nothing, he may fall into great disappointment or even depression. But he is desperate to know what that *kōan* means and would give anything to be able to penetrate it. There is no better student than one so desperate to learn.

Confucianism II: Mutual Polishing

Though Teaching Without Teaching can work in one-to-one situations, it develops a special dynamic in groups. Monks do not reserve their criticism and admonishments just for the new monk. Teaching Without Teaching is not merely hazing, an initiation ritual for newcomers. Long after initiation is over, monks continue to constantly admonish, warn, reprimand, and lecture each other:

> The seam of your robe is crooked. Fix it!
> Your collar is dirty. Wash it!
> Chant louder. Put more guts into your voice!
> The floors are dirty. Are you sure you mopped them today?

Walk quietly. Make no noise when walking!
Shut up! No talking!
Your sitting cushions aren't in line. Fix them!
If you have so much time on your hands, go sit!
Your attitude is wrong. Be grateful when someone corrects you!
No running away!

Whether or not he has experienced awakening, every Zen monk is expected to lead the life of enlightened action in all his daily behavior. A monk may not know the enlightened way to act in any given situation, but if he does anything clumsy or mistaken or selfish or in any way unenlightened, some monk senior to him will be sure to chastise him.

In a large community of course, a single *rōshi* cannot monitor the daily behavior of all his monks. The community of monks thus monitors itself. This self-disciplining action is called *sessa takuma*, another Confucian phrase (*Analects*, I, 15), which means, literally, "cutting, chipping, filing, polishing" but which I translate here as "mutual polishing." The image is of a pile of rough stones all placed into a stone mortar and constantly stirred. The rough edges of the stones cut and chip each other away, rubbing against each other in constant friction until they become round, smoothly polished gems. No one stone is superior to any other but through mutual friction all become gems together revealing the unique individual nature of each. Through the constant abrasive action of their criticism upon each other, all monks learn though no single teacher teaches. Through mutual polishing, each attains an individual uniqueness.

In Teaching Without Teaching, the process must be initiated by the student, not by the teacher. Despite the very great authority of the *rōshi*, fundamentally the learning process is student-dependent not teacher-dependent. However, the monastery does not make the naive assumption that monks left on their own will spontaneously teach themselves in a burst of creative self-education. It realizes that although some few monks need no external motivation, most monks are all too human and will make little effort unless pushed to do so. In mutual polishing, monks constantly push each other to learn. The dynamic works without a specific teacher in charge because every person is charged with the responsibility of being teacher. By teaching, one deepens one's learning.

Generalizability and Genuineness

In defense of traditional monastery-style teaching, I have heard Zen *rōshi* offer two arguments: (1) a monk taught the traditional way generalizes his ability to learn beyond the original context while a student taught by the new, rational methods must be retaught for each new task; and (2) a student taught the traditional way genuinely knows for himself why he is doing what he is doing, while a student taught the rational way is merely following someone else's example.

After a monk has survived his first assignment to office, usually he returns to the communal *dōnai* to spend a term without office. But he knows that in the following term, he may very likely be appointed cook or attendant to the *rōshi*. In his off-term, he watches every move those officers make, remembers the stories that older monks tell of their terms in those offices, and every now and then will ask them what the cook is normally doing at 7:30 in the morning or what is the *rōshi*'s favorite food and how is it to be prepared. If the monk happens to be near the kitchen, he will observe where all the kitchen utensils are kept, the order in which the cook does his many jobs, the way the cook works together with the *rōshi*'s attendant, and so on, trying to deduce the overall pattern of the cook's job from a few observations. Long before he actually gets appointed cook or *rōshi*'s attendant, he tries to build up a picture of the daily routine of these jobs. He is learning without being taught in a situation outside his first learning experience. He is generalizing.

During my time in the Zen monastery, we were told stories of how model students learned without being taught. In the traditional carpenter's shop, we were told, a new apprentice would spend his first three years doing nothing but drudge work. He would arrive first at the shop in the early morning to light the fire, bring in the water, wash the toilets, make tea, and do all the other little tasks of getting the shop started. During the day he would not be allowed to touch a tool. Instead he would have to haul lumber, clean up cuttings, deliver a cabinet to Mr. So-and-So, and so on. In the evening, when everyone had left, he would do a final sweep of the floor. During this initial period, no one would actually teach him any carpentry. But after three years when his formal training began, the older carpenters would expect him to know already what wood to use for what kinds of job, how that wood is cured, where that wood is kept, etc. Though no one would have taught him, he would be expected to know the names and uses of all the tools, all the language and terminology used to describe joints, types of construction, methods of finishing, etc., as well as the names of all the customers and suppliers of the shop. Like a carpenter's apprentice, a Zen monk is urged to be always observant, to be able to understand the entire task long before he is required to do it.

In Teaching Without Teaching, the student genuinely learns. In using the English word "genuine," I am constructing a concept to correspond to the casual, everyday Japanese phrase *hontō ni* as in *hontō ni wakaru*, which normally is translatable as "truly understand." Let me try to explain what this ordinary-sounding phrase implies in the monastery. When a student is told in advance and in detail what to do and how to do it, he has no opportunity to test out different ways of doing the task and to discover through his own exploration which methods work and which fail. Probably the rationale for this procedure would be efficiency: why ask the student to reinvent the wheel? But if asked how the method he has learned from the teacher or textbook compares with other methods, the student cannot answer from his own experience of those other methods. He has never tried the other methods and failed; he has only succeeded at the one method which he has been taught is successful. In that sense, he does not really know why he is doing what he is doing; his understanding is not entirely first-hand, not based on personal experience, not entirely genuine.

Power and Hierarchy

To some, the Rinzai monastery's method of teaching may appear to be nothing more than indoctrination or brain-washing, especially since the teaching method is imbedded in a hierarchical social structure. Here it is necessary to make a few comments about power and hierarchy in the monastery.

The monastery has an explicit hierarchy. The *rōshi* warns the head monk who will afterward scold one of the middle-ranking monks; the middle-ranking monk in turn will deliver a blistering lecture to the *shintō*. Except for the single monks at the very top and very bottom of the hierarchy, every monk is simultaneously subject to discipline by higher-ranking monks and in turn responsible for disciplining lower-ranking monks. An outside observer may object, first, that since the monastery is a hierarchical system, teaching and learning are not truly reciprocal since younger monks may not criticize senior monks, and second, that such a system of hierarchy must inevitably encourage senior monks to abuse the power of their position.

Criticism is not traded reciprocally, of course; junior monks do not criticize senior monks. Nevertheless, like the junior members of all groups in Japanese society at large, the younger monks have their own techniques for managing senior monks. The general literature on Japanese groups and on the practice of *amae* has made us familiar with this phenomenon. But more specifically, in an indirect but very real sense, older monks truly are taught by the younger monks. With superiors, a monk can be dependent and concede authority, but when he himself occupies the role of senior monk, the responsibility connected with senior position demands that he lead, direct, and teach. It is the duty of senior monks to be severe, critical, and demanding of their junior brethren. The *rōshi* has two attendants, one junior monk serving his first term in the office, and one senior monk serving his second term. When I was senior attendant, the *rōshi* told me to order the junior attendant to make a certain dish rather difficult to make. I myself could not make that dish and when after a few days, the ordered food had not appeared, the *rōshi* asked why. When I told him that I did not feel right ordering other people to do what I myself could not do, he scolded me severely for my self-centeredness. Many younger monks will not learn how to cook difficult dishes or learn to do difficult tasks unless they are pressured to do so, he said; not everyone is like this, of course, but monks are only human. When they are resistant, it is the responsibility of the older monks to push them into these difficult tasks for their own good; only in this way will they grow and gain in competence. Then he pointed to himself and said, "Look at me. I cannot do anything and yet I must order everybody else around" (the humility of arrogance!). The courage to take authority, the humility proper to authority, responsibility for others—some aspects of these lessons cannot be learned until one is cast into the role of teacher. In this indirect but very real sense, the student teaches the teacher.

Against the charge that the monastery hierarchy encourages abuse of power and that younger monks surely must suffer, I can say that in my experience, this did not happen often. There were occasions in which a senior monk would try to use his position to personal advantage but this did not happen enough times to be a problem. There was one monk, however, who consistently disregarded monastery rule and very often took advantage of others. He was detested by many but, strangely, he was also admired by others. Eventually after many years, he was expelled from the monastery. But this charge raises the question of what we mean by "abuse of power" and here I believe different cultural perspectives produce quite different expectations and divergent moral evaluations. When a young monk enters a monastery, he expects to be ordered around in very rough language, to be humiliated in public, to be slapped, cuffed, and hit with a stick quite often. Yet he does not consider himself "abused" or think himself the victim of injustice. In fact, he may very well look back upon this experience with great gratitude, as I do.

A *sesshin* is a week devoted to intensive practice. In the yearly calendar, *rōhatsu* is the most intense *sesshin* because it commemorates the Buddha's own enlightenment celebrated on December 8. In my second year, I went through the entire week of *rōhatsu* without once passing my *kōan*. Since first- and second-year monks are required to announce after every meeting with the *rōshi* whether or not they have passed their *kōan*, my failure to progress was public knowledge. As encouragement, the *jikijitsu*, head of the *zendō*, hit me with the stick with increasing frequency each succeeding day. At first, I attempted to keep count of how many times I was hit with the stick. By the fourth day, my count had risen to more than 500 times. During the second half of the *sesshin*, the *jikijitsu* was even more ferocious with the stick and although I lost count, I estimate that I received well over a thousand hits with the stick by the end of the week. At the end of *sesshin*, the *jikijitsu* showed me a blister on his right hand and said, "You gave that to me, I had to hit you so often I got a blister on my hand." We laughed and I thanked him for his efforts on my behalf.

Such use of force and apparent punishment is not considered physical abuse. In fact, it is called *zen no shinsetsusa*, "Zen kindness." What explanation could justify calling this "kindness"?

Zen monastic practice is essentially directed at spiritual freedom or liberation. In our ordinary understanding of freedom, to be free is to be able to do whatever one wants or desires; to be forced to do otherwise is compulsion or bondage. But in Buddhism, one finds a different conception of freedom. It contains the notion that our wants and desires themselves are not freely chosen nor maintained, and that our wants and desires are various masks for attachment to self. The constant need to protect and enhance the self is what makes us unfree. Freedom is not conceived of as being able to follow one's wants and desires without hindrance. Instead it is conceived of as freedom from attachment to one's wants and desires. For ultimately, in addition to external sources like oppressive society and authoritarian government, the original agent of compulsion is the self.

These ideas are not the exclusive cultural property of Japan, of course. Most educators have probably criticized the idea that "to be free is to do as one wants" in confronting the practical problem of how to help students who imprison themselves by wanting very little for themselves. Also, Christian monasticism, psychotherapy, and other sources share the insight that when we are doing what we want or desire, the surface feeling of freedom may really mask a form of compulsion at a deeper level. But while the modern secular teacher may use as many enticing carrots as desired, the teacher may not use the stick. The use of force or compulsion violates modern notions of the autonomy and dignity of the individual and is thought to damage the student's self-esteem. In addition, a stick-wielding teacher will probably be perceived as requiring psychological treatment. Corporal punishment and coercion were formerly part of school education in both Japan and the West but since World War II, modern Japanese schools follow Western example and actively discourage their use. But the Zen monastery does not. According to traditional Buddhist and Confucian notions of discipline and self-cultivation, one seeks to overcome the attachments to self by living in a wholesome environment with good role models and then imitating them until one has eradicated self-centered wants and desires. In addition to providing such an environment, the Zen monastery also has other more direct methods. If self-attachment is the cause of why one is not free, then the quickest way to liberation is to cut

one's attachment to self. The use of force and coercion is justified on the ground that to do otherwise is to allow the monk to indulge the self.[7]

Back and Front

Despite the hierarchical social structure and the "authoritarian" teaching style of the monastery, the life of the monk has an informal, more relaxed side. Again, although it would take this paper off on a tangent to go into detail, a short description might help to balance the picture of monastery life presented so far.

To the outside world, the Rinzai Zen monastery appears to be a disciplined group of dedicated and sincere monks all committed to maintaining the purity and severity of the monastic institution. Behind this facade, however, the monks carry on an active life not revealed to the public. Monks look forward to *takuhatsu* (begging) days since they have a chance to leave the monastery for the morning and remove themselves from the watchful eye of the head monk. Sometimes they enjoy themselves so much they come back from begging rounds slightly drunk. Late at night after the last *zazen* (meditation) is over, some of the monks may gather for a cigarette behind the woodshed where the firewood is stacked. Carefully pulling a thick piece of firewood from the stack, one of the monks will reach into the open space and pull out a bottle of whiskey. Suddenly everyone has a teacup in hand and little pieces of dried fish are being passed around. In monastery language, this is *sarei*, "tea ceremony," and on a winter's night, after sitting out in the open until almost midnight, a little drink is most welcome before crawling into a very cold mattress. Other monks may climb over the wall to go to the local public bath and afterward enjoy a bowl of noodles. Some of the more adventurous ones may even head downtown to sing in the *karaoke* bars, always mindful that wake-up is 3:30 or 4 A.M. Of course, in the monastery there will be one or two monks who are very fussy about keeping all the rules, and they will receive their share of good-natured kidding, perhaps even be dragged against their will on some outrageous escapade.

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[7] I realize this discussion leaves many questions unanswered. In the wake of several scandals in which Buddhist teachers have engaged in sexual liaison with their students, women members of Buddhist practice centers in the West have argued that the traditional monastic hierarchical system does encourage abuse of power. I stand by my statement that in the Japanese Zen monastery in Japan, there is little abuse of power. But Zen instruction in the West has become Westernized and is now quite different from traditional monastic practice. Part of the evidence for saying this is that the problems of authority and power in Zen teacher-student relations in the West are the same as teacher-student relations elsewhere in Western culture in general. I am sorry that I cannot here discuss this very complicated question further.

125/14

The formal life of disciplined obedience masks an informal life of pranks, deceptions, and even betrayals. The *densu* is responsible for waking everyone up at 3:30 (summer) or 4 A.M. (winter) every morning. If he fails to get up, everyone sleeps in late, an event appreciated by all. To make that much-appreciated event occur more often, monks are not above sabotage. A careless *densu* who leaves his alarm clock near a window will likely find that during the night a hand from outside the window has reached in and turned off the alarm. The next morning as the head monk chastises the *densu* for his idleness, everyone will sympathetically agree that the *densu* certainly has a difficult office. Slipping back and forth between the formal life of strict discipline and the informal life of play, monks constantly slide in and out of inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory, relations with each other.

To outside observers, such behavior may seem to be the epitome of hypocrisy, but in the monastery not only is it tolerated, it is considered quite necessary. Few people can live entirely and completely in the abrasive world of strict discipline. In fact, one might even argue that monks can practice with such strict discipline only because they play so hard on the shadow side. But although the shadow life of pranks and play is a break from the strict discipline, it is still considered an integral part of monastery practice. Monks are required to make great effort in both the formal and informal sides of monastery life. Because the *rōhatsu ōzesshin* commemorates the Buddha's own enlightenment, all other activities are cancelled so that the monks can devote all their energy to *zazen* and *sanzen*. As the daily 22-hour schedule begins with wake-up at 2:00 A.M. and ends after midnight, a late-night snack of hot noodles is served at about 10:00 every evening. The *jikijitsu*, of course, wants to get his monks finished with eating as quickly as possible in order to return to the *zendō* to continue sitting. But the monks deliberately eat as slowly and as much as possible in order to extend the eating time to a maximum. With effort, they will be able to cut off an entire half-hour, a full period of *zazen*, from the time they spend afterward sitting in the cold *zendō* under the stick. The *jikijitsu* cannot complain since the rule is that everyone may have as many second helpings as desired. In this way, the monks silently and playfully resist the *jikijitsu*.

However, one year an interesting incident occurred. During this particular *rōhatsu ōzesshin*, the monks were not eating much; the evening noodles were quickly eaten and within 15 minutes, everyone was back in the *zendō* for further *zazen*. This attitude was symptomatic of the entire *sesshin* that year for the monks in general moved and sat with an air of tired lassitude. After noodles one night, the *jikijitsu* gave us a furious scolding for failing to eat more noodles, criticizing us for not making effort, for being passive, for not arousing fighting spirit. Later that night, as we brushed our teeth, we all agreed our performance at noodle-eating had been shameful. From the next day on, everyone ordered second and third helpings and the general air of lassitude lifted from the entire *sesshin*. With that, the *jikijitsu* told us that we had finally worked up some of the fighting spirit required for the most important *sesshin* of the year.

Much more can be said about this aspect of monastery life, but here it is worthwhile only to make two points. First, in addition to allowing the monks time and space for rest and relaxation, the behind-the-scenes life of play teaches monks not to make a religion out of Zen practice, not to treat monastery practice as something holy. A beginning *shintō* quite naturally is rigid about trying to maintain as strictly as possible all the rules and regulations of monastery life. But in time he soon learns the concrete meaning of the teaching that the *samadhi* (state of consciousness attained in deep meditation) of the advanced Zen practitioner is *yūge zammai*, "the *samadhi* of play." Second, while the formal life of monastery discipline often isolates a monk and tests his individual personal resources, the shadow life affirms that beyond distinctions of rank and office, all monks share common social bonds and a fundamental humanity. This sense of shared life is often expressed in the traditional Japanese way by taking a bath together and sharing a drink.

All social organizations have a formal and an informal aspect. But in other contexts, while the informal behavior is often thought to be antithetical to the formal, perhaps even a degeneration or corruption of an ideal, in the Zen monastery, both the formal and the informal life of the monastery are thought to be equally important arenas of Zen practice. The informal life is neither antithetical to, nor a corruption of, the formal; it is the partner or complement of the formal.

American Mysticism

In the Rinzai Zen monastery, all aspects of monastic discipline direct the monk toward the attaining of Buddhist enlightenment through the use of ritual formalism. I have sometimes described this by saying that enlightenment is just as much impressed from the outside as expressed from the inside. But this description of how one reaches enlightenment is not easily accepted in North America. For despite their unfamiliarity with the Zen monastic tradition, Westerners do have a preconception of what ought to happen in mystical insight and in the attainment of enlightenment. True mystical insight, they will object, is not something that can be imposed from outside by a social system; instead it is a welling up of psychic energy from within, a breakthrough in which the true self erupts through the shell imposed by intellect, self-images, and socialization. From this point of view, the Zen monastery's imposition of ritual form must seem to be just the opposite of mystical insight.

This conception of mystical enlightenment—as the inner inarticulate self breaking through the shell of externally imposed self-images, morality, and conventional understanding—is just what one would expect to find in American culture, the culture of romantic individualism. The culture heroes of the West are heroes precisely to the extent that they assert their individuality against a dehumanizing society. In America, from an early age, children are urged to stand on their own feet and assert their individuality, to not be swayed by society or get lost in the crowd. In the images that define American identity, the Pilgrim fathers assert their right to individual worship against an oppressive church, and action heroes single-handedly defy society to defeat the authoritarian mastermind who would destroy the world. It is not surprising that in America, one associates "to be an individual" with resisting the group, rejecting tradition and institution, opposing authority. Translate this culture legend into psychological terms and at once the outlines of the Western conception of mystical experience appear.[8]

Of course, intertwined with this culture of romantic individualism is another culture of pious work, Puritan self-denial, self-righteousness, and repression of sexuality. We cannot take time out here to follow these different strands in American culture in detail. Suffice it to say that for romantic individualism, the culture of pious work, Puritan self-denial, repression of sexuality, etc. represents the conventional culture that traditional society has programmed into the individual and against which the individual must rebel.

Individualism, antiauthoritarianism, the self of feeling, rejection of institution, etc. are the themes that Western interpreters of Zen have wanted to find in Zen. Of course, they have succeeded just as they were preordained to do. One then should not be surprised at how American-like (how Protestant) the chorus of claims made about Zen sound: Zen is not a religion, Zen is individualism, Zen is iconoclastic, Zen is antiritualistic. But in this American interpretation of Zen, ritual formalism and mystical insight are diametrically opposed. Ritual formalism is thought to be the very agent of that suffocating, moralizing, self-image that prevents the true self from free expression. One who has only these conceptions will not understand teaching and learning in a Japanese Zen monastery, where in Teaching Without Teaching, ritual formalism is the means by which one gains mystical insight.

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[8] Though the authors make no mention of mysticism, I have profited from reading Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985) and also Robert N. Bellah, "The Meaning of Dōgen Today," in William R. LaFleur, ed., *Dōgen Studies* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 150–58.

Development or Self-Discovery?

In thinking about how we conceptualize personal development and how we attempt to understand other cultures, I have found it useful to use a typology of models: a Development model and a Self-Discovery model.[9]

The Development model presupposes that the learner has a set of innate dispositions to develop in a certain way. The process of learning is a gradual response to external stimuli in the learner's environment. If there are no traumatic occurrences to impair or truncate development, the learner will develop naturally, actualizing all innate dispositions in a sequential development. Biological metaphors, expressed in language such as "nurturing," "organic," and "blooming," come easily to mind. The process of learning is depicted as systematic and reasonable; innate dispositions work their way out according to their own internal logic. The learner in the beginning is the passive receiver of nurturing from the physical and social environment, and the self comes to full form only through interaction with the environment.

On the other hand, the Self-Discovery model presupposes that buried within the learner is a fundamentally pure, true self. But from earliest childhood, we are socialized to accept a self-image imposed by our parents, a morality imposed by society, a set of conventional beliefs about our place in the world sanctified by tradition. It is only when the true self breaks free of this false consciousness that a person attains true self-knowledge, maturity as a person, and individual creativity. The Self-Discovery model therefore depicts learning and personal development as the destruction of the encrusted, unnatural shell around the self, a struggle often described as traumatic, liberating, and very sudden. Mythic metaphors of "quest," "ultimate ordeal," and "rebirth" come easily to mind. Although one may encounter guides along the way in one's journey, in contrast to the rational and interactive learning of the Development model, learning in the Self-Discovery model is fundamentally solitary; the lonely self wells up from inside, breaking through its environment in an irrational thrust to come to the light.

Zen has appealed strongly to Westerners because it seems to be one of the few areas of Japanese culture that embodies Self-Discovery. However, in this paper, I am questioning whether the Self-Discovery so often associated with Zen is truly part of actual traditional monastery practice. Is the attainment of mystical insight in the Rinzai Zen monastery Self-Discovery or Development?

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[9] I do not know who first coined these terms. They are used by Lee H. Yearley in *Mencius and Aquinas* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), pp. 59–60. However, I have extended and amplified these terms in my own way. I would like to thank Harold Roth of Brown University for pointing me to this text.

Ritual Practice

We are now starting to close in on the problem of how ritual formalism can reside together with mystical insight. Let us start by pointing out that this is not a problem for Japanese people, who are quite used to the idea that one goes to a Zen monastery to engage in a highly ritualized form of life in order to gain spiritual enlightenment. It is in the secular West that a conjunction of ritual formalism and mystical insight is difficult to grasp.

Traditional Buddhism and Confucianism employ ritual in many ways. Actions are ritualized to endow them with special or sacred meaning; ritual acts function as symbols; ritual is done for cathartic effect; and so on. There is also an educational use of ritual formalism: it trains consciousness. Each particular ritual act in Confucianism has not only a prescribed behavioral form but also a prescribed attitude, emotion, or state of mind. The making of prostrations or the offering of food to deceased ancestors, for example, is to be done with an attitude of repentance or devotion. The ritual fails if not done with sincerity. Meditation, one of the central ritual practices of Buddhism, similarly is often explicitly directed toward the cultivation of feelings, emotions, and attitudes such as loving kindness, compassion, or sympathetic joy. Other ritual practices aim at the eradication of the attachments found in ordinary consciousness. One repeats and repeats the prescribed act with the prescribed state of mind until one no longer has to will them consciously, until one can act naturally with sincerity, or devotion, or loving kindness.

Buddhist meditation practices here exemplify the simplest form of rote repetition. In many sects, the beginning student repeats again and again the mere watching or counting of the breath going in and out of the body. In some forms of Tibetan Buddhist practice, the beginner starts off with 100,000 full-body prostrations, 100,000 repetitions of a short mantra, 100,000 creations (and destructions) of a mandala, and 100,000 repetitions of a longer mantra. These practices are merely repeated again and again with little attempt made to understand why or how one is to do them. In fact, often students are cautioned that too much thinking about the practice inhibits the practice. All of these are ritual practices performed with the explicit intention of disciplining consciousness.

Practitioners perform these meditation exercises, at least in the beginning, in the belief that to do so leads eventually to Buddhist enlightenment. But Zen priests also teach that wanting enlightenment is itself a form of attachment and thus a hindrance to the attainment of the non-attachment of enlightenment. This makes enlightenment seem especially mysterious, for what, then, can one do to gain enlightenment if the very attempt to gain enlightenment is what prevents it? Despite this rhetoric about the apparent futility of practice, the very existence of monasteries and of monastic discipline presupposes that one can engage in concrete practices that advance one toward the goal of enlightenment. And the concrete practices that form the path to that spiritual insight consist of ritually performed acts.

The Zen Kōan

In the Rinzai Zen monastery, monks are given *kōan* upon which they focus their attention during long periods of *zazen*, sitting meditation. The traditional beginning *kōan* include, for example, Hakuin's famous, "Two hands clap and there is a sound. What is the sound of the one hand?" and Jōshū's Mu: "A monk asked Jōshū, 'Does a dog have Buddha-nature?'; Jōshū replied 'No!' " (pronounced *mu* in Japanese). Sitting in meditation, the monk blindly repeats the *kōan*, posing the problem of the *kōan* to himself again and again. The *kōan* has a correct response—a single response, which that monastery's lineage considers correct—and the monk is under enormous pressure to produce it. The remarkable point of the *kōan* method is that with concentrated effort, monks regularly do start to penetrate the *kōan* usually within six months of their arrival in the monastery.

Some critics have charged that the *kōan* question and answer is mere ritual, that the monk merely presents a set response which the *rōshi* ritually approves. If the monk is too dull-witted to come up with the appropriate answer on his own, then the *rōshi* will just tell the monk the answer, so it is thought. In fact, a "crib" of set answers to *kōan* has been published in both Japanese and English and the existence of this book leads many people to believe that the encounter between *rōshi* and monk is little more than a *pro forma* stage play. But the fact that a crib exists proves nothing. A high school algebra crib will provide all the answers to the algebra problems, but the student who wants to pass the final test in algebra must not only know the final answer but also understand the reasoning that leads from the problem to the answer and be able to perform the necessary intermediate calculations correctly. Similarly, giving the correct response in *kōan* training can degenerate into merely an exercise in rote memory, but understanding the connection between the *kōan* and the correct response requires insight. In order to test whether the monk has true insight into the *kōan*, the *rōshi* asks numerous "checking questions" called *sassho*. For the *kōan*, "The Sound of One Hand," the checking questions include "Cut the sound of one hand into two with one slash of the sword," "Did you hear the sound of one hand from behind or from the front?" "The sound of one hand—let me hear it too," and many more. If the monk has true insight into the *kōan*, he will be able to answer these checking questions as well. If he is merely a parrot repeating a set phrase, he will not.

Nothing is more mysterious than the way in which rote repetition of the *kōan* triggers the mystical insight called awakening or enlightenment. The monk repeats to himself over and over again, "What is the sound of one hand?" constantly posing anew the question to himself. The repetition becomes so ingrained that without conscious effort the *kōan* always rises to consciousness whenever attention is not fixed on anything else. As he drifts off to sleep at the end of the day, the last thing involuntarily drifting through his mind is the *kōan* endlessly repeating itself. And on arising in the morning, the first conscious thought is again the *kōan* continuing its ceaseless repetition from the night before.

In the beginning, the monk seeks for the answer to the *kōan* expecting that the answer will arise someday in his consciousness like an object illuminated by a spotlight. But as he continues to work on the *kōan* and yet still fails to penetrate it, he starts to react to his own inability. He begins to have doubts about the *kōan* practice. He will doubt his own abilities. He may fall into a deep disappointment or depression. He challenges himself to have faith and pushes himself beyond what he thought were the normal limits of endurance and willpower. In this region beyond his normal limits, he panics, turns desperate, becomes frantic. Here all self-consciousness is gone. No longer is there a self constantly watching the self. By such forceful techniques, the Rinzai Zen monastery pushes monks into a state of mind beyond the dualism of ordinary consciousness.

At the extremity of his great doubt, there will come an interesting moment. This moment is hard to describe but on reflection afterward we might say that there comes a point when the monk realizes that he himself and the way he is reacting to his inability to penetrate the *kōan* are themselves the activity of the *kōan* working within him. The *kōan* no longer appears as an inert object in the spotlight of consciousness but has become part of the searching movement of the illuminating spotlight itself. His seeking to penetrate the *kōan*, he realizes, is itself the action of the *kōan* which has invaded his consciousness. It has become part of the very consciousness that seeks to penetrate itself. He himself is the *kōan*. Realization of this is the response to the *kōan*.

The Zen Buddhist term for enlightenment or awakening is *kenshō*, often translated in English as "seeing one's nature." This translation and the usage of this term in English is extremely misleading for several reasons. It suggests that there is seeing, on the one hand, and an object of seeing, called "one's nature," on the other. This is misleading because awakening occurs at the breakdown of the subject-object distinction expressed in "seeing" (subject of experience) and "one's nature" (object of experience). Further, *kenshō* in Japanese is as much verb as noun: "How do you *kenshō* this?" is a typical Zen challenge.[10] Finally, in Japanese *kenshō* is used to cover anything from a slight insight to a total spiritual transformation of character and personality, unlike the English usage which tends to use it only to label something total and absolute.

In *kōan* training, the insight comes precisely in the fact that the traditional distinction between a subject of consciousness and an object of consciousness ("two hands clapping") has broken down. The subject seeing and the object seen are not independent and different. "One's nature" and "seeing" are not two. To realize, in both senses of "realize," this fundamental non-duality is the point of *kōan* practice and what makes it mystical insight. One gets to this fundamental realization not through the rational understanding of a conceptual truth, but through the constant repetition of the *kōan*. One merely repeats the *kōan* without being given any instruction on why or how. Ritual formalism leads to mystical insight.

Self

Does monastery Zen practice fit the model of Self-Discovery or of Development? The more prominent elements of Zen practice—it is chaotic, full of anguish, capped by *kenshō* ("seeing one's nature," a translation that suggests a pure original self)—fit the Self-Discovery model nicely. These are the elements emphasized both in the rhetoric of native Zen practitioners and in descriptions by outside observers. But there is an important point that does not fit the model nicely. Whereas the Self-Discovery model attributes the false consciousness that obstructs our self-awareness to the conditioning that our parents, schools, and society in general forced upon us, Zen follows traditional Buddhism in attributing that false consciousness not to society and external forces but to us ourselves. Not "them" but the self's own attachments, its own anger, greed, and ignorance, are responsible for the distorted way it perceives the world and for its own alienation from itself. For those who thought Zen justified rebellion against society, this is not good news.

Rinzai Zen monastery practice, however, brings monks to the point of insight through practices that fit only into the Development model. Despite the emphasis on sudden enlightenment in Zen literature, the Rinzai Zen monastery creates a ritualized environment that encompasses all daily activity, formal and informal. Far from playing the role of the suffocating environment that prevents the self from true self-awareness, as depicted by the Self-Discovery model, monastery life provides a complete environment structured to stimulate the personal growth of the monk through an organic sequential development, as depicted by the Development model. The very existence of the Zen monastery as an institution presupposes the belief that the social environment is not a barrier, but rather an aid, to the monk in his quest to attain enlightenment.

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[10] This point will be of interest to those who are interested in whether mystical consciousness has intentional content. The form of this question, "How do you *kenshō* that?" is similar to "How do you interpret that?" and other questions that clearly imply that the state of mind in question has intentional content.

Behind these two models are two different conceptions of self. The Self-Discovery model describes personal growth and development as getting in touch with the independent self buried beneath the obstructing layers of false consciousness created by the social environment. The Development model rests on the assumption that the self does not exist fully formed prior to its contact with its environment and that personal growth occurs through the self interacting with it. The rhetoric of Zen, with its dramatic accounts of the struggle for self-awareness, would lead one to believe that Zen monastery practice is a pure form of Self-Discovery, but actual monastery practice with its ritualized environment more closely fits the Development model. The Zen phrase that denotes enlightenment, "seeing one's nature," seems to invoke an independent autonomous self, but in fact, "seeing one's nature" refers to the collapse of subject and object of experience. Self-Discovery in Zen is discovery that the autonomous self is not real (although neither is it unreal).

Reflections

At the end of this essay, there are many loose ends.

Against the dominant attitude in education, I have argued that ritual and rote methods are necessary in teaching and learning. The ability and disposition to imitate is both primitive and widespread. Young animals, soon after they are born, begin to imitate the adults of their species; the behavior they learn is said to be "imprinted." Children imitate their parents and also other people around them including other children. Teenagers imitate popular idols and students take professors as role models. A great deal of learning goes on outside the classroom and some huge portion of it is accomplished through imitation without any accompanying rational explanation.[11] Yet in the classroom, rote repetition is not highly valued as a method of teaching. In this paper, I have tried to show that there is a connection between ritual formalism and insight, that there is a connection between instructing a student merely to imitate and repeat without explaining "why" or "how" and the student's development of insight later. From the point of view of specialists in psychology or philosophy of education,

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[11] At the Teaching and Learning in Japan Conference, April 9–12, 1992, Thomas Hare of Stanford University pointed out that the original meaning of the Japanese work *manabu* is "to imitate."

I have probably made several blunders in trying to argue for this. The ideas in this paper would benefit from their criticism.

This essay tries to describe some phases of the actual *kōan* practice as it is conducted in the Rinzai monastery. I am afraid however that this essay gives the mistaken impression that the *kōan* is merely a means, a clever irrational instrument, to induce the experience of *kenshō*. The *kōan* however has more than one function, as Hee-Jin Kim points out.[12] The *kōan* as instrument may be non-rational but the *kōan* as realization is discursive and says something. Furthermore, different *kōan* have different things to say. The entire *kōan* curriculum takes more than ten years to complete, each *kōan* expressing some new facet in the total Zen teaching. It would be unfortunate if readers took away the impression that a *kōan* is merely an irrational paradox whose function is to create a psychological crisis as a precedent to Buddhist enlightenment. To explain this would, however, require another essay.

Scholars interested in the contemporary debate about mystical experience and pure consciousness will probably feel that the account in this essay supports the claims that mystical experience is reconditioning not deconditioning, that there is no pure consciousness shorn of all intentional content, that mystical experience is not autonomous from its conceptual, historical, and religious context. I myself am not so sure about any of these claims.

An unintended but relevant consequence is that my description of the operation of the Zen monastery reveals features of the monastery that resemble what has been called the Japanese managerial style. The work-group autonomy of the Japanese corporation corresponds to the autonomy given to a monk newly appointed to office. The explicit vertical structure of the corporation is paralleled by the explicit hierarchy of the monastery. Both the corporation and the monastery give a great deal of attention to detail. *Kaizen*, the constant step-by-step analysis, standardization, and improvement of tasks in, for example, a Japanese automobile factory nicely parallels the monk's constant attempt to make his way of working more and more efficient.[13] Corporation *hansei*, "reflection," is paralleled by the criticism of mutual polishing in the monastery, and both are institutionalized ways of learning from failure. In her study of the Japanese Red Army, Patricia G. Steinhoff discovered that despite their revolutionary stance against the mainstream values of Japanese society, over the years the members of the Japanese Red Army developed through trial and error a working style that spontaneously reinvented several features of the Japanese managerial style.[14]

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[12] Hee-Jin Kim, "Introductory Essay: Language in Dōgen's Zen," in *Flowers of Emptiness: Selections from Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō* (Lewiston/Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1985), pp. 1–47. Reprinted as Hee-Jin Kim, "'The Reason of Words and Letters': Dōgen and Kōan Language," in LaFleur, ed., *Dōgen Studies*, pp. 54–82.

[13] See Paul S. Adler, "Time and Motion Regained," *Harvard Business Review*, Jan.-Feb. 1993, pp. 97–108, Reprint 93101. Adler's paper, in several ways, is similar in purpose to this one.

What is the significance of the fact that such diverse organizations—the business corporation, the Zen monastery, and the Red Army—should share such a resemblance? Do all Japanese, by virtue of the fact that they are Japanese, carry a genetically determined template that causes them to create very similar social organizations wherever they find themselves? Or is there some other explanation? Patricia Steinhoff speculates that the source of "this quintessentially Japanese style of organization can be located explicitly in the culture of the postwar Japanese elementary school."[15] Her point is that Japanese children, including those who later went on to become members of the Red Army, learned non-traditional decision-making procedures introduced by the American educational reformers during the postwar occupation period. In similar fashion, Paul Adler in his study of the Toyota automobile production system shows that it was originally inspired by the time and motion studies of the American, Frederick Winslow Taylor, the original efficiency expert. Is the present social organization of the Rinzai monastery similar? Is the social organization of the Rinzai Zen monastery a recent, postwar creation, too? Is there some non-traditional influence in its formation?[16] These questions need further investigation.

Many Buddhist practitioners in the West are attempting to distinguish what in Zen is Buddhist and what is merely Japanese culture. I hope that this essay does not leave them with the mistaken impression that the entire monastic system is one more variant of a standard Japanese cultural pattern

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[14] Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Hijackers, Bombers, and Bank Robbers: Managerial Style in the Japanese Red Army," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Nov. 1989), pp. 724–40. This study also describes how in a crisis in 1972, the group mechanisms of vertical authority, peer pressure, and self-criticism combined to create an uncontrollable purge which after six weeks left twelve members dead. This raises the question, under what conditions does this style of social organization break down?

[15] Ibid., p. 733.

[16] The 86-year-old Rinzai *rōshi*, Sasaki Jōshū, says that some important monastery vocabulary changed after World War II. Before the war, the standard word for Zen enlightenment was not *satori* but *taitoku* ("bodily attainment"). *Satori* became popular with the younger generation of monastery *rōshi* after the war because of the influence of D. T. Suzuki and the philosopher Nishida Kitarō who psychologized enlightenment. Nishida's first and most popular book was *Zen no kenkyū* (translated into English by Masao Abe and Christopher Ives as *An Enquiry into the Good* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990]) which expounded the notion of *junsui keiken* or "pure consciousness." Nishida's footnotes to *Zen no kenkyū* show that he was inspired by both Wilhelm Wundt and William James. There is, of course, the question of whether Nishida used the notion of pure experience in the same way that Wundt and James did.

and that very little of it is Buddhist. My own feeling is that the question, "Is it really Buddhist or is it just Japanese culture?" is another one of those either-or questions whose very asking mistakenly creates a false dichotomy.

Finally, my overall conclusion is that the Rinzai Zen monastery in Japan employs a unique style of teaching and learning in which ritual formalism leads to mystical insight. One might well ask, does the Christian monastery in the West not employ ritual formalism and does it not lead to mystical insight as well? There is a great opportunity and need here for a study of comparative monasticism. However, my initial impression is that although Rinzai Zen and Catholic monasteries are both ritualized training centers whose common goal is mystical insight, nevertheless there is a distinct difference in style. The Zen monastery is person-focused, the daily schedule and the methods of training all designed to focus great pressure on the individual person and bring him quickly to a moment of awakening. By contrast, the Catholic monastery is place-focused, the emphasis being to create a total time and place environment that perpetually reminds the monk of his vocation to God. Such a monastic style does not systematically confront him with a daily challenge to demonstrate his spiritual understanding and is not designed to induce sudden moments of insight. While the Zen monk progresses in sharp bursts, it seems, the Catholic monk's progress is more smoothly graduated. I do not wish to speculate on differences in spiritual maturity measured over the years.

Finally, in order to show how teaching and learning function in the Rinzai Zen monastery, I have also had to describe some monastic teaching practices and sketch the different cultural assumptions that underlie them. Without this exploration into cultural assumptions, I fear that a mere surface description of monastic practices will be misunderstood. To point out cultural differences almost inevitably leads to comparisons which in turn will inevitably cause someone offense. Critics of earlier versions of this paper justly criticized me severely for making invidious cultural comparisons. I stand chastised. Nevertheless, it is a legitimate problem for intellectual study to ask why people in one culture construct and reconstruct certain fixed images of other cultures.

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131/14

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Teaching and Learning in the Rinzai Zen Monastery

Popular images of Japan tend to cluster around two conflicting cultural stereotypes. One depicts Japan as a ritualistic, rule-governed, hierarchical society where obsession with preserving traditional form and with conformity to group goals stifles individual creativity. The other pictures Japan as the repository of a mystical culture that produces gentle, creative, slightly foolish sages. These two stereotypes clash. How can one society be both? A closer look at teaching and learning in the Japanese Zen monastery allows us to see how ritual formalism coexists with mystical insight.

I propose to divide the spectrum of human learning into three domains: (1) ritual formalism, (2) rational teaching and learning, and (3) mystical insight. In modern Western society, we have focused upon, and greatly developed, what I have labeled rational teaching and learning, but we seem to have less interest in, or confidence about, the two ends of the spectrum. A Japanese Zen monastery, on the other hand, substantially discounts rational teaching and learning and teaches both ritual formalism and mystical insight. In fact, it teaches mystical insight by *means of* ritual formalism.

By "ritual formalism," I am stretching one term to cover several kinds of behavior: repetition, rote memorization, behaving according to traditional prescription. In ritual formalism, students imitate form without necessarily understanding content or rationale. They are instructed in "what" to do, but given very little instruction in "why" and "how" to do it.

By "rational teaching and learning," I refer to that pattern of education in which a teacher of a body of knowledge and/or skills usually formulates

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in such a way that the resulting tone pattern is simpler than what would result from straightforward concatenation of tones.

It was also seen that different types of interaction between two lexical melodies may occur if words are combined into compounds, or into phrases and clauses. Here, too, the interaction proceeds in the direction of simplification. It was observed that simplification of tone patterns in Kalam Kohistani is brought about by the assimilation of an H tone to a preceding L tone.

Tones in Kalam Kohistani not only interact with each other, but also with aspects of segmental structure. In particular a process of vowel lengthening was described in which tone appears to play a conditioning role.

Furthermore, it was suggested that a number of phenomena (floating L tone, utterance-final glottal stop, the absence of inflectional L tone on some words, and the immunity of these same words with regard to vowel lengthening) have derived from a single source, namely the diachronic loss of a word-final vowel. This hypothesis needs to be confirmed by historical and comparative research, a task which is outside the scope of the current paper.

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132/14

Is there a Chinese word for 'Confucius'? A review article

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The dissolution of ideological identities that had seemed since the middle of this century fairly stable would appear to be one of the characteristics of our times. In place of the struggle between Capitalism and Communism, Samuel Huntingdon would wish to erect a more fragmented competition between civilizational blocs, bearing such labels as the Confucian East and the World of Islam.[1] Yet even such an analysis seems already distinctly old-fashioned, imposing a questionable cultural stability on more labile phenomena. As an alternative Lionel Jensen suggests that the first of these labels, at any rate, is in no small measure the creation of early European observers, and that far from basking in any unproblematic sense of identity, some of the best minds of twentieth-century China actually expended much of their ink on a highly problematic search for the origins of an identifiable Confucian group in the early Chinese past.[2]

Jensen's findings will, of course, come as less of a surprise to those who have had the leisure or (more probably) the professional obligation to read books on the history of China and the West, which after all have been clashing away with greater or lesser vigour for something over four centuries by now. Paul Rule, for example, posed one of the key questions addressed by Jensen in a work entitled *K'ung-tzu or Confucius*? over a decade ago, pitting the Latinized term by which we Westerners refer to China's best-known thinker against a romanization of his name (in Wade-Giles; the *pinyin* would be Kongzi) in the form most familiar to Chinese speakers.[3] To point this out, however, is not to detract in the slightest from Jensen's achievement in making us think much more carefully about the degree to which our assumptions about something called 'Confucianism' can be traced back no further than those heady days in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when the outstanding Jesuit leader Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) and his associates attempted for the first time to interpret China's intellectual traditions to their European contemporaries. He makes, it must be said, some dramatic points, reproducing the page of Ricci's manuscript where a Jesuit editor has deleted an entire passage concerning the use of animal sacrifices in the cult of Confucius, literally at a stroke reducing a dangerous gap between Christianity and the Chinese tradition which he had selected as his '*praeparatio evangelii*'. His chapters on Zhang Binglin (1868–1936) and Hu Shi (1891–1962) also take research into the construction of Confucianism in modern times into new areas, while doubtless many reviewers will respond, too, to his incisive observations on such timely topics as 'Confucius, Confucianism and the politics of scholarship' (pp. 14–18).

It is, in short, easy to see the merits of this book, harder to detect the ways in which it falls short, and to discuss them—certainly to discuss them without

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[1] Samuel P. Huntingdon, 'The clash of civilisations?', *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (Summer, 1993), 22–49.

[2] Lionel M. Jensen, *Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese traditions and universal civilization*, xix, 444 pp. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1997 [pub. 1998]. £56.95 (paper £18.95).

[3] Paul Rule, *K'ung-tzu or Confucius? The Jesuit interpretation of Confucianism* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin Australia), 1986.

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seeming captious and ungrateful for the work that has been expended on it. But on the assumption that most reviewers will opt for the easier course, the following remarks will concentrate on one or two identifiable problems, and if that assumption is wrong, I can only apologise to the author for not giving him his due, but assure him that his efforts are bound to stimulate many students to more careful thought, and that in itself should outweigh any number of reviews dedicated to attempting to expose his shortcomings.

The most direct way to highlight where those shortcomings lie is to point out that were it not that his 'Acknowledgements' (p. xiv) reveal that he has been working with an editor for four years, there are passages in this book which might be mistaken for signs of haste. The medieval period, for example, is passed over with a judicious lightness—for anyone who works on that period will know that 'Confucianism' is an analytical construct of limited usefulness when trying to untangle the Tang mind—but out of the four sentences devoted to this phase, at least two lead us back through their footnotes to information which seems at a significant variance with the text. First, 'Thus Kongzi appeared, as Arthur Waley has shown, as a protagonist in satirical and even pornographic popular ballads, some of which have been preserved in the grottoes of Dunhuang' (p. 21). Footnote 37 at this point leads us to Waley's *Ballads and stories from Tun-huang*.[4] But here we find but one prose story and one appended ballad about the confounding of Confucius by a mere lad, and as far as I can see nothing remotely pornographic at all. Yet more bafflingly, we are next informed that 'In his study of Chinese scholars and the state in the Tang, David McMullen notes that Kongzi was the focus of "an official cult of satire and ribaldry" associated with court entertainment by the mid-ninth century.' Footnote 38 then directs us to the following passage by the scholar named: 'Nor, understandably, is there any hint in the sources for the official cult of the satire and ribaldry to which Confucius was subjected in such widely different contexts as a court entertainment in the mid-ninth century and in popular ballads preserved at Tun-huang in modern Kansu.'[5] Two footnotes in this source direct us first to an edict from a mid-ninth century emperor *criticizing* the impersonation of Confucius in an informal court entertainment, and then to the translation by Waley already noted. The point which is being made is precisely the opposite of that suggested by Jensen's truncated quotation: the official cult in medieval times gives a misleading impression of reverence and must be balanced against the occasional levity with which society as a whole regarded the sage at this time.

Of course, making medieval China a more entertaining place than it really was can only be regarded most indulgently, but it is precisely because Jensen is forcing us to look closely at the realities beyond our stereotypes that any imprecision jars in a way that might otherwise be overlooked. One of his greatest strengths (as we shall see) is his insistence on close attention to some key etymologies, yet in the very midst of this discussion we read (p. 91) 'And without the native referent, "Confutio", "Confutius", or "Confucio" was similar to many other Chinese words like "mandarin", "bonze", and "Cantao" or "Canton" that were adopted into the European lexicon through derivative forms in the sixteenth century'—where in fact 'mandarin' derives ultimately from Sanskrit and 'bonze' from Japanese, as any dictionary listing etymologies will reveal. We must, therefore, construe 'Chinese words' as

meaning 'words about China', but the unwary, I fear, will have already been lured astray.

Thus forewarned, we are obliged to approach Jensen's most telling claim—that 'Kong Fuzi', the Chinese term underlying Latin 'Confucius', is actually a non-standard form—with due respect for the force of his arguments, but also with a critical eye to the evidence adduced. This topic is first adumbrated in the 'Introduction' (p. 7), where it is remarked that 'In fact, "Confucius" was invented as a Latinized equivalent for "Kong Fuzi", a rare, respectful title for the Chinese sage Kongzi that could only be found on the spirit tablets [*shenwei*] of certain regional temples devoted to worship of this hallowed figure and his extended apostolic lineage.' Note 4 at this point, however, leads us not (as far as I have been able to tell) to any precise documentation of the assertion contained in the first portion of this sentence, but rather to whole books by Herbert Giles and Henri Doré covering in their ample pagination general descriptions of the temples and tablets mentioned in its latter part.

No matter: we return to the topic once more in what seems at first to be a definitive way on pp. 85–6, though the first of these pages is actually solely concerned with listing the *absence* of the term 'Kong Fuzi' from every text likely to have been read by the Jesuits. Turning over, we find the following:

> In admitting that 'Kong Fuzi' was a distance marker, it is interesting that the only native evidence of Kong Fuzi preceding Jesuit entrance into China appears to be from an inscriptional record of a state ceremony held during the Yuan dynasty on the occasion of Temür's (1265–1307 C.E.) adoption of a second reign title. At the time of the renomination, the emperor (*huangdi*) Chengzong received a memorial from his cabinet ministers wherein he is addressed as 'zhisheng wenxuanwang Kong Fuzi zhi disun', 'legitimate descendant of the most holy, literary king, Kong Fuzi'.

Note 22 at the end of this passage then directs us to p. 327, where we read:

> Temür ascended the throne as 'Chengzong' in 1294, designating his era 'Yuan-zhen' [the Source of Truth]. Two years later this *nianhao* [era name] was superseded by the appellation of the new era, 'Dade' [Great Virtue]. See *Zhongwen dacidian*, vol. 3, p. 3744. A search of the chronicle of Chengzu's reign and of the invocations of and sacrifices to Kongzi in the *Yuan shi* turned up no additional evidence other than that cited here from the *Zhongwen dacidian*. *Yuan shi* [reprint; Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976].

No other source on this crucial question is cited either here, or (as far as I have been able to tell) anywhere else in Jensen's study, so for all its virtues or vices we must leave his monograph aside and push on to confirm or deny the usage he cites as best we may.

Now the *Zhongwen dacidian* need not long detain us. As is well known, this multi-volume dictionary depends in large measure on the first edition of the famous *Dai Kan-Wa jiten* of Morohashi Tetsuji, which itself was largely compiled on the basis of the holdings of one particularly outstanding Japanese library.[6] Consulting vol. 4, 814, of this work, we find two references to 'Kong Fuzi'. One is clearly a 'back-formation' from the European word, since it refers to a 'Kong Fuzi Canal', named after a Western steamship evidently called the '*Confucius*'. The other entry, slightly mispunctuated at the start even in the most recent revised edition, contains a passage assigned to a Chinese author, one Cai Wenyuan 蔡文淵, which is clearly the source of Jensen's assertions.

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[4] Specifically, Arthur Waley, *Ballads and stories from Tun-Huang* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960), 89–96.

[5] Thus David McMullen, *State and scholars in T'ang China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 34.

[6] See Harriet T. Zurndorfer, *China bibliography: a research guide to reference works about China past and present* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 53–4, n. 134, and 216–17. First edition, 1955–60; I have used the reduced format 1969–71 reprint by the Taishūkan shoten, Tokyo.

Once Cai's original personal name is substituted for that used here, he turns out to be a minor scholar-official of the early nineteenth century from Shunde 順德 in Guangdong, Cai Jinquan 蔡錦泉, who gained his *jinshi* degree in 1832, but whose exact dates are not given in any of the biographies I have so far unearthed for him.[7] Given Cai's time and place, it may be that his use of the term 'Kong Fuzi' also represents a deliberate, subtle barbarism, a Western term placed slyly in the mouth of a Mongol, since we know that Chinese scholars under the Qing saw many analogies between rule by Manchus and rule by Mongols, though the Manchus knew well enough how to suppress any too overt criticism of their own foreign origins.[8] At any rate his earliest biography in the 1853 local history of Shunde shows that he was for a while a junior associate of Lin Zexu (1785–1850), the famous opponent of the British in the first Opium War, so doubtless Cai possessed a certain level of awareness of Europeans and their ways.[9] Unfortunately, it is impossible to grasp the entire context of Cai's piece of writing, since although it is summarized—without reference to the particular passage in question—by one contemporary to provide a biography of its subject, I have yet to find a copy of the full text excerpted by Morohashi. Indeed, I have so far not even succeeded in finding where it was published at all.[10]

The title and topic of the piece are, even so, quite clear. It is a memorial inscription (technically, a 'spirit road stele') for a descendant of Confucius named Kong Zhi 孔治 (1236–1307), who was in 1295 awarded by Temür the title 'Duke Yansheng' 衍聖公, which the Jurchens had earlier introduced as hereditary for the leader of the Kong family in each generation. In fact, the division of China between the Jurchen and the Southern Song had divided the descendants of Confucius also, so for a while there were two claimants to leadership in each generation, causing much historiographic confusion, the details of which are now not easy to sort out, since both the archives of the central government in China and of the family of Confucius, though now much more accessible to scholars, do not go back as far as the Mongol period. That Kong Zhi did receive the title indicated is, however, beyond all doubt, since the matter is mentioned in a record by a contemporary, Yan Fu 閻復 (1236–1312).[11] But, most unfortunately, we seem to have no early record of the court memorial promoting the award of the title, which is what Cai appears to be quoting. We can only assume, I would think, that he did so not from archival materials, but at second hand.

Yet whatever Cai's own proximate source, there are at least two other quotations from the same court memorial which are earlier than the nineteenth century, and there may be more, though in general Ming sources on Kong Zhi and his line do not dwell on their contacts with the Jurchens or the Mongols.[12] The reasons for this are not far to seek: even in our own times the topic of Confucians who remained in the Jurchen-held territory after its conquest has been a touchy one, and Hoyt Cleveland Tillman reports a 1982 conversation with a Chinese scholar in Beijing in which he was told that all Confucians left the northern, Jin dynasty territory and fled to the surviving Chinese Southern Song.[13]

At any rate, of the two quotations from the memorial that I have seen, one is in an institutional encyclopedia compiled under government auspices in the eighteenth century which is regrettably not known for its faithful citation of original documents.[14] The other, however, is in a study of the Kong family heritage published in 1762 by Kong Jifen 孔繼汾 (1725?–1786), a leading scholar and head of the main Kong line of descent, who claims that he went to particular lengths to sort out on the basis of the best materials to hand the history of the period when the family was divided.[15] Both works at any rate agree (so far as I am aware, independently) in citing the description of Kong Zhi in the text of the memorial as reading not (as Cai's piece apparently would have it) 'a descendant of Kong Fuzi', but simply 'of Kongzi'.[16] This, then, leaves for the moment the number of incontestably documented sources for the former term prior to the Jesuit missions at zero. .

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[7] Cai's fame as a painter stimulated the production of a number of brief notices on him in collections devoted to artists' lives: the most detailed of these is in Wang Zhaoyong 汪兆鏞 *Lingbiao hua zhenglue* 嶺表畫徵略 (n.p., 1928) 8.5b—the Hong Kong, Commercial Press reprint of 1961 with further dates of artists determined in an appendix has not been available to me; two more brief biographies may be found through the Harvard-Yenching index to Qing biographies, though unfortunately I have not had access to the earliest of these. The fullest listing of materials on or by Cai may be found in the brief note on him in the *Zhongguo meishujia renming cidian*, second edition (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin meishu chubanshe, 1987), 1374b: two of the biographical sources named there I have also found impossible to locate so far.

[8] Of course it cannot be taken as axiomatic that an official from Guangdong in the early to mid-nineteenth century would be part of a solid bloc opposed to an equally solid Manchu dominant elite: Pamela Kyle Crossley, in an eloquent review of James Polachek, *The Inner Opium War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1992), has argued at length against such an interpretation, in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Third Series, 3/2, 307–11. But at any rate the 'Yuan analogy' seems to have cast a long shadow, making it an area where Chinese writers tended to tread warily until very late in the nineteenth century: note that it was not until that point, for example, that they felt free to support for the legitimacy of Japanese resistance against the Mongols: see D. R. Howland, *Borders of Chinese civilisation: geography and history at empire's end* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 37.

[9] *Shunde xianzhi* 順德縣志, 27.26a–27a, in edition of 1853 as reprinted in *Zhongguo difangzhi congshu* (Taibei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1974). Lin's activities have been described many times, most recently by James Polachek's book, cited in the preceding note.

[10] For the summary, see *Song-Yuan xuean buyi* 宋元學案補遺 (ed. in *Siming congshu* 四明叢書, series 5, Ningbo, 1938), 78.42a, and for this work (originally compiled in 1842) and its authors, Arthur W. Hummel (ed.), *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period* (1644–1912) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943–44), 353–4. I have found no trace of the published 'Collected works' by Cai that might have been consulted by Morohashi—if indeed it printed his prose, since it appears to have been solely a poetry collection—nor indeed of any anthology likely to contain the piece.

[11] Yan Fu, *Jingxuan ji* 靜軒集, 2.7a, as reprinted in the series *Ouxiang lingshi* 藕香零拾, ed. Miao Quansun (1844–1919), in 1895.

[12] I have checked all the Ming period sources on Kong Zhi (including the references in rare gazetteers, available to me on microfilm) listed in Wang Deyi, *et al.*, *Yuanren zhuanji ziliao suoyin* Vol. I (Taibei: Xinwenfeng, 1979), 40, without being able to find any mention of the memorial.

[13] See Hoyt Cleveland Tillman and Stephen H. West, *China under Jurchen rule* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 113.

[14] Compare the remarks on the original *Xu Wenxian tongkao* 續文獻通考 of Wang Qi 王圻, preface dated 1586 (which regrettably mentions Kong Zhi without citing the memorial, 58.4b in the first edition) and on the Qinding 欽定 *Xu wenxian tongkao* compiled in 1747, in Ssu-yü Teng and Knight Biggerstaff, *An annotated bibliography of select Chinese reference works*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 111–12.

[15] Cf. his remarks in this study, *Queli wenxian kao* 闕里文獻考, 8.5a–6a, as reprinted in the series (ed. Miao Fenglin, *et al.*) *Kongzi wenhua daquan* 孔子文化大全 Jinan: Shandong youyi shushe, 1989. For Kong Jifen, cf. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period*, 434. Ming works reprinted in the *Kongzi wenhua daquan* series (e.g. the *Shengmen zhi* 聖門誌 of 1627, 3B.6a) tend to demote the northern line of Kongs to which Kong Zhi belonged, doubtless (as already explained) because they were seen as collaborators with the barbarians, so Kong Jifen for his part may be read as trying to rescue that line from Chinese historiographic prejudice from his own position as a collaborator with the Manchus. I note, however, that Yu Yue 俞樾 (1821–1906) finds Kong's treatment of the Five Dynasties period unsatisfactory, but that neither he nor any other scholar known to me so far comments on his treatment of the Jin and Yuan era: cf. Yu, *Chunzaitang suibi* 春在堂隨筆 10 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1984), 180.

[16] Kong, *Queli wenxian tongkao*, 8.4b; *Qinding Xu wenxian tongkao*, 536.14a (in edition of *Siku quanshu*).

It may well be, of course, that 'Kong Fuzi' was a local colloquial term picked up by Ricci and his colleagues when they were settling in and learning Chinese in their first Guangdong home; it may even be that in future local historians will be able to find it in surviving manuscripts or epigraphic sources from that time and place. But all of us would do well to be guided by the famous advice to a young scholar (variously phrased, it must be said, in different reference works) given by the great Martin Joseph Routh (1755–1854) to the effect that 'I think, Sir, you will find it a very good practice *always to verify your references*.' Until that process is complete—and the foregoing observations will have shown that neither the reference works nor the reference libraries immediately available to the average British scholar allow for any swift resolution of the question—the name 'Confucius' must be placed, at least provisionally, in the same category of Sino-Western cultural synthesis as 'chop suey', a product perhaps serving an immediate purpose, but open to the severest criticisms on the grounds of authenticity.

135/14

Notes and communications

Puzzling words and spellings in Babylonian Aramaic magic bowls

Through work on the large collection of Mandaic lead rolls in the British Museum and collations of incantation bowls in various museums and libraries, it appears that Mandaic gnostic incantation formulas were often translated into Babylonian Aramaic and Syriac, but not the reverse.[1] In Late Antiquity, Mandaic *Vorlagen* seem to have dominated the field of magic in Mesopotamia. Although, only a scanty amount of pre-Islamic Mandaic incantation material has been published so far, classical Mandaic literature already gives many hints of this fact.[2] It turns out that many solutions to puzzling words or spellings in Babylonian Aramaic incantation bowls can be explained in the light of a Mandaic *Vorlage*.

Another surprising fact is that up to now hardly any work has been invested in the re-study of the already published material. Although many of the hitherto published incantation formulas have been inadequately published with unsatisfactory explanations for the interpretation of unclear contexts, it seems that scholars prefer to publish new text material. Unfortunately, the new material does not often add to the corpus of formulas, but the previously known formulas turn up in numerous and varied versions.

A good example of such texts is the Babylonian Aramaic incantation bowl in the Allard Pierson Museum,[3] in which one can detect a variety of Mandaic gnostic features. The whole incantation is worked into a demon story which centres (like many other Mandaic demonic tales) around an anonymous higher being or a higher demon speaking and acting. This anonymous speaker uses the hair, the skin and the blood of demons to make threads to bind the evil elements. The idea that demons feed on the flesh and blood of human beings and that a thread is prepared to be used with the amulet occurs frequently in Mandaic incantations as well in the *Ginzā yamīnā*.[4]

Smelik was on the right track by connecting *ywkbr zmy'* with the Mandaic spirit of light *ywkbr zyw'*, except that the spelling of *zmy'* became corrupted as one would expect a form **zym'*<*zyw'*.[5] Another three Babylonian Aramaic incantation bowls show correctly *ywkbr zyw'* in similar passages.[6] The idea that the *Vorlage* of this incantation derives from Mandaic is suggested in line

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[1] See Ch. Müller-Kessler, 'Aramäische Koine. Ein Beschwörungsformular aus Mesopotamien', *Baghdader Mitteilungen*, 29, 1998, 337–52.

[2] As one has to work with late copies of that material scholars in the field of Mesopotamian magic of Late Antiquity have hesitated to use these sources as evidence.

[3] K. A. D. Smelik, 'An Aramaic incantation bowl in the Allard Pierson Museum', *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, 35, 1978, 175–7.

[4] For similar passages cf. J. Naveh, 'Another Mandaic lead roll', *Israel Oriental Studies*, 5, 1975, 47–63 and Ch. Müller-Kessler, 'The story of Bguzan-Lilit, daughter of Zanay-Lilit', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 116, 1996, 185–95. On another unpublished lead sheet (BM 135793I) a ritual is described in which a thread has to be made from the hair of seven different animals, dyed with seven dyes and then knotted into seven knots. Later the thread is to be put on the amulet which should be worn by night and day.

[5] Smelik, art. cit., 176, n. 3.

[6] See C. H. Gordon, 'Aramaic magical bowls in the Istanbul and Baghdad Museums' *Archiv Orientální*, 6, 1934, 331–4.

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A new publication[1] on the date and historiography of the Buddha's decease (*nirvāṇa*): a review article

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150/114

The date of the demise, or (Mahāpari)Nirvāṇa, of the historical Buddha Śākyamuni is one of the key chronological markers in early Indian history, one which has therefore been of pivotal importance to modern scholarship on ancient India. Whilst the dates of the conquest of Gandhāara and Sindh by the Achaemenid empire and the dates of Alexander's campaigns in the subcontinent are among the very oldest established for the history of north-western India, that of the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha has long been regarded as the oldest more or less fixed chronological value in the history of north-eastern India. The dating of the Buddha has a crucial significance for the dates of certain ancient Indian kings—Bimbisāra of Magadha and Prasenajit (Pasenadi) of Kosala—and for that of the Jain Tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra, for the development of Jainism and the Śramaṇa movement, and for the earlier history of the Brahmanical religion and the oldest Indian philosophy, including the thought of the Upaniṣads. Moreover, quite apart from its importance for South Asia alone, the consensus (apparently) obtaining among scholars about the time of the Buddha contributed to the elaboration by Karl Jaspers, in his book of 1955 entitled *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*, of the concept of an Axial Age ('Achsenzeit') around 500 B.C. when a number of epoch-making events are thought to have taken place in the ancient Eurasian world. On the other hand, the chronological and factual uncertainties surrounding the biography of the Buddha have in the past led the occasional sceptical writer to the view that the Buddha was not a historical person at all but, rather, a more or less mythical figure (perhaps a solar symbol)—something that in some respects recalls discussions that have turned round the historicity and the mythologization of another famous personage sometimes dated to a time perhaps a century (?) before what has so often been regarded as the date of the Buddha: the Iranian Zarathustra (not to speak of Lao-tzu in China).

Until recently, then, by either the explicit or the tacit consensus of numerous scholars, the date of the Nirvāṇa was generally (though certainly not universally) placed in the range between 544/543 B.C. (in accordance with the [Uncorrected] Long Chronology) and around 480 B.C. (in the Corrected Long Chronology, and in conformity with the Cantonese 'Dotted Record' which yields a dating of *c.* 486). These historians' working hypotheses (for in effect they are nothing more than this) placed the Buddha significantly more than two centuries before the reign of the Mauryan emperor Aśoka, i.e. Priyadarśin, whose rock and pillar edicts are still extant and constitute the earliest epigraphic documentation for Indian history. But much of the chronology constructed for the life of the Buddha and the early history of India in virtue of this *communis opinio* of many historians is in fact open to very serious question. And it cannot be overlooked that Buddhist tradition has itself preserved the so-called Short Chronology which places the Buddha's Nirvāṇa about a century ('100 years') before Aśoka, the figures of 116 and 160 years (Vasumitra and Bhavya), as well as of 120 years (*Mahāmeghasūtra*), being also given in our sources. The two long chronologies in question are most closely associated with Therāvadin traditions, and the short chronologies of about a century before Aśoka are connected in particular with Sarvāstivādins and Mahāyānists. Often the Long and the Short Chronology have been described as those of the Southern and Northern Buddhists respectively, but these latter designations are approximate since longer and shorter reckonings of the Nirvāṇa are in fact both to be found in many parts of the Buddhist world, 'northern' (China, Tibet, etc.) and 'southern' (Sri Lanka) equally.

In 1982 Professor Heinz Bechert published an important, but still preliminary, article in which he marshalled weighty evidence and arguments against the earlier datings of the Buddha following either the Long Chronology or the Corrected Long Chronology (see 'The date of the Buddha reconsidered', *Indologica Taurinensia*, 10: 29–36). And in April of 1988, under the auspices of the Göttingen Academy of Sciences, a large Symposium was organized by him at Hedemünden near Göttingen which was devoted to the discussion of the date of the Nirvāṇa and, more generally, to the question of the Buddha's time in the frame of ancient Indian and Buddhist history and culture. In the three volumes under review are published revised versions of the papers delivered at this Symposium together with much additional documentation and editorial comment. Since the Symposium Bechert has returned to the problem in a number of papers published in Europe, India, Japan and the United States, notably in his extended interim report on the Symposium published under the title 'The problem of the determination of the date of the Historical Buddha', *WZKS*, 33, 1989, 93–120. He has also publicized the issues raised in a paper presented at the Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Paris in the summer of 1991 ('A note on the International Symposium on the Dates of the Historical Buddha', in A. Guruge ed., *Tenth International Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, Paris, 1992, 221–6), as well as in a volume of essays he edited in India under the title *When did the Buddha live? The controversy on the dating of the Historical Buddha* (Delhi, 1995). Part I of the present publication contains Bechert's general 'Introductory essay' in English in which he reviewed the multiple problems involved and the results achieved at the Symposium. And Part III now contains a final introduction in German in which Bechert briefly summarizes the latest state of discussion eight years after the Symposium of 1988.

As originally conceived, the question of the date of the Buddha was perhaps seen in the first place purely as one of chronology and of history in the strictest sense. The expression 'Historical Buddha' appears in several of Bechert's publications. In the course of both the preparations for the Symposium and the discussions taking place during it, it then emerged ever more clearly that the problem of the Buddha's dating was at the same time one of Buddhist chronography and historiography, that is, of how Buddhist traditions have themselves treated the date of the Nirvāṇa and other crucial events in his life such as his birth, his Awakening (*sambodhi*) and his preaching of particular teachings. In addition, the way modern researchers in the history of India and Buddhism have handled the problem of the Buddha's dates, and the methods and presuppositions of modern historical and philological scholarship in South, East and Central Asian studies, also possess an unmistakable historiographical dimension. All these aspects of the problem of the dating of the Buddha receive attention in the present publication.

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[1] Heinz Bechert (ed.), *The dating of the historical Buddha/Die Datierung des historischen Buddha. Parts 1–3.* (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung, IV/1–3.) (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr. 189, 194, 222.) xv, 525; x, 530; vii, 171 pp. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1991, 1992 and 1997.

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Pivotal to the discussion is the date of accession, or consecration (*abhiṣeka*), of the Emperor Aśoka. This is because of the above-mentioned fact that Buddhist sources have themselves dated the Nirvāṇa as taking place a given number of years before Aśoka's reign: 100 years (meaning, probably, a century approximately) according to a computation represented by Buddhist traditions grouped together under the designation 'Short Chronology' and found in the Sanskrit sources of Buddhism and in their translations into Chinese and Tibetan, and 218 years according to a computation known as the Long Chronology found mainly in Pali sources (and also known in Tibet). The discrepancy between these two Buddhist traditions on this point alone is accordingly of more than a century. This disagreement is further aggravated by the fact that additional calculations of the date of the Nirvāṇa, etc., made by various Buddhist authorities at known times over the centuries have differed from these two traditions by very much more than just a century. As a consequence, with regard to the dating of events in the Buddha's life, some sections at least of Buddhist tradition have adopted what can be described as a relativistic position, acknowledging that there indeed exist divergent computations in various recognized, and 'authoritative', sources, scriptural or otherwise. Dating has thus sometimes come to be regarded as, so to say, context-bound; and we even find expressed (in several Tibetan sources at least) the view that some calculations are provisional in sense (*neyārtha* = *draṅ don*) whereas others are definitive in sense (*nītārtha* = *ṅes don*). For these authorities as well as for the modern scholar the question of course remains as to which calculation is in fact to be regarded as provisional and which is on the contrary definitive, but on this point many of our sources were themselves unable to arrive at a final conclusion. Bechert (III, 6) has described as 'speculations' the Tibetan reckonings which place the Nirvāṇa at widely separated dates; actually, in most such cases, it would probably be correct to speak of (attempted) calculations, most of which were in fact based on Indian written sources or on traditions of Indian or Ceylonese origin introduced to Tibet by either Indian (e.g. Dīpaṃkara-śrījñāna Atiśa and Śākyaśrībhadra) or Tibetan masters. On this matter of dating, accordingly, some Buddhist sources, recognizing the existence of a sort of *non liquet* because of the existence of diverging, and evidently irreconcilable, written and oral traditions, have been compelled to adopt a virtually agnostic position. And this attitude of theirs has been regarded as just another symptom of a disregard for history and time attributed to Indians and Buddhists. Yet, for Buddhists, time has not always been a matter of complete indifference. The chronological succession of 'Patriarchs' has been calculated in relation to the Nirvāṇa, as has been the future duration of the Buddha's Teaching or Dispensation (*śāsana*). On it can also depend the reckoning of the precise time of a monk's ordination, which in turn determines his seniority in the Order or Saṃgha. (In Tibet, the function of time-keeper, or *dus sgo ba*, has been an important one at the time of monastic ordination. And there of course exist countless Tibetan chronicles and dated histories of the Dharma.) It cannot, therefore, be accurately said that time and dating have been of no significance in Buddhism. While clearly not a matter of mere antiquarian curiosity for the Buddhist, it possesses a very considerable historiographical importance for the Buddhist traditions. And at least some traditions of Buddhism have been keenly aware of the divergences between various literary and oral sources, and of the impact of these discrepancies on the history of Buddhism and on its eschatology.

Most of the above-mentioned points have been addressed in some detail or at least touched upon in the publication under review. In its three volumes, in addition to Bechert's introduction to each volume, there are more than 50 contributions by almost as many authors, only a few of whom have contributed more than one article. It is impossible to summarize or even list all these contributions in the space available for a review. As enumerated in Parts I and II, the areas investigated are: I. 'History of research'; II. 'The date of the Buddha in the context of Indian cultural history'; III. 'The chronology of the Buddha: the Indian tradition evaluated'; IV. 'The spread of the Theravāda chronology and its implication'; V. 'Traditions of late Indian and Tibetan Buddhism'; VI. 'Central Asian traditions'; VII. 'East Asian traditions'; and VIII. 'The Axial Age theory and the dates of the Buddha/Comparative studies'. Between these sections there is inevitably some overlap, and the assignment of an article to one section rather than another had sometimes to be determined by considerations of convenience. In Parts II and III there are in addition reprints of many 'Documents concerning the history of research' going as far back as parts of Burnouf and Lassen's *Essai sur le pali* of 1826 and Westergaard's *Über Buddha's Todesjahr* of 1862. Beside several further articles, Part III also contains Bechert's very useful 'Selected bibliography of secondary literature concerning the dates of the historical Buddha and Buddhist chronologies up to 1995', as well as nine pages of Addenda and Corrigenda to Parts I and II.

Many articles are naturally concerned with chronology and history in the strictest sense. But, as already mentioned, a number of others deal with the chronographical and historiographical treatment of the issues in relevant sources of Indian (Buddhist and also non-Buddhist such as the Purāṇas), East Asian (Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean and Japanese) and Central Asian (Tocharian, Uigur, Iranian, Tibetan, and Mongolian) origin. Other articles relate to modern studies on the dating of the Buddha in Western, Indian and East Asian scholarship. Still further topics investigated are the glottochronological rate of linguistic development (Haebler and v. Hinüber), developments in earlier Indian cultural history that might have a bearing on the time of the Buddha (Kulke, v. Simson) and the likely time-frame within which certain relevant philosophical developments may be supposed to have taken place in the period between the Buddha and Aśoka (Schmithausen). Matters connected with Indian archaeology (Härtel) and with the world-historical perspective ('Weltgeschichte' and the 'Axial Age') have not been neglected (Eisenstadt, Wenskus). Nor have non-Buddhist sources such as the Greek (Halbfass) and the Iranian—Zoroastrian and Manichaean—materials (Sundermann) been forgotten. The topics and issues thus treated in such a comprehensive publication are necessarily very numerous, and inevitably they are also heterogeneous. Rather than some simple (and hence more or less simplified or simplistic) picture being placed before the reader, the subject is thus revealed in its full historical, archaeological and historiographical complexity and implications.

From the investigations and analyses in these volumes it appears that much of the evidence, literary and also archaeological, favours a dating of the Nirvāṇa revised downwards to a range between the last two decades of the fifth century and the first half of the fourth century before the common era. As for the considerable body of remaining evidence that is more or less inconclusive, very much of it is not incompatible with—or at least yields no decisive argument against—this revised dating. A compatible dating of the Nirvāṇa to *c.* 404 (or, taking account of a margin of error, to a range between 422 and 399: II, 244, n. 26) has been arrived at by a different route by R. Gombrich in his article on the *Dīpavaṃsa*, a text belonging to the Theravada tradition which has usually been thought to represent exclusively the (uncorrected) Long Chronology. Already in the 1870s, T. W. Rhys Davids had indeed published, also on the basis of the *Dīpavaṃsa*, an almost identical dating of between 423 and 400 (a dating which he seems, however, to have later given up). The coverage in this publication of the Indian Mahāyānist sources is more piecemeal than systematic (and the *Mahāmeghasūtra*'s curious figure of 120 years, alluded to at I, 294 and II, 290, has, for instance, been merely registered in III, 50 in a list of data relating to the Buddha's lifetime to be found in the Chinese Buddhist canon). A separate article is, however, devoted to the Indian Vajrayāna. From the admittedly almost unsurveyably vast literature of the Mahāyāna, Bechert's summaries deal with selected datings (all of which are not automatically late Indian just because they are located in Mahāyānist sources). The uneven coverage accorded to chronologies found in the Mahāyānist sources is no doubt attributable, at least in part, to the fact that (as far as could be discerned) their testimony did not seem to advance the study of the precise dating of the Buddha. None the less these chronologies are of not negligible interest for Buddhist chronography and historiography, and in the future they are likely to call for further study from this standpoint (on some East Asian traditions see recently H. Durt, *Problems of chronology and eschatology*, Kyōto, 1994).

In sum, on the balance of the literary, archaeological, epigraphical and cultural-historical evidence at present available, the dating of the historical Buddha's Nirvāṇa in a time-frame between 420 and 350 B.C. emerges as most likely (even if it cannot yet be definitively pronounced to be beyond all possible doubt). A more precise dating to a particular year or even decade remains impossible. A. Bareau, previously an advocate of the Corrected Long Chronology, now rejects both Long Chronologies because he deems them incompatible with the archaeological evidence (I, 219) and suggests 400 for the Nirvāṇa, giving *c.* 380 as its lowest date. Bechert (III, 13) considers most likely a dating in the first half of the fourth century. From among the dates of the Nirvāṇa known from Buddhist traditions, this conclusion is of course closer (though not identical) to the Buddhists' own Short Chronology based on the passage of a century before the consecration as king of Aśoka. The Corrected Long Chronology of *c.* 480 as well as the Uncorrected Long Chronology of 544/543 are on the contrary considerably more distant from the revised dating span emerging from the present publication. Only two contributors to these volumes—G. Yamazaki and A. K. Narain—seem in fact still to adhere to the earlier dating of the Buddha according to the Corrected Long Chronology. In his treatment of Purāṇic chronologies, H. von Stietencron points out convergences between their datings and those of the Corrected as well as the Uncorrected Long Chronologies; but in his final summary (III, 9–12) Bechert indicates how inconclusive these coincidences are. In India, and also in some countries of South and South-East Asia that follow the Theravāda tradition, several (but not all) scholars continue to maintain the Uncorrected Long Chronology, and in India the *Buddhajayantī* was of course celebrated in 1956 to commemorate the 2500th anniversary of the Nirvāṇa. In the volumes under review, however, there is to be found no advocate of this early dating. At the other extreme, Eggermont argues for placing the Nirvāṇa as late as 261 B.C. (I, p. 245, and for placing the Mahāvīra's Kevala in 267 and his death in 252: I, p. 151).

With regard to the use of archaeological evidence, it is perhaps not always perfectly clear just how it is to be correlated with the testimony of the texts; for the *mise en scène*, narrative frame and material 'furniture' of texts referring, for instance, to towns and a developing urban culture (and even to individual kings, etc.) might belong not to the time of the Buddha himself but, rather, to a later period when the relevant texts were being redacted. Concerning the history of ideas, in future it will be necessary for Indologists once again to investigate the question of the extent to which some Upaniṣads show familiarity with Buddhism and, in particular, to address the still vexed problem as to whether the earlier canonical sources of Buddhism demonstrate a knowledge of specific Upaniṣadic doctrines. In 1968, in a study whose arguments have been passed over in silence even in much more recent discussions of the matter, P. Horsch answered the latter question in the negative (see his 'Buddhismus und Upaniṣaden', in: *Pratidānam* [F. B. J. Kuiper Felicitation Volume, The Hague, 1968], pp. 462–77).

These volumes have been clearly, accurately and beautifully printed. And it is good to see that, in Bechert's summing up in Part III, the practice of italicizing the titles of sources has now been adopted. To the detriment of readability and ready reference, however, none of the other articles in this publication has appeared with this very useful typographical device so convenient for the reader's eye. An *index locorum* covers the Pali works cited, and there is a conspectus of Mahāyānist sources in the Chinese canon. But works in Sanskrit, Tibetan, etc., are not similarly served. And there is no way of readily retrieving the vast amount of information contained in these three volumes since there is no general or analytical index. Although the third volume is presented in its preface as completing the work, it may perhaps in the future still be possible to publish such an index which is much needed in order for these large volumes to serve their purpose fully and conveniently.

William Glen, Mitchell, and Robert Ross are prominent, and at some points coincides verbatim with the text of Brown's account, probably from a use of common sources. The letter also contains *documents*, including the text (or English version) of Prince Gol'itsin's reply authorizing the conversion, and a literal English translation of Mohammed Ali's letter to the Qāḍī of Khiva, which exactly follows the conventional form of an Arabic epistle (see appendix, above). This evidently exact English translation suggests that William Glen may have been the compiler of the narrative.

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139/14

PRAMĀṆABHŪTA, **PRAMĀṆA(BHŪTA)-PURUṢA*, *PRATYAKṢADHARMAN* AND *SĀKṢĀTKṚTADHARMAN* AS EPITHETS OF THE *ṚṢI*, *ĀCĀRYA* AND *TATHĀGATA* IN GRAMMATICAL, EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND MADHYAMAKA TEXTS

By D. Seyfort Ruegg BSOAS Vol 57 1994

1. The expression *pramāṇabhūta* is attested in a number of Indian grammatical and philosophical texts, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, its existence in texts no longer accessible in Sanskrit being inferable from their translations in Tibetan where we find its standard equivalent *tshad mar gyur pa*. But the grammatical correctness and the interpretation of the term have given rise to a good deal of discussion and exegesis. Some commentators have taken up the grammatical question as to why we have the form *pramāṇabhūta* rather than the at first sight perhaps more normal form *pramāṇībhūta*.[1] And in the Buddhist Pramāṇa-school a problem arises as to the precise meaning of the expression *pramāṇabhūta* employed as an epithet of a person. For by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti *pramāṇa* has been exhaustively divided into *pratyakṣa* '(direct) perceptual knowledge' and *anumāna* 'inferential knowledge',[2] so that in the usage of their school at least a person (*puruṣa, pudgala*)—as opposed to knowledge or a cognition (*jñāna* = *śes pa*, or *dhī*/*buddhi* = *blo*)—would not strictly speaking be considered in the first instance as a *pramāṇa*.[3]

We can thus observe how a question of language discussed by grammarians becomes linked in an interesting way with problems of both epistemology and philosophical and religious semantics.

2. In Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* (seventh century) vi.2, we find the expression *tshad mar gyur pa* = *pramāṇabhūta* used to modify *skyes bu* = *puruṣa* in the sentence *bstan bcos tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bus byas śiṅ luṅ phyin ci ma log par 'chad pa mthoṅ ba las luṅ gi dgoṅs pa ṅes pas* …

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[1] Pāṇini, V.iv.50: *kṛ-bhv-asti-yoge sampadyakartari cviḥ*. In his *La grammaire de Pāṇini* (Paris, 1966), L. Renou translated the *Kāśikā* version of this Sūtra, which prefixes to it the word *abhūtatadbhāve* 'becoming that which did not exist' (see Kātyāyana's *vārttika* 1), by: 'Le suffixe secondaire invariant "*cvi*" (= *v* avec ton sur la finale; amui par VI.1,67) est valable (après un mot indéterminé) pour signifier: le fait de devenir quelque chose qui n'était pas, (le nouvel état) obtenu étant celui de l'agent, quand il y a jonction (subséquente) avec les racines *kṛ*- "faire" *ḍukṛñ* VIII.10, *bhū*- 'devenir" *bhū* I.1 et *as*- "être" *ásá* II.56.'

See also *Cāndravyākaraṇa* IV.iv.35: *abhūtatadbhāve kṛ-bhv-astiyoge vikārāc cviḥ//*, with *Vṛtti: avasthāvato 'vasthāntareṇābhūtasya tadātmanā bhāve kṛ-bhv-astibhiḥ sambandhe sati vikāravācinaś cvir bhavati/ … aśuklaḥ śuklo bhavati śuklībhavati/… abhūtatadbhāva iti kim/ ghaṭaṃ karoti, ghaṭaṃ bhavati/ … yat punaḥ prayatnenâpi śuklaṃ na sampadyate tatrâbhūtatadbhāvābhāvād na bhaviṣyati/*

[2] See Dignāga, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* i.2ab: *pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇe*; Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*, Pratyakṣa chapter, *k*. 63 f. (*pramāṇadvitva*). Cf. Dharmakīrti, *Nyāyabindu* i.2–3: *dvividhaṃ samyagjñānam/ pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca/*

These two forms of *pramāṇa* correspond respectively to the *svalakṣaṇa*, the efficient (*arthakriyāsamartha*) and *paramārthasat*, and to the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and *saṃvṛtisat* (*Pramāṇavārttika*, Pratyakṣa chapter, *k*. 3).

[3] In his *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* i.7 concerned with the Bhagavant's being (a means of) correct knowledge (*prāmāṇya*)—i.e. his cognitive 'normality'—, Prajñākaragupta has called attention to the difficulty caused by the fact that, in terms of usage as such, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* have *prāmāṇya*, but not the Bhagavant (ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, 32: *bhagavatas tarhi kathaṃ prāmāṇyam/ pratyakṣānumānayor hi vyavahāramātreṇa prāmāṇyam, na bhagavataḥ/ tad dhi paraṃ pramāṇam/*; P, f. 32b = D, f. 27b reads: *'o na ci ltar bcom ldan 'das tshad ma yin/ mṅon sum daṅ rjes su dpag pa dag ni tha sñad tsam du tshad ma yin gyi/ bcom ldan 'das ni ma yin te/ de ni tshad ma dam pa yin pa'i phyir ro že na*). And in his *Bhāṣya* i.4ab, Prajñākaragupta observed: *dhiya eva prāmāṇyaṃ nânyasya*.

'Through perusing the Śāstra composed by a person who is (like[4]) (a means of) correct knowledge, and which correctly explains scripture (*āgama*), the intention of scripture is ascertained ...'.[5]

Since the intention (*abhiprāya*) of *āgama*, which it is difficult to know, is thus ascertained as a result of looking at a commentarial Śāstra composed by a person (*puruṣa*) described as *pramāṇabhūta*, the author of *āgama* and the composer of an exegetical *śāstra* (such as, according to Jayānanda's commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Nāgārjuna as author of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*) are evidently to be distinguished. And *āgama* (or Sūtra) may be subsumed under *buddhavacana*, whilst a Śāstra is the composition of an *ācārya* who is competent and reliable.[6] In this passage of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*, then, the person referred to as *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu*=**pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa* is not the Buddha, the proclaimer of Sūtra or Āgama, but a reliable commentator and Ācārya (who, as the author of a Śāstra, is also an *auctor* in both senses of this word: authority and author).

Later, in the Buddhist tradition of Tibet, the expression *tshad ma'i skyes bu (*pramāṇa-puruṣa)* is known as the epithet of a teacher of Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290–1364) named bSod nams mgon.[7]

3. With this use of *tshad mar gyur pa*=*pramāṇabhūta* by Candrakīrti to refer to an expert and reliable person who is the author of Śāstra we may compare *pramāṇabhūta* as an epithet used specifically of the Bhagavant or Buddha (=Tathāgata) to be found in the introductory *śloka* of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (early sixth century):

> *pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine/*
> *pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihâikataḥ//*

'Having paid respect to [the Bhagavant] who is (like[4]) a (means of) correct knowledge—the Seeker for the well-being of people [1], the Teacher [2], the Sugata [3] and the Protector [4]—, with the purpose of establishing (the means of) correct knowledge I shall bring together a Compendium [i.e. the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*] from my widely spread doctrine.'[8]

4. This concept of the Buddha as *pramāṇa* was further developed by Dharmakīrti in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* (*k.* 7):

> *tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavān abhūtavinivṛttaye/*
> *bhūtoktiḥ, sādhanāpekṣā tato yuktā pramāṇatā//*
> *(de ldan bcom ldan tshad ma ñid/ /ma skyes pa ni bzlog don du//*
> *gyur pa ñid gsuṅs de yi phyir/ /sgrub byed la ltos tshad yin rigs//)*

'So [in view of what is stated in verses 1–6] the Lord [being] (a means of) correct/efficacious knowledge (*pramāṇa*),[9] the mention of *bhūta* [in Dignāga's use of the epithet *pramāṇa-bhūta*] serves to avert [the wrong supposition of] non-origination; hence, being dependent on the instruments [of realization that the Lord has cultivated, his] quality of being a *pramāṇa* is justified.'[10]

Thus *bhūta* has clearly been interpreted by Dharmakīrti as indicating that the Buddha and his *pramāṇatva* are not unproduced (*abhūta*) and permanent

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[4] For the translation of *bhūta* by 'like' see below.

[5] In his *Ṭīkā* (D, f. 112a), Jayānanda (late 11th to early 12th century) explains the compound **pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa* as follows: ... *tshad mar gyur pa yaṅ yin la/ skyes bu yaṅ yin pas na tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu ste/ 'phags pa klu sgrub žabs la sogs pa'o/ /de rnams kyis byas pa'i bstan bcos te/ dbu ma rtsa ba'i šes rab la sogs pa'o//*

Here *dgoṅs pa* (the Tib. honorific form for *bsam pa*) probably translates Skt. *abhiprāya* (on which cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *JIP*, 13, 1985, 309–25, and 16, 1988, 1–4). And for speaker's *abhiprāya* (=*bsam pa, mṅon par 'dod pa*) in connexion with *śabda* and *śābdajñāna* according to Dharmakīrti, see *Pramāṇavārttika*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 1 and Svārthānumāna chapter, *k.* 213. Tib. *bsam pa* can also translate Skt. *āśaya*.

[6] On *āgama* as a *pramāṇa* according to Candrakīrti, see his *Prasannapadā* i.1 (ed. La Vallée Poussin, 75.7).

[7] See sGra tshad pa Rin chen rnam rgyal, *Bu ston rnam thar*, ff. 6b and 8a (and cf. f. 32b). On the expression *tshad ma'i skyes bu*, see below, § 12.3.

[8] The Sanskrit of this verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is found in Vibhūticandra's notes on Manorathanandin's *Vṛtti* on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, *JBORS*, 26, 1940, 518 (cf. p.108); and the first hemistich is quoted by Prajñākaragupta, *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*, 3, and by Yaśomitra, *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, 7. For Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of this verse in his *Viśālāmalavatī*, see below, § 10. In both Tibetan versions this verse reads:

> *tshad mar gyur pa 'gro la phan par bžed//*
> *ston pa bde gšegs skyob la phyag 'tshal nas//*
> *tshad ma (b)sgrub phyir raṅ gi gžuṅ kun las//*
> *btus te sna tshogs 'thor rnams 'dir gcig bya//*

The epithet *pramāṇabhūta* has been translated as 'who is the personification of the means of cognition' by M. Hattori, *Dignāga, On perception* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 23. M. Nagatomi has rendered it by 'embodiment of *pramāṇa*' and '*pramāṇa* incarnate' in M. Nagatomi *et al.* (ed.), *Sanskrit and Indian studies* [Essays in honour of Daniel H. H. Ingalls], (Dordrecht, 1980), 245. E. Steinkellner then rendered it by 'who has become a means of valid cognition' in his article 'The spiritual place of the epistemological tradition in Buddhism', in *Nanto bukkyô*, 49, 1982, 7. And in his *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika* (Vienna, 1984), T. Vetter has translated it by 'der Erkenntnismittel ist'. Cf. also M. Inami and T. Tillemans, *WZKS*, 30, 1986, 124 f. ('who has become a means of valid cognition'); R. Jackson, *JIP*, 16, 1988, 335 ('who has become authoritative'); E. Franco, *JIP*, 17, 1989, 84; V. van Bijlert, *Epistemology and spiritual authority* (Vienna, 1989), 115 ('who is a means of valid cognition'); H. Krasser, *Dharmottaras kurze Untersuchung der Gültigkeit einer Erkenntnis*, Teil 2 (Vienna, 1991), 29 ('der zum Erkenntnismittel geworden ist') [and now T. Tillemans, *Persons of authority*, Stuttgart, 1993].

On the epithet *tāyin*=*skyob (pa)* and its etymology see below, n. 65. And for the Buddha's function of 'protection' (*tāya*=*skyob pa*), see *PV*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 145 f. and *k.* 280.

[9] For this double translation 'correct/efficacious', see *Pramāṇavārttika*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 1. There *pramāṇa* is defined in terms of being non-disappointing, unfailing (non-defaulting and indefeasible) and congruent (*avisaṃvādin*=*mi [b]slu ba*)—that is, as veridical in relation to a cognition and as non-delusive in relation to an object of cognition. And *avisaṃvādana* is described as being settled in the production of an effect (*arthakriyāsthiti*=*don byed nus par gnas pa*), that is, efficaciousness. See below, n. 56. Dharmakīrti's concept of cognitive correctness is thus linked with the *pragmatic* criterion of cognitive efficaciousness (rather than with the logical or legal, and hence formal, ones of validity). See also *PV*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 4d–5a on *prāmāṇya* existing in virtue of *vyavahāra* or pragmatic transactional usage.

On *avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānam*=*samyagjñāna* as bringing about the attainment of the apprehended object (*gṛhītavastuprāpaṇa*), see Dharmottara's comment on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, ed. E. Steinkellner and H. Krasser, *Dharmottaras Exkurs zur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Vienna, 1989), 24–7 with 74–6, where the link with *arthakriyā* is made explicit; and *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (ed. Malvania, Patna, 1955), 17: *loke ca pūrvam upadarśitam arthaṃ prāpayan saṃvādaka ucyate/ tadvaj jñānam api svayam pradarśitam arthaṃ prāpayat saṃvādakam ucyate.* Cf. Durvekamiśra, *Dharmottarapradīpa* (ed. Malvania), 17: *avisaṃvādakaṃ pravṛttiviṣayavastuprāpakaṃ samyagjñānam.*

The word *(a)visaṃvāda* is found already with Dignāga (*Pramāṇasamuccaya* ii.5: *āptavākyāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā*), and also with Kumārila (*Ślokavārttika*, Codanā° 80: *tasmād dṛḍhaṃ yad utpannam na visaṃvādam [?] ṛcchati/ jñānāntareṇa vijñānam tat pramāṇam pratīyatām//*). And the word *saṃvāda* is cited from Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (see E. Frauwallner, *WZKSO*, 6, 1962, 85–6; cf. Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2853).

In recent works *avisaṃvādin* has frequently been rendered as 'reliable' or 'trustworthy' (cf. V. van Bijlert, op. cit., 174, n. 12). But in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2958 we read *vastusaṃvādaḥ prāmāṇyam abhidhīyate* 'congruence with a real is termed *prāmāṇya*'; here the translation 'trustworthy' would hardly seem to be appropriate.

[10] cf. recently V. van Bijlert, *Epistemology and spiritual authority*, 157 ff. (who on pp. 119–20 translates *pramāṇabhūta* by 'who has become a means of valid knowledge'). In *WZKS*, 33, 1989, 180–1, E. Steinkellner has suggested distinguishing between 'who is a *pramāṇa*' (in Dignāga) and 'who has become a *pramāṇa*' (in Dharmakīrti), rendering *pramāṇa* by 'authority'.

The instruments of realization (*sādhana, upāya*) in question in *Pramāṇavārttika* ii.7c that establish the Buddha as *pramāṇa* are cultivating compassion (*karuṇābhyāsa*) and engaging in teaching (*śāstṛtva*). See *PV*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 34–131ab and 131cd–139ab with 145–6; also Prajñākaragupta, *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*, i.34 (p. 53); and Manorathanandin ad *PV*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 36, and *k.* 284 (*jagaddhitaiṣitvasya sugatatvaśāstṛtvatāyitvasahitasya prāmāṇyam āha—yato dayayā jagaddhitaiṣitvena śreya ācaṣṭe...*).—Compare Dignāga's comment on *Pramāṇasamuccaya* i.1 concerning the Buddha's *hetusampad*, viz. *āśaya*=*jagaddhitaiṣitā* (cf. *PV* ii.34–131ab) and *prayoga*=*(jagacchāsanāc) chāstṛtvam* (cf. *PV* ii.131cd–139ab). (A comparable idea is to be found in different form already in the treatment of *āptaprāmāṇya* in Pakṣilasvāmin's *Nyāyabhāṣya*, II.i.68.) See below, § 6.1 and § 17.

(*nitya*), in the manner of God (*Īśvara*) according to the theists or of the Veda according to the Mīmāṃsakas, etc.[11] In his *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* Prajñākaragupta has, however, offered 'proclaiming the real' (by the Omniscient One, *sarvajña*) as an alternative interpretation of *bhūtokti*; and *abhūtavinivṛtti* is then understood in the sense of 'excluding the unreal', i.e. error (*bhrānti*). Prajñākaragupta has moreover employed the expression *pramāṇabhāva* in his *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* i.283cd–284ab (ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, 165); and this usage where °*bhāva* replaces °*bhūta* would seem to preclude the interpretation that °*bhūta* expresses likeness (*sādṛśya*). *Pramāṇa* has been described as the supreme quality of the Bhagavant by Prajñākaragupta (*pramāṇam eva bhagavato guṇaḥ paramaḥ*, 166).

For the Buddhist Pramāṇa-school the question thus arises as to how exactly the Bhagavant or Buddha is to be regarded as a *pramāṇa* in view of the fact that according to both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti *pramāṇa* is exhaustively subdivided into *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* only.[12]

5. The term *pramāṇabhūta* referring to the Bhagavant is further attested, in parallel with *paramasākṣībhūta* 'being a direct witness/realizer to the highest degree', in the *Lalitavistara*, ch. xxi (ed. Lefmann, 319.9): *yathā tvayâbhihitam vayam atra pratyakṣāḥ/ api tu bhagavaṃs tvam eva sadevakasya lokasya paramasākṣībhūtaḥ pramāṇabhūtaś ca/* Here *pramāṇa* may have the meaning of 'measure, standard, norm' or of '(immediate and trustworthy) knowledge, ascertainment'.[13]

In the *Lalitavistara* (ch. xxvi, 418) *prajñāvimukti* is directly realized (*sākṣātkṛta*). Elsewhere (e.g. ch. xvi, 239) the word *sākṣātkṛta* is employed beside its semi-synonym *adhigata*, the object of this direct perception and understanding being *dharma*.

The term *pramāṇabhūta* is found in addition in the commentary (ascribed to Vasubandhu or Asaṅga) on *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* xviii. 31 dealing with the four recourses (*pratisaraṇa*). There we read: *prāmāṇiko 'rtho yaḥ pramāṇabhūtena nīto vibhaktaḥ śāstrā vā tatpramāṇīkṛtena vā* 'the normal (true and reliable, *prāmāṇika* = *tshad ma daṅ ldan pa*) sense 'elicited' (*nīta* = *ṅes pa*), i.e. explicated (*vibhakta* = *rnam par phye ba*), either by the teacher who is (like?) a means of right knowledge (*tshad mar gyur pa*) or by one whom he has made a standard (means of right knowledge *pramāṇīkṛta* = *tshad mar mdzad pa*).' According to Sthiramati's commentary (available in Tibetan translation, D, Sems tsam Section, f. 95b–96a), the teacher who is *pramāṇabhūta* is of course the Buddha Bhagavant, indirectly alluded to as Ṛṣi in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (xviii. 31a) where his saintly teaching is described as the *ārṣa deśanādharma* (as distinct from *adhigamadharma*). The sense (*artha*) of this teaching may be either *ābhiprāyika* 'intentional'—that is, provisional and to be 'elicited' (*neyārtha*) in another, final, sense, rather than of definitive sense (*nītārtha*)—or *prāmāṇika*. As for the teacher who is *pramāṇīkṛta (tshad mar byas pa, tshad mar gžag pa)* by the Buddha Bhagavant, he is according to Sthiramati either a Bodhisattva or a great Śrāvaka or a person whom the Tathāgata has foretold in a prophecy (*luṅ bstan pa* = *vyākṛta*) as a teacher, such as Nāgārjuna.[14]

6.1. With the epithet *sākṣībhūta* used of the Bhagavant in the *Lalitavistara* we may compare the the concept of a person who is *sākṣātkṛtadharman* 'having directly witnessed/perceived *dharma*(s)' in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (I.i.7), and the expression *sākṣātkṛtadharmatā* in the same text (II.i.68) which describes a quality of competent and reliable experts, the *āptas*. The quality of directly perceiving *dharma*(s) (*sākṣātkṛtadharmatā*) there defines—along with compassion for beings (*bhūtadayā*) and the wish to make things known exactly as they are (*yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣā*)—the *prāmāṇya* 'quality of being *pramāṇa*' (the cognitive 'normality', i.e. reliability/trustworthiness/authoritativeness) of the *āptas*. These *āptas* then show compassion for beings by teaching them what is to be eliminated (*hātavya*), the cause of this elimination (*hānihetu*), what is to be comprehended (*adhigantavya*), and the cause of this comprehension (*adhigamahetu*).[15]

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[11] See Manorathanandin: *bhūtaśabdanirdeśo 'bhūtasya nityasya nivṛttyartham/ 'nityaṃ pramāṇaṃ nâsti' [Pramāṇavārttika* ii.8a]/... *kasmāt punar nityaṃ pramāṇaṃ nâsti/ āha: vastuno 'rthakriyākāriṇaḥ sato 'gateḥ' [PV* ii.8b] *jñānasya prāmāṇyān nâsti nityaṃ pramāṇam/ atrâiva kāraṇam āha: 'jñeyasya' vastuno 'rthakriyākāritvenânityatvāt 'tasyā vastusadgater' api tajjanyāyā 'adhrauvyād' [PV* ii.8cd] *anityatvāt/* See also Jinendrabuddhi, *Viśālāmalavatī*, P, f. 2b (the corresponding Sanskrit fragment was discussed by E. Steinkellner, 'Some Sanskrit fragments of Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī*', in *A corpus of Indian studies* [Essays in honour of Professor Gaurinath Sastri, Calcutta, 1980], 100) quoted below, n. 39.

In his *sTon pa tshad ma'i skyes bur sgrub pa'i gtam*, f. 8b, A lag ša Ṅag dbaṅ bstan dar (b. 1759) has also referred to this interpretation according to which °*bhūta* excludes the idea of a permanent and spontaneously existing *pramāṇa*, and he mentions an interesting difficulty that it entails.

[12] cf. Prajñākaragupta, *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* i.7, quoted above in n. 3.

[13] F. Edgerton, *BHSD*, listed the meanings 'authority, evidence'; and M. Hattori gave 'authoritative' or 'standard' (op. cit., 74).—T. Burrow, 'Sanskrit *MĀ*- "to ascertain"', *TPS*, 1980, 135–40, has however distinguished between the roots *mā*- 'measure' and *mā*- 'ascertain', etc.

As for *sākṣībhūta*, in his *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka* ii (ed. Wogihara, 207), Haribhadra following Candragomin has explained it as equivalent to *sākṣin*.

[14] The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* is generally attributed in the Tibetan tradition to Vasubandhu, but Ārya-Vimuktisena has ascribed what appears to be a passage from this work (xii.9) to Asaṅga in his *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti* (ed. C. Pensa, Rome, 1967), 113–15.

Attention may be drawn to the distinction clearly made here in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* between the form *pramāṇa-bhūta* as an epithet describing the very nature of the Buddha Bhagavant and the *cvi*-formation *pramāṇī-kṛta*, an epithet applicable to masters made standards and means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) by the Bhagavant (e.g. in a *vyākaraṇa*). This morphological difference is discussed below.

As the source for the doctrine of the *ābhiprāyika* and the *nītārtha/neyārtha* in the context of the four *pratisaraṇas*, Sthiramati (f. 96a–b) refers to the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* (cited in part by Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, ed. La Vallée Poussin, 43). Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Purport, implicature and presupposition: Sanskrit *abhiprāya* and Tibetan *dgoṅs pa/dgoṅs gži* as hermeneutical concepts', *JIP*, 13, 1985, 309–25; and 'Allusiveness and obliqueness in Buddhist texts', in: C. Caillat (ed.), *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes* (Paris, 1989), 295–328.

[15] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, II.i.68. In *NBh* I.i.7 it is explained that the *āpta*, who is *sākṣātkṛtadharman*, then becomes an *upadeṣṭṛ* in virtue of his wish to expound. And expertness is there defined in terms of direct perception (*sākṣātkaraṇam arthasyâptiḥ, tayā pravartata ity āptaḥ*).

The *bahuvrīhi* compound *sākṣātkṛtadharman* could also be rendered by 'having direct perception for [their] nature/quality', an interpretation that would fit very well the contexts discussed in this article in which this expression and the expression *pratyakṣadharman* have been used. However, Indian commentators seem to have actually understood *dharma(n)* as the object of the direct perception in question. See e.g. Uddyotakara, *Nyāyavārttika*, II.i.68: '*sākṣātkṛtadharmatā' yaṃ te padārtham upadiśanti sa taiḥ sākṣātkṛto bhavatîti*; and Vācaspatimiśra, *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, I.i.7: *sudṛḍhena pramāṇenâvadhāritāḥ sākṣātkṛtā dharmāḥ padārthāḥ* (and the same commentary on II.i.68: *pratyakṣīkṛtaheyopādeyatā*). See also below, n. 17 (on *sākṣātkṛtadharman* in the *Nirukta*) and n. 19 (on *pratyakṣadharman*). Compare e.g. the expression *sākṣātkṛtatattva* 'having directly peceived reality' in Manorathanandin's *Vṛtti* on *PV*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k*. 147 (p. 54).

The parallelism of the set of four factors constituted by *hātavya*, etc. in *NBh*, II.i.68—in other words the four *arthapadas* of *NBh*, I.i.1 (*heya, nirvartaka, hānam ātyantikam* and *upāya*)—with the four factors enumerated in the *Yogasūtra* (ii.15 f.)—*heya* = *duḥkha/saṃsāra, heyahetu* = *pradhānapuruṣayor saṃyogaḥ, hāna* = *kaivalya/saṃyogasyâtyantikī nivṛttiḥ*, and *hānopāya* = *vivekakhyātir aviplavā/ samyagdarśana*—and with the four 'principles of the Nobles' (*āryasatya*) in Buddhism beginning with *duḥkha* is to be noted. (Cf. A. Wezler, 'On the quadruple division of the Yogaśāstra, the Caturvyūhatva of the Cikitsāśāstra and the "Four Noble Truths" of the Buddha', *IT*, 12, 1984, 289–337, who seeks to demonstrate that the four-fold division in question originated with the Buddha and then passed on the one side to the medical Śāstra and on the other to the Yoga system whence it was adopted by the Nyāya.)

On *āptopadeśa*, see G. Oberhammer, 'Die Überlieferungsautorität im Hinduismus', in his *Offenbarung, geistige Realität des Menschen* (Vienna, 1974), 49 f. (Oberhammer, 50, has rendered *sākṣātkṛtadharmatā* by 'das den Dharma direkt Erkannthaben', explaining his interpretation—

In *Nyāyabhāṣya* II.i.68. both the *āptas* and their reliable instruction (*āptopadeśa*) are described as being *pramāṇa*.[15] And the latter's prāmāṇya 'quality of being *pramāṇa*' results from the *prāmāṇya* of the former (*āptaprāmāṇyāc ca prāmāṇyam*), which in turn results from the *āptas' sākṣātkṛtadharmatā, bhūtadayā* and *yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣā*.

6.2. An earlier attestation of *sākṣātkṛtadharman* is found in Yāska's *Nirukta* (i.20): *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ/ te 'varebhyo 'sākṣātkṛtadharmabhya upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ/* 'There were seers who directly perceived *dharma*(s). By [their] instruction they transmitted the [Vedic] *mantras* to the later ones, who did not directly perceive *dharma*(s).'[17]

6.3. The expression *sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayaḥ* is also found in Act 7 of the *Uttararāmacarita* by Bhavabhūti (eighth century). There the expression figures near references to the seer's eye (*ārṣa cakṣus*) and to *bhūtārthavādin* 'speaking true things/truth' used as an epithet of the Ṛṣi Prācetasa (Vālmīki).[18]

7. An old equivalent of *sākṣātkṛtadharman* is the expression *pratyakṣadharman* 'having direct perception of *dharma*(s)'.[19] This term is used as an epithet of certain Ṛṣis who are characterized as *yarvāṇas* and *tarvāṇas* and are described as 'knowing the higher and the lower',[20] 'cognizant of what has to be cognized'[21] and 'having comprehended things exactly as they are (i.e. reality)'.[22] This description of the sage, which is a sort of echo of the *Nirukta* passage quoted above (§ 6.2), is found in a passage of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (Paspaśāhnika, ed. Kielhorn, I, 11): *yarvāṇas tarvāṇo nāmarṣayo babhūvuḥ pratyakṣadharmāṇaḥ parāparajñā viditaveditavyā adhigatayāthātathyāḥ*.[23]

8.1. Now the expression *pramāṇabhūta* is not confined to Buddhist texts exclusively, its first attestation in Sanskrit being apparently in the *Mahābhāṣya* (on Pāṇini, I.i.1, *vārttika* 7).[24] There it modifies the word *ācārya* and may mean either 'having attained the quality of being a means of correct knowledge (*prāmāṇyam prāptaḥ*)' or, perhaps, 'like a means of correct knowledge' (i.e. reliable/trustworthy and, eventually, authoritative).[25]

This use of the term to refer to an *ācārya* is comparable with Candrakīrti's usage in the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* cited above.

8.2. In the sole manuscript available of Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* used for the existing editions,[26] the passage corresponding to the part of the *Mahābhāṣya* containing the word *pramāṇabhūta* is unfortunately missing, and we do not therefore know for certain how Bhartṛhari (fifth [?] century) might have explained this epithet. In view of the fact that Dignāga has elsewhere used Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*,[27] the latter's explanation of *pramāṇabhūta* would have been of particular interest in the present context.

In his preserved explanation of the term *sāmānyabhūta* in the Paspaśāhnika of the *Mahābhāṣya* (ed. Kielhorn, I, 1.9), however, Bhartṛhari has explicitly stated that the element °*bhūta* expresses likeness;[28] and in his *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa* Kaiyaṭa (eleventh century) has followed Bhartṛhari on this point. This use *upamārthe* of °*bhūta* to express likeness or similarity could, then, have been familiar to Dignāga, and the question must arise whether such

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'Dharma als Gegenstand der autoritativen Überlieferung'—in his n. 29.) Cf. G. Chemparathy, *L'autorité des Veda selon le Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika* (Louvain, 1983), 19ff.

[16] It is to be observed that according to Uddyotakara, *Nyāyavārttika*, I.i.7 (p. 174.6), the compound *āptopadeśa* is interpretable as a *karmadhāraya (āptaś câsāv upadeśaś ca* 'instruction that is reliable'), not as a *tatpuruṣa (āptasyôpadeśaḥ* 'instruction of a reliable person') according to some (i.e. the Mīmāṃsaka, who maintains the impersonality, *apauruṣeyatva*, of the Veda).

[17] See also the commentary by Skanda/Maheśvara (ed. L. Sarup, *Fragments of the commentaries of Skandasvāmin and Maheśvara* [ch. i], Lahore, 1928), 114.

Concerning the interpretation of the *bahuvrīhi* compound *sākṣātkṛtadharman*, Durga remarks *sākṣātkṛto yair dharmaḥ sākṣād dṛṣṭaḥ prativiśiṣṭena tapasā ta ime sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ*, thus taking *dharma(n)* as the direct object of direct perception (cf. n. 15 above).—In his *Jâska's Nirukta* (Göttingen, 1852), p. xiii, R. Roth paraphrased this passage by the words 'Die Weisen der Vorzeit, welche um Recht [*dharma*] zu tun selbst keiner Anweisung bedurft hatten'. PW lists *sākṣātkṛtadharman* on p. 892b but does not translate it; Monier Williams in his Dictionary gives 'one who has an intuitive perception of duty'. And in his translation of the *Nirukta (The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta*, 20), L. Sarup rendered the compound *sākṣātkṛtadharman* by 'had direct intuitive insight into duty'. But it is not established that *dharma(n)* here has the meaning of duty or virtue (cf. n. 15 above).

[18] On *bhūtavādin* as an epithet of the *tathāgata*, see below, § 13.

[19] Or: 'whose nature is direct perception'? Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, ed. Bronkhorst (Pune, 1987), 31, reads: *ye 'pratyakṣadharmāṇaḥ' <a?> lokadharmā ye parokṣā lokasya te pratyakṣās teṣām*. But Abhyankar and Limaye in their edition (Pune, 1970), 38 read: *dharmā ye parokṣā lokasya te pratyakṣās teṣām*. According to Kaiyaṭa's *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa*, the mode of knowledge in which 'all' is known by these Ṛsis is direct perception born of Yoga ('*pratyakṣadharmāṇa' iti, yogajapratyakṣeṇa sarvam viditavantaḥ*). (But this commentator's gloss does not make it altogether clear whether he took *dharma(n)* as the object of direct perception, or whether *pratyakṣa* is to be understood as the nature or quality (*dharman*-) of those who 'know all' in virtue of possessing such direct and immediate knowledge.)—Monier Williams gave 'keeping in view the merits (of men)', but this hardly fits the context.

[20] Kaiyaṭa explains this as *vidyāvidyāvibhāgajñāḥ*. K. C. Chatterji, *Patanjali's Mahabhashya* (Calcutta, 1964), 92, suggests emending *parāparajñāḥ* to *parāvarajñāḥ*.

[21] When explaining this epithet in his *Pradīpoddyota*, Nāgeśa speaks of the three stages of *śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana*.

[22] Nāgeśa explains *adhigata* in terms of *sākṣātkāra*.

[23] The words *yarvāṇas* and *tarvāṇas* are stated by Patañjali to derive by mispronunciation from *yad* and *tad*. On the derivation from *yadvānas* and *tadvānas*, see J. Wackernagel, *Altindische Grammatik*, I, § 189c) β) (p. 212); and M. Bloomfield and F. Edgerton, *Vedic variants*, II (Philadelphia, 1932), § 272a (p. 142). And on this passage of Patañjali, see K. C. Chatterji, *Patanjali's Mahabhashya*, 92 f. A number of attempts at explaining the two words have been reviewed by K. Kunjunni Raja, *ABORI*, 68, 1987, 537–9.

[24] Ed. F. Kielhorn, I, 39.10: *pramāṇabhūta ācāryo darbhapavitrapāṇiḥ śucāv avakāśe prāṅmukha upaviśya mahatā prayatnena sūtrāṇi praṇayati sma*.

[25] For the meaning 'like a *pramāṇa*', see Nāgeśa's comment in his *Pradīpoddyota* on the form *sāmānyabhūta* in the Paspaśāhnika of the *Mahābhāṣya* (ed. Kielhorn, I, 1): *vṛddhisaṃjñāsūtrasthabhāṣyaprayogasya 'pramāṇabhūta' ity asya svayaṃ kariṣyamāṇavyākhyānarītyâsvâpi vyākhyānasambhavāt/ pitṛbhūta ity atrâpi anyatrânyaśabdaprayogaḥ sādṛśyapara iti sādṛśyapratītir, na tv asya sādṛśyavācakatve mānam astîti dik/* As noted at the the beginning of this paper, following Pāṇini, V.iv.50 the form to be expected could be *pramāṇībhūta* rather than *pramāṇabhūta*. But in his *Pradīpoddyota* on *vārttika* 2 to this *sūtra (prakṛtivivakṣāgrahaṇaṃ ca)* Nāgeśa has noted a restriction, explaining that when the meaning of likeness (*sādṛśya*) is conveyed by the compound ending in °*bhūta* the grammatical operation in question does not take effect. *Paribhāṣā* 15 in Nāgeśa's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* specifies moreover that a grammatical operation is realized when a word has its primary meaning, but not when the word has a secondary meaning: *gauṇamukhyayor mukhye kāryasampratyayaḥ*. A form quoted in this context is *mahadbhūtaś* [instead of **mahābhūtaś*] *candramāḥ* 'the moon become as it were great'. (For this last reference I am indebted to J. Bronkhorst.) On further commentarial discussions, see below § 8.3.

Following many commentators who understand the expression *pramāṇabhūta* as meaning *prāmāṇyam prāptaḥ* (see below, § 7.3), P.-S. Filliozat has translated by 'le Maître qui possède l'autorité' in his *Le Mahābhāṣya de Patañjali*, Part I (Pondichéry, 1975), 376; but in Part V (Pondichéry, 1986), p. vii, he has adopted the meaning 'qui est devenu, est transformé en' for *bhūta*. Earlier, in *L'Inde classique*, I (Paris, 1949) 96, L. Renou had rendered Patañjali's expression by 'le maître-fait-norme'.

The term *pramāṇabhūta* is found also in an old commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikās*, the *Yuktidīpikā* (*c.* 600?) 4, where we read (ed. Pandeya, 31): *āptavacanaṃ tu pramāṇabhūtadvārako 'tyantaparokṣe 'rthe niścayaḥ*. See also Pārthasārathimiśra's *Nyāyaratnākara* on *Ślokavārttika*, Codanāsūtra 64, on the *pramāṇabhūtapauruṣeyavaças*.

[26] See lastly *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari*, Āhnika 3, ed. G. B. Palsule, Pune, 1985.

[27] On the dependence of Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīkṣā* on part of the Sambandhasamuddeśa of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya (Trikāṇḍī)*, see E. Frauwallner, *WZKSO*, 3, 1959, 145–52. For Bhartṛhari's influence on Dignāga in general, including in grammatical matters, see M. Hattori, 'The Sautrāntika background of the *apoha* theory', in: *Buddhist thought and Asian civilization: Essays in honor of Herbert V. Guenther* (Emeryville, 1977), 47–58, and '*Apoha* and *pratibhā*', in M. Nagatomi *et al.* (ed.), *Sanskrit and Indian studies*, 61–73; and R. Hayes, 'Jinendrabuddhi', *JAOS*, 103, 1983, 714; *Dignāga on the interpretation of signs* (Dordrecht, 1988) (on pp. 30 f. Hayes discusses R. Herzberger's *Bhartrhari and the Buddhists*, Dordrecht, 1986).

[28] *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* on the Paspaśāhnika, ed. J. Bronkhorst (Pune, 1987), 3: '*sāmānyabhūtam' iti/ bhūtaśabda upamāvācī/ tatra yeṣām arthāntarabhūtā jātiḥ teṣāṃ viśiṣṭeṣu goपिṇḍeṣv anuvartamānam gotvam teṣām sāmānyam, nâśvādīnām sarveṣām iti tadapekṣa upamāsambandhaḥ/* For a discussion of this difficult passage, see Bronkhorst's note on p. 111 and his translation on p. 43.

was the meaning intended by him when using the epithet *pramāṇabhūta* for the Buddha in the introductory verse of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.[29]

8.3. Now, when commenting on *pramāṇabhūta* in his *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa*, Kaiyaṭa has provided a different explanation, glossing it by *prāmāṇyaṃ prāptaḥ* 'having attained the quality of being a means of correct knowledge ("normality", i.e. reliability/trustworthiness/authoritativeness)'.[30]

In his *Pradīpoddyota* Nāgeśa (*c.* 1700) then discussed the correctness of using the form *pramāṇabhūta* rather than the *cvi*-formation *pramāṇībhūta*, which would, however, have conveyed the meaning—not intended in this passage of the *Mahābhāṣya*—of having become something a person (here the *ācārya*) had not previously been.[31]

In his *Mahābhāṣyasiddhāntaratnaprakāśa*, Śivarāmendra Sarasvatī also understood °*bhūta* to mean *prāpta*. But he has addressed an objector's question as to how an *ācārya*—who is of course a *pramātṛ* 'cognizer'—could be said to be *pramāṇabhūta* since only a means of correct knowledge—viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*—is in fact a *pramāṇa*.[32] Śivarāmendra replies that just as a *pramāṇa* brings about the attainment of an object (*arthagrāhaka*) without a second *pramāṇa* being required for this purpose, just so, independently of the *pramāṇas* of *pratyakṣa*, etc., the teacher has directly perceived all correctly formed words through the greatness of his holy exercises, for authoritativeness is present in him too; and for this reason reference was made to *pratyakṣadharman* in the Paspaśāhnika (I, 11, cited above, § 7).[33]

As for the commentator Nārāyaṇa, comparing first the form *pitṛbhūta* 'father-like',[34] he has explained that if the meaning of similarity (*upamānārthatva*) were attached to the epithet *pramāṇabhūta* this would imply that being a means of correct knowledge would not apply in the proper sense (*mukhyaṃ prāmāṇyam*) to the *ācārya*. If, however, it were meant that something not previously present appears, as in the case of the sprouting of a seed, the *cvi*-formation *pramāṇībhūta* would occur (*'aṅkurībhūtaḥ' ityādivad abhūtaprādurbhāvavācitve tadvad eva cviprasaṅgaḥ*).[35] Nor could past time that is no longer actual be denoted here by °*bhūta*, contrary to what holds in the phrase *vasanto bhūtaḥ* 'spring was'; for in this case there would be a loss of the teacher's authoritativeness in the present. So Nārāyaṇa concludes that the sense intended

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[29] Concerning the use *upamārthe* of °*bhūta*, L. Renou tentatively dated it from the time of Kālidāsa in his *Grammaire sanskrite* (Paris, 1961), 113. Renou further noted its use as a copula to express the predicate and, especially 'en bouddhique', its pleonastic use. Cf. J. S. Speijer, *Sanskrit syntax* (Leiden, 1886), 154.

[30] *Pradīpa: prāmāṇyaṃ prāpta ity arthaḥ/ bhū prāptāv ity asyâdhṛṣād vêti ṇijabhāve rūpam/ vṛttiviṣaye ca pramāṇaśabdaḥ prāmāṇye vartate/*

Concerning *pramāṇa* and *āpta-prāmāṇya* 'trustworthiness/authority of the expert/fit', cf. *Nyāyabhāṣya*, II.i.68 with I.i.7 discussed above, § 6.1.

[31] *Pradīpoddyota: nanu bhavater janmārthatvenâbhūtatadbhāvapratītyā cvāu sati pramāṇībhūta iti syāt, tadavivakṣāyāṃ tu pramāṇam ācāryaḥ prakārāntareṇa bhūta ity arthaḥ syād ata āha 'prāmāṇyam' iti/ 'vṛttiviṣaye' iti prakṛtābhiprāyam/*—Compare also the discussions in Rāmacandra Sarasvatī's *Vivaraṇa*, Annambhaṭṭa's *Uddyotana* and Pravartakopādhyāya's *Mahābhāṣyapradīpaprakāśa* (ed. M. S. Narasimhacharya, *Mahābhāṣya-Pradīpa-Vyākhyānāni*, I, Pondichéry, 1973) and in the *Mahābhāṣyapradīpaprakāśa* (ed. M. S. Narasimhacharya, Pondichéry, 1986), 56.

[32] Contrast what was said in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, II.i.68 on the *āptas* as well as the *āptopadeśa* being *pramāṇa* (see above § 6.1).

[33] See the *Mahābhāṣya-Pradīpa-Vyākhyānāni*, ed. M. S. Narasimhacharya, I, 230: ... *yathā pramāṇasya pramāṇāntaranairapekṣyeṇârthagrāhakatvaṃ tathā pratyakṣādipramāṇanairapekṣyeṇa tapomahimnaiva sarvān sādhuśabdān sākṣātkṛtavān iti tasyâpi prāmāṇyasambhavāt/ ata evôktaṃ bhagavatā paspaśāhnike 'pratyakṣadharmāṇa' iti/*—In this publication, p. xiii, Śivarāmendra has been dated to the second half of the seventeenth century by P.-S. Filliozat.

[34] See above, n. 25, for Nāgeśa's comparison of the forms *pramāṇabhūta* and *pitṛbhūta* when commenting in his *Pradīpoddyota* on the word *sāmānyabhūta*.

[35] This is according to Pāṇini's rule V.iv.50.

by Kaiyaṭa is the establishment of *prāmāṇya* consequent on being established as a teacher (*ācāryasiddhyuttarakālā ca prāmāṇyasiddhiḥ*).[36]

9. The meaning 'like' for *bhūta* is attested already in the *Nirukta* (iii.16 *meṣa iti bhūtopamā*, on *ṚS* VIII.ii.40), on which see further the commentaries of Durga (*meṣa ity eṣā bhūtaśabdenôpamā*) and Maheśvara (*'meṣabhūta' meṣa iva*[37]). Moreover, when commenting on the word *sattvabhūta* in *Nirukta* i.1 Maheśvara has explained that °*bhūta* expresses likeness and has compared the compound *pitṛbhūta* 'father-like'.[38]

10. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned special interpretation given it by Dharmakīrti in verse 7 of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* (above, § 4) and following him by commentators belonging to his Pramāṇa-school, the use of °*bhūta* in the meaning 'like' already attested in the *Nirukta* and Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* is found even in some of the post-Dharmakīrti commentaries of the Buddhist Pramāṇa-school known to us either from the surviving Sanskrit texts or from their Tibetan translations.

Thus, at the beginning of Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī* on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* we read (*tasya hi anadhigatasya prakāśako 'visaṃvādakaś ca bhagavān nânya iti) pramāṇasādharmyāt pramāṇam* 'because of similarity with *pramāṇa* [the Buddha is] *pramāṇa*'.[39] And in his *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* Prajñākaragupta has explained *Pramāṇavārttika* ii.7a by saying *pratyakṣarūpa eva bhagavān pramāṇam* (ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, 32.5), 'the Bhagavant being similar to (or: of the nature of) *pratyakṣa* is *pramāṇa*'.[40]

Furthermore, in the Tibetan translation of Devendrabuddhi's

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[36] See the *Nārāyaṇīya* in the *Mahābhāṣya-Pradīpa-Vyākhyānāni* (ed. M. S. Narasimhacharya, I), 232. On these commentators, see the editor's Introduction in vol. X of the series (Pondichéry, 1983).

For further discussions on the use or non-use of the *cvi*-suffix taught in Pāṇini, V.iv.50, see for example the commentaries on Pāṇini I.iv.74; II.i.59 (concerning the form *śreṇikṛta*); III.i.12 *vārttika* 4; III.1.92 *vārttika* 2; III.ii.56. I am indebted to K. Bhattacharya for the opportunity of discussing some of these passages with him.

[37] ed. L. Sarup, *Commentary of Skandasvāmin and Maheśvarà on the Nirukta, Chapters II–VI* (Lahore, 1931), 173.

[38] Maheśvara (ed. L. Sarup, 11): *'sattvabhūtam': sattvaṃ dravyam, bhūtaśabdaḥ pitṛbhūta ityādivad upamāyāṃ draṣṭavyaḥ.*

[39] In the Tibetan translation of Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, the whole relevant passage reads (P, f. 2b): *tshad ma daṅ 'dra bas bcom ldan 'das tshad ma'o/ /gaṅ gi phyir ji ltar mṅon sum la sogs pa'i tshad ma ni skyes bu'i don la ñe bar mkho ba sṅar ma rtogs pa'i gsal bar byed ciṅ mi bslu ba yin pa de ltar/ bcom ldan 'das kyaṅ gaṅ la skyes bu'i don gyi mchog rag las pa 'phags pa'i bden pa bži'i mtshan ñid kyi de kho na ñid la de'i yul can gyi šes pa bskyed nas/ ṅes par legs pa don du gñer ba rnams la/ khoṅ du ma chud pa de gsal bar byed pa daṅ mi bslu ba de'i phyir tshad ma daṅ chos mtshuṅs pa ñid kyi phyir tshad ma'o/ /gyur pa ni skyes pa ste byuṅ ba ces pa'i don to/ /gyur pa'i tshig ni ma byuṅ ba rtag pa dbaṅ phyug la sogs pa'i tshad ma gžan gyis yoṅs su brtags pa dgag pa'i don du'o/ /tshad ma yaṅ 'di yin gyur pa'aṅ yin pas tshad mar gyur pa ste/ tshad mar gyur pa de la'o//*

For the corresponding Sanskrit fragment from the *Viśālāmalavatī* found in Vibhūticandra's notes, see their edition by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, *JBORS*, 26, 1940, 518–19, and by E. Steinkellner, in: *A corpus of Indian studies*, 100. The Sanskrit of Jinendrabuddhi's further comment giving the alternative explanation of *pramāṇabhūta* (in which *bhūta* = *anitya*) reads: *bhūta utpannaḥ/ bhūtavacanam aprajātasyêśvarādeḥ paraparikalpitanityasya [?] pratiṣedhārtham ivârthas tu sāmarthyagata iti na tadartham iti vakṣyate/ pramāṇam câsau bhūtaś cêti pramāṇabhūtaḥ/ tasmai pramāṇabhūtāya praṇamyêti yojanam/* See also E. Steinkellner, *WZKS*, 33, 1989, 180–1.

On the question whether the author of the *Viśālāmalavatī* is identical with Jinendrabuddhi, the grammarian author of the *Nyāsa* commentary on the *Kāśikā*, see R. Hayes, *JAOS*, 103, 1983, 709–17.

[40] Tib. (D, f. 27b): *bcom ldan 'das ni mṅon sum gyi raṅ bžin gyis tshad ma yin te.*

Yamāri in his voluminous commentary on Prajñākaragupta's work, the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā*, has also mentioned similarity with *pramāṇa* (D, phe, f. 203b6: *tshad mar chos mtshuṅs pa*). But in his detailed exegesis in which he has some very interesting things to say, he has also introduced a further line of explanation. Although the entire passage (D, f. 202a ff; cf. also f. 188b) needs to be considered in detail, this is not possible in the frame of the present article. Suffice it to say here that in his analysis of the proposition *tshad ma yaṅ bcom ldan 'das ñid* Yamāri has discussed the suitability of employing *pramāṇabhūta* as an epithet

144/14

decessors, but they all remain colourless figures. The only text in ich the six are mentioned in this old body of the Canon, apart from the ahāpadāna Sutta, is that they are invoked, in sequence and by name, at beginning of the verses which form the bulk of the *Āṭānāṭiya Sutta*[6]. e verses are recited by Buddhists as apotropaic magic, a form of protec- n from potentially dangerous spirits; the post-canonical term is *paritta* om Sanskrit *pari-trā*), but in the text they are simply called *rakkhā*.

The question I now want to put is that in the title: why are these mer Buddhas, whose antecedents are mysterious to scholars, just six in mber?

Several times in the Pāli canon the Buddha is referred to as an *isi*, eer or sage (from Sanskrit *ṛṣi*); and in three different verses he is erred to as *isi-sattama*. The original meaning of *isi-sattama* was pre- nably "best of seers". However, it is well known that in the Sanskrit dition there has been since Vedic times a set of seven seers *(saptarṣi)*. e names of the seers who make up the list of seven have varied consi- ably. The earliest list was of seven sages to whom Vedic *sūktas* were ributed. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, however, there is a list of seven ich starts with Gautama and has Kaśyapa in the sixth place.[7] None of other names agree with those of Buddhas and that could be a coinci- ice. The main point, however, is that *isi-sattama* came to be interpreted "seventh of the seers" (from Sanskrit *ṛṣi-saptama*).

There are many cases of terms having been misunderstood through ambiguities of Middle Indo-Aryan phonetics. Some of them have ected matters quite central to Buddhism: K. R. Norman has shown that *tyekabuddha* is a wrong back-formation for *pratyayabuddha* "enlight- d by a (non-verbal) cause"[8]; *bodhisattva* seems to be a wrong back- mation for *bodhisakta*[9]; and even the Pāli term *sutta* (as in *Sutta-nipāta*) may well have originated not from *sūtra* but from *sūkta*[10]. The need to explain Sanskrit *pratyekabuddha* and Pāli *paccekabuddha* (which is itself a wrong back-formation from another dialect of Middle Indo-Aryan) has led to the formation of new Buddhist doctrine. I think that *isi-sattama* may have led to a very similar development: Gotama Buddha came to be interpreted as standing seventh in a series.

If we leave out of account the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* and the *Apadāna*, because they are comparatively late texts, the compound *isi-sattama* occurs five times in the Canon,[11] always in verse: *Majjhima Nikāya* I, 386; *Sutta-nipāta* verse 356; *Saṃyutta Nikāya* I, 192; *Theragāthā* verses 1240 and 1276. The third and fourth of these references are in fact the same text, and likewise the second and fifth are the same; all these four references are in verses ascribed to the monk Vaṅgisa. On the last reference, that at *Theragāthā* 1276, there is no commentary.

All four commentaries on these passages give the interpretation of *sattama* as "seventh", and two also give alternative interpretations as "best". They all differ in their wording. That on the *Majjhima Nikāya* is: *vipassiādayo cha isayo upādāya sattamassa*[12] (the lemma is in the genitive): "seventh with reference to the six seers of whom Vipassī was the first." That on the *Sutta-nipāta* is: *bhagavā isi ca sattamo ca uttamaṭṭhena, vipassi-sikhi-vessabhu-kakusandha-koṇāgamana-kassapa-nāmake cha isayo attanā saha satta karonto pātubhūto ti pi isi-sattamo*[13]: "The Blessed One is a seer and *sattama* in the sense of best; he is also *isi-sattama* in that he appeared making seven: the six seers Vipassi to Kassapa plus himself." This notes the ambiguity, though it interprets the compound when *sattama* means "best" as a *karmadhāraya* rather than a *tatpuruṣa samāsa*. That on the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, glossing the phrase *isīnaṃ isi-*

Ibid, XXXII. The reference is at vol. II, pp. 195-96

Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, XIV. 5. 2. 6.

K. R. Norman, "The Pratyeka-Buddha in Buddhism and Jainism, *Buddhist dies*, ed. Philip Denwood and Alexander Piatigorsky (London, 1983), pp. 106.

Cf. K. R. Norman, "Pali Philology and the Study of Buddhism", *The dhist Forum*, Vol. I, pp. 31-9, particularly p.36.

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[10] Cf. R. F. Gombrich, "How the Mahāyāna began" *The Buddhist Forum* vol. I, pp. 21-30, particularly p. 23.

[11] I rely on the *Critical Pali Dictionary s. v. isi-sattama* (vol. II, fascicle 7) pp. 316-17.

[12] *Papañcasūdani*, ed. Dhammakitti Siri Dhammānanda (Colombo 1926), p. 620.

[13] *Paramatthajotikā*, II, 351.

[illegible] Oriental Research 56/62
(1986-1992) pp 326-330

145/14

WHY SIX FORMER BUDDHAS?

RICHARD GOMBRICH

Dr. Janaki and I have been colleagues for many years, and friends ever since she came to Oxford twenty years ago, to write a thesis on the *Bhāṇa*. Both as scholar and as administrator Dr. Janaki has performed great services in the cause of Sanskrit scholarship. Her own work has lain within the brahminical field, whereas mine has mostly been on Buddhism and Middle Indo-Aryan.

However, I present here a topic in which our areas of research overlap. That is not impossible, since I have begun to investigate the brahminical background of early Buddhism. I have recently been able to show, in works both published and yet to be published, that the statements by some earlier western scholars that there is no evidence that the Buddha was acquainted with brahminical literature is incorrect.[1] The Pāli Canon contains clear allusions to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* as well as to the *Puruṣa Sūkta* and *Nāsadīya Sūkta* of the *ṚgVeda*.[2] The commentarial tradition is unaware of the Upaniṣadic allusions, but that is not surprising, because the Pāli commentaries were evidently set not only several centuries later than the canonical texts but in quite another cultural milieu. Proof that at least a major part of the Pāli commentaries must come from South India or Sri Lanka has been provided by Prof. Thomas Trautmann.[3] He has shown that all the stories about the Buddha's family, including that of his own marriage, must have been composed in an area where marriage between cross-cousins is the norm. That is of course the case in southern India and in Sri Lanka, whereas in northern India such marriages are prohibited, and regarded as incestuous. The failure of the Pāli commentaries to note some feature of the Buddha's cultural background is therefore of no account.

My research project is ambitious and time is short. On this occasion, therefore, I offer a fragment.

It is well known that Buddhists have from the earliest times believed in a multiplicity of Buddhas. In the Theravadin tradition the sequence of Buddhas stretches into the infinite past and the infinite future, but there is a set of twenty-four Buddhas which is singled out and regularly depicted, for example, in the Buddhist temples of Sri Lanka. What is special about these twenty-four is that Gotama, the Buddha of our time, made a resolution in the presence of each of them to attain Buddhahood. This tradition can be traced back as far as the *Buddhavaṃsa*, a text which scholars agree to have been one of the later ones added to the Pāli Canon —very likely in the third or second century B. C. .

Since the Jains have a set of twenty-four *Tīrthaṃkaras*, it is reasonable to suppose that the figure twenty-four came from Jaina influence. Gotama is not included in the set of twenty-four, whereas Mahāvīra is, but that is not decisive: the rationale for the set is different in the two religions. A further echo of Jain influence is found in the name of the first of the Buddhist twenty-four: *Dīpaṃkara*. His three predecessors, who are not in the twenty-four but are mentioned in the same *Buddhavaṃsa*, also have names ending in *-aṃkara*. I think that all these names echo *Tīrthaṃkara* or Middle Indo-Aryan *Titthaṃkara*.

In an earlier article[4] I have shown that in the Pāli Canon, if we exclude the few texts which everyone acknowledges to be later additions, there are only six former Buddhas. Their names, in chronological order, are Vipassin, Sikhin, Vessabhu, Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana and Kassapa. I do not wish to repeat here what I have said there, beyond what is essential to my argument. In the body of the Canon there is only one text which has anything to say about all six of these Buddhas: the *Mahāpadāna Sutta*[5] of the *Dīgha Nikāya*. This *sutta* gives a biography of each of the six Buddhas from birth to the founding of his Sangha in almost identical terms; moreover, the story is the same as that which was to become famous, with some further embellishments, as the story of Gotama. The Buddha before Gotama, Kassapa, figures in one story in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, and there are a couple of allusions besides to him and his two

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[1] See in particular my paper "Recovering the Buddha's Message", *The Buddhist Forum*, vol. 1, ed. Tadeusz Skorupski (London, 1990), pp. 5-20.

[2] The allusions to the *Ṛg Veda* are discussed in my forthcoming paper on the *Aggañña Sutta*.

[3] [illegible] pp. 316-30.

[4] "The Significance of Former Buddhas in the Theravādin Tradition", *Buddhist Studies in honour of Walpola Rahula*, ed. Somaratna Balasooriya, *et al.* (London, 1980), pp 62-72.

[5] *Dīgha Nikāya Sutta*, XIV. References to Pāli texts, unless otherwise stated, are to the Pali Text Society editions.

sattamo, is: *vipassito paṭṭhāya isinaṃ sattamako isi*[14]: "seventh seer of the seers starting from Vipassi." All the above three glosses are from commentaries ascribed to Buddhaghoṣa, and though he only edited them it is still interesting that they all differ. The commentary on the *Thera-gāthā* is ascribed to Dhammapāla, and glosses the same verse as the last: *sāvaka-paccekabuddha-isinaṃ uttamo isi, vipassi-sammāsambuddhato paṭṭhāya isinaṃ vā sattamako isi*[15]: "best seer of the hearers, independently enlightened and seers (i.e., of the three classes of Buddhas), or seventh of the seers from the fully enlightened Buddha Vipassi." This last is the only comment to take *isi-sattama* exactly as seems to me most natural, as "best of seers"; and unlike the *Sutta-nipāta* commentary, it presents the meanings "best" and "seventh" for *sattama* as different interpretations, rather than seeing the word as a deliberate pun.

The few texts in the older parts of the Canon which mention former Buddhas directly do so for the most part to ascribe to them a saying or an episode, or just mention their names. So far as I can judge, the former Buddhas affect no Buddhist doctrine, and the Buddha's message would lose none of its power or coherence if the idea of a series of Buddhas were excluded. Though we know that Asoka believed in a former Buddha (the one known to Pāli tradition as Konāgamana), and Buddhists everywhere do believe in multiple Buddhas, I believe that it is not absurd to think that the doctrine of former Buddhas may not have been part of the teaching of Gotama Buddha but added by his followers—possibly even as early as during his own lifetime. I doubt whether it will ever be possible to prove this conjecture; but at least the evidence here adduced may be taken to point in that direction.

Journal of Oriental Research
1986-1992 Vol. 56-62

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[14] *Sāratthappakāsini*, I, 278.

[15] *Paramatthadipani*, III, 195.

146/14

LITERARY SAMVĀDA

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It is a common knowledge that literary writers in different languages, belonging to different times and places, tend to refer to some same or similar ideas and imagery. All such common occurrences cannot be dismissed as plagiarism and hence a defect on the part of the poet. On closer analysis it is possible to see that such repetitions cannot just be avoided on account of the commonness or universality of some core ideas. Also in the Indian context it is not wrong on the part of the poet to start his composition with his mind filled with the expressions and imagery of his predecessors, which are very often reflected in his own works.

In order to elaborate the above idea, we could in the first instance, look at a few Sanskrit poets like Kālidāsa and Vedānta Deśika who sometimes tend to repeat ideas even within their compositions or reflect the earlier writings. For example in the first sarga of *Raghuvaṃśa* (v. 32), Kālidāsa describes Dilipa as "though having a large harem Dilipa considered himself as having two wives only, the virtuous Sudakṣiṇā, and Rājyalakṣmi."[1]

The same idea is found with a slightly different verbal expression in the *Abhijñāna Śākuntala* (III. 19)[2]. Here Duṣyanta assures the friends of Śakuntalā that, "inspite of the large harem, the sea-girdled earth and your friend are the wives of mine".

Again, Kālidāsa compares the Puranic God Indra, his wife Śaci and their son Jayanta to Dilipa, Sudakṣiṇā and Raghu in the *Raghuvaṃśa* (III. 23)[3]; the same idea repeats itself in the *Abhijñāna Śākuntala* (VII. 28), while Śakuntalā is blessed as - "Your husband is like Indra, your son like Jayanta and may you shine like Śaci"[4] and again in the *Vikramorvaśiya*

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1. कलत्रवन्तमात्मानमवरोधे महत्यपि ।
तया मेने मनस्विन्या लक्ष्म्या च वसुधाधिपः ॥

2. परिग्रहबहुत्वेऽपि द्वे प्रतिष्ठे कुलस्य मे ।
समुद्ररसना चोर्वी सखी च युवयोरियम् ॥

3. उमावृषाङ्कौ शरजन्मना यथा यथा जयन्तेन शचीपुरन्दरौ ।
तथा नृपः सा च सुतेन मागधी ननन्दतुस्तत्सदृशेन तत्समौ ॥

4. आखण्डलसमो भर्ता जयन्तप्रतिमः सुतः ।
आशीरन्या न ते योग्या पौलोमीसदृशी भव ॥

Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (not available in Sanskrit) we read (P, f. 2a=D, f. 1b): *tshad mar gyur pa žes bya ba ni tshad mar 'khruṅs pa'o/ /tshad ma daṅ 'dra bas na tshad ma ste bcom ldan 'das so/ /tshad ma'i ṅo bo de ci žig yin na/ gaṅ gis de daṅ 'dra bar dam bca' bar byed ce na...* '"*Pramāṇabhūta*" [in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* i.1], i.e. come to be[41] *pramāṇa*. Being like a *pramāṇa* [the Buddha] is *pramāṇa*, the Bhagavant.—What is this nature of *pramāṇa* whereby it is asserted that [the Buddha Bhagavant] is like it?—[Reply: *Pramāṇavārttika* ii.1]'. Several pages further on we read (P, f. 7b=D, f. 6b): *'di tshad ma daṅ yaṅ ci žig mtshuṅs na/ gaṅ gis tshad ma daṅ 'dra bas tshad ma ñid yin/ tshad ma'i mtshan ñid rnam pa gñis ñid daṅ mtshuṅs pa yin no//* 'In what is [the Buddha] similar to *pramāṇa*, whereby being *pramāṇa*-like [he] is indeed *pramāṇa*? [He] is similar in respect to both definitions (*lakṣaṇa*) of *pramāṇa* [namely the one given in *Pramāṇavārttika* ii.1ab in terms of *avisaṃvādi jñānam*, and the one given in 5c in terms of *ajñātārthaprakāśa*].'[42] This is, then, why the Bhagavant is indeed *pramāṇa*.

11.1. For the grammatical formation and semantics of the expression *pramāṇa-bhūta*, in addition to Pali *dhammabhūta* and *brahmabhūta* (in e.g. Dīghanikāya, III.84)[43] we can further compare *cakkhubhūta* and *ñāṇabhūta*, which are also epithets of the Bhagavant (in e.g. Aṅguttaranikāya, V. 226).

A grammatically comparable form in Sanskrit is *caityabhūta*, an epithet of a piece of ground that is (i.e. serves as) a *caitya* or is *caitya*-like—i.e. to be honoured (because of the presence of a scriptural text)—in the *Vajracchedikā* (ed. E. Conze), Section 12 (translated by Tib. *mchod rten du gyur pa*) and Section 15c (translated by Tib. *mchod rten lta bur*). In this passage *caityabhūta* is parallel to *pūjanīya, vandanīya* and *pradakṣiṇīya*.[44] For °*bhūta* meaning 'like' in a non-religious and non-philosophical use, Skt. *śavabhūta* (=*ro daṅ 'dra ba, ro bžin, ro mtshuṅs*) in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* iii. 48 (cf. Sagāthaka 91) may be cited.[45]

11.2. In his *Saddanīti*, Dhātumālā 1555 (ed. H. Smith, 554) *bhū pattiyaṃ: patti pāpanaṃ; sakammikā dhātu*, the twelfth-century Pali grammarian Aggavaṃsa has taken °*bhūta* in the sense of *patta* (cf. Kaiyata's explanation as Skt. *prāpta*), and he explains *cakkhubhūta, brahmabhūta*, etc. accordingly.[46] But for °*bhūta* Aggavaṃsa has also recorded the meaning *viya* 'like' (555. 9: *atha vā cakkhu viya bhūto ti cakkhubhūto*).

12.1. Now, beside its above-mentioned twofold division into *pratyakṣa* and *anumāṇa, pramāṇa* has, it is true, been sometimes divided into three: cognition (*jñāna*=*šes pa, buddhi/dhī*=*blo*), word (*vāc*=*ṅag, brjod byed kyi sgra*) or scripture (*āgama*=*luṅ*), and person (*puruṣa*=*skyes bu, pudgala*=*gaṅ zag*).[47] The first of these divisions corresponds to the concept of *pramāṇa* as knowledge/cognition discussed so far.

12.2. Concerning *śābda(-jñāna)* 'verbal knowledge' as non-disappointing and materially congruent (*avisaṃvādin*, i.e. veridical and non-delusive) because it efficaciously conveys the speaker's intention (*abhiprāya*), and for the *prāmāṇya* of *śabda*, reference can be made to the *Pramāṇavārttika* (Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 1cd-2, and Svārthānumāna chapter, *k.* 185 f. and 213 f.; c.. iv. 48 ff.).

Now, just as precious gold is assayed by a jeweller, so the jewel of the Buddha's Word (*dharmaratna*=*buddhavacana*) is tested be means of a threefold scrutiny (*parīkṣā*).[48] That is, in order to serve as *pramāṇa* the *buddha-vacana* must *not* be

(i) incompatible with what is accessible to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*=*mṅon sum*, in the domain of what is evident, *mṅon gyur*),
(ii) annullable by reasoning (*yukti*) or inferential knowledge (*vastubala-pravṛtta-anumāna*=*dṅos po stobs žugs kyi rjes dpag*, in the domain of what

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of the Bhagavant and the applicability to the Bhagavant, as attribute-possessor (*viśeṣya*), of the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of being *pramāṇa*. This Yamāri has done (f. 203a) with reference to two fundamental syntactic-semantic principles: (i) predication by the exclusion of connexion of the attribute (here *pramāṇa*) with any possessor of this attribute other than the one specified (here the Bhagavant: *gžan daṅ ldan pa rnam par gcod pa*=*anyayogavyavaccheda*, in which case the particle *eva* [if used] follows the possessor of the attribute, as in e.g. *pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ* where it is asserted not only that Arjuna is a bowman but also that he *alone* is the perfect [*phul du byuṅ ba*] bowman); and (ii) predication by the exclusion of non-connexion between the attribute and the possessor of the attribute (*ma 'brel pa rnam par gcod pa*=*ayogavyavaccheda*, where the particle *eva* [if used] follows the attribute possessed, as in e.g. *sa paṇḍita eva* where it is asserted that a person is learned *indeed*, but without asserting that this person alone is a learned person). It is explained that it is predication by *ayogavyavaccheda* that applies in the present case, and that what is in question is having the character of *pramāṇa (tshad ma'i mtshan ñid)*. On the contrary, in the case of *pratyakṣa*—i.e. of a *pramāṇa* in the strongest and strictest sense—what is in question is perfect *pramāṇa*; and it is then predication by *anyayogavyavaccheda* that applies. Reference is further made to the content (*brjod bya*=*abhidheya*) of the Pramāṇa-Sāstra being indeed directly (*dṅos su) pramāṇa* as such, but dominantly and preeminently (*gtsor*) the Bhagavant.

[41] *'khruṅs pa*. Cf. E. Steinkellner, in Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (ed.), *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy* (Vienna, 1983), 276. And compare *bhūta utpannaḥ*: *gyur pa ni skyes pa ste byuṅ ba* in Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī*.

[42] On this, in addition to v. Bijlert, op. cit., 150 ff. see most recently S. Katsura, 'Dharmakīrti's theory of truth, *JIP*, 12, 1984, 215–35; G. Dreyfus, 'Dharmakīrti's definition of *pramāṇa* and its interpreters', in: E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition*, 19–38; E. Franco, 'The disjunction in *Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter verse 5c', ibid., 39–51; C. Lindtner, 'The initial verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter in the *Pramāṇavārttika*', ibid., 155–9.

[43] cf. K. Bhattacharya, *Dr. B. M. Barua birth centenary commemoration volume* (Calcutta, 1989), 67, 69.

[44] F. Edgerton, *BHSD*, has rendered *caityabhūta* in the *Vajracchedikā* by 'of the nature of an object of veneration'. Conze's rendering 'a true shrine' (Glossary, 105) does not follow the Tibetan translators' interpretation of °*bhūta*, and it is somewhat ambiguous (though it has been retained by G. Schopen in his recent translation of the Gilgit Manuscript in: L. O. Gómez and J. A. Silk, *The Great Vehicle: three Mahāyāna Buddhist texts*, Ann Arbor, 1989, 124). On this passage, cf. G. Schopen, 'The phrase "*sa pṛthivīpradeśaś caityabhūto bhavet*" in the *Vajracchedikā*: notes on the cult of the book in Mahāyāna', in *IIJ*, 17, 1975, 147–81.

The same expression is attested in *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā* iii (ed. Rājendralāla Mitra), 56–8 (where *caityabhūta* is found in the proximity of *āśrayabhūta* [p. 58]).—But in Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* iii (ed. Wogihara, 207) *caityabhūta* has been explained following Candragomin as meaning 'in nature a *caitya*', in the same way that *sākṣībhūta* is stated to have the meaning of *sākṣin (sākṣy eva sākṣībhūta iti tatsvabhāvatve caityabhūta iti candragomī)*. The Tibetan translation of Haribhadra's work (ascribed to rṄog Blo ldan šes rab) accordingly has *mchod rten ñid la mchod rten du gyur pa* (which is comparable with Ye šes sde's translation *mchod rten du gyur pa* in *Vajracchedikā*, Section 12, but not with *mchod rten lta bur* in Section 15c).

[45] On the other hand, in e.g. *Nyāyabindu* iii.30 where the compound expression *avidyamānasarvajñatāptatāliṅgabhūtapramāṇātiśayaśāsanatva* is found, and where *liṅgabhūtāḥ pramāṇātiśayaḥ* is explained as *liṅgātmakaḥ pramāṇaviśeṣaḥ* by Dharmottara. the meaning 'like' would clearly not be appropriate for °*bhūta*. This meaning *ātmaka* is of course also frequent for °*bhūta*.

[46] Aggavaṃsa (*Saddanīti*, 554) adds the explanation: *bhāveti bhāvayati pabhāveti pabhāvayati, itthambhūto 'cakkhubhūto ñāṇabhūto ... brahmabhūto'*. (Here *pabhāvayati* curiously recalls *prabhāvanā* in the above-mentioned passage of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, 58, where *caityabhūta* is attested.) *Itthambhūta* means according to Aggavaṃsa *imaṃ pakāraṃ bhūto patto*.—Cf. K. Bhattacharya, loc. cit.

[47] Compare e.g. 'Jam dbyaṅs [phyogs/]mchog lha 'od zer (1429–1500), *Tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi bsdus gžuṅ šes bya ba'i sgo 'byed rGol ṅan glaṅ po 'joms pa gdoṅ lṅa'i gad rgyaṅs rgyu rig lde mig (Rva stod bsdus grva)*, f. 187a; A kya yoṅs 'dzin dByaṅs can dGa' ba'i blo gros (*c.* 1800), *Blo rigs kyi sdom tshig blaṅ dor gsal ba'i me loṅ*, f. 1b; and Yoṅs 'dzin Phur bu lcog pa Byams pa Tshul khrims rgya mtsho (1825–1901), *Tshad ma'i gžuṅ don 'byed pa'i bsdus grva'i rnam bžag rigs lam 'phrul gyi lde mig ces bya ba las Rigs lam che ba yul yul can daṅ blo rig gi rnam par bšad pa*, f. 12b.

[48] cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, Svārthānumāna chapter, *k.* 215–16, and Parārthānumāna chapter, *k.* 108. For the testability—or, to keep the established metaphor, the 'assayability'—of the Buddha's teaching, see Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṃgraha* 3587:

tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ/
parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyaṃ madvaco na tu gauravāt//

See also 3344 and Kamalaśīla, *Pañjikā* 3.

is not directly perceived [but is not imperceptible by nature, i.e. transempirical] and is hidden [by circumstances but not by nature], *[cuṅ zad] lkog gyur = parokṣa*), and
(iii) internally inconsistent either explicitly or implicitly (in respect to the domain of the transempirical, *ma mthoṅ dṅos po šin tu lkog gyur = atyantaparokṣa*, that is, the scope of the *luṅ la brten pa'i rjes dpag* or *yid ches rjes dpag*).[49]

Since Dignāga (*Pramāṇasamuccaya* ii.5) and Dharmakīrti (*Pramāṇavārttika*, Svārthānumāna chapter, *k*. 216ab) have subsumed *āgama* or *āptavāda* under *anumāna*, this second of the three divisions of *pramāṇa* is in fact not incompatible with their twofold division of *pramāṇa* discussed earlier.

12.3. The third division of *pramāṇa* in question, *puruṣa* 'person', appears *prima facie* to be in conflict with the principle that *pramāṇa* is knowledge only. Ultimately derivable (as seen above) from Dignāga's concept of the Bhagavant as *pramāṇabhūta* in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and developed by Dharmakīrti in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, it is however grounded in a special idea of the *buddha* as (a valid means of) correct knowledge.

As for the relation between this concept of the Bhagavant as *pramāṇabhūta* and that of *tshad ma'i skyes bu = *pramāṇa-puruṣa*, viz. the Buddha as Knower-and-Teacher, it has been explicated for example by rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432) in his *Thar lam gsal byed*.[50] This concept of the Teacher (*śāstṛ*) as *tshad ma'i skyes bu* has received separate monographic treatment in a work by A lag ša Ṅag dban bstan dar (b. 1759) entitled *sTon pa tshad ma'i skyes bur sgrub pa'i gtam*.[51]

But as seen above (§ 2), in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* the expression *tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu (*pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa)* was applied not to the Buddha but to an author of Śāstra.

13. With *adhigatayāthātathya*, the epithet of certain Ṛṣis in the passage of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* mentioned earlier (§ 7), we can compare the Buddhist term *tathāgata*, which has been variously interpreted as being derived from *tathā + (ā)gata < gam-* 'go/understand' or from *tathā + gad-* 'speak'.[52]

The *tathāgata* is moreover described as *bhūtavādin* (with which we might compare *bhūtārthavādin* as an epithet of the Ṛṣi in the passage of the *Uttararāmacarita* cited above, § 6.3) and as *tathāvādin*.[53]

14. In sum, in view of the foregoing body of evidence it appears that the epithet *pramāṇabhūta* applied to the Buddha in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* i. 1 could legitimately be understood according to Sanskrit usage as meaning '*pramāṇa*-like', the sense of likeness being corroborated by a meaning of °*bhūta* recorded by Bhartṛhari in his *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* as well as by an explanation of *bhūta* in the *Nirukta*. If understood in this way, there will be no conflict with Dignāga's own doctrine that only *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are *pramāṇas*.

As for Dharmakīrti, he has interpreted °*bhūta* in *pramāṇabhūta* in the special sense of 'become' serving to exclude the idea of permanence in connexion with the Buddha (above, § 4). Dharmakīrti's commentators then developed various interpretations of the term, though several of them have also mentioned that °*bhūta* has the meaning of 'like' (above, § § 4 and 10).

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[49] Manorathanandin on *Pramāṇavārttika* iv.50 mentions *svarga* as an example of the *atyantaparokṣa*, and *nairātmya* as an example of the *parokṣa*.

This threefold scrutiny—corresponding to the domains of *pratyakṣa, anumāna* and *āgama*—constitutes the fundamentally important *dpyad pa gsum* of the Tibetan tradition. See e.g. Tsoṅ kha pa, *sDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gñer Yid kyi mun sel* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. tsha), f. 3b, 6b, 23a–b; rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen, *Thar lam gsal byed* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. cha), f. 99a ff.; Guṅ thaṅ dKon mchog bsTan pa'i sgron me, *Legs bšad sñin po'i dka' 'grel*, f. 24a ff.; D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra* (Paris, 1969), 229. Cf. recently T. Tillemans, 'Dharmakīrti, Āryadeva and Dharmapāla on scriptural authority', *Tetsugaku*, 38 (Felicitation Volume for Professors A. Uno and K. Ogura, Hiroshima, 1986), 31–47; and *Materials for the study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*, I (Vienna, 1990), 23 ff.

In relation to the triad of *pratyakṣa, anumāna* and *āgama*, it is to be noted that Dharmakīrti has himself alluded to a *pramāṇatraya* several times in his *Svavṛtti* on the *Pramāṇavārttika* (pp. 102 [cf. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* ii.34, p. 17*], 107, 176). Cf. E. Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ*, II (Vienna, 1979), 62.

[50] See rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen on *PV*, Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter, in *Thar lam gsal byed*, f. (126b ff.,) 134a (under the rubric of *yoṅs gcod* or positive determination). Cf. 'Jam dbyaṅs mchog lha 'od zer, *Rva stod bsdus grva*, f. 212 f.

[51] A reference to a *puruṣa* as *saṃvādaka* and as *pramāṇa* is found in a passage of Siddhasena Divākara's *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* (ed. Sanghavi and Dośi, Ahmedabad, 1924–31), 468 (cited by Steinkellner and Krasser, *Dharmottaras Exkurs zur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im Pramāṇaviniścaya*, 27: *loke pratijñātam arthaṃ prāpayan puruṣaḥ saṃvādakaḥ pramāṇam ucyate*).

On the concept of **pramāṇa-puruṣa* and its sources, reference can be made to E. Steinkellner's article in: E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (ed.), *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy*, 275–84, where *tshad ma'i skyes bu* is rendered as 'person of authority'. [See now T. Tillemans, *Persons of authority*.]

[52] For the etymology of *tathā-gata* by *gad-*, see e.g. Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* ii (ed. Wogihara, 183): *yathaiva te dharmā vyavasthitās tathaiva gadanāt tathāgata iti anenâviparītadharmadaiśikatvād vaktṛtvasampad uktā*. (Cf. *sGra sbyor bam po gñis pa* [ed. M. Ishikawa, Tokyo, 1990], 7. And compare *Bodhisattvabhūmi* vi, 384: *yat kiṃcid anena bhāṣitaṃ lapitaṃ udāhṛtaṃ sarvaṃ tat tathā avitathêti tasmāt tathāgata ity ucyate* with Dīghanikāya, III 135 [cited below in n. 53 and containing implicitly also the etymology by *tathā + gam-* 'understand'], Aṅguttaranikāya II 24 and *Itivuttaka*, 121.)

According to Haribhadra, through this *vaktṛtvasampad* of the Buddha the appellation *tathāgata* relates to his *vaktṛtvalakṣaṇā śāstṛtvasampad*. Concerning the *śāstṛtvasampad*—characterizeded by this *vaktṛtva* of the Buddha and his *pratipattṛtva* (viz. the *jñāna*° and *prahāṇa-sampad*, connoted respectively by the appellations *arhant* and *samyaksambuddha*)—compare the idea of the Buddha's *sampad* in Dignāga's comment on his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* i.1 (referred to in n. 10 above).—For secondary literature on the etymology of *tathāgata*, see E. Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, I (Louvain, 1944), 126, n. 1; and for *sugata* see ibid., 131.

Concerning the more frequent etymology of *tathā-gata* by *gam-*, the semantic link between *tathāgata* and *adhigatayāthātathya*, the epithet of certain Ṛṣis in the *Mahābhāṣya* passage cited above (§ 7), was noted by D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Védique *addhā* et quelques parallèles à *Tathāgata*', *JA*, 1955, 168 and 169 note 5.

On *adhigata* and *sākṣātkṛta/sākṣātkāra*, see above § 5 and n. 22.

[53] e.g. in *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, ch. ii (ed. Kern and Nanjō), 39: *śraddadhata me śāriputra bhūtavādy aham asmi tathāvādy aham asmy ananyathāvādy aham asmi/ durbodhyaṃ śāriputra tathāgatasya saṃdhābhāṣyam/ tatkasya hetoḥ/ nānāniruktinirdeśābhilāpanirdeśanair mayā śāriputra vividhair upāyakauśalyaśatasahasrair dharmaḥ samprakāśitaḥ/ atarko 'tarkāvacaras tathāgatavijñeyaḥ śāriputra saddharmaḥ/* See also ch. xv, 315 (*abhiśraddadhadhvaṃ tathāgatasya bhūtāṃ vācaṃ vyāharataḥ*), and xv.23. Cf. *Bodhisattvabhūmi* vi (p. 384) quoted above in n. 52. The canonical Pali sources can easily be identified from the *Pāli Tipiṭakaṃ concordance*. See in particular the *Pāsādikasuttanta* (*DN*, III.135): *yaṃ kho sadevakassa lokassa samārakassa sabrahmakassa sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiyā pajāya sadevamanussāya diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā sabbaṃ tathāgatena abhisambuddhaṃ tasmā tathāgato ti vuccati. yañ ca ... rattiṃ tathāgato anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhiṃ abhisambujjhati, yañ ca rattiṃ anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyati, yaṃ etasmiṃ antare bhāsati lapati niddisati sabbaṃ taṃ tath' eva hoti no aññathā. tasmā tathāgato ti vuccati. yathāvādī ... tathāgato tathākārī, yathākārī tathāvādī. iti yathāvādī tathākārī yathākārī tathāvādī tasmā tathāgata ti vuccati*... For the *tathāgata* being so called because of his *aviparītārthavāditva*, see Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* i, p. 12.1; and i.3, p. 78.14.

The word *evaṃvādin* is used beside the term *tathāgata* in the summary *pratītyasamutpāda* formula *ye dharmā hetuprabhavāḥ* ..., and the question arises whether this expression also belongs in the present context. In rendering *evaṃvādī mahāśramaṇaḥ* in this summary stanza, E. Lamotte once used the translation 'le véridique grand ascète' (see *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, II, Louvain, 1949, 631 note). But op. cit., 1076, Lamotte has translated by 'et leur suppression également il l'a révélée'; and later, in his *Histoire du bouddhisme indien* (Louvain, 1958), 547, Lamotte translated 'telle est la doctrine du grand śramane'. It is indeed to be noted that *evaṃvādin* often stands beside *evaṃdiṭṭhi(ka)* and modifies *samaṇabrāhmaṇa*, and that it there evidently means 'having such (and such) a [possibly wrong] doctrine'. But in the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula *evaṃvādin* may well have the special sense of speaking exactly and just as things are, i.e. truly.

Concerning *addhā + vid-*, see the present writer's remarks in *JA*, 1955, 163–4. And for a connexion between *evaṃ vid-* and *tathāgata*, see L. Renou, *Etudes védiques et pāṇinéenes*, I (Paris, 1955), 83, n. 1, who refers to *tathā* 'à nuance "transcendante" (cf. *tathatā*)'. And for *tathāgata : tathā pratipad-*, see J. Filliozat, *JA*, 1952, 266, along with R. O. Franke, *Dīghanikāya* (Göttingen, 1913), 143, n. 2 (on *tathattāya paṭipajjanti*).

149/14

In addition to the meaning *iva*, etc., that of *prāpta/patta* is also known to Sanskrit and Pali grammarians for *bhūta*.

15.1. Concerning the semantic value of *pramāṇa* by itself and in the Buddha's epithet *pramāṇabhūta*, as an epistemological term *pramāṇa* has very often been rendered by '*right/correct* knowledge/cognition'. The translation '*valid* knowledge/cognition' has however been adopted by several scholars, a rendering that is perhaps motivated by a wish to distinguish between the terms *pramāṇa* and *samyagjñāna* 'right/correct knowledge/cognition'.[54] The term *pramāṇa*—which by a frequently found definition designates a correct cognition *that is fresh*—is indeed narrower than *samyagjñāna*, which may include other kinds of correct knowledge.[55] But freshness and validity not being identical concepts, and given the fact that in logic validity properly characterizes an argument or process of reasoning, the translation 'right/correct knowledge/cognition' has been retained here. For it appears to be not only appropriate but also necessary to distinguish between *pragmatic* efficaciousness that attaches to correct knowledge—which, in being non-disappointing and *materially* congruent (*avisaṃvādin, avisaṃvādaka*, i.e. veridical and non-delusive), is also goal-fitted and efficient (*arthakriyākārin*)—and validity, which characterizes an argument or reasoning-process as being *formally* (rather than materially or pragmatically) correct.[56] Validity moreover would involve a mediated process and hence indirectness, whereas immediacy and directness of cognition is what characterizes the sage or Tathāgata as *pramāṇa(bhūta)*.

15.2. Both in the usage of Patañjali and in the that of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and their followers, *pramāṇa* has moreover been rendered by some scholars as 'authority'. This is of course an acceptable translation for example in the case of the above-mentioned attestation of *pramāṇabhūta* in the *Mahābhāṣya*.

But in the Buddhist Pramāṇa-school considerably more appears to be at issue than authority in the usual senses of 'power or right to enforce obedience' or even of 'power to influence the conduct and actions of others' and 'power over the opinions of others'.[57] For what is being referred to is nothing short of (a means of) correct knowledge, with respect both to the Buddha's direct knowledge of reality for himself and to his resulting ability to proclaim what is not cognitively accessible for others in their ordinary situations. Prajñākaragupta's explanation of Dharmakīrti's words *tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavān* (*k.* 7a) by *tathāgato hi bhagavān tadvān iti kṛtvā pratyakṣarūpa eva bhagavān pramāṇam* (above § 10), where *pratyakṣa* can hardly be taken to mean authority in the usual sense, appears to accord with this interpretation.

When the Tathāgata-Bhagavant is described as *pramāṇabhūta* '(like) (a means of) correct knowledge'—or as *pratyakṣarūpa*—, this can then have to do also with his direct cognition of what would for others be 'entirely hidden' (*atyantaparokṣa = šin tu lkog gyur*). This is the transempirical which is cognitively inaccessible to ordinary cognizers in their usual condition (and which, for them, can therefore belong only to the domain of that particular form of inferential knowledge—*anumāna*—that is founded on a reliable statement, that is, on *āptāgama*).[58] Hence, whereas in and for himself the Buddha is (like) correct knowledge,[59] for those persons who have not reached the state of cognition proper to buddhahood the Buddha as Teacher (*śāstṛ*) is, in respect to the *atyantaparokṣa*, (a valid means of) correct knowledge, that is, one that is validated as a division of inference (*anumāna*).[60]

In the first case, it would seem that *pramāṇabhūta* could appropriately be taken in the sense of '*like* correct knowledge', there being then no conflict with Dignāga's definition of *pramāṇa* as being only *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*. Or, if °*bhūta* was in fact intended by Dignāga to express the meaning of the copula (or of °*ātmaka*), this compound would have to be understood in a sense that is figurative and hence wider than the technical one he has established for *pramāṇa* in so far as this word here will refer, by secondary semantic force, to a person rather than, by primary denotation, to cognition; and on this understanding also there need be no conflict with Dignāga's division of *pramāṇa* into only *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.[61] As a third possibility, it might be supposed that the Bhagavant/Buddha is being thought of not as a person at all but as cognition. But this last interpretation will not be available in the line of thought that developed the concept of a person who is *pramāṇa*: the *tshad ma'i skyes bu* = **pramāṇa-puruṣa*.

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[54] It is to be observed, nevertheless, that in Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* i.2–3 (cited above, n. 2) *samyagjñāna* refers to *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, and therefore in this passage has the same meaning as *pramāṇa*.—In the *Nyāyasūtra*, where the *pramāṇas* are four (*pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna* and *śabda*, I.i.3) and the *prameyas* 12 (beginning with *ātman* and ending with *apavarga*, I.i.9), *tattvajñāna* relates to 16 things the first and second of which are *pramāṇa* and *prameya* (I.i.1).

[55] Among the kinds of cognition recognized in the Tibetan Pramāṇa-school *bcad šes* and *yid dpyod* can be described as being in accordance with fact (*don mthun*). Nevertheless, since *yid dpyod* does not ascertain the elimination of imputation (*sgro 'dogs gcod pa*) on the basis of either direct empirical perception or an inferential reason, and because it is *conceptual* fresh knowledge (*gsar du žen pa'i rtog pa*) bearing on a real object rather than *non-conceptual* fresh cognition (*gsar du rtogs pa'i blo*) or *non-conceptual* fresh and non-disappointing/congruent knowledge (*gsar du mi bslu ba'i šes pa*), it is not counted as *tshad ma = pramāṇa* (even though it is not *log šes* either).—On *pramāṇa* defined as fresh knowledge, see recently G. Dreyfus, 'Dharmakīrti's definition of *pramāṇa* and its interpreters', in: E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition*, 19 ff.

[56] *PV*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 1ac:

> *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam, arthakriyāsthitiḥ/*
> *avisaṃvādanam*

On this relation between *(avi)saṃvāda* and *arthakriyā*, see also *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2958. And on the concept of *arthakriyā* in relation to knowledge as well as to a thing, see M. Nagatomi, *ALB*, 31–32, 1967–68, 52–72; and E. Mikogami, *JIP*, 7, 1979, 79–94.

The epistemological term *avisaṃvādin = mi (b)slu ba*—literally non-disappointing, unfailing (indefeasible), congruent—could be rendered by 'veridical' when relating to a cognition, and by 'non-delusive' when relating to an object of cognition. For *avisaṃvādin* as a quality that relates to both the *yul can = viṣayin* and the *yul = viṣaya*, see Devendrabuddhi, *Pañjikā* on *PV*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 1 (P, f. 2a–b, D, f. 1b). In *PV*, Svārthānumāna chapter, *k.* 216 *avisaṃvāda* is defined in terms of *abādhana* 'non-cancellation, non-sublation, non-invalidation, non-defeasibility'; and in *PVSV*, 217 Dharmakīrti has equated it with *avaiparītya* 'non-mistakenness'. (On the translation of *avisaṃvādin* see above, n. 9.)

Admittedly, an inference (*anumāna*) as a *process of reasoning* may legitimately be described as valid, and *anumāna* is of course also a *pramāṇa*. But since *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* are distinguished, there in fact exist two forms of *anumāna* which are not to be simply equated because only the first is a *pramāṇa*. And even if validity in the proper sense could somehow, by extension, attach to the inferential *knowledge* that is *anumāna*, it does not automatically follow that the concept of validity can be extended to *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*. In any case, rather than the *pramāṇa* of inferential *knowledge* known as *(svārtha-)anumāna*, it is doubtless the inferential *process* in a *parārthānumāna* that can philosophically speaking be appropriately described as formally 'valid'.

Concerning the translation of *pramāṇa* by '*validating* cognition' which has also been used in some scholarly work, it is not clear just what cognition is considered to validate. But it could be said that a *pramāṇa* is a *validated* correct cognition in so far as it is certified in terms of *avisaṃvādana* and *arthakriyā*.

Validity can of course attach in addition to a legal or administrative act, such as a law or a visa. But a law can remain valid even if it proves ineffective, that is, even if it does not successfully fulfil its purpose intended by the legislator. And a visa can be valid even if the intention with which it was issued (e.g. travel to a given destination) is, for some reason, not possible or realized. Thus there clearly exists a difference between validity and effectiveness, i.e. the realization of the envisaged effect. Here too the concept of validity on the one side and that of being cognitively efficacious (*arthakriyāsamartha*) and non-defaulting and unfailing (*avisaṃvādin*) on the other side are certainly not identical.

In French, a rendering for *pramāṇa* that is gaining currency is 'connaissance droite'. For *pramā* B. K. Matilal opted for the translation 'true cognition' in his *Logic, language and reality* (Delhi, 1985), 203, while noting that this rendering is 'purely arbitrary'; and about *pramāṇa* he remarked that its meaning 'seems to be so comprehensive in some contexts and so limited in other contexts that it defies all our attempts at finding a happy English translation'.—Concerning the translation equivalents and the problems discussed in this and the next section of this article, I am indebted to Ernst Steinkellner for his valuable observations.

[57] For these definitions, see *The shorter Oxford English dictionary*, *s.v.* authority.

[58] That is, the *luṅ la brten pa'i rjes su dpag pa* or *yid ches rjes dpag*, as distinct from the *dṅos stobs rjes dpag = vastubalapravṛttānumāna* which relates to the *(cuṅ zad) lkog gyur = parokṣa*—i.e. that which owing to distance or some other impediment is not accessible to direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), but is nevertheless not transempirical—and which is thus in the domain of regular inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*). See above, § 12.2; and cf. *PV*, Svārthānumāna chapter, *k.* 213 f., 309 f. See n. 49 for Manorathanandin's distinction.

[59] See *Pramāṇavārttika*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 29 f.

[60] See *PV*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 132cd ff. See also *k.* 1cd: *avisaṃvādanaṃ, śābde 'py abhiprāyanivedanād//*; and *PVSV* 216.—Compare the concepts of *pratyayita* and *āpta = yid ches pa/yid brtan pa*. Thus, it is through his reliable teaching that the Bhagavant is a means of correct knowledge for those not yet able to achieve such knowledge directly for themselves. Compare further the old canonical idea that he who sees the *dharma* sees the *tathāgata*, where the two are as it were identified.

In the second case mentioned above where the Buddha as Teacher functions as a *means of* correct knowledge for others, the meaning of likeness is probably not required for the epithet *pramāṇabhūta*. And the type of correct knowledge for the recipients of the Buddha's teaching would be what has come to be known as *anumāna* based on the reliable (*āpta*: *yid ches rjes dpag*).

At all events, and in either case, what ultimately grounds the idea of the Buddha-Bhagavant as *pramāṇabhūta* is the concept of *pramāṇa* defined in terms of *avisaṃvāda(na) (mi [b]slu ba)*, which is then connected with the idea of being settled in its efficaciousness in bringing about a congruent result (*arthakriyāsthiti* = *don byed nus par gnas pa*) as stated in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, *k.* 1ac.[62] This is a concept that is quite distinct from authority in the usual senses cited above.

15.3. Attention may finally be called again to the fact that while in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* the Buddha—the *tathāgata*—is termed *pramāṇabhūta*, in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* Ṛṣis characterized as *yarvāṇas* and *tarvāṇas* and described as *adhigatayāthātathya* 'having comprehended things exactly as they are/reality' are termed *pratyakṣadharman* 'having direct perception of things' (above, § 7).[63] In other words, in both Brāhmanical and Buddhist thought, relatively to a Knower designated as *ṛṣi* or as *tathāgata* direct and immediate knowledge of *dharma*, or of truth/reality exactly as it is, appears as a well-established concept of fundamental importance. But in the school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti this concept of the Knower and Teacher underwent a special development in relation with the idea of the Buddha as *pramāṇabhūta* and with this school's theory of *pramāṇa*. At least in the Buddhist Pramāṇa-school it therefore seems preferable to keep the concept distinct from that of authoritativeness, even though there of course exists a link between the two: because a Tathāgata (like a Ṛṣi and an Ācārya) is such a Knower, he can be regarded as a standard or authority, as authoritative. But to be such an authority is logically the consequence of, rather than identical with, being *pramāṇabhūta* or *pratyakṣadharman*/*sākṣātkṛtadharman*.[64]

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[61] If the semantic force of *pramāṇa* in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* i.1 were thus to be understood as secondary rather than primary, the form *pramāṇabhūta* (instead of *pramāṇībhūta* according to Pāṇini V.iv.50) might perhaps be explained in terms of Nāgeśa's remark on likeness (*sādṛśya*) in his *Pradīpoddyota* on *vārttika* 2 on V.iv.50, and by invoking *paribhāṣā* 15 in Nāgeśa's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* specifying that a grammatical operation concerning a word is realized only when the word conveys its primary meaning, but not if it has a secondary meaning. See above, n. 25.

[62] See above, nn. 9 and 56.

[63] See the present writer's article 'Védique *addhā* et quelques parallèles à *tathāgata*' in *JA*, 1955, 163 ff. In Buddhist usage the terms *ṛṣi* and its derivative *ārṣa* have occasionally been applied to the Tathāgata.

[64] According to *Nyāyabhāṣya*, II.i.68, the *prāmāṇya*—'being a means of correct knowledge' or 'trustworthiness/authoritativeness'—of a teaching derives from being taught by an expert teacher (see above, § 6.1). And following the grammarian Nārāyaṇa's explanation of the relation

16. While the materials brought together in this paper may not by themselves definitively solve all the problems in the etymology and historical usage of the term *tathāgata*, they help to define the semantic field to which the concept of *tathāgata* = *buddha* belongs along with the concepts of Knower/Sage and Ṛṣi and of the compassionate and altruistic Teacher.[65] For the words *adhigatayāthātathya* and *tathāgata* appear to be semantically related. And they fit in very well with the expressions *sākṣātkṛtadharman*/*pratyakṣadharman* and *bhūt(ārth)avādin*/*tathāvādin* which are in turn echoed in some hermeneutical etymologies of *tathāgata*, who might be described as *pramāṇabhūta*. As for the links between *(upadeśa-)tathābhāva* = *saṃvādakatva* = *prāmāṇya*, the state of being *tāyin* and *sugata*, the proclamation of what is *bhūta* = *avitatha*, and *sākṣātkāra*, they have been outlined in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (ii.280–284) and its commentaries.[66]

17. Dignāga's concept of the Buddha/Bhagavant as *pramāṇabhūta* in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* i.1 is not only expressed (as noted in the first part of the present study) through terms and concepts related to or reminiscent of ideas found in a number of other Indian texts, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, but it is also grounded in his buddhology.

Dignāga's buddhology is structured in a specific manner by means of the notion of the Bhagavant's perfections (*sampad* = *phun sum tshogs pa*), where

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between *prāmāṇya* and the state of an *ācārya* (cited above, § 8.3) also, this cognitive 'normality', or trustworthiness/authoritativeness, results from being taught by an expert teacher. Here, then, we evidently have a three-stage process: (1) a person being *sākṣātkṛtadharman* or *pratyakṣadharman*, (2) being a teacher, and (3) the cognitive normality, normative force or trustworthiness/authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) of this teacher/his teaching. This series would then seem to support the differentiation argued for above between direct cognition of reality or truth in stage 1 and having force/being reliable/trustworthy/authoritative in stage 3 (see above, § 6.1). (But, according to the theory in question, stage 1 might be preceded by a person's study of the *āptāgama* in a previous life; cf. Skanda/Maheśvara on *Nirukta* i.20, p. 114. In respect to the Veda, a Mīmāṃsaka's view of the matter will of course be quite different because for him the eternal and timeless Veda is *apauruṣeya* and authorless.)

[65] Etymological uncertainty affects in particular the word *tathāgata* in the undetermined question (*avyākṛtavastu*) as to whether a *tathāgata* exists after death or not. (In this case the word is translated into Tibetan sometimes by *de bźin 'oṅs pa* and sometimes by *de bźin gśegs pa*.) In this *avyākṛtavastu*, the word *tathāgata* is apparently being used not as an epithet of the *buddha*/*bhagavant*/*sugata* only but as an expression for 'being, entity'. (It may be recalled that E. W. Hopkins pointed out that in Epic usage *tathāgata* sometimes has the meaning of 'in so (grievous) a condition', i.e. 'dead'; see *American Journal of Philology*, 32/2, 1911, 205–9.)

In the case of *tathāgata* = *de bźin gśegs pa* used as an epithet of the *buddha*, it is not altogether clear whether *tathā* was understood as a noun meaning 'reality, truth', or whether the meaning 'thus' predominated. For *addhāti* 'sage' < *addhā*—perhaps derived from the pronominal base *a(d)*- (see L. Renou, *Grammaire de la langue védique*, Paris, 1952, 329), although Iranian *azdā* with which *addhā* has often been connected etymologically has another derivation according to O. Szemerényi, *Die Sprache*, 12, 1966, 202–05, and M. Mayrhofer, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des altindoarischen*, s.v., with bibliography)—meaning 'manifestly, certainly, truly' (and originally no doubt 'thus'), see the present writer's article in *JA*, 1955.—Very interestingly, some Indian lexicographers have given *pratyakṣa* as a meaning of *addhā*.

The words *tādi(n)* and *tāyin* (used e.g. in the introductory verse of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* cited above, § 3, where it has been understood as 'protector', Tib. *skyob (pa)*; cf. *Pāṇinīya-Dhātupāṭha* 489: *tāyṚ saṃtānapālanayoḥ*, and *sGra sbyor bam po gñis pa*, p. 12), and sometimes also *tādisa*/*tādṛ(n)*/*tādṛśa(ka)*, are epithets of a sage, and of the *tathāgata* = *buddha*, a link between the *tādin* (and the *nāga*) and *tathatta* being attested in *Suttanipāta* 520 and 522. See R. O. Franke, *Dīghanikāya* (Göttingen, 1913), 88, n. 2; P. V. Bapat, '*Tāyin, tāyi, tādi*', in: B. C. Law (ed.), *D. R. Bhandarkar Volume* (Calcutta, 1940), 249–58; H. Lüders, *Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons* (Berlin, 1954), 92 f.; F. Edgerton, *BHSD*, s.v. *tādin*/*tādṛ(n)*/ *tādṛśa(ka)*/*tāyin*; G. Roth, '"A Saint like that" and "A Saviour" in Prakrit, Sanskrit and Tibetan literature' (1968), reprinted in *Indian studies* (Delhi, 1986), 91–107; and C. Caillat, 'Pronoms et adjectifs de similarité en moyen indo-aryen', in: *Indianisme et bouddhisme, Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte* (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1980), 33 ff.

[66] See e.g. Manorathanandin (ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri), 95–6: *pramāṇasaṃvādinaḥ parokṣārthasyopadeśas tatsākṣātkārapūrvaka eveti yuktaṃ tāyitvāt sugatatvānumānaṃ bhagavataḥ*/ *... upadeśasya tathābhāvaḥ saṃvādakakatvaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ ...*

the perfection of cause (*hetusampad*) comprises the two aspects of altruistic intention (*āśayasampad*, i.e. the Buddha's *jagaddhitaiṣitā*) and practical application (*prayogasampad*, viz. his being a teacher, *śāstṛtva*) and the perfection of result (*phalasampad*) comprises the two aspects of own purpose (*svārthasampad*, viz. the Buddha's being a Sugata) and others' purpose (*parārthasampad*, viz. his being a protector, *tāyin*).[67]

The concept of *tathāgata* with which the last part of the present article was concerned would seem to correspond to Dignāga's concept of *sugata* belonging to the subcategory of the *svārthasampad*, which is included under the Bhagavant's *phalasampad*. But it is to be noted that Haribhadra (*c.* 800) has in fact connected the concept of *tathāgata* rather with the perfection of being a Teacher (*śāstṛtvasampad*), a category that instead belongs, according to Dignāga, to the *prayogasampad* of the *hetusampad*. This *śāstṛtvasampad* is subdivided by Haribhadra according to whether it is characterized by being a proclaimer (*vaktṛtvalakṣaṇā*) or a comprehender (*pratipattṛlakṣaṇā*), because being a teacher requires both understanding on one's own part and communication of this understanding to others. Finally, the category of the *pratipattṛlakṣaṇā śāstṛtvasampat* comprises the twin perfections of Gnosis (*jñānasampad*) and elimination (*prahāṇasampad*). Now, in respect of the perfection of elimination (*prahāṇasampad*) belonging to his *pratipattṛlakṣaṇā śāstṛtvasampat*, the Buddha is known as Arhant. In respect of the perfection of Gnosis (*jñānasampad*) belonging to his *pratipattṛlakṣaṇā śāstṛtvasampat*, the Buddha is known as Samyaksambuddha. And in respect of his *vaktṛlakṣaṇā śāstṛtvasampat* the Buddha is known as Tathāgata, this connexion being explained by Haribhadra in terms of the hermeneutical etymology according to which the word *tathāgata* is derived from the root *gad-* 'to speak, proclaim'.[68] As for the cause (*hetu*) of the *śāstṛtvasampad*, it is to be found according to Haribhadra in *vidyā*, i.e. *samyagdṛṣṭi*, the first member of the Eightfold Path, the other seven members of this Path constituting *caraṇa*. Alternatively, Haribhadra adds, *vidyā* may be understood as exercise on the level of discriminative knowledge (*adhiprajñaṃ śikṣā*) and *caraṇa* as exercise on the levels of mind (*adhicittam*) and conduct (*adhiśīlam*). Thus, following either explanation, the Buddha is known as *vidyācaraṇasampanna*.

It is at the same time to be observed that, rather than connecting the category of being a Sugata with a separate *svārthasampad* subsumed under the *phalasampad*, Haribhadra has connected it with the *śāstṛtvasampad*, giving among several alternatives the explanation that a Sugata has achieved the perfection of Gnosis and elimination (*jñānaprahāṇasampadaṃ gataḥ sugataḥ*).[69] Haribhadra's structuring of this *sampad* is accordingly somewhat different from Dignāga's as expressed in the autocommentary to the first verse of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

Thus, in developing their distinctive concept of *pramāṇabhūta*—and notwithstanding the noteworthy resemblances discussed above with earlier terms and concepts found in older Indian texts such as the idea of the Ācārya as *pramāṇabhūta* in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* and the idea of the sage as *addhāti*, *adhigatayāthātathya*, and *pratyakṣadharman* or *sākṣātkṛtadharman*—, Dignāga and his successors have unmistakably combined their epistemology with a special theory of knowledge and buddhahood.

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[67] See Dignāga *Pramāṇasamuccaya-Vṛtti* i.1. This fourfold scheme is again found in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of Dharmakīrti's *PV*, even though it is there worded slightly differently in terms of the cultivation of compassion (*karuṇābhyāsa*, *k.* 35), proclamation (*ākhyāna*, *k.* 132), being a Sugata (*k.* 139) and being a protector (*tāya*, i.e. *svadṛṣṭamārgokti* or *catuḥsatyaprakāśana*, *k.* 145–6).

[68] See above, n. 52.

[69] *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka* ii, 183–4.

ON M. MAYRHOFER'S *ETYMOLOGISCHES WÖRTERBUCH DES ALTINDOARISCHEN*[1]

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Immediately after finishing his *Kurzgefaßtes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen (KEWA)*, M. Mayrhofer had the very commendable courage to start work on an *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen (EWA)*, of which the first 11 fascicles now (Autumn 1992) lie before us. It is not, as the author rightly insists, 'a new (and improved) edition' of *KEWA*, but a renewed attempt in its own rights. It is an attempt to produce 'an etymological dictionary' of 'a big corpus language (i.e. of Sanskrit)' in 'a practicable and finishable form', that is: an etymological dictionary such as could be brought to completion 'by a single scholar within his life time',—provided this scholar would have the industry and tenacious dedication of a Mayrhofer, we should like to add. Even in the close atmosphere of such a somewhat constraining qualification, Mayrhofer aims high: he thinks of 'an etymological dictionary approaching the fulfilment of demands of an ideal order'.

The differences between the former work and the one recently begun, already clearly recognizable, are many and conspicuous. The changes introduced are mostly—not always, as is only to be expected—distinct improvements. One of the most important changes is highly welcome: the conscientious reference to the first occurrence of each word in Sanskrit literature.

The attribute 'kurzgefaßt' does not appear in the title. Even the *KEWA* was not actually 'concise': it was so in comparison only with the planned *Vergleichendes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen* by W. Wüst. Of this only the first fascicle (parts I and II) was published (Heidelberg, 1935), containing beside other items a Vorrede of no less than 123 pages (against *KEWA*, 1st fasc. 1951: 5 pages), constituting quite a monument to what indigenous Sanskrit grammarians would call an *ativistara-*.

While 'Altindisch' (thus in the title of *KEWA*) is not an ideal designation for the sacred language of India, it must be admitted that it is, at least, unequivocal: it is the oldest literary language traditionally handed down and developed, generation by generation, in India and the only one that was not geographically limited to a certain part of India but spread, in the course of time, over the whole Indian subcontinent, though understood and spoken only by a well-defined minority of educated people—and that, in ever growing degree and eventually exclusively, side-by-side with a local dialect or language.

The clumsy expression 'Altindoarisch' in the title of *EWA*, which echoes the linguistic usage of W. Wüst (see above), is hardly preferable: without having received some explanation, most scholars, inclusive of myself, would understand it as referring to Vedic Sanskrit (and, possibly, to old popular Indo-Aryan languages, which can be shown to have lent words and/or ways of pronunciation to Sanskrit even as early as in Rigvedic times).[2]

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[1] Indogermanische Bibliothek, II. Reihe: Wörterbücher. I. Bd. (Lieferungen 1–10), 1986–92), lxiv, 812 pp. II. Bd., Lieferung 1, 1–80 pp. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1992). Lieferungen 1–6 were reviewed by J. C. Wright, *BSOAS*, LIII, 3, 1990, 534–6.

[2] Examples, certain at least according to my conviction, though partly suspect to Mayrhofer, are: *akkhalī-kṛ* (**akṣarī-kṛ*), *salila-* '(salt) water' (**sar-ila*, cf. *sarṣapa-* *EWA*, III, 448, 'mustard'), *śakaṭa-* 'cart' ('[fitted] with a tilt': **sa-kaṭa*), *kāla-* 'point/span of time' (RV also *kāra-*), etc. I have chosen intentionally words distinctly pointing to a common source: the mother of later Māgadhī.

152/14

drawing the *ben ki* into a comprehensive and ultimately finite ('I have granted...') grammatical construction: 'Since to the Porte of Me, who am...'.[94]

The 'reins' and the 'seal' figure in the *'ahdnāmes* for Austria of 975/1568[95] and of 984/1576;[96] but these clauses soon ceased to be reserved to dealings with the emperor, for they form part of the exceptionally prolix and labyrinthine exordium to the Dutch *'ahdnāme* of 1612: this begins with *çūn*; it lacks the expected *-ım* at the end of the *ben ki* element; it states that the reins of sovereignty have been placed in Our (sic) hand; and it is impossible—at least, for me—to detect what logical syntactical structure underlies the first 400 or so words of this text.[97]

Both of the original modifications, the 'reins'-clause and the *çūn*, appearing (perhaps significantly) a few years after Celālzāde had ceased to be Nişancı, seem to have been intended as stylistic improvements, and indeed in the cases of the *'ahdnāmes* for Austria and Florence they are grammatically explicable. However, on reading further through the later *'ahdnāmes* in Ferīdūn and in *Mu'āhedāt mecmū'ası* and on encountering a variety of further modifications and 'repairs', I am left with the impression that the Ottoman chancery had forgotten the simple origin of this protocol, in a declaratory *ben ki* and a vocative *sen ki*; but having first, in two ways and fairly successfully, tampered with it, and being restrained by precedent from re-writing it completely, the composers of *'ahdnāmes* never finally achieved a convincing resolution of its syntax.

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[94] On this interpretation, the Persian conjunction *çūn* 'foreshadows' the Turkish causative *-dükleri ecilden*. Such a use, strictly speaking pleonastic, of loanwords to give warning of the coming Turkish construction is a common feature of Ottoman syntax (cf. *eger, şāyed, egerçi*; *kāşki*; *'ādetā, sanki*; *ṭıbḳı*; etc.).

[95] Ferīdūn, II, 96–100. This text begins with *çūn* and reads (l. 25) *ve sen ki* (error ?).

[96] *Mu'āhedāt mecmū'ası*, III, 65–9 (cf. Hammer, *GOR*, IV, 27). This text has no *çūn* and no string of territorial names for the sultan.

[97] De Groot, op. cit. in n. 34, pp. 233–5.

DHARMA AND ABHIDHARMA[1]

By Johannes Bronkhorst

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1.1. The following list occurs in a number of Buddhist Sūtras and Vinaya texts:

I. 1. 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*
  2. 4 *samyakpradhāna/-prahāṇa*
  3. 4 *ṛddhipāda*
  4. 5 *indriya*
  5. 5 *bala*
  6. 7 *bodhyaṅga*
  7. *ārya aṣṭāṅga mārga*

Most commonly it is presented as a list of beneficial psychic characteristics (*kuśala dharma*) or simply psychic characteristics (*dharma*).[2] Sometimes practising the items of this list is stated to be a precondition for liberation from the intoxicants (*āśrava*).[3] Or else the list is said to constitute the 'cultivation of the road' (*mārgabhāvanā*).[4] In a few instances the items of the list are characterized as 'jewels' (*ratna*).[5] This characterization occurs where doctrine and discipline (*dharmavinaya*) are compared with the ocean, and finds its justification in this comparison.

The importance ascribed to this list cannot be overrated. It is often presented as the teaching of the Buddha in a nutshell,[6] and his central teaching about which no disagreement exists (*MN* II. 245, *MĀ*(C), 753c2 f.). It seems clear that this is an early, perhaps the earliest, list of the type that came to be called *mātṛkā*/P. *mātikā* and formed the basis for the later Abhidharma works. The connexion between this list and Abhidharma seems confirmed by a passage in the *Kinti Sutta* (*MN* II. 239) which speaks of monks who have been trained in the items of this list and then disagree about Abhidharma.[7] (This passage may be the only one in the Sūtrapiṭaka that gives some clear hint as to what was then meant by 'Abhidharma'; cf. Muck, 1980.) Later works also indicate the central position of our list in Abhidharma. The Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins (T. 1451, 408b7–8; cf. Rockhill, 1907: 160) characterizes 'Mātṛkā' as comprised of our list, plus other items following it. The same is true of two Chinese versions of the *Aśokāvadāna* (T. 2042, 113c3–5; T. 2043, 152a14–17; cf. Przyluski, 1926: 45).

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[1] Financial assistance was given by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.). I further thank Professors L. Schmithausen, T. E. Vetter and E. Zürcher for advice and criticism.

[2] *DN* II. 120; III. 102, 127–8; *MN* II. 238–9, 245; *SN* III. 96; *MPS* 196, 224; *MĀ*(C), 753c6–7; T. 7 (translation of *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*), 193a2–3. See also *MN* III. 289–90; *SN* V. 49–50; *AN* V. 175–6; *SĀ*(C), 87c2–5.

[3] *SN* III. 153–4; *AN* IV. 125–7; *SĀ*(C), 67a28–c1.

[4] *Vin.* III. 93, IV. 26.

[5] *AN* IV. 203; *Ud.* 56; *Vin.* II. 240; *MĀ*(C), 476c20–25. Cf. *EĀ*(C), 753b1 f.

[6] This is clearly the case in a Sūtra passage cited in the Abhidharma *Vijñānakāya* (T. 1539, 544a12–16 = 544c4–7 = 545a25–8), according to which the Buddha proclaims the *dharma* (pl.) without exception, and does not keep them secret; the *dharma* are then specified as in the above list.

[7] Perhaps *abhi dhamme* in this passage must be understood as two words, 'as regards the *dhamma*'; cf. *CPD* s.v. *abhidhamma*.

1.2. The above list enumerates 'psychic characteristics'. That, at least, is how it may be regarded (see § 3.2 below). However, psychic characteristics were used in early Buddhism to reach meditational states, and the two cannot always be clearly distinguished. Note, for example, that *samādhi* 'concentration' is found under the headings *indriya, bala, bodhyaṅga* and *ārya aṣṭāṅga mārga*. It comes as no surprise that attempts were made to make the list more complete on meditational states. An obvious extension was the following:

II. 1. 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*
  2. 4 *samyakpradhāna/-prahāṇa*
  3. 4 *ṛddhipāda*
  4. 4 *dhyāna*
  5. 5 *indriya*
  6. 5 *bala*
  7. 7 *bodhyaṅga*
  8. *ārya aṣṭāṅga mārga*

This list is found in some canonical Sūtras.[8]

A further extension is:

III. 1. 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*
  2. 4 *samyakpradhāna/-prahāṇa*
  3. 4 *ṛddhipāda*
  4. 4 *dhyāna*
  5. 4 *apramāṇa*
  6. 5 *indriya*
  7. 5 *bala*
  8. 7 *bodhyaṅga*
  9. *ārya aṣṭāṅga mārga*

This is found (in Pāli) in the Mātṛkā of the *Dhātukathā*, an Abhidharma work (p. 1).

The addition of *dhyāna* and *apramāṇa* was clearly meant to complete the list with meditational states. However, some important meditational states are still absent from list III, namely:

(i) *ākāśānantyāyatana*
(ii) *vijñānānantyāyatana*
(iii) *ākiñcanyāyatana*
(iv) *naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*
(v) *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*

We may surmise that after III there came a list which added an item between *apramāṇa* and *indriya* covering all or most of these as yet unmentioned meditational states.

Such an extension has not survived. However, we do have an indication that it existed. The *Saṅgīti Sūtra* of the *Dīrghāgama* contains lists of items arranged in accordance with the number of their subdivisions. The chapter on items with four subdivisions contains in its various versions the following enumerations (cf. Stache-Rosen, 1968 : 215).

Sanskrit version (Stache-Rosen, 1968 : 93 f.)	Pāli version (DN III. 221 f.)
1. 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*	1. 4 *satipaṭṭhāna*
2. 4 *prahāṇa*	2. 4 *sammappadhāna*
3. 4 *ṛddhipāda*	3. 4 *iddhipāda*
4. 4 *dhyāna*	4. 4 *jhāna*
5 4 *āryasatya*	5. 4 *samādhibhāvanā*
6. 4 *saṃjñā*	6. 4 *appamaññā*
7. 4 *apramāṇa*	7. 4 *arūpa*
8. 4 *ārūpya*	. . . . . .
. . . . . .	

Chinese version 1 (*DĀ*(C), 50c9 f.)	Chinese version 2 (T. 12, 228b16 f.)
11. 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*	1. 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*
12. 4 *prahāṇa*	2. 4 *samyakprahāṇa*
13. 4 *ṛddhipāda*	3. 4 *ṛddhipāda*
14. 4 *dhyāna*	4. 4 *dhyāna*
15. 4 *brahmavihāra*[9]	5. 4 *apramāṇa*
16. 4 *ārūpya*	6. 4 *ārūpya*
. . . . . .	. . . . . .

Clearly, the original *Saṅgīti Sūtra* contained the enumeration in the order preserved by the Chinese versions. It is moreover difficult to doubt that this enumeration was taken from an earlier list, viz.

IV. 1. 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*
  2. 4 *samyakpradhāna/-prahāṇa*
  3. 4 *ṛddhipāda*
  4. 4 *dhyāna*
  5. 4 *apramāṇa*
  6. 4 *ārūpya*
  7. 5 *indriya*
  8. 5 *bala*
  9. 7 *bodhyaṅga*
  10. *ārya aṣṭāṅga mārga*

1.3. The development which we have been able to trace here is not without significance. The whole process, from list I to list IV, must have preceded the composition of the *Saṅgīti Sūtra*, and had therefore run its course well before the completion of the Sūtrapiṭaka. This does not, however, imply that the works from which these lists have been taken must all be as old as that. Clearly, these lists, or some of them, had a life of their own, and were open to use by later works. For this reason our attention for the moment is confined to the lists, and not to the works in which they occur.

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[8] *DĀ*(C), 16c11, 74a15, 76c29; *MĀ*(C), 805c12 f.; T. 6 (translation of *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*), 181b8–9. It is remarkable that the *Dīrghāgama* preserved in Chinese seems to have only list II, not I. The passage cited in the *Vijñānakāya* (note 6, above) derives to all appearances from the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*; this would mean that the Dīrghāgama of the Sarvāstivādins had list I at least once.

[9] The 4 *brahmavihāra* are identical with the 4 *apramāṇa*.

There is one circumstance which allows us to push lists I–III back to an even earlier date. We have seen that the development from I to IV was occasioned by the desire to incorporate meditational states. We also saw that list III, while including the relatively unimportant *apramāṇa*, made no mention of the states covered by the term *ārūpya*. How is this to be explained ?

The answer may lie in the fact that the meditational states covered by the term *ārūpya* do not appear to have been originally part of Buddhist meditation. The Buddhist Sūtras contain traces of a time when these states were as yet not accepted: in the story of the Bodhisattva's training under Ārāḍa Kālāma and Udraka, the son of Rāma (*MN* I. 163–7, 240; II. 212; *MĀ*(C), 776b5–777a4; also in the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptakas: T. 1428, 780b7–c19) the Bodhisattva learned from them the *ākiñcanyāyatana* and the *naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana* respectively, but rejected these states since they did not lead him to the desired end. This story does not appear to be historical and was intended as a denouncement of these two states, and consequently of the 4 *ārūpya*. In another study (Bronkhorst, forthcoming: § 7.2) it has been argued that these states were adopted into Buddhism from Jaina or related circles.

The states covered by the term *ārūpya* figure frequently in the Buddhist Sūtras, but could not have made their entrance there until after they were universally accepted. List III appears to date from before this time.

I do not know if conclusions can be drawn from the absence of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* in list IV. List IV is, after all, a hypothetical construction, the exact shape of which is not known with certainty. It *may* have contained an item which also covers *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, such as, e.g., the 8 *vimokṣa*.

2.1. Part of the Pāli *Vibhaṅga* (pp. 193–305) is based on the following list.

V. 1. 4 *satipaṭṭhāna*
   2. 4 *sammappadhāna*
   3. 4 *iddhipāda*
   4. 7 *bojjhaṅga*
   5. *ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga*
   6. 4 *jhāna*
   7. 4 *appamaññā*
   8. 5 *sikkhāpada*
   9. 4 *paṭisambhidā*

Frauwallner (1971: 107–8) considered this to be a modified version of III, but it seems more likely to have been an independent development of I which, like III, must date from before the general acceptance of the 4 *ārūpya*.[10] (The absence of *indriya* and *bala* is explained by their treatment elsewhere in the *Vibhaṅga*.)

The *Vibhaṅga* itself must—as was argued by Frauwallner (1964: 73–80; 1971: 103 f.)—have developed out of an earlier work which also underlay the *Dharmaskandha* of the Sarvāstivādins. This earlier Abhidharma work, Frauwallner thinks (1971: 104), must have come into being before 200 B.C. Two

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[10] The Pāli *Vibhaṅga* makes up for the absence of the 4 *ārūpya* by citing under the heading *jhāna* a passage that covers much more than just the 4 *jhāna* and includes the 4 *ārūpya* (pp. 244 f.). It is, however, clear from the Pāli *Vibhaṅga* itself that this was originally not the case: the section 'Pañhāpucchaka' under the heading *jhāna* (pp. 269 f.) does not repeat that long passage, as it should, but gives the no doubt original passage which deals only with the 4 *jhāna*.

arguments (which Frauwallner explains in detail) support the common origin of *Vibhaṅga* and *Dharmaskandha*:

(i) Both works are based on three Mātṛkās which show undoubted similarities.

(ii) Both works share an otherwise very uncommon way of explaining the items of the Mātṛkās, viz. by citing relevant passages from Sūtras.

We shall not consider here the Mātṛkās of the *Dharmaskandha*, which show both similarities and differences by comparison with those in the *Vibhaṅga*. The *Dharmaskandha* has, for example, the 4 *ārūpya* after *dhyāna* and *apramāṇa* which indicates that these Mātṛkās had been 'updated' after the general acceptance of the *ārūpya*. We shall concentrate rather on the early Abhidharma work, referred to hereafter as 'Original Vibhaṅga', which must have been composed before 200 B.C. (see above). The nature of one of its Mātṛkās (viz. list V above) indicates that it *may* have been composed *long* before 200 B.C., for this Mātṛkā dates from before the general acceptance of the 4 *ārūpya*.

The 'Original Vibhaṅga' cited parts of Sūtras that introduced or explained items occurring in the Mātṛkās. Our question is: did the 'Original Vibhaṅga' make use of the Sūtras in their finished form, or did it rather use pieces of tradition which were still more or less free-floating and would only later be taken into the Sūtras known to us ? In the former case the agreement between the descendants of the 'Original Vibhaṅga' and the Sūtras would have to be great; in the latter, we might hope to find in *Vibhaṅga* and *Dharmaskandha* traces of a time prior to the completion of the Sūtras.

Whether such traces have survived is not certain. There is, however, one passage in the Pāli *Vibhaṅga* which *may* retain some ancient features. It occurs in the explanation of the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*/P. *satipaṭṭhāna*. The citations in the Pāli *Vibhaṅga* (pp. 193 f.) present the following specification.

I. *satipaṭṭhāna* on the body (*kāya*): observation of the impure constituents of the body
II. *satipaṭṭhāna* on feelings (*vedanā*)
III. *satipaṭṭhāna* on the mind (*citta*)
IV. *satipaṭṭhāna* on the *dhamma* (pl.): (1) observation of the 5 *nīvaraṇa*;[11] (2) observation of the 7 *bojjhaṅga*.[11]

The 'Original Vibhaṅga' must have contained this same description of the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*, because it is also found in the *Dharmaskandha* (T. 1537, 475c25 f.), with the difference that the *Dharmaskandha* adds items after those given in the *Vibhaṅga*, in the following manner.

I. *smṛtyupasthāna* on the body: (1) observation of the impure constituents of the body (476a6); (2) observation of the elements constituting the body (476a28); (3) observation of the body as sick, impermanent, not oneself, etc. (476b4).
II. *smṛtyupasthāna* on feelings (476c20)
III. *smṛtyupasthāna* on the mind (477c10)
IV. *smṛtyupasthāna* on the *dharma* (pl.): (1) observation of the 5 *nīvaraṇa* (478b23); (2) observation of the 6 *saṃyojana* (478c14); (3) observation of the 7 *bodhyaṅga* (478c21); (4) observation of *rūpa skandha* and *saṃskāra skandha* (478c29).

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[11] The terms *nīvaraṇa* and *bojjhaṅga* are not used, but the items covered by these terms are enumerated.

The items added are also found in the same or similar form in the Sūtras which deal with the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna* [12] (see Schmithausen, 1976 : 243 f.), and we may assume that the *Dharmaskandha* was influenced by them. Yet the *Dharmaskandha* seems to have added only items which came *after* those given in the *Vibhaṅga*, for only thus can we explain the striking absence of, in particular, the ' observation of the positions of the body ' under I ' *smṛtyupasthāna* on the body '.

This brings us to an important question: how should we explain the peculiar specification of the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna* found in the *Vibhaṅga* ? It is possible, but unfortunately far from certain, that the specification preserved in the *Vibhaṅga* is older than most of those found in the Sūtras. I shall show what arguments support this possibility, but emphasize beforehand that these arguments—for what they are worth—do no more than, at best, support the ancientness of the *specification* of the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*; they by no means support the ancientness of the exact wording of this portion of the *Vibhaṅga*, which is clearly not very old.

Regarding the *smṛtyupasthāna* on feelings and mind (II and III) there is no difficulty; these two *smṛtyupasthāna* are virtually the same in all sources, early and late. The original *smṛtyupasthāna* on *dharmas* (IV) concerned, according to Schmithausen (1976 : 247–9), the 5 *nīvaraṇa*, 6 *saṃyojana*,[13] and 7 *bodhyaṅga*. This accords well with the *Vibhaṅga*; the latter may be considered as leading back to an even earlier phase when the 6 *saṃyojana* did not as yet belong here.

A difficulty arises concerning the *smṛtyupasthāna* on the body (I). Schmithausen (1976 : 250–54) is of the opinion that originally only the ' observation of the positions of the body ' belonged here, and that everything else was added later. His arguments for the ' observation of the positions of the body ' (' Beobachtung der Körperhaltungen ') and against the ' observation of the impure constituents of the body ' (' Betrachtung der unreinen Körperbestandteile ') are as follows:

(i) Only the ' observation of the positions of the body ' is presented in exactly the form of the *smṛtyupasthāna* on feelings and mind (II and III).

(ii) The ' observation of the positions of the body ' stands first in the *Madhyamāgama* (*MĀ*(C), 582c12 f.), and in the later *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (p. 204, ll. 8 f.).

(iii) The ' observation of the impure constituents of the body ' is followed by a comparison, unlike e.g. the unsuspected *smṛtyupasthāna* on feelings and mind (II and III).

(iv) Reasons can be adduced to show that the addition of the ' observation of the impure constituents of the body ' has to be looked upon as incorporating old material. Schmithausen does not specify these reasons beyond the remark (pp. 252–3, n. 25) that the enumeration of constituents of the body mentions first the solid, then the fluid constituents; this in his opinion is explained by the assumption that this enumeration was taken from a context (e.g. *MN* I. 185 f.) where such a division is relevant.

(v) The ' observation of the impure constituents of the body ' represents an evaluation of what is observed, unlike the *smṛtyupasthāna* on feelings and mind.

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[12] *DN* II. 290 f.; *MN* I. 55 f.; *MĀ*(C), 582b7 f. A special case is *EĀ*(C), 568a1 f., which will be discussed below (§ 2.2).

[13] The Pāli versions have *āyatana*, which Schmithausen (1976 : p. 248, n. 15) considers a secondary modification.

These arguments are not completely beyond dispute. As regards (i)–(ii), it is at least conceivable that the ' observation of the positions of the body ' was brought in and placed at the head precisely *because* it could be presented like the *smṛtyupasthāna* on feelings and mind. The ' observation of the impure constituents of the body ' cannot easily be presented in this way.

(iii) A comparison *may* have been added to the ' observation of the impure constituents of the body ' precisely because it could not be presented like the *smṛtyupasthāna* on feelings and mind.

(iv) The uniformity of the Pāli canon is sufficient explanation for the similarity of the two enumerations of constituents of the body.

(v) The ' evaluation ' is embodied in only three words (*pūraṃ nānappakārassa asucino*), and no trace of it is found in the comparison; it is clearly of secondary importance and may even be an addition.

Apart from these in themselves not very decisive considerations, there is one argument which lends some plausibility to the view that the ' observation of the positions of the body ' was not originally the first of the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*. Briefly stated it is that in Buddhism *smṛti* is of two kinds (or better perhaps: degrees); ' observation of the positions of the body ' is of one kind, the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna* of the other.

In order to recognize the two kinds of *smṛti* we turn to the stereotype description of the road to liberation which often recurs in the Sūtras.[14] It distinguishes between preparatory exercises on the one hand, and ' meditation ' proper on the other, the two being divided by the moment when the monk went to a lonely place and sat down in the prescribed manner. *Smṛti* plays a role both before and after this moment, but in different ways. Before this moment the monk ' acts consciously while going and while coming, while looking forward and while looking backward, while bending his limbs and while stretching them, while carrying his clothes and alms-bowl, while eating and while drinking, while defecating and while urinating, while going, while standing, while sitting, while sleeping, while waking, while speaking and while remaining silent ' (*MN* I. 181 = *MN* I. 57 (*Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*), etc.); in short, the monk practises the ' observation of the positions of the body '. After this moment the situation changes. The monk no longer makes any movement. Yet his first act in this motionless position is ' calling up mindfulness ' (*parimukhaṃ satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā; pratimukhāṃ smṛtim upasthāpayitvā Mv.* II. 131). As the expression indicates, it is here that the *smṛtyupasthāna* would seem to come in. If this is correct, there is no place for ' observation of the positions of the body ' in the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*.

What then constitutes *smṛtyupasthāna* on the body in this motionless position ? Obviously only this: the monk directs his mindfulness to the different parts of his body. The enumerations found in the texts were no doubt amplified in the course of time by monks who could thus display their knowledge of the constituents of the human body, but we have no means of determining their original form. We may, however, consider the possibility that ' observation of the constituents of the body ' was initially the *smṛtyupasthāna* on the body. And this would confirm the view that the ' Original Vibhaṅga ' was composed before the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna* were given the explanations we now find in the Sūtras.

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[14] See Frauwallner, 1953 : 162 f.

2.2.1. One Sūtra of the *Ekottarāgama* (*EĀ*(C), 568a1 f.) specifies the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna* in the following manner:

I. *smṛtyupasthāna* on the body: (1) observation of the impure constituents of the body (568a17 and b1); (2) observation of the elements constituting the body (568a23); (3) observation of dead bodies (568b3).
II. *smṛtyupasthāna* on feelings (568b27)
III. *smṛtyupasthāna* on the mind (568c20)
IV. *smṛtyupasthāna* on the *dharma* (pl.): (1) practice of the 7 *bodhyaṅga* (569a19); (2) practice of the 4 *dhyāna* (569a23).

Schmithausen (1976: p. 247, n. 14a and p. 249, n. 17a) argues that this specification must be the result of a secondary development which began from the extended versions known from the Pāli Suttas and from the *Madhyamāgama*. In support of this opinion one might recall the generally late character of the *Ekottarāgama* preserved in Chinese (cf. Lamotte, 1967: 106; Bareau, 1963: 9; Bronkhorst, forthcoming: § 1.2).

However, the lateness or otherwise of any particular passage of the *Ekottarāgama* needs to be determined separately. The present passage may also be an independent development from a description of the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna* even older than the one surviving in the *Vibhaṅga*. This earliest recognizable description of the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna* would then have been somewhat like this:

I. *smṛtyupasthāna* on the body: observation of the (impure ?) constituents of the body
II. *smṛtyupasthāna* on feelings
III. *smṛtyupasthāna* on the mind
IV. *smṛtyupasthāna* on the *dharmas*: observation of the 7 *bodhyaṅga*

The fact that 'observation of the 5 *nīvaraṇa*' soon came to be added under heading IV is easily explained. In the stereotype description of the road to liberation the mention of *smṛtyupasthāna* (*parimukhaṃ satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā*/*pratimukhām smṛtim upasthāpayitvā*) is immediately followed by the abandonment of the 5 *nīvaraṇa*.

Note that the existence of a passage like the present one in the *Ekottarāgama* would be difficult to explain other than by assuming that it preserves an old tradition. We may therefore look upon it as evidence in support of the view developed in the preceding section.

2.2.2. It is tempting to explain the presence of the above, supposedly archaic specification of the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna* in the *Ekottarāgama* preserved in Chinese by assuming that this *Ekottarāgama* belonged to the Mahāsāṅghikas. The Mahāsāṅghikas may have emerged as a separate sect around 116 or 137 years after the death of the Buddha (Bareau, 1955b: 88–9; Nattier and Prebish, 1977: 270–72; but see Bechert, 1982: 31), long before the other sects whose collections of Sūtras have been preserved. This would make it at least conceivable that the Sūtras of the Mahāsāṅghikas should preserve some early features where the texts of the other sects show in common a further development.

Regarding the Mahāsāṅghika affiliation of the *Ekottarāgama* preserved in Chinese I may quote the following passage from a letter from Professor André Bareau dated 14.6.1983:

> 'Les études comparatives partielles que j'ai pu faire ces dernières années . . . entre divers autres passages de cet *Ekottara-āgama* et les textes parallèles en pāli, en sanskrit et en traduction chinoise ont confirmé sans cesse l'hypothèse de l'appartenance de ce recueil à une secte du groupe des Mahāsāṃghika, hypothèse émise et soutenue notamment par Akanuma. A chaque fois, en effet, le passage en question se distingue très nettement des textes parallèles donnés par les Theravādin, les Mahīśāsaka, les Dharmaguptaka et les Sarvāstivādin, et il est au contraire fort proche de celui que contient le *Mahāvastu*, dont l'origine mahāsāṃghika, plus précisément lokottaravādin, n'est pas contestée. Plus exactement, la version fournie par l'*Ekottara-āgama* est plus simple, et probablement donc plus ancienne, que celle du *Mahāvastu*, mais toutes les deux dérivent clairement d'une même tradition et présentent en gros les mêmes caractéristiques par la structure du récit, la surabondance des détails prodigieux, etc.
>
> L'hypothèse selon laquelle cet ouvrage aurait appartenu aux Dharmaguptaka, comme le pensent certains de nos estimés collègues, me paraît difficile à soutenir, car il y a beaucoup trop de différences, et de différences importantes, entre les passages de l'*Ekottara-āgama* et les textes parallèles trouvés dans le *Vinaya-piṭaka* des Dharmaguptaka (T. no. 1428) et dans le *Dīrgha-āgama* (T. no. 1) de cette même secte, qui nous sont parvenus tous les deux seulement dans leur version chinoise. Cela apparaît déjà nettement dans les trois volumes de ma *Biographie du Buddha* . . . et surtout dans les deux qui traitent du dernier voyage, de la mort et des funérailles du Bienheureux. Il est tout à fait significatif, à mon sens, que, dans le récit du don de l'Āmravana fait au Buddha par Āmrapālī, le texte de l'*Ekottara-āgama* (T. no. 125, p. 596c) ne contient pas l'enseignement prêté au Bienheureux par les Dharmaguptaka (T. no. 1, p. 14b–c; T. no. 1428, p. 856c) et dans lequel il insiste sur les avantages du don fait au Buddha, conformément à la fameuse thèse fondamentale de la secte. Le fait que la femme offre son parc " au Buddha et à la Communauté des moines " ne suffit pas pour décider que ce recueil appartient certainement aux Dharmaguptaka, comme cela apparaît assez clairement, je pense, dans l'étude que j'ai faite de ce passage dans ma *Biographie du Buddha* . . . (volume II, tome I, pp. 130–31). Les différences sont si évidentes que je n'ai pas pensé un seul instant à attribuer le recueil en question aux Dharmaguptaka.'

An additional argument in support of the Mahāsāṅghika affiliation of the Chinese *Ekottarāgama* is its great divergence from the Pāli *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, far greater than the divergence of the other collections of Sūtras preserved in Chinese from their counterparts in Pāli. Anesaki (1908a: 84) already observed that 'the difference of the two traditions is not only in the title, but the deviation of single texts and of their contents, even when they agree as wholes, is most conspicuous. As my researches show, the collections have only 10 per cent of the texts (suttas) in common. Those Pāli Anguttara texts which are not found in Chinese Ekottara are found in other Agamas in Chinese, and vice versa. For instance, 70 Anguttara suttas are found in the Chinese Madhyama, though some of them are also in the Ekottara. In like manner most of the Chinese Ekottara texts may be traced in other Nikayas and Agamas'. The idea suggests itself that the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* and the *Ekottarāgama* are really independent works, which could not, however, fail to have some elements of similarity because both adopted the same principle of arrangement, viz. in accordance with the number of topics.

This view is supported by the following circumstance. The Chinese Tripiṭaka preserves a collection of Sūtras (T. 150) which the oldest catalogues already ascribe to the translator An Shih-kao (second century A.D.). Anesaki (1908b: 28–9) was able to show that this is really an Ekottara collection of 44 Sūtras, to which three other Sūtras were added. Of these 44 Sūtras only six do *not* correspond with Sūtras of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (see Anesaki, 1908b: 29–31; Ono Gemyō, 1968–75: IV, 333–4). Only five of the 44 Sūtras, on the other hand, correspond with Sūtras in the *Ekottarāgama*.[15] The Sūtras contained in T. 150 represent an independent development of a collection that also found expression in the Pāli *Aṅguttara Nikāya*. The *Ekottarāgama* preserved in Chinese does not appear to be a development of this early collection, and is consequently likely to be a more or less independent creation.

The possibly archaic specification of the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna* in a supposedly Mahāsāṃghika text induces us to consider tentatively the possibility that the Mahāsāṃghikas did not initially accept the 4 *ārūpya* and the meditational state called *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*. This supposition is supported by the fact that the *Mahāvastu*—which presents itself as a Vinaya work of the Lokottaravādins, a sub-sect of the Mahāsāṅghikas—seems to refer to these meditational states only in a negative way: to *ākiñcanyāyatana* (cf. Edgerton, 1953: 87, s.v. *ākiṃcanyāyatana*) and *naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana* in the context of Ārāḍa Kālāma and Udraka, the son of Rāma (*Mv.* II. 118–20; III. 322); to *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* as 'an unworthy object of supreme religious ambition' (*Mv.* I. 127; see Edgerton, 1953: 552, s.v. *saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha*). (The 4 *dhyāna* are mentioned positively: *Mv.* I. 228; II. 131–2.) Moreover, points 2–4 of the 'five points of Mahādeva' (see Nattier and Prebish, 1977: 251–7) which seem to have been the reason for the schism that gave rise to the sect of the Mahāsāṅghikas (Bareau, 1955b: 92–6, 1957: 242 f.; but see Nattier and Prebish, 1977: 265–70)[16] appear to reject the belief that Arhants are omniscient. This belief was a foreign intrusion into Buddhism, most probably inspired by the corresponding belief among the Jainas. The Mahāsāṅghikas may also not have accepted other influences from outside, among them the 4 *ārūpya* and *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*. If all this is correct, the Mātṛkās which do not mention the 4 *ārūpya*, as well as the 'Original Vibhaṅga', date from before the schism that gave rise to the Mahāsāṅghikas, i.e. from before the year 116 or 137 after the death of the Buddha.

Against this there is a possible objection. Some Sūtras which are found both in the Pāli *Aṅguttara Nikāya* and in the *Ekottarāgama* refer to the meditational states that were supposedly not accepted by the early Mahāsāṅghikas: *AN* IV.40 and the corresponding *EĀ*(C), 730c mention, and apparently accept, *ākāśānantyāyatana*, *vijñānānantyāyatana* and *ākiñcanyāyatana*; *AN* IV.401 and *EĀ*(C), 764c refer to these same states, plus *naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*. The obvious conclusion would seem to be that the common ancestor of both *Aṅguttara Nikāya* and *Ekottarāgama*, which existed before the schism and was accepted by all, already contained references to these meditational states.

The answer to this objection has already been given. It is not likely that the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* and the *Ekottarāgama* had a common ancestor. The fact that they none the less share a limited number of Sūtras in common is explained by the extensive borrowing which took place later between the different sects.

2.3. A closer understanding of the time and function of the 'Original Vibhaṅga' may be obtained by comparing it with the other text of the same name belonging to the Buddhist canon and which we shall refer to as 'Vinaya-Vibhaṅga'.[17] This text shares a number of peculiarities with our 'Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga'. Both comment on lists, the one on a list of Vinaya rules called 'Prātimokṣa', the other on a list of Abhidharma items called 'Mātṛkā'.[18] The manner in which the two Vibhaṅgas comment is also very similar. They both give passages of undoubted canonicity which explain or shed further light on the items of the respective lists. In the Vinaya-Vibhaṅga we read how, when and why the Buddha uttered this or that rule of the Prātimokṣa. The Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga explains the items occurring in its Mātṛkās by citing passages that also occur in Sūtras. Moreover, both the Vinaya-Vibhaṅga and the Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga give detailed explanations of words which occur in rules (Vin.-Vibh.) or in explanatory passages (Abh.-Vibh.).

It seems clear that both the Vibhaṅgas had a common purpose, viz. to demonstrate the canonicity of the lists on which they comment. Interestingly, this purpose was not fully achieved in the case of the Vinaya-Vibhaṅga: this work is canonical, the Prātimokṣa in itself is not (Winternitz, 1920: 18; Prebish, 1975: 10). The Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga was more successful in its attempt: this work (or rather the later Pāli *Vibhaṅga* and Sarvāstivāda *Dharmaskandha*) became canonical together with the Mātṛkās on which it came to comment.

It is reasonable to assume that the two original Vibhaṅgas date from roughly the same period, so that we must look at what is known about the date of the original Vinaya-Vibhaṅga. Frauwallner (1956: 130–44) has argued convincingly 'that the author of the *Skandhaka* already knew, if not the [Vinaya-]*Vibhaṅga*, at least similar explanations to the Prātimokṣa, and that he drew some of his stories from them'; that is to say, the original Vinaya-Vibhaṅga is older than the original Skandhaka. The original Skandhaka must have been composed shortly before or after the second council according to Frauwallner (1956: 67); this may have been around 40 or 50 years after the death of the Buddha (Bechert, 1982: 36). The original Vinaya-Vibhaṅga, and perhaps also the original Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga, may be older than this.

2.4. Frauwallner (1956: 151) observes that the original Skandhaka made no mention of Abhidharma, whereas Dharma and Vinaya are repeatedly spoken of. He concludes 'that the author of the *Skandhaka* work did not know the Abhidharma'. How can this be made to accord with the idea that the Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga already existed?

The answer to this question must be twofold. First, we must agree that the author of the Skandhaka did not accept Abhidharma—i.e. the Mātṛkās and the extensive explanations in the Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga—as canonical. Secondly, the central portion of the Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga consisted in passages which also (came to) occur in Sūtras, and which consequently are 'Dharma', not

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[15]

T. 150	*EĀ*(C) (T. 125)
no. 6, p. 877a :	no. 21.2, p. 602b
no. 10, p. 877b :	no. 25.10, p. 635a
no. 15, p. 878a :	no. 32.12, p. 681b
no. 40, p. 881b :	no. 18.1, p. 587b
no. 45, p. 882a :	no. 21.7, p. 604a

[16] Nattier and Prebish (1977: 260 f.) propose to associate Mahādeva and the five points with a later schism within the ranks of the Mahāsāṅghikas. Frauwallner (1952: 243–9) makes the more plausible proposal to connect Mahādeva with the later schism, but the five points with the origin of the Mahāsāṅghikas.

[17] For information regarding the 'Vinaya-Vibhaṅga' in the various traditions, see Frauwallner, 1956: 172 f.

[18] The Pāli Pātimokkha is sometimes referred to as *mātikā*; see Norman, 1983: 96, 126.

'Abhidharma'. We may assume that the 'Abhidharma' aspect of the 'Original Vibhaṅga', i.e. primarily the Mātṛkās, was not considered canonical until much later.[19]

We saw that the Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga was an attempt to make the Mātṛkās canonical by tracing their items to utterances of the Buddha. This very attempt indicates how old the work was. The later tradition ascribes Abhidharma to persons other than the Buddha, primarily Śāriputra (cf. Migot, 1952: 519 f.; Lamotte, 1958: 200 f.). This later tradition already finds expression in the *Saṅgīti Sūtra* and *Daśottara Sūtra* of the *Dīrghāgama*, which are ascribed to Śāriputra. Here we have another indication that the Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga existed prior to the completion of the Sūtrapiṭaka.

3.1. The Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga was not accepted as canonical until much later. This made it possible for extensive modifications still to be made to it, resulting in texts that diverge from each other as greatly as the Pāli *Vibhaṅga* and the Sarvāstivāda *Dharmaskandha*. The reason why the early Buddhists were hesitant to assign canonicity to this work cannot have lain with the passages which are also found in the Sūtras. The stumbling-block must rather have been the claim accompanying the Mātṛkās that they embodied the whole, or at least the most essential, teaching of the Buddha. This claim was perhaps not explicitly made in the Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga, but we have seen (§ 1.1) that it already accompanied the early Mātṛkā, designated 'list I' here. Moreover, the two Sūtras which have the closest connexion with Abhidharma—*Saṅgīti Sūtra* and *Daśottara Sūtra*—and which are even ascribed to Śāriputra instead of to the Buddha, present themselves as summarizing the whole of the teaching of the Buddha.

Clearly, such large claims would have had a twofold effect: (i) the early Buddhists would be reluctant to look upon any such Mātṛkā or collection of Mātṛkās as final; (ii) as a result they might have been led to try to complete the lists, finding more items in the body of utterances traditionally ascribed to the Buddha. This latter endeavour would of course be greatly helped by a suitable arrangement of the traditional material. Thus the early existence of some kind of Abhidharma would explain the peculiar shape of the Sūtrapiṭaka, or rather of two sections of it, the *Saṃyuktāgama*/P. *Saṃyutta Nikāya* and the *Ekottarāgama*/P. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*. The former arranges traditional utterances ascribed to the Buddha subject-wise; the latter follows a scheme determined by the number of subdivisions in the items discussed. Again, this peculiar arrangement accords well with a time when efforts were made to distil from the tradition lists of items that could be considered to embody the essence of the teaching of the Buddha. The rearrangement of accepted utterances does not in itself make them unacceptable; the additional claim that one particular enumeration constitutes the whole, or the essence, of the teaching of the Buddha may not be acceptable. The former procedure characterizes the *Saṃyuktāgama*/*Saṃyutta Nikāya* and *Ekottarāgama*/*Aṅguttara Nikāya*; the latter, the Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga.

An original connexion between the *Saṃyuktāgama*/*Saṃyutta Nikāya* and early Abhidharma is supported by the information we possess on the arrangement of the early *Saṃyuktāgama*. The *Saṃyutta Nikāya* consists of the following five Vaggas:

1. *Sagātha-vagga*
2. *Nidāna-vagga*; includes sections on *paṭiccasamuppāda* and *dhātu*
3. *Khandha-vagga*
4. *Saḷāyatana-vagga*
5. *Mahā-vagga*

The last of these, the Mahā-vagga, consists of twelve Saṃyuttas, the first seven of which deal with *magga*, *bojjhaṅga*, *satipaṭṭhāna*, *indriya*, *sammappadhāna*, *bala* and *iddhipāda*, respectively. Anesaki (1908b: 70 f.) has shown that the two extant versions of the *Saṃyuktāgama* in Chinese (T. 99 and 100) are based on divisions to which he assigns the following Pāli names:

1. *Khandha-vagga*
2. *Saḷāyatana-vagga*
3. *Nidāna-vagga*; includes sections on *paṭiccasamuppāda* and *dhātu*
4. *Sāvaka-vagga*
5. *Magga-vagga*
6. *Puggala-vagga*
7. *Sagātha-vagga*
8. *Tathāgata-vagga*

Here it is the Magga-vagga whose first five Saṃyuttas deal with *satipaṭṭhāna*, *indriya*, *bala*, *bojjhaṅga* and *magga*, respectively. The Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins (T. 1451, 407b16 f.; cf. Lévi and Chavannes, 1916: 35–6) describes the contents of the *Saṃyuktāgama* in this manner:

1. *Skandha-varga*; contains *Pañcaskandha-saṃyukta*
2. *Āyatana-dhātu-varga*; contains *Ṣaḍāyatana-aṣṭādaśadhātu-saṃyukta*
3. *Nidāna*; contains *Nidāna-āryasatya-saṃyukta*.
4. *Śrāvaka-vargasthāna*
5. *Buddha-vargasthāna*
6. *Āryamārga-vargasthāna*; contains Saṃyuktas on *smṛtyupasthāna*, *samyakpradhāna*, *ṛddhipāda*, *indriya*, *bala*, *bodhyaṅga*

We can easily recognize the connexion of the elements common to these three enumerations with the subject-matter of Abhidharma works, which almost invariably deal with *skandha*, *āyatana*, *dhātu*, and often with all or most of the items of list I (§ 1.1, above). The fact that the Vinaya of the Mahāsāṅghikas (T. 1425, 491c17–19), Dharmaguptakas (T. 1428, 968b21–3) and Mahīśāsakas (T. 1421, 191a25–7) give enumerations which cannot but be looked upon as incomplete (cf. Lévi and Chavannes, 1916: 33–5) does not cast doubt on this observation.

The obvious connexion between the Vibhaṅga Vagga of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (Suttas no. 131–42) and the Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga also points to the early date of the latter work and the influence of early Abhidharma on the Sūtras. The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* of the *Khuddaka Nikāya* 'seems to imply knowledge of the Vibhaṅga, e.g. when discussing the four *satipaṭṭhānas* the Paṭisambhidāmagga comments only upon *bhāvanā*, which is not included in the comment upon *satipaṭṭhāna* in the Vibhaṅga' (Norman, 1983: 89; cf. Rhys Davids, 1908: 591). Note further *Theragāthā* 1255, which describes knowledge of the *skandha*, *āyatana* and *dhātu* as a precondition for ordination of a monk.

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[19] In the present context it is of interest to note that 'at the time of the original brotherhood of monks into the Sthavira and Mahāsaṅghika lineages, the conceptual content of the term "*abhidharma*" was not yet clearly established' (Hirakawa, 1980: 175).

159/14

3.2. The items listed in the Mātṛkās came to be known as *dharma*. The word *dharma* acquired in Buddhism a sense which is very different from the senses it has in non-Buddhist contexts (and which are also met with in the Buddhist scriptures).[20] If the development described in the preceding sections is correct, the peculiar meaning which the word *dharma* acquired may also have a simple explanation.

We had occasion to observe that the items enumerated in list I can all be described as 'psychic characteristics' (§ 1.2, above). A glance at the explanations of these items in the Saṅgīti Sūtra (which repeats passages that are common in the Sūtras) confirms this. Moreover, the use of the word *dharma* in the 4th *smṛtyupasthāna* appeared to allow this same interpretation, since we learned that the '*smṛtyupasthāna* on the *dharma* (pl.)' was originally specified as 'observation of the 7 *bodhyaṅga*'. We may conclude that in this earliest list, which stands at the beginning of all later Abhidharma, *dharma* has a meaning which is in no way peculiarly Buddhist.

The fact that the later Mātṛkās developed out of, or were inspired by, our 'list I',[21] would explain the fact that the items contained in these later Mātṛkās came to be designated *dharma* as well. Another factor may also have supported this expansion of the meaning of *dharma*. We know that the teaching of the Buddha is frequently called *dharma*. This use of the term would be acceptable to Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike. The Mātṛkās were intended to contain the teaching (*dharma*) of the Buddha in a nutshell. Moreover, they were extensions of an original list of 'psychic characteristics' (*dharma*). These two factors may jointly be responsible for the fact that all the items enumerated in Mātṛkās, i.e. all the 'elements of existence', came to be designated *dharma*.

The circumstance that references to all kinds of *dharma* ('elements of existence') are found throughout the Sūtrapiṭaka does not indicate that some kind of *dharma*-theory constituted the original teaching of the Buddha (as maintained, e.g., by Stcherbatsky (1923) and Glasenapp (1938); cf. Conze, 1962: 92 f.; Kalupahana, 1975: ch. iv f.). Rather, it is satisfactorily explained by, and is a further support of, our thesis that Mātṛkās, and even one or more Abhidharma works, were in existence well before the completion of the Sūtrapiṭaka.

4. The results of our investigation can be summarized as follows. There is evidence that there were Abhidharma-like activities going on well before the Sūtras of the Sūtrapiṭaka had achieved anything like their present shape. In the case of one Mātṛkā—the oldest, it seems—four consecutive stages can be discerned, the last of which was known to the *Saṅgīti Sūtra* of the *Dīrghāgama*. An independent development of this Mātṛkā was used in the original Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga, which may date from less than 50 years after the death of the Buddha, provided that Frauwallner's ideas on the original Skandhaka are correct. It is further possible that the Abhidharma-Vibhaṅga existed before the common version of the *Smṛtyupasthāna Sūtra* in the *Madhyamāgama* took shape; the evidence in support of this, however, is not altogether decisive.

Our investigation could perhaps also shed light on the history of Buddhist meditation. It has confirmed that the meditational states covered by the term '4 *ārūpya*' are a foreign element in Buddhist meditation which did not acquire general acceptance until a rather late date. It has further provided some suggestions regarding the earliest accessible shape of the 4 *smṛtyupasthāna*.

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[20] See esp. Geiger, 1921.

[21] So also Warder, 1961: xxi, xxvii; 1980: 81–2.

A final result of this study may be to explain the presence in the Sūtras of a '*dharma*-theory'. The explanation is not that original Buddhism was, or contained, such a '*dharma*-theory'; rather it points to the influence of Abhidharma-like activities long before the completion of the Sūtrapiṭaka.

The above observations show how unreliable the Sūtras are as a basis for conclusions about earliest Buddhism if they are not used with the utmost care. In order to reach reliable conclusions on this subject we need to make use of all the information available. Sometimes this may be found in non-Buddhist scriptures, like those of the Jainas; and sometimes it may be necessary to conclude that later Buddhist works like the *Vibhaṅga*, *Dharma-skandha*, *Ekottarāgama* and even *Mahāvastu*, which are all based on very old traditions, can help us reach back to the period preceding the completion of the Sūtras known to us.

Abbreviations used in the text are:

AN	*Aṅguttara Nikāya* (PTS ed.)
(C)	Reference to the Chinese translations
CPD	*Critical Pāli dictionary*, begun by V. Trenckner. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard. 1924–
DĀ(C)	*Dīrghāgama* (T. 1)
DN	*Dīgha Nikāya* (PTS ed.)
EĀ(C)	*Ekottarāgama* (T. 125)
MĀ(C)	*Madhyamāgama* (T. 26)
MN	*Majjhima Nikāya* (PTS ed.)
MPS	*Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*. Sanskrit text edited by Ernst Waldschmidt. 3 parts. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 1950–51. (Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst, Jahrgang 1949, Nr. 1; 1950, Nr. 2, 3)
Mv.	*Mahāvastu* (ed. Senart, Paris, 1882, 1890, 1897)
P.	Pāli
PTS	Pali Text Society
SĀ(C)	*Saṃyuktāgama* (T. 99)
T.	Taisho ed. of Buddhist Tripiṭaka in Chinese
Vin.	*Vinaya Piṭaka* (PTS ed.)

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SWAHILI GESTURES: COMMENTS (*VIELEZI*) AND EXCLAMATIONS (*VIINGIZI*)

By Carol M. Eastman and Yahya Ali Omar

oduction

In this paper a number of gestures used by Kenya coastal Swahili speakers described. We describe gestures that are associated with speech in various ys ranging from some requiring speech as they are performed to others ferred to *via* verbs or phrases which are performed non-verbally. We attempt place the verbal-dependent gestures on a continuum of verbal—non-verbal mmunication. We also describe verbally-independent gestures and gesturally dependent speech forms that function similarly in discourse.

This research is an outgrowth of an earlier paper by Eastman (1983) escribing exclamations in (Standard) Swahili as verbal gestures, i.e. spoken rms functioning entirely in context and in relation to the behaviour in that ntext. Here we seek to broaden the scope of the pragmatic word class to hich exclamations (*viingizi*) belong to include gestures *per se*. We also delimit nother pragmatic 'word' class comprised of gestures. This other pragmatic Part of Speech' or, more aptly, 'Part of Communication' may be referred to a set of *vielezi*—comments. We distinguish the function of verbal and estural exclamations (*viingizi*) as being to evoke behaviour in context while e verbal and gestural behaviours classified as *vielezi* or 'comments' remark n behaviour that has already gone on in the context of discourse.

In spring 1983 at the University of Washington we collaborated on the reparation of a video programme to aid in Swahili language-class instruction.[1] In the process of working on this programme, we found that we were giving ames to some of the gestures being illustrated and using whole sentences to epresent others. Thus, during 'takes' when a gesture was required we would make reference to it verbally. Sometimes we would refer to it by the verbal xpression used to accompany it (e.g. *ng'o ng'o*). Otherwise we would use a verb eferring to the action of the gesture (e.g. *kuramba kishogo* 'to lick the back of omeone's neck') or a phrase or sentence indicating what the gesture means e.g. *kidevu cha mtume* 'the prophet's beard').

In what follows, we provide some background information about gestures n general in Swahili. Next we describe the specific gestures independent of speech, requiring speech, or substituting for strings of spoken forms, respectively. By way of conclusion we summarize what we found to be the function of these pragmatic context-sensitive 'Parts of Communication' making some attempt to relate the gestural aspect of Swahili to the study of language use in context.

Background

The Swahili–Swahili dictionary recently published for Standard Swahili in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (the *Kamusi ya KiSwahili Sanifu*, Oxford University Press, 1981) marks a number of entries, *kl.* for *kielezi* (pl. *vielezi*) referring to 'word which explains the condition of some thing or matter (i.e. *kitu au*

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161/14

THE CHINESE MADHYAMAKA PRACTICE OF *P'AN-CHIAO*: THE CASE OF CHI-TSANG [1]

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Because of the growing interest in Buddhist hermeneutics in recent years, the subject of *p'an-chiao* 判教 (classification of teachings) has lately attracted increasing attention in the West.[2] *P'an-chiao* is essentially an attempt to distinguish and to integrate various trends of Buddhist thought, various systems of Buddhist praxis and various kinds of Buddhist texts, with a view to highlighting their individual characteristics and to reconciling their apparent disparities. Different Chinese Buddhist schools, each with its own particular idea of the essence of the Buddha Dharma, naturally consider the significance of the heterogeneous elements of their spiritual heritage differently. Hence, examining and comparing their *p'an-chiao* theories is a convenient and reliable way to assess their doctrinal positions and to determine the respective places of their teachings in the bewildering labyrinth of Buddhist dogmatics. This article is an attempt to bring out the basic orientation and special concerns of Chi-tsang's 吉藏 (549–623) thought as reflected in his opinions about a number of central Buddhist sūtras and their interrelation. Chi-tsang, as is well-known, was the pivotal figure in the revival of Chinese Madhyamaka in the late sixth century, and it was the common consensus that his teaching represented the apex of the development of Madhyamaka thought in China.[3]

I. *The practice of p'an-chiao before Chi-tsang*

The practice of *p'an-chiao* has its theoretical basis in the idea of expedience (*upaya*), i.e. the idea that the Buddha, in order to adapt his message to the diverse needs of sentient beings of varied intellectual capacities, put forward different teachings using different methods at different times. This idea provides a means of explaining the discrepancies in theme and style in the wide range of texts commonly recognized as Buddhist. References to the idea and practice of expedience can be found in almost all major Mahāyāna sūtras, the best known instance being the section on the three vehicles (*triyāna*) in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra* (henceforth cited as *Lotus Sūtra*), which tells that the Buddha approached each of the three vehicles of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas with a dissimilar teaching with a view to adjusting to their dissimilar levels of spiritual maturity.[4] Another famous instance is the simile of the rising sun of the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* (henceforth cited as *Garland Sūtra*), which likens the non-differentiating Truth revealed by the Buddha to the all-encompassing light emitted by the sun, and the successive receival of the Truth by the bodhisattvas, the pratyekabuddhas, the śrāvakas, and ordinary men to the successive receival of the sunlight by mountains, hills and plains of various altitudes.[5] Also significant in this connexion is the simile of five flavours of the Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* (henceforth cited as *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*) which compares the five main bodies of Buddhist texts, i.e. the twelve categories of scriptures, the sūtras, the *vaipulya* sūtras, the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, to milk, cream, curd, butter and ghee of ascending nutritive value.[6] It should be noted that although all the aforementioned examples can be considered as rudimentary attempts at distinguishing and integrating various forms of Buddhist texts and teachings, their original purpose was not to bring order and coherence to the disparate elements of the Buddhist religion, but to emphasize the superiority of the works in which they appeared.[7] Deliberate and wholesale efforts to classify Buddhist teachings and texts did not come into being until Buddhism had made its inroad into China; and most of the earliest contributors to this venture were connected with the Madhyamaka circle of Kumārajīva.[8]

When Kumārajīva arrived in Ch'ang-an in the first decade of the fifth century, Buddhism had already been imported into China for over four hundred years, and Buddhist scriptures and doctrines of diverse origins and contents had long been in circulation. True understanding of the foreign religion was, however, slow to develop, and the fact that Buddhism actually comprised a variety of different traditions had totally escaped the notice of the early Chinese Buddhists. Even the major distinction between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna did not appear to have been properly comprehended by them, and although several early Chinese Buddhist works mentioned the terms 'Hīnayāna' and 'Mahāyāna', they showed in their discussions little knowledge of the precise differences' between the teachings of the two schools.[9] Under these circumstances, the necessity for differentiation and coordination was naturally not felt. Kumārajīva's appearance on the Chinese Buddhist scene brought an abrupt end to this state of affairs. Being a dedicated and learned Mahāyāna theorist, Kumārajīva demonstrated in his extant writings a keen consciousness of the demarcation separating the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna, a consciousness which he must have imparted to his Chinese students and correspondents. Kumārajīva's translations of the early Madhyamaka treatises, the first major corpus of Mahāyāna interpretative literature, marked by their sharp critique of Hīnayāna ideas, must have also served to open the eyes of the Chinese to the conflicts between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna thoughts.[10] Besides the coming of Kumārajīva and of Madhyamaka literature, another impetus for the formation of the practice of *p'an-chiao* was the rapid growth of influence of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* and the *Garland Sūtra* among Chinese Buddhists in the early fifth century. Since these two works differ significantly both in style and in subject matter from the other popular Buddhist sūtras of the time, such as the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Vimalakīrtinirdéśa-sūtra* (henceforth cited as *Vimala Sūtra*), their ascendancy accentuated the incongruities between the various components of the Buddhist Canon and stimulated the search for a way of reconciliation.

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[1] This paper is a part of ongoing research work on the development of Madhyamaka thought in China. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Professor Kenneth K S. Ch'en for kindly agreeing to read over my research manuscript and offering many penetrating comments. I am indebted to the Hsu Long-sing Research Fund managed by the University of Hong Kong for a grant which defrayed part of the cost of producing this manuscript.

[2] On *p'an-chiao* as a form of Buddhist hermeneutics, see Robert A. F. Thurman, 'Buddhist hermeneutics', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 46/1, 1978, 29–30, Peter N. Gregory, 'Chinese Buddhist hermeneutics: the case of Hua-yen', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 51/2, 1983, 232–3, and Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (ed.), *Buddhist hermeneutics* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 3–4.

[3] On Chi-tsang's life and contribution to the Chinese Madhyamaka movement, consult Tao-hsüan 道宣 (597–667), *Hsü Kao-seng chuan* 續高僧傳, *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* 大正新修大藏經 [hereafter T], 50.513c–515a and Hirai Shunei 平井俊榮, *Chūgoku Hannya Shisōshi Kenkyū* 中國般若思想史研究 (Tokyo, 1976), 60–79 and 345–52.

[4] See T,9. 12b–13c.

[5] See T,9. 616b.

[6] See T,12. 449a.

[7] The *Nirvāṇa Sūtra's* comparison of itself to ghee, the best of the five flavours, is a good example. See ibid. On the Indian origin and the basic problematic of the practice of *p'an-chiao*, see Robert A. F. Thurman, op. cit., 19–39, Peter N. Gregory, op. cit., 231–3, and Nathan Katz, 'Prasaṅga and deconstruction: Tibetan hermeneutics and the *yāna* controversy', *Philosophy East and West*, 34/2, 1984, 185–99.

[8] Biography of Kumārajīva in Seng-yu 僧祐 (445–518), *Ch'u-san-tsang Chi-chi* 出三藏記集, T, 55.100a–102a and Hui-chiao 慧皎 (497–554), *Kao-seng Chuan* 高僧傳, T, 50.330a–333a. Kumārajīva introduced Madhyamaka teaching into China through translating the so-called 'three treatises' (*Madhyamaka-śāstra*, *Dvādaśamukha-śāstra* and *Sata-śāstra*) and the encyclopaedic *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*.

[9] On the early Chinese understanding of the distinction between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna, consult Ōchō Enichi 横超慧日, 'Chūgoku bukkyō ni okeru daijō shisō no kōki' 中國佛教に於ける大乘思想の興起, in Ōchō Enichi, *Chūgoku Bukkyō no Kenkyū* 中國佛教の研究 vol. 1 (Kyoto, 1958), 290–4.

It was against this background that the practice of *p'an-chiao* was initiated by a number of monks who had studied under Kumārajīva. The most important of them in this regard was Hui-kuan慧觀. His *p'an-chiao* scheme of 'two periods and five teachings' takes into account most of the sūtras in vogue, and constitutes the first comprehensive attempt made by a Chinese Buddhist to devise a systematic framework to synthesize the heterogeneous elements of the Buddhist heritage.[11] The scheme is recorded by Chi-tsang as follows:

> Formerly, when the *Nirvāṇa* [*Sūtra*] was first brought to [the region of] the Lower Yangtze, the monk Hui-kuan of the Tao-ch'ang Monastery 道場寺 wrote a preface for it, in which he classified Buddhist teachings roughly into two categories:
>
> 1. Sudden teaching: this is the kind of [teaching found in] the *Garland Sūtra*. It is meant only for the bodhisattvas, and it reveals the Truth completely.
> 2. [Gradual teaching:] from [his] first [turning the wheel of Dharma] at the Deer Park to [his] final [nirvāṇa] at the Crane Grove, [the Buddha preached doctrines progressing] from the shallow to the profound. This is called 'gradual teaching'.
>
> Within the gradual teaching, five periods [can] be distinguished:
>
> 1. The distinctive teaching of the three vehicles:
>
>   [The Buddha] preached the four [noble] truths for the śrāvakas, lectured on the twelve [factors of] dependent origination for the pratyekabuddhas, and explained the six pāramitās for the Mahāyānists. [Since in this period,] the deeds [the three vehicles practised] differed from each other and the fruits [the three vehicles obtained] were not the same, [its teaching] is called 'distinctive teaching of the three vehicles'.
> 2. The *Prajñāpāramitā*[*-sūtras*] instructed in common [practitioners of] three [different levels of] capacities, and so [their teaching] is called 'common teaching of the three vehicles'.
> 3. The *Vimala* [*Sūtra*] and the *Viśeṣacinta [brahmaparipṛcchā-sūtra*] extolled the bodhisattvas and reproved the śrāvakas, and so [their teaching] is called 'teaching which reproves and extols'.
> 4. The *Lotus* [*Sūtra*] united the three vehicle [teachings] and demonstrated [their] convergence on the one ultimate [goal of Buddhahood], and so [its teaching] is called 'teaching of convergence'.
> 5. [What] the Nirvāṇa [*Sūtra* taught] is called 'teaching of permanence.'[12]

The above points are summed up in tabular form in table 1 below. As can be seen from this table, Hui-kuan's *p'an-chiao* scheme classifies Buddhist teachings into two main categories: sudden teaching and gradual teaching. The sudden teaching is represented by a single text, the *Garland Sūtra*. This opens with the majestic scene of the Buddha sitting under the Bodhi-tree surrounded by a huge assembly of bodhisattvas, devas, men and demons. Hence, it is commonly regarded in China as the first sūtra which the Buddha taught after his enlightenment. The main body of the *Sūtra* is largely made up of descriptions of the numerous stages of the path to enlightenment, coupled with some of the most divine and awe-inspiring portrayals of the enlightenment experience found in Buddhist literature.[13] A famous passage of the *Sūtra* depicts the leading Hīnayāna disciples of the Buddha, including Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, as being totally oblivious to the Buddha's display of supernatural power,[14] a fact which is often taken as an indication that the profundity of the message of the *Sūtra* is such that it is totally beyond the understanding of the Hīnayānists and ordinary believers. Hui-kuan is obviously expressing this view of the esoteric character of the *Garland Sūtra* when he attributes to it in particular the 'sudden' mode of revealing immediately the unadulterated Truth. To the opposite mode of disclosing the Truth slowly by degrees, he gives the name 'gradual teaching', which he ascribes to all the other sūtras. Hui-kuan further divides gradual teaching into five successive periods, and identifies each period with a specific doctrine or method of instruction:

1. First period: the distinctive teaching of the three vehicles.

   The teaching of the first period is called 'distinctive' because at the initial stage of his evangelical career, the Buddha taught each of the three vehicles a different doctrine: He taught the śrāvakas the 'four truths', the pratyekabuddhas the 'twelve factors of dependent origination,' and the bodhisattvas the 'six pāramitās'.
2. Second period: the common teaching of the three vehicles.

   The teaching of the second period is called 'common' because at the second stage of his evangelical career, the Buddha taught the three vehicles the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* similarly.

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[10] On the knowledge of the distinction between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna in Kumārajīva's circle, see ibid., 294–7.

[11] Biography of Hui-kuan in Hui-chiao, *Kao-seng chuan*, T, 50.368b. On the inception of the practice of *p'an-chiao* in China, see Ōchō Enichi, 'Kyōsō hanjaku no genshi keitai' 教相判釋の原始形態, in Ōchō Enichi, *Chūgoku Bukkyō no Kenkyū*, vol. 2 (Kyoto, 1971), 145–61, and Aramaki Noritoshi 荒牧典俊, 'Nanchō zempanki ni okeru kyōsō hanjaku no seiritsu ni tsuite' 南朝前半期における教相判釋の成立について, in Fukunaga Mitsuji 福永光司 (ed.), *Chūgoku Chūsei no Shūkyō to Bunka* 中國中世の宗教と文化 (Kyoto, 1982), 239–413.

[12] *San-lun Hsüan-i* 三論玄義, T, 45.5b4–14. Also see Chi-tsang, *Ta-p'in-ching Yu-i* 大品經遊意, T, 33.67a12–29.

[13] For synopses of the *Garland Sūtra*, see George P. Malalasekera (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, vol. 2 (Colombo: Government Press of Ceylon, 1966), 438–41, Thomas Cleary, *Entry into the Inconceivable* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 171–205 and Kawada Kumatarō 川田熊太郎 'Budda Kegon—*Kegongyō* no kōsatsu' 佛陀華嚴 - 華嚴經の考察 in Kawada Kumatarō and Nakamura Hajime 中村元 (ed.), *Kegon Shisō* 華嚴思想 (Kyoto, 1960), 21–62.

[14] See T,9. 679b–680c.

3. Third period: the teaching which reproves and extols.
   In the first two periods, the Buddha treated the three vehicles without discrimination. In the third period, on the contrary, the Buddha 'reproved' the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and 'extolled' the bodhisattvas, with the intention of instilling in his Hīnayāna followers the wish for the Mahāyāna way. The representative texts of this period were the *Vimala Sūtra* and the *Viśeṣacintabrahmaparipṛcchā-sūtra*.
4. Fourth period: the teaching of convergence.
   After using the method of blaming and praising in the third period to stress the superiority of the Mahāyāna over the Hīnayāna, the Buddha taught in the fourth period the *Lotus Sūtra*, in which he revealed the underlying unity of all forms of Buddhist teachings and demonstrated the 'convergence' of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna on the same goal of Buddhahood.
5. Fifth period: the teaching of permanence.
   Seeing that the audience was ready to receive the ultimate Truth after having gone through the preceding four periods of instruction, the Buddha taught them the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, in which he dwelled on the permanent nature of nirvāṇa and of the Buddha.

Table 1: *Hui-kuan's p'an-chiao scheme of two teachings and five periods*

Two Teachings	*Five Periods*
1. Sudden teaching (*Garland Sūtra*)	
2. Gradual Teaching	1. The distinctive teaching of the three vehicles 2. The common teaching of the three vehicles (*Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*) 3. The teaching which reproves and extols (*Vimala Sūtra* and *Viśeṣacintabrahmaparipṛcchā-sūtra*) 4. The teaching of convergence (*Lotus Sūtra*) 5. The teaching of permanence (*Nirvāṇa Sūtra*)

The foregoing exposition of Hui-kuan's *p'an-chiao* scheme of 'two teachings and five periods' shows that he brought to the task of *p'an-chiao* a variety of perspectives. The 'two teachings' are connected with the methods of instruction (*chiao-i* 教儀) whereas the 'five periods' have to do with the times of instruction (*chiao-shih* 教時). The linking of a particular sūtra to a particular method or time is based mainly on its instructional content (*chiao-i* 教義). While the *p'an-chiao* classification of 'two periods and five teachings' takes account in this way of the three aspects of method, time and content of instruction, its primary objective is to provide a general frame of reference to account for the discrepancies between various central Buddhist sūtras and to demonstrate the distinctive significance of each sūtra in relation to the rest. Its aim is thus to categorize the texts of instruction (*chiao-tien* 教典). Another noteworthy feature of the scheme is its high esteem for the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, as can be seen from its presentation of the two works as the embodiments of the full and final Truth.

In the century that followed, *p'an-chiao* gradually established itself as a principal topic of Chinese Buddhist dogmatics, a fact amply demonstrated by the large number of current *p'an-chiao* theories reported in the writings of Ching-ying Hui-yüan 淨影慧遠 (523–592), Chih-i 智顗 (538–597), Yüan-ts'e 圓測 (613–696), K'uei-chi 窺基 (632–682) and Fa-tsang 法藏 (643–712).[15] Among the most popular were the schemes of 'three teachings and four periods' and 'three teachings and five periods' accepted by many Ch'eng-shih masters 成實師, and the scheme of 'four creeds' advocated by the Ti-lun masters 地論師.[16] The first two schemes add to the 'sudden' and 'gradual' teachings of Hui-kuan's scheme a third teaching which they call 'indeterminate'. According to the account of Chi-tsang, this new category of teaching is introduced to accommodate the *Srīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra*, which resembles the *Lotus Sūtra* in taking the idea of one vehicle as its essential principle and which is similar to the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* in having the idea of permanence as one of its main themes. Since it partakes of the characteristics of both the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, and so cannot be grouped definitively with either of them, its teaching is given the name 'indeterminate' and is placed beside the 'sudden teaching' and the 'gradual teaching' as a separate class of teaching.[17] As for the 'four periods' and the 'five periods', they are almost identical to Hui-kuan's 'five periods', except that the third period of extolment and reproval is missing from the former. The scheme of 'four creeds' is described by Chih-i as follows:[18]

1. The creed of causality: it refers to the teaching of 'four conditions' and 'six causes' found in the Sarvāstivāda treatises.[19]
2. The creed of provisional names: it refers to the teaching of 'three states of provisional existence' (*san-chia* 三假) found in the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*.[20]
3. The creed of deceptive forms: it refers to the teaching of emptiness found in the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* and the Madhyamaka treatises.
4. The creed of permanence: it refers to the teaching of the permanence and the original quiescence of the Buddha-nature found in the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*.

The two schemes of 'three teachings and four periods' and 'three teachings and five periods' closely parallel Hui-kuan's scheme of 'two teachings and five periods', and like the latter, they involve the classifications of the methods, times, contents and texts of instruction, and evidence the same preference for the *Garland Sūtras* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. However, their listing of the 'indeterminate teaching' as a third category alongside the 'sudden teaching' and 'gradual teaching' is open to the charge of inconsistency, because within the two schemes, 'indeterminate teaching' has to do with teaching content, whereas 'sudden teaching' and 'gradual teaching' have to do with teaching method. As for the scheme of 'four creeds', it enumerates four principal Buddhist tenets, together with the sūtras and śāstras which propound them, and so is involved with the classifications of the contents and the texts of instruction. The progression from the Hīnayāna creeds to the Mahāyāna creeds suggests that the final creed of permanence found in the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* represents the consummation of the Buddha Dharma. All the early *p'an-chiao* schemes we have examined hold the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* in high esteem, a fact which bears witness to the prominence enjoyed by the two sūtras in the Chinese Buddhist world of the fifth and sixth centuries.

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[15] See Hui-yüan, *Ta-ch'eng I-chang* 大乘義章, T, 44.465a–b, Chih-i, *Fa-hua Hsüan-i* 法華玄義, T, 33.801a–b. Chi-tsang, *Ta-p'in-ching Yu-i*, T, 33.66b–c, Yüan-ts'e, *Chieh-shen-mi-ching Su* 解深密經疏, *Hsü Tsang-ching* 續藏經, 150 vols. (Hong Kong, 1967), 34.298b–c, K'uei-chi, *Ta-ch'eng Fa-yüan I-lin Chang* 大乘法苑義林章, T 45.247a–c and Fa-tsang, *Hua-yen Wu-chiao Chang* 華嚴五教章, T, 45.480b–481a.

[16] The Ch'eng-shih and Ti-lun masters were experts in the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra* and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra-śāstra* respectively. See the opening paragraph of the next section.

[17] See *Sheng-man-ching Pao-k'u* 勝鬘經寶窟, T, 37.5c23–28.

[18] See *Fa-hua Hsüan-i*, T, 33.801b11–15.

[19] The treatises of the Sarvāstivāda School, together with the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*, form the main body of the Hīnayāna literature known to Chinese Buddhists. For a summary account of the Sarvāstivāda teaching of four conditions and six causes, refer to Edward Conze, *Buddhist thought in India* (2nd ed. rev., London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983) 153–6.

[20] According to the teaching of three states of provisional existence, all things are 'provisional' (not real) in nature because of their states of 'being produced by causes', 'arising in succession' and 'being dependent on each other'.

Table 2: *The p'an-chiao scheme of Four Creeds*

1. The creed of causality—The Sarvāstivāda treatises
2. The creed of provisional names—The *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*
3. The creed of deceptive forms—The *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* and the Madhyamaka treatises
4. The creed of permanence—The *Garland Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*

II *Chi-tsang's criticisms of the p'an-chiao theories of the Ch'eng-shih Masters and Ti-lun Masters, and Chi-tsang's view of the unity of purpose of all Mahāyāna Sūtras*

The Chinese Madhyamaka movement began in the early fifth century with the translation and propagation of Madhyamaka texts by Kumārajīva and his followers. With the passing away of its first generation of Chinese promoters, it gradually lost its momentum, and the interest of Chinese Buddhists shifted to texts of other Buddhist traditions, such as the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra* (*Ch'eng-shih Lun* 成實論, commonly referred to as *Ch'eng-lun* 成論), and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra-śāstra* (*Shih-ti-ching Lun* 十地經論, commonly referred to as *Ti-lun* 地論). By the mid sixth century, these two works had become so widely studied that later historians often speak of the existence at that time of a Ch'eng-shih School and a Ti-lun School. When Chi-tsang came forward to champion the Madhyamaka cause in the late sixth century, he made one of the first priorities of his teaching programme exposing the weaknesses of the doctrines of these two traditions, including their *p'an-chiao* doctrines. In respect of the Ti-lun masters' *p'an-chiao* scheme of 'four creeds', Chi-tsang limits himself to brief résumés of and strong statements against its position, largely because he sees it as derived from the scheme of 'five periods' and so requiring no separate treatment.[21] Chi-tsang's critical attention is directed primarily at the scheme of 'three teachings and five periods' popular among the Ch'eng-shih masters. His most frequent objection to the scheme of 'three teachings and five periods' is the absence of textual evidence. Chi-tsang comments on the 'three teachings' as follows:

> The [*Mahāprajñāpāramitā-*]*śāstra* says, 'The Buddha Dharma comprises two types [of texts]: first, the Mahāyāna *piṭaka*, second, the Hīnayāna *tripiṭaka*.' It further says, 'The Buddha Dharma comprises two ways: first, the way of the śrāvakas, second, the way of the bodhisattvas.[22] . . . Hence, we know that there can only be two [*piṭakas*], and [the scheme of] three [teachings] should not be established.[23]

Chi-tsang speaks about the 'five periods' in a similar vein:

> The *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* says, 'All the gods acclaimed, "We witness in Jambudvīpa the second turning of the Dharma-wheel."'[24] Nāgārjuna explains, '[The Buddha] has already turned the Hīna[yāna] wheel in the Deer Park. Now, he further turns the Mahā[yāna] Dharma-wheel.'[25] The *Lotus Sūtra* says, 'Formerly, at Vārāṇasī, you turned [the Dharma-wheel and taught] the four truths. Now at Vulture Park, you preach the one-vehicle [teaching].'[26] The *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* says, 'Formerly, I turned the Hīna[yāna wheel] in the Deer Grove. Now, I preach the Mahā[yāna] under the twin trees.'[27] Thus we know that there are just two categories of teaching, and there are no five periods.[28]

Both passages point out that the chief Buddhist works speak only of the presence of the two ways of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna and never mention the existence of 'three teachings' and 'five periods'. As to the contention that the idea of 'five periods' is supported by the idea of 'five flavours' of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*,[29] Chi-tsang dismisses it vehemently as unfounded. He maintains that the 'five flavours' represent five successive stages in the process of interaction between teaching and practice and between cause and effect, ending in the realization of the supreme nirvāṇa, and have little to do with attributing specific teachings and texts to specific phases of the Buddha's evangelical career.[30]

The issue of the absence of scriptural basis is raised again when Chi-tsang proceeds to subject each item of the 'three teachings and five periods' to his critical judgement. Quoting the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, 'When I [the Buddha] first achieved enlightenment, there were already bodhisattvas asking me about this very profound meaning,' Chi-tsang argues that the Buddha taught the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, just as he taught the *Garland Sūtra*, at the beginning of his evangelical career, and so it is wrong to make a distinction between 'gradual teaching' and 'sudden teaching' with respect to these two works.[31] He questions the validity of the category of 'indeterminate teaching' on the grounds that the practice is not founded upon the sūtras and śāstras.[32] In Chi-tsang's opinion, labelling the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* as 'the common teaching of the three vehicles' runs counter to the assertion that the *prajñāpāramitā* pertains

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[21] On Chi-tsang's opinion about the relation between the 'four creeds' and the 'five periods', see *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun* 法華玄論, T, 34.382b26–27 and 384c3–6. The *Ta-ch'eng Hsüan-lun* 大乘玄論 does give a long criticism of the practice of identifying the teaching of the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* with the third creed. See T, 45.63c–64b.

[22] See T, 25.756b18–24.

[23] *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun*, T, 34.382b27–c22.

[24] See T, 8.311b15–16.

[25] See *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*, T, 25.517a–b.

[26] See T, 9.12a18–21.

[27] See T, 12.447c16–18. The 'twin trees' were the *śāla* trees under which the Buddha attained nirvāṇa.

[28] *San-lun Hsüan-i*, T, 45.5b29–c5.

[29] See, for instance, the remarks of Pao-liang 寶亮 (444–509) recorded in Pao-liang, ed. (?), *Ta-pan-nieh-p'an-ching Chi-chieh* 大般涅槃經集解, T, 37.493b11–24.

[30] See *Ta-ch'eng Hsüan-lun*, T, 45.63b13–29.

[31] See *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun*, T, 34.384b3–5.

[32] See ibid., T, 34.384b23–24.

only to the bodhisattvas found in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra.*[33] Moreover, if one calls the *Vimala Sūtra* 'the teaching which reproves and extols,' given the contemptuous attitude it adopts towards the Hīnayānists, one should apply the same description to the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* in which the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are scolded as 'stupid dogs'.[34] While it is beyond dispute that the *Lotus Sūtra* is concerned with showing the original unity of the three-vehicle teachings, it also engages in demonstrating the permanent nature of the Buddha. And this latter fact has not been taken into consideration by the *p'an-chiao* theorists when they refer to the *Lotus Sūtra* simply as 'the teaching of convergence'.[35] As for labelling the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* as 'the teaching of permanence', Chi-tsang claims that the idea of permanence is raised in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* as a corrective to the view of impermanence. In fact, the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* transcends both 'permanence' and 'impermanence', and to attribute the view of 'permanence' to it is a gross misunderstanding.[36]

What emerges very clearly in Chi-tsang's critique of the *p'an-chiao* scheme of 'three teachings and five periods' is his rejection of the common practice of identifying a particular Buddhist text with a particular Buddhist teaching to the exclusion of the rest. This attitude proceeds from the belief that all Buddhist scriptures share the same purpose of eliminating attachment which is the root of all hindrances and sufferings, a belief which Chi-tsang inherited from his teacher Fa-lang 法朗 (507–581):

> Whenever our teacher, the Reverend [Fa-]lang, ascended the high seat and instructed his followers, he often said: [Our] words should take 'non-abidingness' as the point of departure, and [our] minds should take 'non-acquisition' as the principal [guide]. Hence, the profound sūtras and eminent masters enlighten living beings by making their minds free from attachment. It is so because attachment is the root of encumbrances. As the origin of all sufferings is attachment, Buddhas of the three periods [of past, present and future] devise sūtras and lecture śāstras, all in order to make the minds of sentient beings free from attachment.[37]

Starting from the premise that all Mahāyāna sūtras are dedicated to revealing the way of non-attachment, Chi-tsang concludes that they are the same in spirit despite their surface dissimilarities:

> All Mahāyāna sūtras are dedicated alike to revealing the Way. As the Way is non-differentiated, how can the teachings [of the sūtras] be diverse? However, since the gateways [to the Truth] are many, the various categories [of scriptures] differ.[38]

Furthermore, Chi-tsang is convinced that every sūtra contains the chief ideas of all other sūtras, and introduces the distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' themes (*p'ang-cheng erh-i* 傍正二義) by way of explanation:

> However, all sūtras have alike the two aspects of 'secondary' and 'primary' [themes]. The *Prajñāpāramitā*[*-sūtras*] refute comprehensively [the error of] acquisition [so as to] demonstrate [the ways of] non-dependence and non-acquisition. [This] is their primary principle, whereas [the teachings of] Buddha-nature and one vehicle are their secondary themes. The *Lotus* [*Sūtra*] demonstrates comprehensively the causes and the fruits of the one [vehicle]. [This] is its primary principle, whereas [the teachings of] non-acquisition and Buddha-nature are its secondary themes. The *Nirvāṇa* [*Sūtra*] demonstrates comprehensively the permanence of the Buddha-nature [with an eye to] disparaging the erroneous [view of] impermanence. [This] is its primary principal, whereas [the teachings of] one vehicle and non-acquisition are its secondary theme.[39]

Chi-tsang does not deny that different sūtras focus on different aspects of the Buddha Dharma, which he calls their 'primary themes'. Thus, he recognizes that the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* have as their primary themes the teachings of non-acquisition, one-vehicle and Buddha-nature respectively. However, he insists that what appears as the primary theme in one sūtra can also be found, albeit less frequently, in the other sūtras as the secondary theme. Chi-tsang traces the cause of these variations of primary and secondary themes to the need to cater for dissimilar occasions (*tou-yüan pu-t'ung* 逗緣不同):

> Further, [different] sūtras cater for dissimilar occasions, and make way for each other. Since the *Prajñāpāramitā*[*-sūtras*] have already demonstrated comprehensively the true character of non-acquisition, the *Lotus* [*Sūtra*] does not demonstrate it; since [the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*] have not yet explained comprehensively the causes and the fruits of the one vehicle, [the *Lotus Sūtra*] demonstrates them comprehensively. Since the *Lotus* [*Sūtra*] has already demonstrated the causes and the fruits of the one vehicle, the *Nirvāṇa* [*Sūtra*] does not demonstrate them comprehensively; since the *Lotus* [*Sūtra*] has not yet demonstrated comprehensively the permanence of the Buddha-nature, [the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*] explains it comprehensively.[40]

According to Chi-tsang, the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* have different primary themes because they were taught in succession under different circumstances. By the time the Buddha preached the *Lotus Sūtra*, the theme of non-acquisition had already been dealt with at length in the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* and there was no need to dwell on it again. Therefore, the Buddha turned the focus of his attention to the theme of one vehicle. Having discussed this extensively in the *Lotus Sūtra*, the Buddha deemed it unnecessary to harp on it when he preached the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. Consequently, the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* was devoted to the exposition of the theme of Buddha-nature.

P'an-chiao, as was observed above, involves both highlighting the distinctive characteristics of various Buddhist texts and teachings, as well as reconciling the apparent disparities between them. In Chi-tsang's opinion, the *p'an-chiao* schemes of 'three teachings and five periods' and 'four creeds', by dividing texts and teachings into hierarchical categories, have stressed the outer differences at the expense of the inner unity of the Buddha Dharma.

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[33] See *San-lun Hsüan-i* 三論玄義, T, 45.5c26–29. For the assertion in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*, see T, 25.371a5–7. Refer also to *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun*, T, 38.382c-383c and *Ta-ch'eng Hsüan-lun*, T, 45.65b for Chi-tsang's comments to the similar effect.

[34] See *San-lun Hsüan-i*, T, 45.6a5–8. For this denunciation of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, see T, 8.319a24–27. For similar comments in Chi-tsang's writings, see *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun*, T, 38.383c–384a and *Ta-ch'eng Hsüan-lun*, T, 45.65b26–c1.

[35] See *San-lun Hsüan-i*, T, 45.6a9–13.

[36] See ibid., T, 45.6a13–15.

[37] *Sheng-man-ching Pao-k'u*, T, 37.5c8–12.

[38] *Ta-ch'eng Hsüan-lun*, T, 45.57a26–27.

[39] *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun*, T, 34.388b16–21 and *Ta-ch'eng Hsüan-lun*, T, 45.65c19–24.

[40] *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun*, T, 34.388b21–24 and *Ta-ch'eng Hsüan-lun*, T, 45.65c24–28.

Hence they must be removed to make way for *p'an-chiao* schemes which achieve a better balance:

> Hence, we know that all Mahāyāna sūtras reveal the Way which is non-differentiated, and we should not maintain the theories of 'five periods' and 'four creeds'.[41]

III. *Chi-tsang's p'an-chiao teaching of two piṭakas* (erh-tsang 二藏) *and Chi-tsang's view on the distinction between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna.*[42]

Having dismissed the *p'an-chiao* classifications of 'three teachings' and 'five periods' as without scriptural basis, Chi-tsang offers the division of 'two *piṭakas*' as the classification best supported by the sūtras and śāstras.[43] The two *piṭakas* are given different names when they are considered from different angles:

> [Regarding] the significance of the 'two *piṭakas*', there are three pairs [of names]:
> [1.] First, 'the *piṭaka* of the śrāvakas', second, 'the *piṭaka* of the bodhisattvas': they are so named in reference to the people [they instruct].
> 2. 'Mahāyāna *piṭaka*' and 'Hīnayāna *piṭaka*': they are so called in reference to the dharmas [they instruct].
> 3. 'Partial [*piṭaka*]' and 'full [*piṭaka*]': they are so designated with respect to their imports.[44]

The term 'two *piṭakas*' (two baskets) suggests the existence of two collections of texts and teachings. These two collections are called the '*piṭaka* of the śrāvakas' and the '*piṭaka* of the bodhisattvas' because they have as their objects of instruction the śrāvakas and the bodhisattvas respectively. As the '*śrāvaka piṭaka*' teaches Hīnayāna ideas which express the Truth only partially, it is also called the 'Hīnayāna *piṭaka*' or the 'partial *piṭaka*'. As the 'bodhisattva *piṭaka*' preaches Mahāyāna ideas which set forth the full Truth, it is also called the 'Mahāyāna *piṭaka*' or the 'full *piṭaka*'. According to Chi-tsang, the division of Buddhist teachings into two *piṭakas* happened right after the Buddha's demise, at the time when the Buddha's followers gathered together the words of their preceptor for the benefit of posterity.[45] Unlike the case of the 'three teachings and five periods'; the classification of 'two *piṭakas*' is confirmed by a long line of scriptures, including the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, the *Lotus Sūtra*, the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* and the writings of the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools.[46] Among the *p'an-chiao* theorists in China who adopted this classification, Chi-tsang several times mentions Bodhiruci, the founder of the Ti-lun tradition, in particular.[47] Thus he remarks:

> From [the time of] Bodhiruci's arrival [in China] down to the present period, teachers [in the North] divided Buddhist teachings in general into the two classes of 'partial' and 'full', which they also called the 'two *piṭakas*' of the śrāvakas and the bodhisattvas. As this [practice] has [the support of] the very words of the sūtras and śāstras, it should not be rejected.[48]

This is one of the very few instances in which Chi-tsang endorses a proposition of the Ti-lun camp.[49]

The notion that Buddhist texts and teachings can be divided into a superior category called the Mahāyāna proper to the bodhisattvas and an inferior category called the Hīnayāna proper to the śrāvakas is, as Chi-tsang himself tells us, no new invention of his. In India, it could be traced back to the time of the advent of Mahāyāna thought, and in China, it was first made popular by Kumārajīva and his followers.[50] Chi-tsang's innovation consists in his upholding it as the authoritative *p'an-chiao* scheme to replace the other *p'an-chiao* schemes in vogue in his time. Furthermore, Chi-tsang's particular way of regarding the Hīnayāna, the Mahāyāna, and the relation between them, reflects the centrality given to the practice of non-attachment in his teaching and the pragmatist strain in his hermeneutics:

> Generally speaking, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras demonstrate alike the One Way. Hence, they [all] take the true insight of non-acquisition as the essential principle. However, [at the time of the preaching of] the Hīnayāna teachings, [the matter of] demonstrating the true insight is still a long way off. Hence, [the Hīnayāna sūtras] adopt the teaching of four truths as the essential principle. The Mahāyāna [sūtras, on the contrary,] demonstrate directly the true insight. Hence, all Mahāyāna sūtras alike take the true insight of non-duality as the essential principle. It is only because there are divergences in expedient functions that there are different categories [of sūtras].[51]

This passage points out that Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna sūtras share the same aim of cultivating the true insight of non-acquisition. It admits that the

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[41] *Fa-hua I-su* 法華義疏, T, 34.518c16–17. On Chi-tsang's criticism of the *p'an-chiao* theories of his time and Chi-tsang's idea of the unity of purpose of all Mahāyāna sūtras, see Hirai Shunei, op. cit., 482–4, 494–500, Muranaka Yūshō 村中祐生, 'Kajō Daishi "nizō" gi no seiritsu kō' 嘉祥大師'二藏'義の成立考, *Nanto Bukkyō* 南都佛教 22, 1969, 35–40, Suemitsu Yasumasa 末光愛正, 'Kichizō kyōten-kan no haikei' 吉藏經典觀の背景, *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 印度學佛教學研究, 29/1, 1980, 136–7 and Kanno Hiroshi 菅野博史, 'Kichizō ni okeru *Hokekyō* to sho daijō kyōten no hikaku' 吉藏における法華經と諸大乘經典の比較, *Ōkurayama Ronshū* 大倉山論集 19, 1986, 205–8.

[42] On the *p'an–chiao* teaching of two *piṭakas* of Chi-tsang, see Hirai Shunei, op. cit., 500–6, Muranaka Yūshō, op. cit., 35–54, 'Kajō Daishi ni okeru kyōhan shisō no tenkai' 嘉祥大師における教判思想の展開, in Kushida Hakushi Shōju Kinekai 櫛田博士頌壽記念會 (ed.), *Kōsō Den no Kenkyū* 高僧傳の研究 (Tokyo, 1973), 736–40 and Suemitsu Yasumasa, 'Kichizō kyōhan no genryū' 吉藏教判の源流, *Sōtō-shū Kenkyūin Kenkyūsei Kenkyū Kiyō* 曹洞宗研究員研究生研究紀要, 12, 1980, 218–29.

[43] See nn. 23 and 28 above.

[44] *Ching-ming Hsüan-lun* 浄名玄論, T, 38.900c23–26.

[45] See *Fa-hua Yu-i* 法華遊意, T, 34.644b4–9.

[46] Refer to nn. 23 and 28 above.

[47] See *Jen-wang Pan-jo-ching Su* 仁王般若經疏 T, 33.315b28–c1 and *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun*, T, 34.384c 6–8. The fact that Bodhiruci had divided Buddhist teachings into the two categories of 'partial' and 'full' is also mentioned in Chih-i. *Fa-hua Hsüan-i*, T, 33.801b10–11.

[48] *Sheng-man-ching Pao-k'u*, T, 37.6a15–17.

[49] It is noteworthy that Ching-ying Hui-yüan, a leading Ti-lun master and a contemporary of Chi-tsang, had also adopted the division of 'two *piṭakas*' as the mainstay of his *p'an-chiao* teaching. The possibility of mutual influence between the two masters has been discussed, but no definite conclusion has yet been reached. See discussions in Hirai Shunei, op. cit., 504–6, Muranaka Yūshō, 'Kajō Daishi "nizō" gi no seiritsu kō', 51, and Suemitsu Yasumasa, '*Daijō Gishō* "shūkyō kyōshaku gi" ni okeru Jōyōji Eon san no mondai-Kichizō chosho to no taihi' 大乘義章「衆經教迹義」に於ける浄影寺慧遠撰の問題 - 吉藏著書との對比, *Sōtō-shū Kenkyūin Kenkyūsei Kenkyū Kiyō*, 13, 1981, 217–33.

[50] Refer to n. 9 above.

[51] *San-lun Hsüan-i*, T, 45.10c14–18.

167/14

Hīnayāna sūtras take as their primary theme the four truths in which the true insight is barely hinted at, whereas the Mahāyāna sūtras demonstrate the true insight directly in teaching the truth of non-duality. However, it considers this difference as outward appearance stemming from 'divergences in expedient functions', i.e. as surface divergences resulting from the need to cater for audiences of different abilities, instead of as a testimony to the presence of irreconcilable doctrinal disagreement. Unlike most Mahāyānists, Chi-tsang is positive about the value of Hīnayāna scriptures. The following passage, for example, affirms the usefulness of Hīnayāna sūtras as pointers to the final Truth by comparing them to streams leading to the source and fingers pointing at the moon, and reserves the derogatory sense of the term 'Hīnayāna' for the Sarvāstivādaśāstra and the *Satyasiddhi-śāstra* which, in Chi-tsang's opinion, have totally missed the real objective of the Hīnayāna sūtras in treating the sūtras' tentative assertions as inviolable dictums:

> For those who do not know [where] the source [of the river] is, we point to the streams, so that they can arrive at the source by following the streams. For those who do not see the moon, we point at it with our fingers, so that they can find the moon by [looking in the direction of] our fingers. Coming to the ends of the streams, [they discover] just one source; looking past the fingers, [they perceive] just one moon. This is the purpose of the Tathāgata on preaching the Hīna[yāna sūtras]. But the Abhidharmists hold on to the Hīna[yāna] principles stubbornly, and do not head towards the Mahā[yāna] way. Since they hang on to the instrument and forget the real [objective, Nāgārjuna] composes śāstras to refute them.[52]

While Chi-tsang deems Hīnayāna teachings to be unobjectionable so long as they are adopted as provisional rules, he considers Mahāyāna teachings to be unacceptable when they are presented as absolute truths. In this regard, he cites the attachment to the Mahāyāna as the bodhisattva's pitfall,[53] and denounces practitioners liable to it as 'the retinue of the devil, not the followers of Buddha.'[54]

Thinking along these lines, Chi-tsang reaches the conclusion that Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna teachings are similarly provisional:

> Now, we explain that the True Way is never Mahā[yāna] nor Hīna[yāna], and it was for the sake of sentient beings that [the Buddha] preached Mahā[yāna] and Hīna[yāna teachings]. If we just oppose the Mahā[yāna] to the Hīna[yāna], [we would consider] Hīna[yāna teachings] to be expedient and Mahā[yāna teachings] to be real. If we see that the [True] Way is neither Mahā[yāna] nor Hīna[yāna], [we shall realize that] Mahā[yāna] and Hīna[yāna teachings] are both expedient.[55]

The True Way, i.e. the way of non-attachment, transcends all thoughts of difference, including the thought of difference between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. The Buddha, for the benefit of sentient beings of different levels of intelligence, formulated different kinds of teachings, to which he gave the name 'Hīnayāna' or 'Mahāyāna' according to how closely they approximated to the True Way. If the Mahāyāna teachings are often described in Buddhist texts as 'real' for being a clearer reflection of the True Way than

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[52] Ibid., T, 45.3a3–8.

[53] See, for example, *Ching-ming Hsüan-lun*, T, 38.854c16–19.

[54] See *San-lun Hsüan-i*, T, 45.5b23–24.

[55] *Chung-kuan-lun Su* 中觀論疏, T, 42.160b6–8. For other remarks of Chi-tsang to the similar effect, refer to ibid., 14a6–7 and *Fa-hua I-su*, T, 34.501b14–16.

the Hīnayāna teachings, which are thereby referred to as 'expedient', that is to speak by way of contrast. Actually, Mahāyāna teachings are also expedient, in that the True Way of non-attachment which they serve to promote is neither Hīnayāna nor Mahāyāna. When this is understood, it is easy to see why Chi-tsang cautions against adhering to the distinction between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, after he has proffered the 'two *piṭakas*' as the most authoritative *p'an-chiao* scheme:

> However, it should be understood that the Supreme Way is never Hīna[yāna] nor Mahā[yāna]. [Some teachings] cater for objects of superior [intelligence], and so are tentatively named 'Mahā[yāna]'; [some teachings] adapt to objects of inferior [intelligence], and so are provisionally named 'Hīna[yāna]'. It is hoped that through [instructing] these Mahā[yāna] and Hīna[yāna teachings], [sentient beings] will be made to realize the Supreme Principle which is neither Mahā[yāna] nor Hīna[yāna].[56]

IV. *Chi-tsang's fondness for the* Lotus Sūtra *and Chi-tsang's ideas of Three Dharma-wheels* (san fa-lun 三法輪), *Four Periods* (ssu-shih 四時), *and Four Alternatives of Overtness and Covertness* (hsien-mi ssu-chü 顯密四句)

In discussing Chi-tsang's *p'an-chiao* teaching, historians of Chinese Buddhism also often refer to the idea of 'three dharma-wheels'. In Chi-tsang's writings, this idea is raised primarily to undermine the popular belief, as exemplified by the *p'an-chiao* schemes of 'two teachings and five periods' and 'four creeds', that the *Lotus Sūtra* plays second fiddle to the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* in respect of the disclosure of the highest Truth. It reflects clearly Chi-tsang's fondness for the *Lotus Sūtra*, which is understandable given the close link between this sūtra and the Chinese Madhyamaka, going all the way back to the time of Kumārajīva, who was at once the founder of the Chinese Madhyamaka tradition and the translator of the most influential Chinese version of the *Lotus Sūtra*.[57] The *Lotus Sūtra* of course gradually became an object of universal interest in the fifth and sixth centuries, yet its teaching has a number of features which recommend it to Chi-tsang. A case in point is the central role played by the idea of expedience in the *Sūtra*. According to the opinion of many exegetes, the first half of the *Lotus Sūtra* (chs. 1–14 of Kumārajīva's version) is concerned with the problem of the relation between the three-vehicle teachings and one-vehicle teaching. There, it is constantly remarked that the Buddha instructed the three vehicles of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas each with a separate teaching in consideration of their different dispositions, and that the three-vehicle teachings actually share the identical goal of revealing the one-vehicle teaching which expresses the Buddha's real intention.[58] The theme of expedience also runs through the second half of the *Sūtra* (chs. 15–28 of Kumārajīva's version). There, it is declared that the Buddha assumed the transient, physical appearances of Dīpaṃkara, Śākyamuni, and others in order to foster the longing for his gospel, that in point of fact, the Buddha's power is boundless and the Buddha's longevity is past human comprehension. Another feature of the *Lotus Sūtra* relevant to our present concern is its peculiar reticence on the precise contents of the one-vehicle teaching and the specific characteristics of Buddhahood, despite the great lengths it goes to to eulogize them. Also noteworthy in this connexion is its brevity on the matter of religious practice. In these respects, it is in total contrast to the *Garland Sūtra*, which is famous for its exhaustive analysis of the path to enlightenment and its vivid portrayal of the beatitude of Buddhahood.

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[56] *Sheng-man-ching Pao-k'u*, T, 37.6a18–20.

[57] On Kumārajīva's followers' opinion about the *Lotus Sūtra*, see Ōchō Enichi (ed.), *Hokke Shisō* 法華思想 (Kyoto, 1969), 224–33 and Inari Nitsusen 稻荷日宣 *Hokekyō Ichijō Shisō no Kenkyū* 法華經一乘思想の研究 (Tokyo, 1975), 29–35.

[58] We speak here as if the *Lotus Sūtra* teaches the existence of four vehicles, viz. the śrāvaka vehicle, the pratyekabuddha vehicle, the bodhisattva vehicle and the Buddha vehicle. However, there is also the opinion that the bodhisattva vehicle and the Buddha vehicle mentioned in the *Lotus Sūtra* actually refer to the same vehicle, so that there are in fact only three vehicles. It was formerly the general consensus that Chi-tsang was an advocate of the theory of three vehicles, but this opinion has recently been challenged. See Maruyama Takao 丸山孝雄, *Hokke Kyōgaku Kenkyū Josetsu* 法華教學研究序說 (Kyoto, 1978), pt. 1, chs. iv and v, Suemitsu Yasumasa, 'Kichizō no *Hokke Genron* kan daishi "ichijō-gi" ni tsuite' 吉藏

This poverty of content of the *Lotus Sūtra* perhaps contributed to the opinion prevalent among Chi-tsang's contemporaries that the *Lotus Sūtra* is inferior to the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. However, to Chi-tsang, the extraordinary importance the *Lotus Sūtra* gives to the theme of expedience, and its silence on most key Buddhist subjects may well appear to confirm his hermeneutical method, which is, as we have seen, characterized by its functionalistic approach to the scriptures and by its firm refusal to consider any Buddhist teaching, be it Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, as an absolute.[59] Thus, it is not surprising that Chi-tsang should so admire the *Lotus Sūtra*, even to the extent of shifting the focus of his study and teaching in later life, from the Madhyamaka treatises to the *Lotus Sūtra*.[60] In Chi-tsang's writing, this *Sūtra* is extolled as the consummate discourse which is 'perfect in its teaching' and 'excellent in its principle',[61] and is acclaimed as 'the true essence of all sūtras' and 'the secret treasury of all Buddhas'.[62] That Chi-tsang sees the *Lotus Sūtra* as sharing the doctrinal concerns of the Madhyamaka is evident from his constant reference to such favourite Madhyamaka concepts as 'middle-way', 'non-duality', 'non-acquisition', 'freedom from one-sidedness', etc. in analysing the significance of the *Sūtra's* title.[63] Conversely, Chi-tsang often uses concepts derived from the *Lotus Sūtra*, such as the concept of three dharma-wheels, to explain Madhyamaka texts.[64] His admiration for the *Lotus Sūtra* being such, Chi-tsang would naturally look askance at the commonly accepted view that it gives a less complete picture of the Buddha Dharma than the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, and it is largely to refute this view that he puts forward the idea of three dharma-wheels.[65]

This idea, like that of two *piṭakas*, is by no means Chi-tsang's invention. Several Chinese Buddhist works of the seventh and eighth centuries mention Paramārtha, the founder of the She-lun 攝論 tradition, as its propounder.[66] There is no evidence, however, that Chi-tsang is indebted to Paramārtha for his idea of three dharma-wheels. In explaining it, he frequently refers to the parables of the burning house and the lost son, from chapters 3 and 4 respectively of Kumārajīva's version of the *Lotus Sūtra*, which suggests that he considers the *Lotus Sūtra* to be its primary scriptural source.[67] In fact, nearly all Chi-tsang's discussions of the three dharma-wheels appear in his writings on the *Lotus Sūtra*, and they are introduced to clarify yet another prominent point of divergence between the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Lotus Sūtra*: in the *Garland Sūtra*, the Hīnayāna sages, like Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, for example, are described as being oblivious to the Buddha's display of supernatural power,[68] whereas in the *Lotus Sūtra*, these same sages are predicted to be destined for Buddhahood.[69] This divergence is construed in the *Garland Sūtra*'s favour by many of Chi-tsang's contemporaries, who consider the esotericism of the *Garland Sūtra* as proof of its greater profundity. Chi-tsang gives a different interpretation of the situation in his explication of the three dharma-wheels, as follows:

の『法華玄論』巻第四「一乘義」について', *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*, 33/1 1984, 78–83 and 'Kichizō sanshake-setsu no ayamari ni tsuite' 吉藏三車家説の誤りについて, *Sōtō-shū Kenkyūin Kenkyūsei Kenkyū Kiyō*, 16, 1984, 42–67.

[59] The functionalistic approach of Chi-tsang's hermeneutics can be seen from the following account he gives of the teaching of his teacher Fa-lang:

> [Our] teacher further said: 'Whatever we say [should] all be for the sake of stopping errors. When errors are stopped, speech ceases. It is just like hailstones which crush grass. When the grass is dead, the hailstones disappear. We should not adhere to words and form opinions. If we adhere to words and form opinions, we shall fall into errors once again and cannot attain deliverance.' (*Chung-kuan-lun Su*, T, 42.27b13–16).

That is, Buddhist ideas and theories are formulated not as eternal truths depicting the constituents and the essence of the ultimate reality, but are invented as instruments to check errors. Consequently, they should be abandoned immediately once they have fulfilled their intended function. Chi-tsang is highly hostile to any tendency to divorce scriptural teachings from their original function of refuting falsehoods and to treat Buddhist doctrines as fixed dogmas. Again quoting Fa-lang, he laments how often truth, wisdom and meditation become additional obstacles on the path of enlightenment because of the deliberate frame of mind of the practitioners:

> Further, whenever my teacher, the Reverend Master of the Hsing-huang [Monastery] 興皇寺, ascended the high seat, he often said as follows: 'Practitioners of the Way want to foresake the false ways and seek the True Way, and thus are bound by [their longing for] the Way. Practitioners of meditation [try to] stop disturbances and seek calmness, and thus are bound by [their fondness for] meditation. Pursuers of scholarship claim that there is wisdom [to be cultivated], and thus are bound by [their love of] wisdom.' They further say, 'We should practise contemplating [the truth of] non-origination so as to eliminate the mind of acquisition.' As a consequence, they are bound by [the idea of] non-origination. Living in the midst of bondages, they want to abandon bondages, not really knowing that [their attempts to abandon bondages] are all [additional causes of] bondages. (*Ching-ming Hsüan-lun*, T, 38.874b15–20).

[60] See Chi-tsang's own account of this change in the *Fa-hua-ching T'ung-lüeh* 法華經統略, *Hsü Tsang-ching* 43.1c4–5. Suemitsu Yasumasa points out that among Chi-tsang's twenty-six extant works, five are connected with the *Lotus Sūtra*, making up around 30% of the total volume of the Master's extant writings. See his paper 'Kichizō no *Hokekyō* kaishaku ni tsuite' 吉藏の「法華經」解釋について *Indogaku Bukkyō-gaku Kenkyū*, 32/1, 1983, 239. For information about Chi-tsang's writings on the *Lotus Sūtra*, refer to Maruyama Takao, op. cit., 67–75.

[61] *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun*, T, 34.364b8–9.

[62] *Fa-hua Yu-i*, T, 34.647c18–19.

[63] See, for instance, *Fa-hua I-su*, T, 34.485b20–26 and *Chung-kuan-lun Su*, T, 42.30c24–27.

[64] On Chi-tsang's attempt to harmonize the teaching of the *Lotus Sūtra* with that of the Madhyamaka treatises, see Satō Seijun 佐藤成順, 'Kichizō no okeru *Chūron* kaishaku no tokushitsu' 吉藏における中論解釋の特質', in *Ryūju Kyōgaku no Kenkyū*, 龍樹教學の研究, Mibu Taishun 壬生台舜 (ed.), (Tokyo, 1983), 341–57 and Suemitsu Yasumasa, 'Kichizō no *Hokekyō* kaishaku ni tsuite', op. cit., 239–42.

[65] On Chi-tsang's theory of three dharma-wheels, see Hirai Shunei, op. cit., 506–10, Muranaka Yūshō, 'Kajō Daishi no kyōhan shisō' 嘉祥大師の教判思想, *Taishō Daigaku Kenkyū Kiyō* (Bungaku-bu Bukkyōgaku-bu) 大正大學研究紀要（文學部佛教學部）57, 1972, 20–23 and Suemitsu Yasumasa, 'Kichizō no nizō sanrin setsu' 吉藏の二藏三輪説, *Bukkyōgaku* 佛教學, 15, 1983, 77–82.

[66] See Yüan-tse, *Chieh-shen-mi-ching Su*, *Hsü tsang-ching*, 34.412d8–413a7, Hui-yüan 慧苑, *K'an-ting Chi* 刊定記, *Hsü Tsang-ching*, 5.8d15–9a4 and Ch'eng-kuan 澄觀 (738–839), *Hua-yen-ching Su* 華嚴經疏, T, 35.508c16–21. For a comparative study of these accounts of Paramārtha's *p'an-chiao* scheme of three dharma-wheels, see Sakamoto Yukio 坂本幸男, *Kegon Kyōgaku no Kenkyū* 華嚴教學の研究 (Kyoto, 1956), 209–12.

[67] See, for example, *Fa-hua I-su*, T, 34.453c1–8, 484a5–16 and *Fa-hua Yu-i*, T, 34.634c23–635a4.

[68] See n.14 above.

[69] See T, 9.11b and 21c.

125/114

> . . . since [the Buddha] wanted to discourse on the three kinds of dharma-wheels, he preached this [*Lotus*] *Sūtra*. By the three kinds [of dharma-wheels], we refer to: 1. The original dharma-wheel, 2. The derivative dharma-wheel, 3. [The dharma-wheel] assimilating the derivative into the original. Regarding the original dharma-wheel, when the Buddha first achieved enlightenment, he opened, in the assembly of the *Garland*, the dharma-door of the causes and the fruits of the one [vehicle] solely for the bodhisattvas. This is known as the 'original teaching'. However, those [practitioners] of few merits and dull faculties were not equal to hearing the causes and the fruits of the one [vehicle]. Hence, the one Buddha-vehicle was divided into three [teachings], which are known as the 'derivative teaching'. For over forty years, [the Buddha] preached the three-vehicle teachings to train the minds [of his lesser followers]. Only then did he [, in the assembly of] the *Lotus*[,] unite those three-vehicle [teachings] in the one way [of the one vehicle]. This is [known as] the 'teaching assimilating the derivative into the original'.[70]

The three dharma-wheels denote three consecutive phases in the Buddha's teaching career:

1. The original dharma-wheel: immediately after his enlightenment, the Buddha preached the *Garland Sūtra*, in which he set forth the causes and the fruits of the one vehicle for the benefit of the bodhisattvas only.
2. The derivative dharma-wheel: this phase lasted forty years, during which the Buddha preached the three-vehicle teachings for the benefit of his lesser followers who were of dull faculties and who could not comprehend the one-vehicle teaching pertaining to the first dharma-wheel.
3. The dharma-wheel assimilating the derivative into the original: after instructing his lesser followers for forty years, the Buddha perceived that they were at last ready to receive the one-vehicle teaching. So he preached for them the *Lotus Sūtra*, in which he informed them of the tentative nature of the three-vehicle teachings pertaining to the second dharma-wheel, and of the function of the three-vehicle teachings to prepare the way for the manifestation of the one-vehicle teaching.

According to the above description, the first and the third dharma-wheels were represented by the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Lotus Sūtra* respectively, and they carried the same one-vehicle teaching. The following comparison between the first and third dharma-wheels bears witness to the intention of Chi-tsang's theory of three dharma-wheels to affirm the importance of the *Lotus Sūtra* as a vehicle for expressing the supreme truth in the face of opinions to the contrary:

> Formerly, [teachers in] the South and the North all maintained that the *Garland* [*Sūtra* embodies] the supreme teaching and the *Lotus* [*Sūtra* teaches] doctrines of incomplete [meaning]. Now, we say that it is not the case. This [*Lotus*] *Sūtra* explains that the one-vehicle [teaching preached] at the beginning (i.e. the *Garland Sūtra*) cannot save the sons [from the danger of fire], and that the one-vehicle [teaching] elucidated at the end (i.e. the *Lotus Sūtra*) can save the sons [from the danger of fire].[71] The meanings of 'being able to [save]' and 'being unable to [save]' are dissimilar; the one-vehicle [teaching taught] at the beginning and [the one-vehicle teaching taught] at the end are not different.[72]

This passage opens with an outright dismissal of the prevailing view of the *Garland Sūtra*'s superiority because of the greater purity of its teaching. It does not deny that there is the difference that one (the *Garland Sūtra*) is accessible to only a few and the other (the *Lotus Sūtra*) to many. However, it maintains that as far as the content of instruction is concerned, the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Lotus Sūtra*, being the representative texts of the first and the third dharma-wheels, embody alike the supreme one-vehicle teaching, and so are equally pure and perfect.

The assigning of the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Lotus Sūtra* respectively to the beginning and the final periods of the Buddha's evangelical mission in Chi-tsang's theory of three dharma-wheels is supported by the text of the two scriptures. As has already been mentioned, the *Garland Sūtra* opens with the scene of the Buddha sitting under the Bodhi-tree surrounded by a huge retinue, which suggests that it was the first sūtra taught by the Buddha after his enlightenment. The late appearance of the *Lotus Sūtra* is suggested by the Buddha's allusion there to his imminent nirvāṇa:

> Monks! When the Tathāgata knows of himself that *his time of nirvāṇa has arrived* and his multitude [of followers] are pure [at heart], firm in faith and understanding, thorough in the comprehension of the truth of emptiness and profound in [the practice of] meditation, then he gathers together various bodhisattvas and śrāvakas, and preaches for them this [*Lotus*] *Sūtra*.[73]

Now, besides the *Lotus Sūtra*, there is another influential Mahāyāna sūtra which has the last days of the Buddha as its backdrop: namely, the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. Since the latter relates the final events of the Buddha's earthly existence, it is generally regarded as the record of the Buddha's last words and as being posterior to the *Lotus Sūtra*. This fact has been taken by some, such as the proponents of the *p'an-chiao* scheme of five periods, as evidence that it is the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, not the *Lotus Sūtra*, which constitutes the apex of the Buddha's life's work. In discussing the three dharma-wheels, Chi-tsang sometimes speaks of the *Lotus Sūtra* as the commencement and of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* as the conclusion of the third dharma-wheel,[74] which indicates that he shares the popular opinion on their chronological order. However, Chi-tsang firmly rejects the contention that the later work is the superior. Instead, he asserts that the ideas of the inherence of the Buddha-nature in all sentient beings and the permanence of the Buddha central to the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* are implicit in the teachings of the one-vehicle and of the longevity of the Buddha propounded in the *Lotus Sūtra*. He goes so far as to maintain that those who understand thoroughly the lessons of the *Lotus Sūtra* need not hear the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*.[75] To illustrate this conception of the relation between the two sūtras, Chi-tsang borrows the parable of the clever physician from the *Lotus Sūtra* which tells of a physician whose sons had taken poison by mistake. To save his sons, the physician gathered the most fragrant and savoury medical herbs, pounded and blended them, and offered them to his sons as a remedy. Those sons who still retained their presence of mind readily accepted their father's gift of medicine and immediately recovered, while those sons who had lost their sanity under the influence of the poison stubbornly refused to act as advised. To save the deranged sons, the physician left for a faraway country, from where he sent a messenger with the news of his death. Greatly shocked and deeply saddened, the deranged sons awoke from their mental slumber, took the drug, and were instantly cured.[76] According to Chi-tsang, the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* contain the same beneficial message which can deliver all the three vehicles from the pains of *saṃsāra*, like the physician's wholesome medicine which could cure all the sons. Among the three vehicles, there were many who, on hearing the teaching of the *Lotus Sūtra*, accepted it at once and achieved enlightenment, like the sane sons who took the physician's medicine promptly and recovered; yet there were a number of dullards who did not respond to the message of the *Lotus Sūtra*, like the insane sons who turned a deaf ear to the physician's advice. Thus, just as the physician used the news of his death to cure his insane sons, so the Buddha told the poor learners of the *Lotus Sūtra* of his imminent nirvāṇa in the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* with a view to rousing them from their spiritual stupor. All in all, unlike the propounders of the theory of five periods, who see the *Lotus Sūtra* as paving the way for the ultimate revelation of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, Chi-tsang regards the latter as finishing the task of universal deliverance already brought to near-completion by the preaching of the *Lotus Sūtra*.[77]

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[70] *Fa-hua Yu-i*, T, 34.634c16–23. For other passages in Chi-tsang's writings to the similar effect, refer to *Fa-hua I-su*, T, 34.494b22–c1 and *Chung-kuan-lun Su*, T, 42.8b23–29.

[71] This remark refers to the famous parable of the burning house found in the *Lotus Sūtra*, T, 9.12b–13c.

[72] *Fa-hua Yu-i*, T, 34.635a5–8.

[73] T, 9.25c20–22.

[74] See *Fa-hua I-su*, T, 34.473c8–10, 476b5–6 and *Fa-hua-ching T'ung-lüeh*, *Hsü Tsang-ching*, 43.14c7–11.

[75] See *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun*, T, 34.367a12–b17, 369c17–24 and *Ta-ch'eng Hsüan-lun*, T, 45.43a12–22.

If one sees the Buddha's evangelical mission as beginning with the *Garland Sūtra* and concluding with the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, one may infer that the period between was devoted to preaching the remaining sūtras, first the Hīnayāna sūtras which were easier to understand and then the more difficult Mahāyāna sūtras. In this way, one arrives at the idea of four periods, which is found in Chi-tsang's writings in the following terms:

> Roughly speaking, the [Buddha's] entire life's work comprised four periods: 1. [The period when] the Mahā[yāna] capacities had not yet matured, 2. [The period when] the Hīna[yāna] faculties had already been developed, 3. [The period when] adherence to the Hīna[yāna Way] began to yield and the Mahā[yāna] capacities first became active, 4. [The period when] adherence to the Hīna[yāna Way] definitely gave way and the Mahā[yāna] capacities definitely matured. The [Buddha's] entire life's work comprised just these four periods.
>
> By '[the period when] the Mahā[yāna] capacities had not yet matured,' [we refer to the time] when the Buddha first achieved enlightenment, when he preached for the bodhisattvas the *Garland Sūtra* [because] he wanted to edify them with the [supreme] Mahā[yāna] Dharma. However, [those practitioners of] Hīna[yāna] capacities were not equal to [the direct revelation of the perfect Truth]. Hence, the Buddha ceased [this way of] instruction . . .
>
> Next, by 'the Hīna[yāna] faculties had already been developed,' [we refer to the fact that those practitioners] not equal to the Mahā[yāna form of] edification on the days of [the preaching of the *Garland Sūtra* at] the place of enlightenment came to accept the Hīna[yāna] Dharma at the time of [the preaching of Hīnayāna sūtras at] the Deer Park . . .
>
> By 'adherence to the Hīna[yāna Way] began to yield and the Mahā[yāna] capacities first became active,' [we refer to the fact that the Buddha] taught directly the bodhisattvas and edified covertly the two vehicles with the various *vaipulya* teachings of the *Prajñāpāramitā[-sūtras]* and *Vimala* [*Sūtra*], in order to improve the minds of the Hīna[yānists] and make them long for the Mahā[yāna] Way. As their adherence to the Hīna[yāna Way] began to yield and their Mahā[yāna] capacities first became active, the audiences of the *Prajñāpāramitā[-sūtras]* and *Vimala* [*Sūtra*] could see and hear [the Buddha preaching], but without being able to understand [fully his meaning].
>
> By 'adherence to the Hīna[yāna Way] definitely gave way and the Mahā[yāna] capacities definitely matured,' [we have in mind] the *Lotus* [*Sūtra*] which opened the door of expedience to show the real meaning. As adherence to the Hīna[yāna Way] had given way, it was fitting to open the door of expedience; as the Mahā[yāna] capacities [of the practitioners] had matured, the real meaning became manifest. Hence, the audience of the *Lotus* [*Sūtra*] could believe and understand [the Buddha's message], as well as being able to see and hear [the Buddha preaching].[78]

The four periods, as the above text shows, made up the Buddha's entire life-work. The first and fourth periods, being represented respectively by the *Garland Sūtra* and the *Lotus Sūtra*, corresponded respectively to the first and third dharma-wheels. In place of the second dharma-wheel, there were two periods: the second period spent on the preaching of the Hīnayāna sūtras and the third period dedicated to the preaching of the Mahāyāna sūtras. Unlike Hui-kuan's 'five periods' which were each characterized by a particular form of teaching (e.g. the distinctive teaching of the three vehicles), Chi-tsang's 'four periods', as is readily apparent from their names (e.g. 'the Mahāyāna faculties had not yet matured'), were distinguished from each other by the different levels of intelligence of the learners, a feature which reflects the functionalistic approach of Chi-tsang's hermeneutics. From the notion that the teachings of the four periods are each suitable for learners of a special level of intelligence, the idea of 'four alternatives of overtness and covertness' is obtained:

> 1. What taught overtly the bodhisattvas and did not edify covertly the two vehicles: this was the teaching of the *Garland* [*Sūtra*]. Since the Mahā[yāna] capacities [of the bodhisattvas] had already matured when [the Buddha] first achieved enlightenment, it taught overtly [the bodhisattvas]; since there were no beings of the two vehicles in the assembly and since the Mahā[yāna] capacities [of those beings] had not yet developed, it did not edify covertly the two vehicles.[79]

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[76] For the parable as found in the *Lotus Sūtra*, see T, 9.43a7–b10.

[77] For Chi-tsang's explanation of the relation between the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, see *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun*, T, 34.373c12–20, 441b20–27, *Fa-hua I-su*, T, 34.611c24–27, *Ching-ming Hsüan-lun*, T, 38.886a2–11 and *Ta-ch'eng Hsüan-lun*, T, 45.42c29–43a4, 57c26–58a6, 65c1–9. Chi-tsang's high esteem for the *Lotus Sūtra*, as evinced in the theory of three dharma-wheels, brings to mind Chih-i, Chi-tsang's elder contemporary and the founder of the T'ien-t'ai School 天台宗, who goes further to take the *Lotus Sūtra* as the primary scriptural source of his teaching. In point of fact, Chih-i's opinion on the relation between the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* closely resembles that of Chi-tsang: Chih-i refers to the latter as 'the teaching which gathers up' (*chün-shih chiao* 捃拾教), by which he means that the main function of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* is to gather together and convert those practitioners who fail to react to the supreme teaching of the *Lotus Sūtra*. For more information about Chih-i's opinion on the relation between these two sūtras refer to Leon Hurvitz, *Chih-i* (Bruxelles: L'Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1962), 237–44 and my paper, 'The *Lotus Sūtra* and *Garland Sūtra* according to the T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen schools in Chinese Buddhism', *T'oung Pao*, 74, 1988, 59–61. Those interested in the highly complex problem of the historical and doctrinal links between the teachings of Chi-tsang and Chih-i may consult Hirai Shunei, *Hokke Mongu no Seiritsu ni Kansuru Kenkyū* 法華文句の成立に關する研究 (Tokyo, 1985).

[78] *Ching-ming Hsüan-lun*, T, 38.899b13–c1.

[79] The śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas were not among the thirty-four forms and eighteen groups of sentient beings who gathered around the Buddha in the opening scene of the *Garland Sūtra*.

2. What taught overtly the two vehicles and did not edify covertly the bodhisattvas: this was the three-vehicle teachings [of the Hīnayāna *piṭaka*]. Since the Hīna[yāna] capacities [of the two vehicles] were already developed, it taught [the two vehicles] overtly. The bodhisattvas, being of Mahā[yāna] talent, did not need [this] Hīna[yāna form of] edification.
3. What taught overtly the bodhisattvas and edified covertly the two vehicles: this was [the teaching found in] such sūtras as the *Prajñā[pāramitā-sūtras]* and the *Vimala* [*Sūtra*]. Since the Mahā[yāna] capacities of the bodhisattvas were already developed, it taught overtly [the bodhisattvas]; since the two vehicles' adherence to the Hīna[yāna Way] began to yield and their Mahā[yāna] capacities first became active, it edified [the two vehicles] covertly.
4. What taught overtly the bodhisattvas and taught overtly the two vehicles: this was the teaching of the *Lotus* [*Sūtra*]. Since on hearing this [Supreme] Dharma, the bodhisattvas eliminated completely the web of doubts, it is said that it taught overtly the bodhisattvas; since [it prophesied] that the one thousand and two hundred arhats [present in the assembly] would eventually all become Buddhas,[80] [it is said that] it taught overtly the two vehicles.[81]

Putting together the expositions of the 'four periods' and the 'four alternatives of overtness and covertness' in the two quotations above, we have the following picture:

1. First period: immediately after his enlightenment, the Buddha preached the *Garland Sūtra* and laid out the Mahāyāna Dharma in its entirety. This direct method of instruction was only suitable for bodhisattvas of the highest intelligence, and was not fit for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas whose 'Mahāyāna capacities had not yet matured'. Hence, it is said that the teaching of this period 'taught overtly the bodhisattvas and did not edify covertly the two vehicles'.
2. Second period: seeing that the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas in the audience were not equal to the profound Mahāyāna Dharma demonstrated in the *Garland Sūtra*, the Buddha proceeded to preach various Hīnayāna sūtras with an eye to adapting to their 'Hīnayāna faculties'. Since the teaching of this period was meant for the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas and was too elementary for the bodhisattvas, it is said that it 'taught overtly the two vehicles and did not edify covertly the bodhisattvas'.
3. Third period: seeing that the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas were ready to receive higher truths after having gone through the training of the second period, the Buddha preached various Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* and the *Vimala Sūtra*, with the intention of instilling in them the wish for the Mahāyāna Way. Since the bodhisattvas could understand perfectly the teaching enunciated in these sūtras, it is said that the teaching of this period 'taught overtly the bodhisattvas'. Although the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddas could not fathom the full significance of the lesson of these sūtras, they began to notice the limitations of the Hīnayāna Way ('adherence to the Hīnayāna Way began to yield') and started to strive for the knowledge of the Mahāyāna Way ('Mahāyāna capacities first became active') on hearing it. Hence, it is said that the teaching of this period 'edified covertly the two vehicles'.
4. Fourth period: after undergoing the preceding periods of education, the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas finally gave up their attachment to the Hīnayāna Way ('adherence to the Hīnayāna Way definitely gave way') and were fully equipped to embark on the Mahāyāna Way ('Mahāyāna capacities definitely matured'). Only then did the Buddha preach the *Lotus Sūtra*, in which he pointed out the provisional nature of the previous periods of instruction ('opened the door of expedience') and unfolded the real meaning of the Buddhist gospel ('showed the real meaning'). Since the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, as well as the bodhisattvas, could comprehend the teaching of this period, it is said that the teaching of this period 'taught overtly the bodhisattvas and edified overtly the two vehicles.'[82]

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[80] See T, 9.10a20–21.

[81] *Ching-ming Hsüan-lun*, T, 38.900b1–11. For other remarks of Chi-tsang to the similar effect, see *Fa-hua Yu-i*, T, 34.645a8–21.

The classification of 'four alternatives of overtness and covertness' appears in Chi-tsang's writings largely as a supplement to the classification of two *piṭakas*, and it is formulated by Chi-tsang with a view to showing up the special functions of various central Mahāyāna sūtras.[83] In this connexion, it goes beyond the scheme of three dharma-wheels in taking into account the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* and the *Vimala Sūtra*, which it gives as the representative texts of the third alternative and as a bridge between the initial revelation of the full Truth in the first alternative and the final revelation of the full Truth in the fourth alternative. Now, the ascription of the role of an intermediary to the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* did not begin with Chi-tsang. It was a practice common among the *p'an-chiao* theorists of Chi-tsang's time, and was, for example, an important element of the *p'an-chiao* teachings of 'three periods and five teachings' and 'four tenets' current among the Ch'eng-shih and Ti-lun masters. However, unlike the other *p'an-chiao* theorists, Chi-tsang did not move from the notion of the intermediary role to the notion of the preliminary nature of the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, which is not surprising given the close doctrinal tie between the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* and the Madhyamaka tradition which Chi-tsang championed. According to Chi-tsang, the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* are, like the *Lotus Sūtra*, concerned with revealing the Buddha's real intention:

> All Mahāyāna sūtras without exception demonstrate the [True] Way, i.e. they are all similar in revealing the real [meaning]. However, at the time of

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[82] To readers familiar with T'ien-t'ai teaching, the close resemblance between Chi-tsang's scheme of 'four periods' and Chih-i's *p'an-chiao* scheme of 'five periods' must appear striking. In fact, the only major difference between the two is the attribution of the *Vimala Sūtra* and the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* to two different periods in the latter scheme. On the *p'an-chiao* scheme of five periods of the T'ien-t'ai School, see Chegwan 諦觀 (d.971), *T'ien-t'ai Buddhism: an outline of the fourfold teachings*, transl. by the Buddhist Translation Seminar of Hawaii (Tokyo, Daiichi Shobō, 1983), 55–69 and Leon Hurvitz, op. cit., 230–44.

[83] See T, 45.5c9–20. For studies which stress the importance of the ideas of 'covertness' and 'overtness' in Chi-tsang's *p'an-chiao* teaching, refer to the essays of Muranaka Yūshō mentioned in n. 42 above. Further discussions on these ideas and on Chi-tsang's view of the different roles played by various Mahāyāna sūtras can be found in Hirai Shunei, op. cit., 484–93, 501–4, Suemitsu Yasumasa, 'Kichizō no nizō sanrin setsu', Kimura Kiyotaka 木村清孝, *Shoki Chūgoku Kegon Shisō no Kenkyū* 初期中國華嚴思想の研究 (Tokyo, 1977), 230–6, Kanno Hiroshi, 'Kichizō ni okeru *Hokekyō* to sho daijō kyōten no hikaku', 205–70, and 'Kichizō no kyōten kan' 吉藏の經典觀, *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*, 30/1, 1981, 347–50.

[the preaching of] the *Prajñāpāramitā[-sūtras]* and the *Vimala* [*Sūtra*], the faculties of the two vehicles had not yet matured. Hence, [the Buddha] had not yet opened [the door of] expedience. By the time of [the preaching of] the *Lotus* [*Sūtra*], the faculties of the two vehicles had finally matured. Hence, [the Buddha] then opened [the door of] expedience. It should not be maintained that since [the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*] do not open [the door of] expedience, they also do not reveal the real [meaning].[84]

Taking the idea of non-acquisition as their primary theme, the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, more than any other sūtra, excel in the demonstration of the true nature of no-form and the highest wisdom of no-thought.[85] Admittedly the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* contain no reference to the eventual Buddhahood of the śrāvakas and the pratyekabuddhas. However, this does not imply that the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* do not teach the supreme teaching of one-vehicle characteristic of the *Lotus Sūtra*:

> In the *Pañcavimśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, [it is said that] the bodhisattvas will become Buddhas. [It is] not yet [said that] the two vehicles will become Buddhas. In the *Lotus* [*Sūtra*], [it is said that] the bodhisattvas and the two vehicles will all become Buddhas. However, with respect to [the teaching of] the Buddha vehicle, [the two works are] not different.[86]

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[84] *Fa-hua Hsüan-lun*, T, 34.386c8–12.

[85] See ibid., T, 34.384c19–28 and 385c8–14.

[86] *Ching-ming Hsüan-lun*, T, 38.900c11–13.

NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS

AN UNIDENTIFIED CHRISTIAN–PALESTINIAN–ARAMAIC FRAGMENT IN THE TAYLOR-SCHECHTER COLLECTION: ISAIAH 36: 16–37:4 [1]

(PLATES I–II)

Among the Taylor-Schechter Collection in the University Library Cambridge there are still Christian–Palestinian–Aramaic (CPA) fragments which have yet to be identified. One such fragment, T-S 12.742, was published for the first time in 1900 by A. Lewis and M. Gibson, though scarcely any of the text had been read.[2] Like all the other CPA fragments of earlier date, T-S 12.742 is a vellum palimpsest, and has a small part of another page attached to it (see plates). The CPA script underneath the Hebrew square letters is very faint and consists of two unheaded columns of 24 lines each on both sides of the fragment. It is one of the most difficult CPA palimpsests to decipher.

Lewis suggested in her description of the manuscript collection that this text belonged to the Old Testament and inserted the fragment between Joel and Corinthians.[3] Goshen-Gottstein in his later critical CPA-Bible edition, however, neither included nor identified it.[4]

The CPA word for 'Assyrians' *swryy'*[5] in the last line of column 2 (verso) points to a limited number of possibilities among the books of the Old Testament, and this set me on the right track. After further examination under ultra-violet light and on photographs, and with the help of other key words, I was able to identify the textual remains with the content of Isaiah 36:16–37:4.[6] Several lines on the verso still defy decipherment, but the legible remainder seemed worth publishing and is set out below.

T-S 12.742 a[7]

	col. I	col. II
	ʳswr̈yy :· (16) *l'*	*dmyn̈y' kwl*
	*[t'*ˀ*šmw'wn*	*ḥd mnhwn*
	[l]ḥzqys: h̄kdn	*'r'h mn byn*
	['mr m]lk'	*'ÿdwy dmlkhwn*
5	*[dsw]r̈yy* :· *'n*	*dswr̈yy* :· (19) *hn*

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[1] I am indebted to the curators of the University Library Cambridge for their kind permission to publish the ultra-violet photographs.

[2] A. S. Lewis—M. D. Gibson, *Palestinian Syriac Texts from Palimpsest Fragments in the Taylor-Schechter Collection* (London, 1900), 42/3.

[3] ibid., XIII, 42/3.

[4] This fragment is not even mentioned in: M. N. Goshen-Gottstein, *The Bible in the Syropalestinian Version, Part I: Pentateuch and Prophets* (Jerusalem, 1973).

[5] CPA does not make any difference between the words 'Syrians' and 'Assyrians'. Cf. Schultheß, *Lexicon Syropalaestinum*, (Berlin, 1903), 134a.

[6] At first, I identified the fragment with 2 Kings 18:26–38. However, once more words could be read I realized that it is Isaiah because of verse 36:17 where a half-verse is missing in contrast to 2 Kings 18:32. The misleading information needs to be corrected in: Ch. Müller-Kessler, *Grammatik des Christlich-Palästinisch-Aramäischen = GCPA*, Teil I: *Schriftlehre, Lautlehre, Formenlehre* (Hildesheim, 1991), p.18, n. 96.

[7] For detailed information on diacritics, dividing points and abbreviations cf. Müller-Kessler, *GCPA*, xv-xxiv, 29–31, 34–36, 48. [...] stands for an addition, but the dots do not usually represent the actual missing letters, ʳ...ˀ for only partially legible letters; an unclosed bracket indicates the damaged segment of a letter. A superlinear stroke indicates a faint or doubtful letter. The symbol :· marks the end of a line or verse.

173/14

thought association. Thirdly, we discover that puns could hang on chiastic reversal. It is argued that all three of these devices are features of residual orality in ancient Japan, and it is demonstrated that they could be used in combination to convey to the audience an extremely cryptic or esoteric message. In short, this paper not only provides a deeper analysis of the *Womē-no* poem than ever before, but produces new and original evidence about residual orality in ancient Japan.

The *Kitāb al-Taswi'a* or *Book of Reprobation* by Jonah ibn Janāḥ. A revision of J. and H. Derenbourg's edition

MARÍA A. GALLEGO

In this article I study several linguistic aspects of the *Kitāb al-taswi'a* or *Book of Reprobation*, a Judaeo-Arabic grammatical treatise written in the eleventh century by the Andalusian grammarian Jonah ibn Janāḥ. I start by analysing the various misinterpretations of the title that have been made, partly due to the erroneous reading on the part of the Derenbourgs in their 1880 edition and translation of the *Kitāb al-taswi'a*. I then compare the two complete available manuscripts of this work and give a list of linguistic features not reflected in the Derenbourgs' edition, but that can be included among the typical traits of Medieval or Classical Judaeo-Arabic.

Proto-Afro-Asiatic origin of 'gum'?

GÁBOR TAKÁCS

In this paper I attempt to show that Egyptian qmj.t 'gum' (the ultimate source of our common European word for 'gum') comes from the Proto-Afro-Asiatic lexical heritage. Since the supposed West Chadic cognate of this Egyptian word seems at the moment rather isolated, I try to demonstrate the regularity of the consonant correspondences in question adducing several relevant examples from the etymological material.

Aśoka and the Buddhist *Saṃgha*: a study of Aśoka's Schism Edict and Minor Rock Edict I

HERMAN TIEKEN

Introduction

In the legendary accounts of the Buddhist canon concerning the growth and development of Theravāda Buddhism (Norman, 1987) Aśoka plays an important role. In support of these legends modern scholars have quoted Aśoka's own so-called Schism Edict from Allahabad (Kauśāmbī), Sanchi and Sarnath, in which the emperor would claim to have acted against schisms in the Buddhist Church (e.g. Alsdorf, 1959). However, Bechert has convincingly shown that in this edict Aśoka is not concerned with schisms in the Buddhist Church but with divisions within local, individual *saṃghas* (Bechert, 1961; 1982). It should immediately be added that this does not imply a denigration of Aśoka's importance for Buddhism but merely brings his role into line with contemporary realities. At the time the level of organization in Buddhism did not go beyond that of the individual *saṃgha*. It is all the more important to identify exactly the details of Aśoka's interference in the *saṃgha*. However, it is precisely here that problems start, as several passages in the text of the Schism Edict, an important source on this topic, are still unclear. By way of example I refer to *posathāye* in the Sarnath version, which has been variously interpreted as a dative of direction and a dative of time. The difference would be whether Aśoka's official should go *to* the *uposatha* ceremony or should go to the *saṃgha* *on* the *uposatha* day.

An inventory of the problems

The present study will deal with some of the problems in the text of the Schism Edict in order to gain a clearer picture of the nature and circumstances of Aśoka's interference in the Buddhist *saṃghas*. Before going into detail I would like to present an inventory of the more obvious problems in the text.

The Schism Edict is found in three places, namely in Allahabad (Kauśāmbī),[2] Sanchi and Sarnath respectively. The text consists of two parts. The first, which is found with only minor variations in all three versions, consists of a standard introduction ([*devānaṃ*]*piye ānapayati kosaṃbiyaṃ mahāmātā*),[3] followed by the following three sentences. Below I quote the barest of the three versions, from Allahabad, as reconstructed by Alsdorf (1959: 163):[4]

1. *saṃghe samage kaṭe*
2. *saṃghasi no lahiye bhede*

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[1] An earlier version of this article was read by Professor Tilmann Vetter and Dr Clodwig H. Werba, to both of whom I am grateful for their comments. The article has benefited greatly from discussion with Professor Jan Heesterman, whom I would like to thank here for the keen interest shown in the topic and his many comments and suggestions.

[2] While the inscription has been found at Allahabad, the edict had been addressed to the *mahāmātras* of Kauśāmbī.

[3] In the Sanchi version this part of the text is unreadable. In Sarnath the text is readable only from the third line onwards (*ye kena pi saṃghe bhetave* ...). For the most recent attempt at reconstructing the opening part of this version, see Norman (1987: 8–9).

[4] Unless indicated otherwise references are to Hultzsch's 1925 edition of the Aśoka inscriptions. Other sources are Schneider (1978), for the Rock Edicts (RE), Andersen (1990), for the Minor Rock Edicts (MRE), and Alsdorf (1962), for the Separate Edicts of Dhauli and Jaugaḍa (SE).

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174/14

3. *ye saṃghaṃ bhākhati bhikhu vā bhikhuni vā se pi cā odātāni dusāni saṃnaṃdhāpayitu anāvāsasi āvāsayiye*

1. The *saṃgha* is said to have been made *samagga*. This sentence is missing in Sarnath.
2. In the *saṃgha* division should not be allowed. In Sanchi this sentence is found before (1).
3. The third sentence apparently says that the monk or nun who (in the future) will divide the *saṃgha* (*saṃghaṃ bhākhati*) is to be made to wear white robes again and to be expelled from the *āvāsa* of the *saṃgha*.

In Sarnath, and only in this version. this is followed by a passage which seems to provide instructions to the *mahāmātra*s concerning, among other things, the circulation of the edict.

An important landmark in the study of the edict is Bechert's article published in 1961 (see also Bechert, 1982). As indicated above, it was until then assumed that the edict referred to the schisms in the Buddhist Church which ultimately led to Theravāda Buddhism. As such, the inscription would corroborate the accounts of that schism in Theravāda sources, according to which it had taken place in the wake of Aśoka's interference in the Buddhist Church at a moment at which it was irremediably divided.[5] Bechert argues that *saṃgha* in the edict does not refer to the 'the Buddhist Church', but to a local *saṃgha*. He arrived at this conclusion after a careful study of the use of the terms *samagga* and *saṃghabheda* in Vinaya, showing that they were legal terms for procedures used in the local *saṃgha*, in particular the procedures taking place at the *uposatha* ceremony.

However, if the terminology in the inscription is indeed that of Buddhist Vinaya, it is curious to note that neither Bechert nor any of the scholars after him questioned, or even commented on,[6] the analysis of *bh[.]khati*[7] in *saṃgham bh[.]khati* as a future of the verb *bhañj-*;[8] for the verb to be expected is *bhid-*,[9] the term always being *saṃghabheda*, never **saṃghabhaṅga*. Note expressions like *saṃghaṃ bhindati, jānāti saṃgho bhijjissatīti*, and *ye kena pi saṃghe bhetave*. It is clear that for the derivation of the verb *bh[.]khati* other possibilities should be explored.

The problem of the meaning and derivation of *bh[.]khati* is linked to that of *samagga*, in that the action of *bh[.]khati* results in the annihilation of the *saṃgha* being *samagga*. Unfortunately, two possibilities as to the meaning of *samagga* have been left open, namely 'complete' and 'unanimous' (most recently Hu-von Hinüber, 1994: 219–26). The situation is justified by assuming a distribution of the two meanings over two mutually exclusive contexts: 'unanimous' where *samagga* is found in opposition to *saṃghabheda*, and 'complete' in the other contexts, which deal mostly with the preparation of the *uposatha* ceremony. E.g. with *anujānāmi … samaggānaṃ uposathakammaṃ* (*Vinaya* I 105) the Buddha would order that *all* monks attend: 'Ich ordne … eine Uposathafeier für die vollzähligen (Mönche) an'. On the question to what area this 'completeness' extends, the Buddha answered: *anujānāmi bhikkhave etāvatā sāmaggī yāvatā ekāvāso'ti*, 'Ich ordne an, ihr Mönche, daß die Vollzähligkeit sich so weit wie ein Āvāsa (erstreckt)'.

The word *samagga* will be the starting point of an excursion into the semantics of the term on the one hand, and the 'history' of the Buddhist *uposatha* ceremony on the other. It will be argued that for *samagga* we should start from the meaning 'unanimous'. Doubt about the correctness of that meaning in certain contexts is due to the specific form the Buddhist *uposatha* ceremony has taken when compared to its secular 'predecessor'.

It is generally assumed that the three sentences quoted above are addressed to the *mahāmātra*s, who are instructed on what to do with dissenting monks and nuns; the *mahāmātras* are to defrock them and to dispel them from the *āvāsa* of the particular *saṃgha*. The passage which follows (only in Sarnath) would, or rather could, then not have been meant for publication. In it Aśoka 'merely' tells his officials what to do with the preceding text. Norman (1987: 12; 1982) introduced for this second part in Sarnath the term 'covering letter'.

However, some words vital for understanding the text of this second part are unclear and the interpretation of some other passages is questionable. In Hultzsch's edition the text reads as follows:

5. *hevaṃ iyam sāsane bhikhusaṃghasi ca bhikhunisaṃghasi ca viṃnapayitaviye*
6. *hevaṃ devānaṃpiye āha hedisā ca ikā lipī tuphākaṃtikaṃ huvāti saṃsalanasi nikhitā*
7. *ikaṃ ca lipiṃ hedisameva upāsakānaṃtikaṃ nikhipātha te pi ca upāsakā anuposathaṃ yāvu*
8. *etameva sāsanaṃ visvaṃsayitave anuposathaṃ ca dhuvāye ikike mahāmāte posathāye*
9. *yāti etam eva sāsanaṃ visvaṃsayitave ājānitave ca āvate ca tuphākaṃ āhāle*
10. *savata vivāsayātha tuphe etena viyaṃjanena hemeva savesu koṭaviṣavesu etena*
11. *viyaṁjanena vivāsāpayāthā.*

Thus this edict must be submitted both to the *Saṃgha* of monks and to the *Saṃgha* of nuns.

Thus speaks Dēvānāmpriya:

Let one copy of this (edict) remain with you deposited in (your) office; and deposit ye another copy of this very (edict) with the lay-worshippers. These lay-worshippers may come on every fast-day (*posatha*) in order to be inspired with confidence in this very edict; and invariably on every fast-day, every *Mahāmātra* (will) come to the fast-day (service) in order to be inspired with confidence in this very edict and to understand (it). And as far as your district (extends), dispatch ye (an officer) everywhere according to the letter of this (edict).

In the same way cause (your subordinates) to dispatch (an officer) according to the letter of this (edict) in all the territories (surrounding) forts.

(Translation by Hultzsch)

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[5] For the various traditional accounts of this schism see Norman (1987: 16–8).

[6] One of the few scholars to comment on the use of the verb *bhañj-* instead of *bhid-* is Norman (1987: 10).

[7] The vowel is uncertain. Allahabad-Kauśāmbī has [...]*khati*, Sarnath *bh[...]t[i]*, and Sanchi *bh[.]khati*. *-kh-* stands for both single or for double *-kh-/-kkh-*, depending on whether the preceding vowel is long (*bh[ā]khati*) or short (*bh[a]kkhati*).

[8] See, for instance, Turner (1931), who, however, also drew attention to the problems involved in this derivation, which assumes the loss of the nasal element *ṅ* in *bhaṅkṣyati*.

[9] On final analysis the derivation of *bh[.]khati* from a form of *bhañj-* is the outcome of the search for a synonym of the verb *bhid-* found in *saṃghabheda*. In this connection it should be noted that the meanings of *bhañj-* 'to break (in two pieces, to break off)' and *bhid-* 'to divide, to break open' overlap only partly. It should be noted again that *ad hoc* variations in the legal terminology were at all costs to be avoided. In this respect Buddhist law was no exception as may be gathered from, for instance, the insistence on the correct pronunciation of the words used in the legal procedures of the Buddhist *saṃghas* (see von Hinüber, 1987).

175/14

As indicated, our understanding of the text is considerably hampered by at least two words which so far have defied any attempt at interpretation.[10] The first word is *visvaṃsayitave*, the second *vivāsayātha*/*vivāsāpayāthā*. With precisely these two verbs Aśoka instructs his officials what to do, or rather to have done, with the text of the three sentences. Given this uncertainty the interpretation of this second part of the edict as a 'covering letter' is, to say the least, premature.

I have already referred to the problem posed by the dative *posathāye*. It is important to define the meaning of the dative exactly, for *posathāye* must have a very specific meaning since the role of outsiders at the *uposatha* ceremony was (and still is) severely restricted.

Probably because of the problems posed by *posathāye* yet another strange dative expression, namely *dhuvāye*, has been left without comment. If one thinks about it, the current translation 'invariably' is clearly an *ad hoc* solution, lacking support from elsewhere. An attempt will be made to make sense of the word.

The examination of this second part of the edict will draw attention to the formulaic nature of the text of the first part, a feature which until now has gone unnoticed. As I will try to show, the combination of the three lines invites a comparison with other Buddhist formulae, in particular the *prātimokṣasūtra* and *karmavācanā*. The determination of the relationship of our text with either of these two sets of formulae depends on, among other things, at exactly which stage in the *uposatha* ceremony the *mahāmātras* are supposed to present themselves. On analysis this appears to be one of the key questions of the present study. An answer will be found in the very word *posathāye*, and confirmation found in another inscription by Aśoka, namely Minor Rock Edict I (MRE I), in which the emperor mentions his visit in his capacity of lay follower to a Buddhist *saṃgha* and the beneficial effects of this visit on his actions. The edict is notorious for the enigma posed by the reference to Aśoka's '256 nights', which at one time was taken to refer to the years elapsed since Buddha's death and as such played an important role in determining the date of this event (see Dietz, 1992). A more recent interpretation of the meaning of the 256 nights is given by Falk (1990), according to whom they refer to the number of *uposatha* days elapsed since Aśoka's conversion to Buddhism (for a correction of Falk's calculation, see Hu-von Hinüber, 1996). However, as I will try to show, the 256 nights refer to quite something else; they indicate the moment of the year at which Aśoka visited the *saṃgha*.

visvaṃsayitave, vivāsayātha *and* vivāsāpayāthā

Norman has shown that the derivation of *visvaṃsayitave* from the causative *viśvāsaya-* does not yield a meaning which fits in the present context (Norman, 1987: 14ff). His own attempt to make sense of the word by dividing it into *visvaṃ* (*viśvaṃ*) and *sayitave*, which latter word, through *savitave*, would be the infinitive of the rare verb *śravati* 'to hear', is clearly a *tour de force*. In the second round he suggested that the word hidden beneath *visvaṃsayitave* was Sanskrit *viśraṃsa-*, for which the dictionaries give, among other meanings, 'to betray, to publish' (Norman, 1993: 21). However, a quick look at the same dictionaries shows that the meaning 'to betray' is to be taken literally. It is an *ad hoc* translation of 'to let slip a secret'. This cannot have been the meaning intended in the inscription.

The words *vivāsayātha* and *vivāsāpayāthā* are generally derived from *vivāsaya-* 'to banish', the causative of *vi-vas-*. To Falk's derivation from *vi-vas-* 'to dawn' (Falk, 1990) I will return. The verb is taken to mean something like 'to dispatch'. The object of the verb is not specified in the text but, as we have seen, Hultzsch supplied Aśoka's officers.[11] However, Falk has already objected to the translation of *vivāsaya-* as 'to dispatch' in the light of the markedly negative connotations of the causative *vivāsaya-* in Sanskrit (Falk, 1990: 119). Starting from the meaning 'to banish' one could think of supplying the *bhikkhus* who divide the *saṃgha*. However, this solution is awkward, as the 'object' so far is the text (*lipi*) of the edict (*sāsane*) itself. Moreover, it does not fully account for the phrase *etena viyaṃjanena*. Beside 'to banish' (I no longer consider 'to dispatch') *viyaṃjanena* defies translation. In any case it cannot mean anything like '(to banish [them]) on the basis of this text' or 'with this text in hand'. *viyaṃjana* refers to the literal text, not to its meaning, as may be gathered from its opposition to *attha* (see Falk, 1990: 121, with reference to Neumann, 1913) or *hetu* as in *hetuto ca vyaṃjanato ca* in RE III (E), Girnār.

I think we are justified in assuming that the object of *vivāsayātha*/*vivāsāpayāthā*, as in the preceding sentences, is the edict, and that *etena viyaṃjanena* specifies the way in which the particular action is to be carried out: 'you should cause the edict to be ... literally', or 'you should cause the literal text of the edict to be ... '. At the same time it is difficult to see how the text of an edict can be said to be made to live abroad. In what follows I will therefore elaborate on the idea that *vivāsaya-* is an emendation of a word which was perceived to be even more nonsensical.[12] For the origin of *vivāsayātha*/*vivāsāpayāthā* I think we have to go back to preceding *visvaṃsayitave*, with which it is related through the substitution of *-aṃ-* by *-ā-*, which is indeed fairly common in later manuscripts,[13] and the transposition of *-s-* and *-v-*. However, as already indicated, the derivation and meaning of *visvaṃsayitave* are themselves problematic. As far as the form is concerned, with *viśvāsaya-* the possibilities of a derivation are virtually exhausted, though there is still no satisfactory meaning. A possible conclusion is that *visvaṃsayitave* might itself be a corruption.

In this connection the following observations may be made. First, in the corpus of Aśoka inscriptions Sanskrit *sv* and *śv* are throughout represented as *sv* (or *sp*). This development is peculiar as it goes against the general trend in the language, according to which one would expect *s* (initially) or *ss* (medially). Leaving aside the question of whether *sv* represents a linguistic reality, I would next like to refer to similar occasional instances of *sr* (*sruṇāru*, *susrūsā*) beside *s*(*s*) (*samana*, *susuṃsā*). These instances show that *s*(*s*) was occasionally replaced by the cluster found in the original Sanskrit word.[14] Third, we should consider the orthographical practice seen in the inscriptions, in which medial double *ss* is written as *s* and is as such indistinguishable from single *s*. By assuming *sv* to be a substitution of *s* interpreted as *ss*, we arrive at a form *visaṃsayitave*, the infinitive of the causative of Skt. *viśaṃsa-* 'to recite'. In the context of the *uposatha* ceremony (… *anuposathaṃ yāvu*), which is indeed marked by the recitation of formulae, the verb makes perfect sense: 'The lay followers/officials are to take care that (at each *uposatha*) it (the above text) is recited (by the monks)'.

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[10] Another unclear word is *saṃvalana* in line 6, which will not, however, be considered here.

[11] 'And as far as your district (extends) dispatch ye (an officer) everywhere according to the letter of this (edict)'. In a note Hultzsch adds: 'I supply the missing object of the verb from the first separate rock-edict (Dhauli, Z-CC; Jaugaḍa, AA-DD), viz. *mahāmātram*.' (Hultzsch, 1925: 163).

[12] For the moment the argument is restricted to this inscription. I will return to the parallel passage in the Rūpnāth version of MRE II below.

[13] For *akammaṃsa* (*akarmāṃśa*) as a substitute for *akammāsa* (*akalmāṣa*) in *Sūyagaḍa* 1.1.2.12, see Tieken (1986: 15–16, n. 11). Another instance is *samsayam* in *Uttarajjhāyā* 1.9.26a/254 for *sāsayaṃ* (*svāśraya*) (*so* for *jo* in *Pāda* a, which is a printing error):

> saṃsayaṃ *khalu so kuṇai jo magge kuṇaī gharaṃ*
> *jattheva gaṃtum icchejjā tattha kuvvejja sāsayaṃ*,
>
> He makes a place to rest for himself, who makes a home on the road.
> Wherever he wishes to go, he should make a home for himself.

The verse is an answer to the exhortation to king Nami to have a beautiful and luxurious palace built before giving up his kingship and becoming a wandering monk.

[14] These instances of *-sr-* should be kept separate from those of *-Cr-* or *-rC-* met in the north-western versions of the REs.

At the root of the corruption, or rather 'correction', of *visaṃsayitave* would have lain the rarity of the verb *viśaṃsa-*.[15] It may be assumed that once the meaning of *visaṃsayitave* had been lost, the connection with *viśaṃsa-* was not the first to come to mind again. If we have indeed to do with a correction, it is curious to note that the result is a verb which is otherwise unknown: if the other option, *vis-r-aṃsayitave*, was rejected because it made no sense, neither does *vis-v-aṃsayitave*. The situation does not improve if we assume the scribe had been thinking of *viśvāsaya-*. Probably the substitution of *s(s)* with *sv* was carried out more or less blindly.

If the derivation of *visvaṃsayitave* from *viśvāsay-* had indeed come to be considered at all it was also rejected. That is to say, in the words *vivāsayātha/vivāsāpayāthā* we may recognize the outcome of the attempt to make sense of *visvaṃsa-*, or else of *visvāsa-* (with *ā* for *aṃ*, for which see above). By transposing the *-s-* and *-v-* a new verb was created, which as the causative of *vivasa-*, which usually means 'to banish', could with some imagination be taken to express the idea of 'to dispatch' as well.

In support of this reconstruction, in which *vivāsayātha/vivāsāpayātha* are placed at the very end of a string of corruptions ultimately going back to *visaṃsayitave*, from the verb *viśaṃsa-* 'to recite', I may point to the combination of *vivāsayātha* and *vivāsāpayātha* with the phrase *etena viyaṃjanena* 'in precisely these words'.

The emphasis Aśoka places on the recitation of the literal text of the three sentences is striking. This becomes clear if we compare this attitude with the one expressed in RE XIV. I quote Schneider's reconstructed text (without the variants) and his translation (Schneider, 1978: 118–9):

> [A] *iyaṃ dhaṃmalipi devānaṃpiyena piyadasinā lājinā likhāpitā: athi yeva saṃkhitena, athi majhimena, athi vithaṭenā*
> [B] *no hi savatā save savata ghaṭite.*
> [C] *mahālake hi vijite bahu ca likhite likhāpayisāmi ceva nikāyaṃ.*
> [D] *athi cu heta puna puna lapite tasa tasa aṭhasa mādhuliyāye ena: jane tathā paṭipajeyā.*
> [E] *se siyā ata kichi asamati likhite desaṃ vā saṃkhāya kālanaṃ vā alocayitu lipikalāpalādhena vā ti.*

> [A] Diese Schrift über den Dhaṃma ist auf Veranlassung des Königs D.P. geschrieben worden:
> Sie existiert schon, sei es in mehr oder weniger abgekürzter, sei es in ausführlicher (Form).
> [B] Denn nicht überall paßt alles.
> [C] Denn weit ist mein Reich, und viel ist geschrieben worden; und ich werde auch in Zukunft (?) noch weiter schreiben lassen.
> [D] Es ist aber schon in dieser Hinsicht immer wieder gesagt worden, wegen der Unwiderstehlichkeit [wörtlich: 'Süßigkeit'] der verschiedenen Themen (und) damit die Leute sich entsprechend verhalten.
> [E] Es mag sein, daß hier oder dort irgendetwas unterschiedlich geschrieben wurde, entweder, weil die Region [=der betreffende Teil des Reiches] einzukalkulieren war oder weil ich an einem Anlaß [scil. das Betreffende da zu schreiben] keinen Gefallen gefunden hatte, oder infolge einer Nachlässigkeit des Schreibers.

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[15] For *viśaṃsa-* 'to recite', see Narten (1959: 41). PW quotes Ait. Br. 3.19: *trir nividā sūktaṃ viśaṃset* 'Thrice (and) with a Nivid he should recite the formula'. However, the verb is restricted to Vedic Sanskrit, and is not found in Pali or classical Sanskrit.

Through this insistence that during its recitation not a word may be omitted or added, the three sentences of the Schism Edict are almost automatically placed in the same category as the *karmavācanā*s and *prātimokṣasūtras*. It would seem that Aśoka is actually dictating a formula, which the monks are to recite (*viśaṃsa-*) during the ceremonies taking place during the *uposatha* day.

anuposathaṃ ca dhuvāye … posathāye

This conclusion brings to the fore an old problem, for the Buddha himself has forbidden the presence of outsiders at the *uposatha* ceremony, or at least at the recitation of the *prātimokṣasūtras*. So how could the officials take care that the formula was recited, let alone see to it that the sanction stipulated in it was carried out? To this question I will return later. At this point I will restrict the discussion to the problem as it is posed by the dative *posathāye* in the sentence *anuposathaṃ ca dhuvāye ikike mahāmāte posathāye yāti*.[16] As outsiders were not allowed at the *uposatha* ceremony Norman objected to a translation of the *posathāye yāti* with 'he (i.e. the *mahāmātra*) should go *to* the *uposatha* ceremony'. Instead he assumed that we are dealing with a dative of time: 'he should go *on* the *uposatha* day'. However, as far as I can see, the dative of time never expresses simply 'the day on which'. Another point is that *posathāye*, coming after *anuposathaṃ*, seems to be somehow redundant.

Apart from that, *posathāye* is not the only problematic word in the sentence, the other being *dhuvāye*. This dative adjective is generally taken, or at least translated, as an adverb, 'invariably'. However, this is clearly an *ad hoc* solution. As I see it, we should turn to Tōprā v for a possible explanation of the occurrence of *dhuvāye* in this sentence. The passage concerned (H) reads: *tīsu cātuṃmāsīsu tisāyaṃ puṃnamāsiyaṃ tiṃni divasāni cāvudasaṃ paṃnaḍasaṃ paṭipadāye dhuvāye cā anuposathaṃ*. Admittedly, the comparison may not be immediately obvious. In this passage Aśoka specifies a number of days on which fish may no longer be killed or sold. These include the days of the full moon in the three seasons and the full moon in the month of Taiṣa. Next, the text mentions the *uposatha* days on the fourteenth and fifteenth of the month, and a third, *paṭipadāye dhuvāye* (*ca anuposathaṃ*).

The fourteenth and fifteenth are the final days of a *pakṣa* of a month of 29 and 30 days respectively. The months of 29 and 30 days alternate to compensate for the fact that the actual lunar month lasts approximately 29.5 days. By contrast, *paṭipadā* refers to the first day of an actual lunar fortnight. The *paṭipadā* day is calculated on the basis of observation of the moon. In this sense it is invariable (*dhuvā*). The *paṭipadā* is the day immediately following the *uposatha*. It would thus seem that the phrase *paṭipadāye dhuvāye* (*ca anuposathaṃ*) refers to an alternative way of calculating the *uposatha* day: namely, one based on the moon rather than one based on the days of the months.

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[16] The sentence is notoriously problematic (see Bechert, 1961: 27 and Norman, 1987: 12ff).

177/14

In *paṭipadāye dhuvāye* we would consequently have to do with a dative of time. However, the dative of time does not denote 'the day on which' as assumed by Norman, but 'the day leading to, that is, before'.[17] A clear case of this dative of time is found in the Rūpnāth version of the MRE (F): *yā imāya kālāya jaṃbudīpasi amisā devā husu te dāni misā kaṭā*, 'Those gods in Jambudvīpa who *before* (i.e. *up to*) this time did not live among (the people), do now live among (the people)'. It should be noted that in the light of the Vedic expression *miśrā devebhiḥ* (see Meille, 1949; Schlingloff, 1985: 330) the text of Rūpnāth is secondary compared to that of, for instance, Bahāpur, in which the subject is mankind (*jaṃbudipasi amisā devehi saṃtaṃ mānūsā*). See also Schmithausen, who for this reason prefers the 'intermediate' reading *misaṃdevā* of Ahraurā, Gujarrā and Sahasrām (Schmithausen, 1992: 130–3).[18]

The meaning of the dative becomes clear when we consider the corresponding text in Maski: *pure jaṃbu[dīpa]s[i ye amisā devā husu] te [dā]n[i] misibhūtā.* The function of the dative of time[19] was not universally understood, as is shown by the Gavīmaṭh text, in which the dative of (masculine) *kāla* has been substituted by the formally close locative of (feminine) *velā* (*imāyaṃ velāyaṃ*). Most of the other versions of the edict read *etena (ca) aṃtal/rena* (Sahasrām, Gujarrā, Ahraurā, Bahāpur) or *iminā ca/u kālena* (Brahmagiri, Siddāpura, Eṟṟaguḍi, Rājula-Maṇḍagiri, Niṭṭūr, Udegoḷam), without *dāni* in the main clause. The sense, however, is the same: 'In the course of this period the gods who (before) did not live (among the people) have [now] come to live among the people'. Eṟṟaguḍi, with *imin[ā] cu kālena* and *d[ā]ni* seems to present a conflated version.[20]

Another question is which of the two sets of readings is the original, *imāya kālāya ... dāni* of Rūpnāth (and *pure* ... Maski) or *etena ca/u*) *aṃtarena ... [-]* of the other versions. In this connection I would like to note that while in virtually all other instances of the dative of time we find the 'feminine' ending *-āye* (<*-āyai*), that is, also after masculine or neuter nouns, in *imāya kālāya* of Rūpnāth we find the 'correct' ending *-āya*. As such *imāya kālāya* looks much like an innovation. Note in this connection the dative *tadātpano dighāya* in the Girnār version of RE x (A) for *tadatvāye āyatiye ca* in the other versions.

Returning to *tīsu cātuṃmāsīsu tisāyaṃ puṃnamāsiyaṃ tiṃni divasāni cāvudasaṃ paṃnaḍasaṃ paṭipadāye dhuvāye cā anuposathaṃ*, the sentence may now be translated as follows: 'on three days, namely the *uposatha* days falling on the fourteenth and the fifteenth of the month (depending on the number of days of the month), and (or else) the one immediately *before* the invariable *pratipad* day'. The latter way of calculating the *uposatha* day was current among brahmins, while the former way was preferred by the Buddhists (Hu-von Hinüber, 1994: 1).

As I see it, the Sarnath text originally read *anuposathaṃ ca ikike mahāmate yāti etameva sāsanaṃ visaṃsayitave ājānitave ca*. Except for the extension *ājānitave ca* it was completely parallel to the preceding sentence: *te pi ca upāsakā anuposathaṃ yāvu etameva sāsanaṃ visaṃsayitave*. It is assumed that the word *anuposathaṃ* has brought to mind the phrase *paṭipadāye dhuvāye ca anuposathaṃ* from Tōprā. It was apparently deemed necessary to insert the other two words into the text as well. If the scribe was aware of the specific meaning of *paṭipadāye dhuvāye cā anuposathaṃ*, the phrase by itself makes no sense. As a result it was cut up and the individual words distributed over the sentence. *dhuvāye* has been detached from *paṭipadāye*. Inserted between *anuposathaṃ ca* and *ikike mahāmāte* it seems to have been meant as an adverb.[21] *posathāye* in *posathāye yāti* would be a substitute for *paṭipadāye*.[22]

The main point I wish to make is that the words *dhuvāye* and *posathāye* in our text are not original; the dative *posathāye* is not part of the original message. However, as I will show below, *posathāye*, as a dative of time meaning something like '(on the days) before the *uposatha*', fits contemporary practice: the officials should go every *uposatha* (*anuposthaṃ*), in particular on the days before the actual *uposatha* day (*posathāye*).

The resultant Sarnath text is a patchwork. Below, the the non-existent adverb *dhuvāye* and the dative *posathāye* are translated in parentheses:

> 5. Thus this edict must be made known (*viṃnapayitaviye*) in the *saṃgha* of monks as well as in the *saṃgha* of nuns.
> 6. Thus speaks Devānaṃpiya: One copy of this text should remain with you, deposited in the *saṃsalana* (?).
> 7. You should take care that one copy, exactly similar, is deposited with the *upāsakas*, and these *upāsakas* should go (to the *saṃgha*) during every *uposatha* day
> 8. (and they should take care that) this very edict is recited (by the monks). And during every *uposatha* day <invariably, *dhuvāye*> every *mahāmātra* should go <(in particular on the days) before the *uposatha*, *uposathāye*> as well
> 9. (and they should take care that) this very edict is recited, and they should apprise themselves of the situation. And as far as your district extends,

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[17] The meaning 'before' is supported by the alteration of *imāya kālāya* and *pure*, for which see below. All other examples of the dative of time do not involve a moment but a period (*samvatsarāya, cirakālāya*; see Renou, 1968: 298 and Hopkins, 1903: 6–7), in which case the end of the period is taken as the limit before which the work is to be done (Renou: 'Dat. de temps, notant la période au terme de laquelle le procès sera accompli *vatsarāya nivartanīyaḥ* Mālav. «il devra être ramené au bout d'un an»'; Hopkins: *sucirāya nagarīṃ viveśa* 'after a long time he came to town'.

[18] I cannot agree, however, with Schmithausen's interpretation, according to which Aśoka would refer to a goal reached only after death. As becomes clear from *jaṃbudīpasi* the point is that mankind attains heaven on earth.

[19] The same dative of time denoting 'the day/time *before* which' is found in Pillar Edict (PE) v (J-K), Tōprā: *aṭhamīpakhāye cāvudasāye paṃnaḍasāye tisāye punāvasune tīsu cātuṃmāsīsu sudivasāye gone no nīlakhitaviye ajake edake sūkale e vā pi aṃne nīlakhiyati no nīlakhitaviye, tisāye punāvasune cātuṃmāsiye cātuṃmāsipakhāye asvasā govasā lakhane no kaṭaviye.* This part of the inscription follows H-I, in which Aśoka has ordered that on, or during, the three *cāturmāsī* days, Tiṣyā, the *pūrṇamāsī* day and the three *uposatha* days, fish are not to be killed or sold, and that during these very same days (*etāni yeva divasāni*) no animals living in the 'elephant-forest', nor animals living in fishing ponds, nor any other animals are to be killed. Passage J-K is generally interpreted to mean that Aśoka stipulated that during these days certain specified animals may not be subjected to 'minor' mutilations such as branding or castration. However, the change of case, from locative or accusative of time to dative of time, has so far not been accounted for. I think that what Aśoka is ordering here is that '(On the days) before the eighth of the month, before the fourteenth and fifteenth, before the Tiṣyā-day, before the Punarvasu-day, and in the case of the three *cāturmāsī*s, (on the days) before the actual festive day, no cows are to be branded either. Likewise, goats, rams, boars and whichever other animals are normally branded, are not to be branded then. (On the days) before the Tiṣyā-day, before the Punarvasu day, (on those preceding) the *cāturmāsī* and (on those) preceding the *cāturmāsīpakṣa* horse(s) and cattle are not to be castrated.' That is, during the days referred to they are not to be killed, nor are they to be subjected to branding and castration. While the rule laid down in H-I is restricted to the actual festive days, the one in J-K would cover a certain period preceding the festive day. The latter type of rule has its counterpart in Kauṭalya's *Arthaśāstra* 13.5.12-13: *cāturmāsyēṣv ardhamāsikam aghātam, paurṇamāsīsu ca cāturātrikam, rājadeśanakṣat eṣv aikarātrikam. yonibālavadhaṃ puṃstvopaghātam ca pratiṣedhayet*, '[The king should order] slaughter stopped for a half month at the rituals [celebrating the beginning of the three seasons] every four months, for four nights [and days] on [the occasion of] full moon nights, [and] for one night [and day] on the [astrological] constellation days of the king and country. He should prohibit the killing of females and their young and the destruction of a male's virility' (Scharfe, 1993: 256).

[20] Pāṅgurāriā has yet another solution: *imaṃ ca kā[la]ṃ jaṃbu[dīpa]si d[e]vā na [manusehi mi]s[i]bhūtā husu* ... 'The gods who during this period did not mingle among men'.

[21] The spacing between *dhuvāye* and *posathāye* does not allow us to take the two words together.

[22] For other instances of this type of lexical variation see Norman (1970).

10. everywhere, you should take care that the edict is recited literally. In the same way,
11. in all forts and in all regions, you should take care that the order is given that the edict is to be recited literally.

The meaning of samagga

As indicated above the meaning of the verb *bh[.]khati* depends on, among other things, that of the term *samagga* (Skt. *samagra*). For the starting situation is that the *saṃgha* was *samagga*: *bh[.]khati* destroys the state of the *saṃgha* being *samagga*. However, precisely on the point of the meaning of *samagga* scholars do not agree. Most scholars translate *samagga* with 'complete'. However, Hu-von Hinüber (1994: 219–26) allows also for the meaning 'unanimous' in contexts in which *samagga* is directly opposed to *saṃghabheda*.

Unfortunately, Hu-von Hinüber does not go into the relationship between the two meanings, so we cannot be certain which meaning for *samagga* has been used in Aśoka's edict; it is not only opposed to *saṃghabheda* but also to the 'unknown' verb *bh[.]khati*. In this connection it should be noted that of the two meanings, 'unanimous' and 'complete', it is the latter which requires explanation. In any case, the meaning 'unanimous', that is 'all having the same object', is supported by the derivation of the word. Compare *vyagra* 'agitated, confused' and *ekāgra* 'concentrated on one object'. It is also supported by the opposition of *samagga* to *bheda* which, as shown by, for instance, *nāyikābheda*, does not refer to a part which is broken off, but to a subdivision. It is also supported by its opposition to *pṛthak*, which expresses the idea of going one's own way within a group. All three terms concerned are found together in Bhavabhūti's *Uttararāmacarita* III: 47:

eko rasaḥ karuṇa eva nimittabhedād
bhinnaḥ pṛthak pṛthag ivāśrayate vivartān
āvartabudbudataraṅgamayān vikārān
ambho yathā salilam eva tu tat samagram,

Un seul sentiment—la Pitié—diversifié par des causes diverses,
semble sujet tour à tour à des développements distincts
tourbillons, bulles ou vagues,—
l'eau revêt ces formes variées,—
mais ce n'est encore et toujours que de l'eau
(Translation by Stchoupak).

samagra in Bhavabhūti's verse refers to a state in which all subdivisions have abandoned their temporarily assumed, separate identities or their differences and have submerged again in the greater totality. We will see the pair *samagra* and *pṛthak* again in the passage Kauṭalya *Arthaśāstra* 2, 7, 24 which will be discussed below.

The question then arises if, and if so, how, this same *samagga* has come to mean 'complete' in other contexts. All the passages advanced in favour of this latter meaning pertain somehow to the intention to hold an *uposatha* ceremony or the preparations involved in this. A case in point, in addition to the one quoted earlier (*anujānāmi* ...), is: *aham adhiṣṭhānapoṣathaṃ karomi. yadā ti saṃghasya sāmagrīm āsādayiṣyāmi tadā saṃghapoṣathaṃ pratyanubhaviṣyāmi* (Härtel, 1956: 110–11). Von Hinüber, who for *sāmagrī* explicitly rejects Härtel's translation 'Einverständnis der Gemeinde', translates: 'Ich mache einen Anerkennungs-Poṣatha. Wenn ich aber Vollzähligkeit des Saṃgha erreiche, dann werde ich an dem Saṃghapoṣatha teilnehmen' (Hinüber, 1970: 124).

However, what I will try to show next is that in these instances too, *samagga* means 'unanimous'. What has happened, however, is that the procedure of the *uposatha* ceremony has changed in such a way that the issue of the unanimity of the meeting has shifted backwards. It is no longer the outcome of the ceremony but has become a condition for it to take place. This seems to be a specific Buddhist development, which becomes clear if we have a closer look at the secular prototype of the *uposatha* ceremony.

The gathering in the akṣapaṭala

The 'secular' counterpart of the Buddhist *uposatha* is the gathering in the *akṣapaṭala* at the end of the fiscal year, that is, at the end of the dry season in the month of *āṣāḍha* or in any case before the onset of the rains in the month of *śrāvaṇa*. As will become clear below, gatherings of this type were also organized by Aśoka. However, for a more detailed description of the aims and procedures of this gathering we have to look at a much later text, namely Kauṭalya's *Arthaśāstra*. From *Arthaśāstra* 2, 7 it appears that the basic function of the ceremony is for the king and the assembled *mahāmātras* to render account of the activities undertaken during the previous eight months.

As such this gathering has developed out of those festivals marking the community's transition from a period of 'travelling', when people were on their own, to one of sedentary or communal life. Heesterman has pointed out that these festivals revolve around the confession of sins and their expiation. They mark 'the turning point between the season of violent strife and the season of settled life and harmony. The people that have gone out to lead an irregular life outside the settled community are now reintegrated into the community and brought again under the sway of its norms' (Heesterman, 1985: 137).

The actual proceedings taking place in the *akṣapaṭala* are described in *Arthaśāstra* 2, 7, 24:

pracārasamaṃ mahāmātrāḥ samagrāḥ śrāvayeyur avisamamantrāḥ;
pṛthagbhūto mithyāvādī caiṣām uttamaṃ daṇḍaṃ dadyāt.

The words in parentheses in Scharfe's translation given below have been added by me:

> The fully assembled (*samagrāḥ*) *mahāmātra*-s should unanimously (*aviṣamamantrāḥ*) proclaim those who conformed to procedure (*pracārasamaṃ*); anyone who abstains or does not speak the truth should pay the highest fine (Scharfe, 1993: 201).

Despite Scharfe's detailed analysis of some of the terms occurring in the text (Scharfe, 1993: 193–203), his translation still needs improvement on some vital points. My first comment concerns his translation of *sama* in *pracārasamaṃ*. I think we are dealing with the very same word *sama* here which occurs in *Mānavadharmaśāstra* VIII 177: *karmaṇāpi samaṃ kuryād dhanikāyādhamarṇikaḥ/samo 'vakṛṣṭajātiś ca dadyāc chreyāṃs tu tac chanaiḥ*, 'Even by (personal) labour shall the debtor *make good* (what he owes) to his creditor, if he be of the same caste or of a lower one; but a (debtor) of a higher caste shall pay it gradually (when he earns something)' (Bühler, 1886: 285–6). It should be noted that the duty of a *mahāmātra* towards his king is seen in quite concrete terms as a debt, which has to be served completely (see Separate Edict I ... *mama ca ānaniyaṃ ehatha*' [Und wenn ihr das tut,] werdet ... eurer Schuld gegen mich ledig werden' (Alsdorf, 1962: 33, 37)). Thus, in the *akṣapaṭala* the *mahāmātras* render account of the way in which they have fulfilled (*sama*) their obligations towards their king in their respective fields (*pracāra*).

Furthermore, Scharfe's translation does not properly account for *eṣāṃ* in the second sentence. *eṣāṃ* refers to those present at the ceremony. If, however, *pṛthagbhūto … ēṣāṃ* means 'he among those present who abstains (from rendering account)', then *samagra*, on which, as I understand the passage, *pṛthagbhūta* comments, cannot mean 'fully assembled'. *samagra* would instead refer to the fact that all those present at the ceremony are prepared to submit themselves to the rules of the gathering and do what is expected of them. This, in turn, has consequences for *aviṣamamantra*, which Scharfe translates as 'unanimous' but which meaning has already been covered more or less by *samagra*. Starting from *mithyāvādin* 'one who lies', by which *aviṣamamantra* has been taken up, we may translate the latter compound simply as 'honestly', that is, without either embellishing or belittling one's own achievements (cp. *viṣama* 'dishonest' MW). The *Arthaśāstra* passage may accordingly be translated as follows:

> The *mahāmātra*s should unanimously (*samagrāḥ*) and honestly (*aviṣamamantrāḥ*) render account of the way in which they have fulfilled their obligations in their respective fields (*pracārasamam*). He among those present (*eṣām*) who sets himself apart or lies should pay the highest fine.

Typically, Kauṭalya does not speak about those who stay away from the gathering. Apparently, the boundaries of the 'state' were not fixed beforehand but became clear only at the meeting itself by counting the heads of those present. Those of the participants at last year's meeting who stayed away had apparently decided to join another ruler or to start for themselves. The main purpose of the gathering was to prove the unanimity of all those present. It would seem that the main threat to the 'state' described here was felt to come not from without but from within.

This picture of the state thus conflicts with that other picture given by Kauṭalya, namely of the state surrounded by enemies and allies (Scharfe, 1993: 105 ff.). As already noted by Heesterman (1985), in *Arthaśāstra* we are dealing with a conflation of contemporary political reality and an ideal, or the description of a tribal, acephalous community, a phenomenon which is otherwise covered by the term *saṃgha*,[23] in terms of a bureaucratic state.

The Buddhist uposatha

The Buddhist *saṃgha* has been grafted on to the latter political institution. However, its position was entirely different, the Buddhist *saṃgha* being a community within the community. In this sense its boundaries (*sīmā*), or rather its sphere of action, were limited. Moreover, as a community of 'ascetic' monks the Buddhist *saṃgha* was dependent on the support of this larger community. These two factors have greatly affected the character of its communal activities, in particular the *uposatha* ceremony.

As already indicated the Buddhist *uposatha* is a counterpart of the *akṣapaṭala* ceremony. One difference lies in the frequency of the respective ceremonies. The rhythm of the Buddhist *uposatha* is that of the brahmanic full and new moon sacrifices. Like the Buddhist *uposatha* these latter sacrifices mark the

beginning of a new period. Through the *agnyādheya* they are preceded by an *upavasatha* day, which gave the Buddhist *uposatha* its name. One of the main functions of the Brahmanic *upavasatha* day was to purify oneself by getting rid of the sins and violence performed in the preceding period (Krick, 1982: 67 ff). This function returns in the accounting declarations of the *akṣapaṭala* ceremony, on the one hand, and in the 'confessions' made during the Buddhist *uposatha* ceremony, on the other.

The most striking aspect of the Buddhist ceremony, however, is that the sting has been completely removed. The recitation of the *prātimokṣasūtra*s has become a purely ceremonial act: the monks can remain silent; and loud and public declarations of guilt (*śrāvaṇa!*) are avoided. Before the recitation could take place the *saṃgha* had to establish its purity (*pariśuddha*, *pāriśuddhi*). The 'real' confessions had taken place beforehand. The only confessions allowed at the ceremony itself were those involving transgressions remembered while the recitation was in progress or those concealed previously.

This development bases its rationale in the position of the Buddhist community within society at large. In order to receive support from society[24] the *saṃgha* had to prove its cohesion continuously in smooth communal ceremonies. Incidents showing even the slightest hint of disagreement had to be avoided at all costs. Possible sources of dissent were therefore to be dealt with beforehand.

As I see it, a special meaning 'complete' for *samagga* for those contexts which deal with the preparation for the *uposatha* ceremony is unnecessary, unanimity having become an important issue at this stage of the ceremony. The position of the *saṃgha* as a community within the community has led to a concern with boundaries and radius of action. Every monk staying within the area of the *saṃgha* had to attend. For, when a monk living in the area stayed away without a valid reason this could easily be construed as a sign of internal trouble or dissent. At the same time, however, the necessity that all the monks living in the area attend the *uposatha* ceremony makes it all the more important to take care that only harmonious monks attend.

MRE I: Aśoka's 256 nights

It has been argued above that the first three sentences of the Schism Edict together form a 'legal' formula. The Buddhists have two sets of such formulae: namely the *prātimokṣasutra*s and the *karmavācanā*s. The order given in the second part of the edict that the officials go to the *saṃgha* in the period before the actual *uposatha* ceremony (*posathāye*) suggests that we are dealing with an example of the *karmavācanā*s, which indeed play a role in the proceedings before the actual *uposatha*. This conclusion is of some importance for the derivation of *bh[.]khati*, as the *karmavācanā*s and *prātimokṣasūtra*s differ in the tense/mode of the verb. Even more importantly, however, it provides a valuable indication as to the nature and circumstances of the interference by the worldly authorities in the affairs of the *saṃgha*. Above, however, it has been argued that the word *posathāye* is probably a later insertion in the text. This need not of course mean that the insertion is nonsensical. As I will try to show on the basis of an examination of MRE I, *posathāye* indeed makes perfect sense. Its meaning is completely in accordance with contemporary practice, to the point of being superfluous. The text of MRE I is known through a total of 17 versions (see Andersen, 1990). I quote the one from Rūpnāth.

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[23] For Kauṭalya's description of the *saṃgha* type of government, see *Arthaśāstra* 11.1. The strength of the *saṃgha* indeed lies in the unanimity among its members. See 11.1.2: *saṃghā hi saṃhatatvād adhṛṣyāḥ pareṣām*, and the advice given next on how a *saṃgha* can best be defeated, namely by planting the seeds of dissent among its members.

[24] The influence of lay followers in giving shape to the Buddhist *uposatha* ceremony is attested in the two accounts of the institution of the *uposatha* by the Buddha (see Hu-von Hinüber, 1994: 2–3). The Buddha decided to institute it after requests from lay followers and kings respectively.

> B *devānampiye hevaṃ āhā*
> C *sāti[ra]kekāni aḍha[t]i[y]āni va ya sumi pakāsa [sa]ke*
> D *no cu bāḍhi pakate*
> E *sātileke cu chavachare ya sumi hakaṃ [saṃ]gh[e] upete bāḍhiṃ ca pakate*
> F *yā imāya kālāya jaṃbud[ī]pasi amisā devā husu te dāni misā kaṭā*
> G *pakamasi hi esa phale*
> H *no ca esā mahatatā p[ā]potave*
> I *khudakena pi paka[ma]minenā sakiye pipule pā svage ārodheve*
> J *etiya aṭhāya ca sāvane kaṭe*
> K *khudakā ca uḍālā ca pakamatu ti*
> L *atā pi ca jānaṃtu*
> M *iya paka[rā] ca kiti ciraṭhitike siyā*
> N *iya hi aṭhe vaḍhi[ṃ] vaḍhisiti vipula ca vaḍhisiti apaladhiyenā diyaḍhiya vaḍhisata*

The following passage, in which instructions are given for the circulation of the message, is found only in Rūpnāth and Sahasrām:[25]

> Q *iya ca aṭhe pavatis[u] lekhāpetavāla ta hadha ca ath[i] s[.]lāṭhabhe silāṭhaṃbhasi lākhāpetavaya ta*
> R *etinā ca vayajanenā yāvataka tupaka ahāle savara vivasetavā[ya] ti*

In Sahasrām, however, the text corresponding to Q is found after S, and that of R is absent altogether. The following line is again found in all versions, though the exact wording may be different:

> S *vy[u]ṭhenā sāvane kaṭe 200 50 6 sata vivāsā ta*

The interpretation of this last line has proved problematic. The most recent attempt at interpretation is by Falk (1990).[26] According to this scholar the sentence contains an indication of the date of the inscription. He started from the versions from Sahasrām and Ahraurā, in which a word for night (*lāti*) has been added to the number. e.g. Sahasrām: *iyaṃ ca s[ā]vane vivuthena duve sapaṃnālātisatā vivuthā ti 200 50 6*. Next, he derived the word *vyuṭha* and its variants (*vyūtha, viyutha, vivutha*) from *vivas-* 'to become bright, to dawn'. The inscription would be dated after 256 nights had turned to dawn. The number of nights presumably refers to the number of *uposatha* days which had passed since Aśoka's conversion to Buddhism. However, in order to arrive at 256 *uposatha* days Falk has to add the 'more than two and a half years' mentioned in C to the 'more than one year' mentioned in E, which gives a total of 'more than three and a half years'. This solution is questionable. Moreover, his interpretation does not properly account for the instrumental *vyuṭhena*. As we shall see, Falk needlessly introduced a complication here by taking the verb *kaṭe* (or its variant *sāvāpite*) as a secondary addition. According to Falk the original text is found in the versions of Ahraurā, Gujarrā and Sahasrām, from which the verb is absent: *iyaṃ [.] sava[ne] vivuthe[.] [200] 50 [6]* (Gurjarrā).

While Falk's counting of the *uposatha* days has subsequently been questioned by Hu-von Hinüber (1996), this is not the real issue. What Falk, and others,[27] have overlooked is that the word *sāvana* does not denote 'inscription'. As already noted by Thomas (1910), it is a technical term for public declarations such as were made in the *pariṣad*. Aśoka 'quotes' a *śrāvaṇa* made by him personally in his own *pariṣad*: 'The "declaration" was "made" (*kaṭe*), or "declared" (*sāvāpite*) [by me] after I had been away from home': *vyuṭhena sāvane kaṭe*, that is, 'after (ablative *vivāsā*) an absence from home for 256 nights' (200 50 6 *sata vivāsā*).[28] As calculated by Filliozat (1949) the 256 days correspond exactly to the eight months of the dry season, during which monks, but also kings, are supposed to tour the country. Aśoka made his declaration upon his return 'home' after a period of touring the realm. The most likely occasion is the gathering held at the end of the dry season or the beginning of the rainy season in the *akṣapaṭala* described above.

A closer look at the text of the inscription shows that it is indeed concerned with 'touring the country'. The key word is the verb *prakram-* (in *pak(k)a(ṃ)te* and *pakamaminenā*).[29] In Buddhist texts this verb refers specifically to the wandering activity of monks, which takes place during the dry season and alternates with four months of sedentary life during the rainy season (see Thomas, 1910: 515ff; Lévi, 1911: 122). As used by Aśoka it would refer to his tour of the realm, which likewise takes place during the dry season. To the specific character of Aśoka's *sāvana* I will return below.

Aśoka was inspired into making this *sāvana* by a visit to a Buddhist *saṃgha*: somewhat more than a year had passed since his visit to the *saṃgha*. In the light of the exactness of the 256 days, 'somewhat more than a year' should be taken as an exact indication as well. This means that Aśoka referred here to a visit to the *saṃgha before* the beginning of the rainy season, when the monks were returning one by one.

If Aśoka's *sāvana* had indeed been inspired by, or modelled on, Buddhist examples he heard at that time, it cannot have been the recitation of the *prātimokṣasūtras*. What Aśoka witnessed were those procedures preceding the *prātimokṣasūtra* recitation, in which concrete and individual cases were submitted to the judgement of the monks.

At the time of Aśoka's declaration he had already been a lay follower for more than two and a half years. Counting backwards from the beginning of the rainy season we land some time in the middle of the dry season. It is interesting to note that he connects his conversion with the monks' and his own touring season. In this way it is represented as the result of contacts with individual monks, not with the institution of the *saṃgna*. However, his visit to the *saṃgha* was the culminating point. Aśoka's specific reference to his visit to the *saṃgha* taking place before the beginning of the rainy season is telling. We may infer that he did not stay to witness the ceremony at which the community celebrated its unity. The canon indeed has a number of passages which show that the *uposatha* ceremony was not a public affair; participation was restricted to monks and nuns only, that is 'to members only' (see, e.g., Hu-von Hinüber, 1994: 18). This is what one would indeed expect of such communal ceremonies. What is exceptional is the public character of the preceding procedures, that is, of those at which returning monks were received and voting took place on their admission. The presence of lay followers and *mahāmātras* (Sarnath), and at one time even of Aśoka himself (MRE I), clearly shows that the community was not always able to solve the problem of keeping itself free from trouble makers, and required the assistance of the wordly authorities. However, this interference from outside was strictly limited to the preparations; the solemn formalization of the unanimity was again a private affair. As may be gathered from MRE I the right of the community to celebrate its *uposatha* ceremonies in private was not infringed: as already indicated, Aśoka's presence, or rather his interference, was restricted to the period preceding the actual *uposatha* day. If therefore in the 'covering letter' of Sarnath the lay followers and the *mahāmātras* are instructed to be present at every *uposatha* this was understood to refer only to their presence at the procedures preceding the actual *uposatha* day. This and the fact that the word *posathāye* '(the days) before the *uposatha*' is not found in the instruction to the lay followers but only in the one given to the *mahāmātras* would indeed mark it, as argued above, as a later addition.

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[25] I leave aside the situation in Pāṅgurāriā.

[26] For earlier literature on this passage, which at one time played an important role in establishing the date of the Buddha, see Dietz (1992: 39 ff).

[27] See, e.g. Fussman (1990: 59, n. 1): 'The Indian term which is translated as "edict" means in fact "proclamation or act of making something heard [*śrāvaṇa*]" '.

[28] *vyuṭha* is a past participle of *vivasa-* 'to live abroad'. For the variant *vivutha*, compare Māhārāṣṭrī Prakrit *pauttha* from *pravasa-*.

[29] For *pakama-* the Ahraurā, Bahāpur, Gujarrā, Sahasrām and, when available, Bairāṭ versions have *parakama-* or *palakama-* (*parākram-*). The latter reading may have been due to the interference of passages like RE VI (M) (Schneider, 1978: 110): *se etāye aṭhāye iyaṃ dhaṃmalipi (-ī) lekhitā. cilaṭhitikā (-īkā) hotu, tathā ca me putanatāle (putā papotā) palakamaṃtu savalokahitāye* or RE X (E) (Schneider, 1978: 112): *dukale cu kho esa khudakena vā vagenā usaṭena vā aṃnata agenā palakamenā (-a) savam palitijitu*. Compare Rūpnāth (G-M): *pakamasi hi esa phale. no ca esā mahatatā pāpotave* khudakena *pi paka[ma]minenā sakiye pipule pā svage ārodheve.* etiya aṭhāya ca sāvane kaṭe khudakā ca uḍālā ca pakamatu *ti atā pi ca jānaṃtu iya paka[ra] ca kiti* ciraṭhitike siyā. In this connection it may be interesting to note that all versions with *par(l)akama-* are found along the river Yamunā (Allchin and Norman, 1985).

Returning to the Rūpnāth text, I suggest the following translation:

B The Beloved of the Gods has spoken thus:
C (Already) for more than two and a half years I have been an *upāsaka*.[30]
D But I was not very zealous[31] in touring the country.
E But little more than a year ago[32] I visited the *saṃgha* and have become very zealous to undertake to tour the country.[33]
F The gods who before this did not live among the people in Jambudvīpa, are now living (among the people).
G For this is the fruit of (enthusiastically?) touring the country.[34]
H And this (fruit) cannot be reached by a person of high rank only.
I By (zealously?) touring the country (even) a person of low rank is able to climb up to heaven even if it is vast.[35]
J And for this purpose (this) declaration was made:

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[30] In the translation I read for *pākāsa [sa]ke* 'well-known (*prakāśa*) Buddhist' *upāsake* found in most of the other versions (see Norman, 1973: 68–9). As already suggested by Hultzsch the syllable *va* most probably stands for *vasāni* 'years'. *ya* is *yaṃ* (cp. *yate* in Pāṅguṛāriā). *sātirekāni* as emended by Hultzsch. For *sātirekāni* some other versions have *adhikāni*.

[31] For *bādhi* (also in Bahāpur) instead of *baḍha(ṃ)* of the other versions, see note 33.

[32] *chavachare* is obviously a writing error for *saṃvacchare*.

[33] For *bādhi* here as well as in D, see also Bahāpur and Bairāṭ. It probably stands for *bādhe*, which would function as an adjective to the subject. Compare the Rūpnāth text, *sumi hakaṃ [saṃ]gh[e] upete bāḍhiṃ ca pakate* 'I have visited ...', with the text of most other versions: e.g. that of Brahmagiri: *yaṃ* mayā *saṃghe upayīte bāḍhaṃ* came *pakaṃte* 'by me was visited ...'. The two types of constructions have been mixed up in Bahāpur (*am* hamaye [*saghe*] *upa[ya]te bā[ḍhi]m] ca palakaṃte*), Gujarrā (*yaṃ* came *sam*[*ghe*] *y*[*ā*]*te t*[*ī*] [a]haṃ [*b*]*ā*[*ḍhaṃ*] *ca parakaṃte tī [ā]ha*), and Pāṅguṛāriā ([me *saghe ya*] *y[ā]te-bāḍha[ṃ] [ca]* sum[i] *pak[a]ṁte*). Note that in all other instances *bāḍhaṃ* is an adverb: e.g. RE XIII E: ... *se bāḍhaṃ vedaniyamate (-tame?) (ca) gulumate (-tame?) ca devānampiyasa*, VII E: *asa nathi sayame bhāvasudhī (-i) kiṭanatā diḍhabhatitā ca nīce bāḍhaṃ*, XII F: *hevaṃ kalaṃtaṃ atapāsaṃḍaṃ(ca) (bāḍhaṃ) vaḍhayati* and H: ... *bāḍhatale upahaṃti atapāsaṃḍaṃ* (quoted from Schneider, 1978), and Tōprā, PE III G: *esa bāḍha dekhiye* and PE VII K: ... *dhaṃmavaḍhiyā ca bāḍhaṃ vaḍhisat[i]*.

For the translation of *bāḍha(ṃ)* as 'zealously', compare its use as an expression of one's enthusiasm for a suggested course of action: 'A mighty good idea!' With *bāḍhaṃ* the speaker indicates that he has no hesitations, sees no obstacles, and will do the thing right away.

[34] For the locative *pakamasi* all other versions have the genitive *pakamasa*.

[35] I take *paka[ma]minenā* with Bloch as a corruption of *pakkamamīnenā* (Bloch, 1950: 64, 80). Read *vipule* for *pipule*, and *pi* for *pā*. The reading *ārodheve*, from *āruh-* 'to climb', is peculiar to this version.

K that the low as well as the high will tour the country,
L and that my neighbours will know it,
M and that this activity of touring the country will be of long duration.
N For, (due to my declaration) this practice will certainly increase, and though vast, will increase even further, will increase a million times one and a half.[36]

Q and R are concerned with the inscribing of the text. As I will show below we are looking at an insertion in the original text.

S (This) *sāvana* was made (by me) after having been abroad; after a stay abroad for 256 (nights).

MRE I as a dhaṃmasāvana

As already indicated, from the last two sentences of the edict (S) it becomes clear that Aśoka made his *sāvana* at the beginning of the rainy season. Thus, what we have here is likely to be an example of the *śrāvaṇas* such as were made by kings and their *mahāmātras* during the *akṣapaṭala* ceremony. In Kauṭalya's *Arthaśāstra* the proceedings of this ceremony are restricted to purely fiscal matters. However, in practice they will have covered the entire range of activities undertaken by the king and his officials while touring the country during the dry season. The *sāvana* is indeed concerned with touring the country, and not, however, with the 'institution', which is covered by the expression *anusaṃyānaṃ niṣkrama-* (RE III (C): ... *pādesike pa[ṃ]ca[s]u paṃcasu vasesu [a]nusa[ṃ]yānaṃ nikham[aṃ]tu* (Kālsī); and SE II), but with the zeal and enthusiasm (*pra/parākrama-*) displayed during this period.

At the beginning of the inscription Aśoka has informed us that more than two and a half years ago he had visited a *saṃgha*. During that visit he attended the procedures through which monks were accepted back into the community, which included confessions by monks of their behaviour during the period of wandering. It would seem that Aśoka in his *sāvana* assumed as it were the role of a monk, and to some extent even borrowed his vocabulary. Note in this connection, apart from *prakrama-*, which is also found in Buddhist texts but may well have been much more universal, the expression and the idea of *miśrā devebhiḥ*. As such, the inscription would seem to contain an example of what Aśoka meant by the term *dhaṃmasāvana*, that is, a *sāvana* not as kings usually make them but one about matters of *dharma* such as were made by religious sects in their gatherings.

For *dhaṃmasāvana*, see Tōprā VII (D ff.):

D *esa me huthā*
E *atikaṃtaṃ ca aṃtala[a]ṃ hevaṃ icchisu lājāne kathaṃ jane anulupāyā dhaṃmavaḍhiyā vaḍheyā ti no ca anulupāyā dhaṃmavaḍhiyā vaḍhithā*
F *se kinasu jane anu[pa]ṭipajeyā*
G *kinasu jane anulupāyā dhaṃmavaḍhiyā vaḍheyā ti*
H *k[i]nasu kāni abhyuṃnāmayehaṃ dhaṃmavaḍhiyā ti*
I *etaṃ devānaṃpiye piyadasi hevaṃ āhā*
J *esa me huthā*
K *dhaṃmasāvanāni sāvāpayāmi dhaṃmānusathini anus[ā]sāmi*

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[36] This sentence should be compared to Tōprā I (D): *esa cu kho anusathiyā dhaṃmapekhā dhaṃmakāmatā cā suve suve vaḍhite vaḍhīsati cevā*, 'But indeed by my instruction this regard for morality and love of morality have been promoted day by day and will progress still (more)' (Hultzsch, 1925: 119–20).

L *etaṃ jane sutu anupaṭīpajisati abhyuṃnamisati dhaṃmavaḍhiyā ca bāḍhaṃ vaḍhisati*

M *etāye me aṭhāye dhaṃmasāvanāni sāvāpitāni dhaṃmānusathini vividhāni ānapitāni [ya] ... [is]ā pi bahune janasi āyatā e te paliyovadisaṃti pi pavithalisaṃti pi.*

The translation has been adapted from Hultzsch:

D The following occurred to me

E On the one hand, in times past kings had this desire, that men might (be made to) progress by an adequate promotion of morality; (but) on the other hand, men were not made to progress by an adequate promotion of morality.

F How then might men (be made to) conform to (morality)?

G How might men (be made to) progress by an adequate promotion of morality?

H How could I elevate them by the promotion of morality?

I Concerning this, king Devānāṃpriya Priyadarśin speaks thus.

J The following occurred to me.

K I shall make *dhaṃma*-declarations (and) shall provide *dhaṃma*-instructions.

L Hearing this, men will conform to (it), will be elevated, and will (be made to) progress considerably by the promotion of morality.

M For this purpose *dhaṃma*-declarations (and) manifold *dhaṃma*-instructions are made by me [in order that those agents] (of mine) too, who are occupied with many people, will exhort (them) and will explain (morality to them) in detail.

The same interpretation may probably apply to those other combinations with *dhaṃma*, such as *dhaṃmalipi* and *dhaṃmamahāmāta* (for a complete list see Schneider (1978: 165–6)). In Tōprā VII quoted here, we find *dhaṃmānusathi* next to *dhaṃmasāvana*. An example of a *dhaṃmānusathi* may be found in RE III. While in the case of a *sāvana* we appear to be dealing with a confession of neglect followed by a promise from the penitent to mend his ways, in the case of an *anusathi* we seem to be looking at a proper instruction by the king to his officials on how to act in the future, to avoid mistakes and to make up for one's earlier errors. However, like a *sāvana* it seems to have been part of a particular communal gathering which involved confessions. This would appear from SE I and II (Alsdorf, 1962). These two edicts contain a 'royal' *anusathi*, not a *dhaṃmānusathi*; note in this connection the final sentence of II: *taṃ pi tathā kalaṃti, atha* lājine *anusathī*, 'Machen sie das auch so, wie die Anweisung *des Königs* lautet'. The *anusathi*s are to be recited in the course of the Tiṣya day of the *cāturmāsya* festivals (*iyaṃ ca lipi anucātummāsaṃ tisena nakhatena sotaviyā*) and on each Tiṣya day (*iyaṃ va lipi tisa-nakhatena sotaviyā*) respectively, and they serve to instruct the officials in how to pay their debt to the king (*mama ca ānaniyaṃ ehatha*, '[werdet ihr] eurer Schuld gegen mich ledig werden').

It is, incidentally, significant that in these two edicts, which are directed to, or issued from, the 'outlying' districts (Kaliṅga, Ujjain, Taxila and Sannathi (see Ramesh, 1990)) Aśoka speaks like a true king. Furthermore, while in Tōprā V (see above) Buddhist holidays are mentioned alongside brahmanic, or rather general holidays, and the Buddhist way of calculating the *uposatha* day is specified along with that used by the brahmins, these two edicts are silent

on specific Buddhist holidays. Indirectly, these two edicts may thus give us an idea of the spread of Buddhism at the time.

Karmavācanā *or* prātimokṣasūtra

It has been argued above that the first three sentences of the Schism Edict together form a 'legal' formula. In connection with the *uposatha* ceremony we may distinguish between two sets of such formulae, *karmavācanās* and *prātimokṣasūtras*. As already indicated, it is most likely our text belongs to the category of the *karmavācanās*, which are indeed used before the actual *uposatha* ceremony. However, if we look at the format of Aśoka's formula, it appears to have elements typical of both *karmavācanā* and *prātimokṣasūtra*. Thus, the construction of the third sentence, *ye ... se*, closely resembles that of the first sentence of the corresponding *prātimokṣasūtra* as preserved in the Pali canon of the Theravādas: *yo pana bhikkhu samaggassa saṅghassa bhedāya parakkameyya bhadasaṃvattanikaṃ vā adhikaraṇaṃ samādāya paggayha tiṭheyya, so bhikkhu bhikkhūhi evam assa vacanīyo*, 'Should any bhikkhu attempt to cause a schism of the Community when it is in concord and should he undertake and endeavour in and persist in litigation conducive to schism of the Community, that bhikkhu should be admonished by bhikkhus thus, ...' (Ñāṇamoli, 1966: 26–7).[37] The *prātimokṣasūtra* on *saṃghabheda* continues by outlining the procedure to be followed. The schismatic monk is to be admonished so he refrains from his harmful behaviour. This is to be repeated three times. Only if he still persists in his harmful behaviour are appropriate measures to be taken. At this point I do not go into the fact that Aśoka stipulates a much graver sanction or at least a much more direct measure than does the corresponding *prātimokṣasūtra*. To this point I will return at the end of this paper.

The first two sentences of the edict, on the other hand, are very similar to the two parts of the *jñapti*, or 'proposal' of a *karmavācanā*. Thus, *saṃghe samagge kaṭe*, 'the *saṃgha* has been made *samagga*.' has a counterpart in a statement such as the following:

> *śṛṇotu bhadanta saṃghaḥ/saṃghenaikapoṣathaḥ samānasaṃvāsaḥ saṃmataḥ,*
>
> Es höre, ihr Ehrwürdigen, die Gemeinde! Die Gemeinde hat den Gemeindebezirk mit gemeinsamer Beichtfeier bestimmt (Härtel, 1956: 98).

The main difference between the second sentence of the edict, *saṃghasi no lahiye bhede*, 'In the *saṃgha* division should not be allowed' and the corresponding statement in the *karmavācanā*,

> *sacet saṃghasya prāptakālaḥ kṣamata ājñā ca saṃghasya yat saṃgha ekapoṣathasya samānasaṃvāsasya sīmāṃ muñceta. eṣā jñaptiḥ,*
>
> Wenn der Gemeinde der Zeitpunkt recht ist und es ihr Wille ist, dann möge die Gemeinde die Grenze des Gemeindebezirkes mit gemeinsamer Beichtfeier aufheben. So lautet der Antrag (Härtel, 1956: 98),

is that while the former anticipates a negative decision, the latter is a request to the *saṃgha* in this particular case to allow the exception.

Aśoka's formula appears to be a curious mixture of *karmavācanā* and

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[37] In fact, a great number of *prātimokṣasūtra* consist of the first relative clause only, which is followed by a brief indication of the nature of the category to which it belongs: *yo pana bhikkhu nānappakārakaṃ kayavikkayaṃ samāpajjeyya, nisaggiyaṃ pācittiyaṃ* 'Should any bhikkhu engage in various kinds of buying and selling, this entails expiation with forfeiture' (Ñāṇamoli, 1966: 42–3). It is clear that in the latter cases we are dealing with summaries.

183/14

prātimokṣasūtra. In itself this situation should not be a cause for surprise, for the *prātimokṣasūtras* as we now have them are very probably transformations of formulae like the *karmavācanās*. However, one of the main differences between the *prātimokṣasūtras* and *karmavācanās* lies in their function. A *prātimokṣasūtra* sketches a hypothetical case; during the recitation of the *prātimokṣasūtra* the monks are not judging a case but agreeing with a principle. The transgressions are expressed in the optative; note *parakkameyya* in the example quoted above. In the case of a *karmavācanā*, however, we would instead be dealing with concrete, individual cases. Accordingly, we should reckon with an indicative present: 'a monk who acts in this way, is to be punished in that way'. Unfortunately, precisely on this point the text of the Schism Edict is not clear. That is to say, the analysis of *bh[.]khati* as a future, which tense may serve as a substitute of the optative, is questionable as it starts from the wrong verb (*bhañj-*). I think we should give up the idea that *saṃgham bh[.]khati* denotes the general phenomenon of *saṃghabheda* here. Rather, it would denote a specific action, or attitude, which results in *saṃghabheda*. As such it may denote one of the actions included in the standard list of causes of *saṃghabheda* found in, e.g., *Mahāvagga* x 5.4 (see below).

In what follows I will explore the possibility of deriving *bh[.]khati* from an entirely different verb from *bhañj-*, namely *abhyākhyā-* (*abhy-ā-khyā-*). The latter verb is well attested, either as *abbhakkha-* or *abbhācikkha-*, in Pali as well as Ardha Magadhi (AMg). I will try to show that the verb, for which the dictionaries give meanings like 'to accuse (falsely), to slander, to misrepresent', is also used to denote precisely the kind of action or attitude which in the Vinaya is mentioned as leading to the division of a *saṃgha*. At the same time it must be noted that the conditions for the supposed loss of the initial syllable in *bh[.]khati* < *abbhakkhati* (or *abbhākhati*) are not yet clear. Instances of such a loss in Middle Indic are not unknown but always involve a short or a light syllable. Note *vataṃsa* (*avataṃsa*), *heṭṭha* (**adheṣṭha*), *posatha* (*upavasatha*), and *bhīṃjā* (< **bhiyañjati* beside Skt. *abhyanakti*, Pali *abbhañjatri*, see *CDIAL*, 9503). However, given the appropriateness of the verb in the present context, I think the derivation should not be immediately dismissed on the basis of this phonetic problem. In fact, as far as phonetics are concerned, we may well have to do with a special development related to the distasteful nature of the action involved.[38]

Abbhakkha- *and* abbhācikkha- *in Pali and AMg*

As already indicated, the verbs *abbhakkha-* and *abbhācikkha-* in Pali and AMg are generally translated as 'to accuse (falsely)', etc. It may not be immediately clear how these meanings fit the verb in the Aśoka edict. In this connection, I would like to begin by drawing attention to *Paṇhāvāgaraṇāiṃ* 2, 2, 9 (p. 653):

> *avare ahammāo rāyaduṭṭhaṃ abbhakkhāṇaṃ bhaṇaṃti aliyaṃ—coro tti acoriyaṃ kareṃtaṃ, ḍāmario tti vi ya emeva udāsīṇaṃ, dussīlo tti ya paradāraṃ gacchati tti mailiṃti sīlakaliyaṃ ...*

The passage provides some examples of the form of 'lying' called *abbhakkhāṇa*:

> Others lie in the *abbhakkhāṇa* way, that is, when with their minds overcome with passion (*rāgaduṣṭa*) and bent upon unlawfulness (*adharmatas*) they tell lies: someone who is no thief at all they make out for a thief, a stoic they make out for quarrelsome, of someone virtuous they say he lacks virtues and steals another man's wife ...

It is precisely this kind of behaviour, or this attitude, i.e., saying that something is not so when it is, or at least, when the majority says it is, which in the Vinaya is mentioned as the cause of *saṃghabheda*. The following standard list is found in *Mahāvagga* x 5.4 (*Vinaya* I 354f), *Cullavagga* IV 14.2 (*Vinaya* II 88) and VII 5.2 (*Vinaya* II 204). As quoted by Bechert (1961: 32):

> *idha ... bhikkhū adhammaṃ dhammo ti dīpenti, dhammaṃ adhammo ti dīpenti, avinayaṃ vinayo ti dīpenti, vinayam avinayo ti dīpenti, abhāsitaṃ alapitaṃ tathāgatena bhāsitaṃ lapitaṃ tathāgatenā ti dīpenti ...*
>
> Here ... *bhikkhus* explain *adharma* as *dharma*, and vice versa, they explain *avinaya* as *vinaya*, and vice versa, what the Tathāgata did not say they ascribe to the Tathāgata, etc.

In this connection I should like to refer to a ninth-century inscription from Māṉūr in Tinnevelly in Tamil Nadu. This inscription lists the qualifications required for membership of the so-called *makkaḷ capai*, or 'the people's *sabhā*', an institution which is in many respects comparable to the Buddhist *saṃgha*. It is said that those who satisfy the conditions and have become members of the *capai* should not obstruct the proceedings by saying 'it is not so', nor should they agree with people who behave in this way.[39]

Apparently one is expected to agree with the proposals, and at least, if one is reluctant to do so, not to show this. An interesting piece of evidence for this may be found in the Vēḷvikkuṭi Grant of the Pāṇṭiya king Neṭuñcaṭaiyaṉ (eighth century). This king is approached with a request to renew a grant made by one of his ancestors. Though the inscription does not say so, we may assume that the matter was raised in front of the *sabhā*. Having heard this request the king smiles and says 'it is good, it is good' (*naṉṟu naṉṟeṉṟu muṟuvalittu*, ll. 112–3. *naṉṟu*, from *nal* 'to be good' is the opposite of *aṉṟu*, from *al* 'to be not so, not good' in the Māṉūr inscription.) Having in this way indicated that he is prepared to consider the request, the king asks the petitioner to provide evidence of his claim (*nāṭṭāṉiṉ paḻamaiyātal kāṭṭi nī koḷka*, l. 113, 'Your request will be granted after you have established your old claim'). The word *muṟuvalittu* 'having smiled' in the Vēḷvikuṭi inscription may give us an idea of what is implied by the expression *rāyaduṭṭhaṃ* (*rāgaduṣṭam*) in the Jaina text quoted above: the negotiations should be conducted in an amiable, relaxed way; heated discussions should be avoided at all cost.[40]

Saṃgha *as object to* abhyākhyā-

The above discussion shows that the action denoted by *abhyākhyā-* was a common incident in an acephalous institution like the *saṃgha*, in which decisions were taken on the basis of consensus. How then do we explain the function of *saṃgha* as object to *bh[.]khati*? In this connection it should be noted that where the object of the verb *abhyākhyā-* is the Buddha, it is not the person of the Buddha which is at stake but his teachings. See, for example, *Vinaya* I, 130: *mā evaṃ āvuso ariṭṭha avaca, mā bhagavantaṃ abbhācikkhi, na hi sādhu bhagavato abbhakkhānaṃ, na hi bhagavā evaṃ vadeyya.* 'Do not speak like this *āvuso* Ariṭṭha, do not misrepresent (the words of) the Bhagavant. It is not right to misrepresent the Bhagavant, the Bhagavant would never have said a thing like that.' Similarly, *saṃgha* in *saṃgham bh[.]khati* could be taken to refer to the opinions held by, or put forward in, the *saṃgha*. The idea would be that where the *saṃgha* says 'yes', the dissenting monk says 'no'.

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[38] Note in this connection the instance of spontaneous cerebralization in Pali *kaṭhati* 'boils' and Prakrit *ḍaḍḍha* 'burnt, cursed' (*dagdha*) (see Tieken, 1987: 199–200). Compare the developments seen in Prakrit *viaṇā* and *diara* (*vedanā* and *devara*) referred to in Tieken (1987: 199).

[39] *ipparicu ceykiṉṟārum aṉṟeṉṟu kuttukkāl ceyyappeṟātār ākavum kuttukkāl ceyvāraiyum kuttukkāl cevvārkku uṟavāyuṭaṉ ī[ṟu]ppāraiyum vevvēṟṟuvakai aiyyañcu k[ā]cu taṇṭaṅ koṇṭu* ll. 51–9, 'Those who abide by this agreement shall not say 'nay' and cause any obstruction (*to this agreement*); those who cause obstruction and those who abet the obstructionists shall be fined five *kācus* each.'

[40] This may, incidentally, account for the image of the *sabhā* as a bunch of old people quickly going through the motions of the meeting given in Kuṟuntokai 146. The poem is put in the mouth of a girl in love with a boy of her own choice, who feels thwarted by convention. She realizes that she has little to expect from the people of the village: 'May you live long, my friend. Perhaps there were once people in our village who brought together those who got separated. But this here is just an assembly (*avai, sabhā*) of old people ... saying 'it is good, it is good' (*naṉṟu naṉṟu*), and declaring it a big day.' The poem is discussed in Tieken (1998: 305–6).

However, there is yet another side to the verb which may be relevant here. In this connection I would like to draw attention to the verb as found in Āyāra I 1.3.22:[41]

> *ṇeva sayaṃ logaṃ abbhāikkhejjā, ṇeva attāṇaṃ abbhāikkhaejjā. je logaṃ abbhāikkhati, se attāṇaṃ abbhāikkhati; je attāṇaṃ abbhāikkhati, se logaṃ abbhāikkhati.*

These lines follow a passage in which a true monk, knowing that earth-matter is full of all kinds of living beings, is exhorted to abstain from any form of violence against earth-matter. The key words are *taṃ pariṇṇāya mehāvī ṇeva sayaṃ puḍhavisatthaṃ samārabhejjā, ṇeva'ṇṇehiṃ puḍhavisatthaṃ samārabhāvejjā, ṇeva'ṇṇe puḍhavisatthaṃ samārabhaṃte samaṇujāṇejjā* (I 1.2.17).[42] After that the text switches to the true houseless monk, who is straightforward (*ujjukaḍe*), is possessed of right knowledge (*ṇiyāgapaḍivaṇṇe*) and who does not practise deceit (*amāyaṃ kuvvamāṇe*). He keeps to the faith with which he had entered upon the state of houselessness, leaving behind all former connections.[43] They are heroes bent towards the 'Great Path' (which leads to success).[44]

The 'heroic' imagery is continued in *logaṃ ca āṇāe abhisameccā akutobhayaṃ*,[45] which is to be constructed with preceding: 'They are heroes, bent towards the "Great Path": [and] having as ordered fearlessly attacked the world'.[46] Otherwise the phrase *āṇāe abhisameccā* has been used to describe, or paraphrase, the effort to grasp the essence of something, which in Pali is indeed one of the meanings of *abhisameti*. However, the original 'heroic' meaning of the phrase is established by *āṇā* (Skt. *ājñā*), which means 'order, instruction', not 'knowledge' or 'understanding'. Where *āṇā* has come to be used in the sense of 'knowledge, understanding' (for which see Alsdorf (1966: 204)), this meaning may well have been extrapolated from precisely such phrases as the one under consideration.

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[41] Also found in *Āyāra* I 1.4.32.

[42] The same sentence is also found at I 1.3.30, with *udaya* instead of *puḍhavi*, and I 1.5.47, with *vaṇassati* instead of *puḍhavi*.

[43] *jāe saddhāe ṇikkhaṃto tameva aṇupāliyā vijahittā visottiyaṃ* I 1.3.20. In my translation of *visottiyaṃ* I simply follow the meaning of the variant reading *puvvasaṃyogaṃ*.

[44] *paṇayā vīrā mahāvihiṃ* (I 1.3.21). The meaning of *mahāvihiṃ* becomes clear from the parallel passage in *Sūyagaḍa* I 2.1.21 (Bollée, 1988): *paṇaye vīraṃ mahāvihiṃ siddhipahaṃ ṇeyāuyam dhuvam.*

[45] See also I 2.4.129

[46] Schubring translates this text as follows: 'nachdem sie dank der Unterweisung begriffen haben, dass die Welt keine Gefahr [der Wiedergeburt mehr] birgt' (Schubring, 1927: 69). I have taken *akutobhayaṃ* as an adverb instead. Compare *akutobhayo* in *Theragāthā* 831:

> *brahmabhūto atitulo mārasenappamaddano*
> *sabbāmitte vasīkatvā modāmi akutobhayo,*

> Having become Brahmā, unequalled crusher of Māra's army, having subdued all enemies I rejoice, having no fear from any quarters. (Norman, 1969: 79)

In *Āyāra* I 4.2.134 *āṇāe abhisameccā*, coming as it does after *ete ya pade saṃbujjhamāṇe*, has indeed been used in its derived, secondary meaning: *ete ya pade saṃbujjhamāṇe logam ca āṇāe abhisameccā puḍho paveditaṃ āghāti ṇāṇī iha māṇavāṇaṃ saṃsārapaḍivaṇṇāṇaṃ saṃbujjhamāṇāṇaṃ viṇṇāṇapattāṇaṃ*, 'Knowing fully these (preceding) words, and having attacked the world as ordered/having understood the world with the help of this instruction as it is explained in detail (in its constituent parts; *puḍho paveditaṃ*), he, the wise, teaches how it is to people immersed in *saṃsāra* as well as to those already fully awakened and possessed of right insight'.

The above passage shows once more that *loga* is a concept highly similar to *saṃgha*: it stands for a group of all kinds of living beings, that is, earth beings, water beings, etc. *abbhāikkha-* 'to misrepresent' denotes in particular the failure to appreciate the composite nature and the necessary integrity of *loga*. *abbhāikkha-* is also painful to the object. This becomes clear if one feels its effects on oneself (*ātmaupamya*), as in *Āyāra* I 1.3.22 quoted above:

> One should not misrepresent *loga*, one should not misrepresent oneself. For he who misrepresent *loga*, misrepresents oneself, and *vice versa*.[47]

Returning to *saṃgha* as object: like *loga*, the *saṃgha* consists of many and diverse members who live together, or, rather, have to live together and operate as a unit. *bh[.]kha-* (<*abbhāikkha-*) would denote, or connote, a lack of respect for the integrity of the *saṃgha* as a composite whole. One might also say: if one member misbehaves, the totality is damaged.

In this way, from *abhyākhyā-* 'to misrepresent, to bear false witness', which was used to refer to obstructing the procedures in the *saṃgha* by angrily shouting 'no' where the majority says 'yes', we may for *saṃghaṃ bh[.]khati* arrive at a translation: 'He (who) disrupts the integrity or unanimity of the *saṃgha*.' For the three sentences of the first part of the edict I suggest the following translation:

1. The *saṃgha* has been made unanimous.
2. In the *saṃgha* division should not be allowed to take place.
3. That person who damages the integrity of the *saṃgha* by verbal obstruction, be he a monk or a nun, is to be made to put on white clothes and live outside the *āvāsa*.

The different versions of the Schism Edict

In the text of the Schism Edict in Sanchi the order of the three sentences differs from that in Allahabad (Kauśāmbī). On the basis of the comparison of the three sentences of the edict with a *karmavācanā* we would have to conclude that the order as found in Kauśāmbī is indeed the original one. Furthermore, the interpretation of the three lines as a legal formula implies that the so-called 'covering letter', contrary to Norman's conclusion, is an integral part of the text. Together with the address it frames the formula, which has the status of quoted text. Strictly speaking, the Allahabad text, in which the 'covering letter' has been omitted while the address has been retained, makes no sense. In Allahabad the three sentences are preceded by *devānaṃpiye ānapayati kosaṃbi-*

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[47] In the translation *sayaṃ* in *ṇeva sayaṃ logaṃ abbhāikkhejjā* has been skipped. In the present context it makes no sense, and it has most likely spilled over from *taṃ pariṇṇāya mehāvī ṇeva sayaṃ puḍhavīsatthaṃ samārabhejjā* and its parallels (see above).

185/14

yam mahāmātā. (In Sanchi the corresponding text has presumably been lost through damage.) As a result it is as if Aśoka wanted the officials of Kauśāmbī to interfere and to banish the monks who disrupt the procedures of the *saṃgha*. It may be precisely such an interpretation which lies behind the additions made to the text of the formula in Sanchi. In the first place, in this version the order of sentences 1 and 2 has been reversed. The only syllables retrieved from the first line, originally the second, are (*y*)*ā bhe*(*ta*). The second line, originally the first, reads: '... *ghe* ... *mage kaṭe bhikhūnaṃ ca bhikhunīnaṃ cā ti putapapotike caṃdasūriyike*. The text of the third line differs from the versions in Kauśāmbī and Sarnath in only a few details. However, after that a fourth line has been added: *ichā hi me kiṃti saṃghe samage cilathitīke siyā ti*.

In the addition of *bhikhūnaṃ ca bhikhunīnaṃ cā* in sentence 2 we may recognize an attempt to create a parallelism with 3: ... *bhikhū vā bhikhuni vā* ... The two other additions: *ti putapapotike caṃdasūriyike* to sentence 2, and *ichā hi me kiṃti saṃghe samage cilathitīke siyā ti* to 3, mark the division of the text into two 'rules' each accompanied by a 'motivation':

1. (Rule:) Division of the *saṃgha* is not to be allowed. (Motivation: For) the *saṃgha* of both monks and nuns has been made unanimous and this is to last for as long as my sons and grandsons (shall reign) and as long as the sun and moon (shall shine).
2. (Rule:) He who damages the integrity of the *saṃgha* ... is to be banished. (Motivation:) For it is my wish that the unanimity of the *saṃgha* lasts for ever.

The additions seem to complete the transformation of what was originally a juridical formula into an order from Aśoka directed to his officials.

It should be noted that the added passages are found elsewhere in the corpus of inscriptions. The phrase *ti putapapotike caṃdasūriyike* corresponds to Tōprā vii (OO): *putāpapotike caṃdamasuliyike hotu ti*. See Dhauli vii (M) for this phrase in combination with the expression 'that it will last forever': *et[ā]y[e aṭhāye i]yaṃ dhaṃmalipi likhitā c[i]laṭh[i]tīkā hotu ta[th]ā ca putā papotā ca palakama[ṃ]t[ū savaloka]hitāye*; see also Erragudi v (O): *etāye a[ṭhāya] iyaṃ dhaṃmalipi likhitā cilaṭhitika hotu*. It would seem that the person responsible for the addition of the phrase *ti putapapotike caṃdasūriyike* had in mind a phrase exactly like the one found in Tōprā. This would explain the clumsy handling of the particle *ti*. The transposition of this particle to the beginning was in the present context the best the scribe could think of.[48]

The insertion of the phrase *dhuvāye paṭipadāye anuposathaṃ* of Tōprā in the Sarnath text is a special case. The way in which the words *dhuvāye* and *posathāye* (for *paṭipadāye*) have been inserted in Sarnath would show that the scribe worked from memory, not from a written copy of the source text. The scribe remembered the original phrase, or the specific combination of words, not the context.

However, the Sarnath text as a whole does seem to have been copied from a written exemplar. At least, this would account for the reference to Pāṭaliputra—if the fragment *pāṭa* retrieved from the beginning does indeed stand for Pāṭaliputra—while the edict itself is found in neighbouring Sarnath. It is almost as if the text had been inscribed straight from a copy of the Pāṭaliputra text without adapting the address to the local situation. This case does not seem to stand on its own. The Allahabad inscription is addressed to the *mahāmātras* of Kauśāmbī. SE i, found in Dhauli and Jaugaḍa, contains passages relevant only for the officials in Ujjain and Taxila (see Fussman, 1974: 379). However, Sarnath may be a special case as, in the second part, which is only found in this version, Aśoka expressly forbade tampering with the text. This does assume, however, that the import of the second part, despite its mangled text, was still understood. The other possibility is that, as in the case of Allahabad, Dhauli and Jaugaḍa, the scribes simply did not consider the contents of the text. The omission of the second part in Allahabad and Sanchi may well have been the outcome of precisely an attempt at its interpretation, in which the (wrong) conclusion was reached, namely that it was not meant for publication.

Here I would also like to discuss the text Q and R in Rūpnāth:

> Q *iya ca aṭhe pavatis[u] lekhāpetavāla ta hadha ca ath[i] s[.]lāṭhabhe silāṭhaṁbhasi lākhāpetavaya ta*
> R *etinā c̣a vayajanenā yāvataka tupaka ahāle savara vivasetavā[ya] ti*

Note that Q is also found in Sahasrām, but after S of Rūpnāth. R is peculiar to Rūpnāth. However, the passage is absent in all the other versions of this edict. This may suffice for us to conclude that we are looking at a later addition. In this connection it should also be noted that Q and R, which deal with the dissemination and inscribing of the text, form an awkward interruption of the flow of the text. Thus, S follows naturally upon B-N. It is telling that in Sahasrām Q is indeed found after S of Rūpnāth.

R seems to have been borrowed directly from a text like the one found in Sarnath, if not directly from Sarnath itself. If my interpretation of the origin of *vivāsayātha* in Sarnath as a corruption of *visaṃsayitave* is correct, R can only come from a text like the one in Sarnath as this is the only one which also contains the intermediate corruption *visvaṃsayitave*.

The second part of Q, *hadha ca ath[i] s[i]lāṭhabhe silāṭhaṃbhasi lākhāpetavaya ta*, in its turn, echoes Tōprā vii (SS): *dhaṃmalibi ata athi silāthaṃbhāni vā silāphalakāni vā tata kaṭaviyā ena esa cilaṭhitike siyā*. The addition may have been triggered by J-M: *etiya aṭhāya ca sāvane kaṭe kh[u]dakā ca uḍālā ca pakamatu ti atā pi ca jānaṃtu iya paka[rā va] kiti ciraṭhitike siyā*. The source of the first part of Q, *iya ca aṭhe pavatis[u] lekhāpetavāla ta*, is more difficult to trace. The injunction to inscribe the edict on 'mountains' is otherwise found only in Dhauli and Jaugaḍa, in which case it may be an element added locally as the inscriptions are found on mountains. Jaugaḍa i (A) reads: *iyaṃ dhaṃmalipī khepiṃgalasi pavatasi devānaṃpiyena piyadasinā lājinā likhāpitā*.

These examples of 'internal' additions are not the only ones. The bilingual (Greek and Aramaic) inscription from Kandahar has been pieced together in its entirety from fragments culled from the first eight REs (see Fussman, 1974: 383–5). In this situation *vivasetavā[ya]* in Rūpnāth would provide no independent evidence for a verb *vivāsaya-* 'to dispatch'. Furthermore, we may, very cautiously of course, conclude that even if we do find more Aśoka inscriptions, we cannot expect to find many more really new edicts. The presently available corpus seems to cover, if not the complete repertory, the greatest part of it.[49]

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[48] Weller (1961), ignoring the parallelism, takes sentences 2 and 3 together:

> ... *[gh]e* ... *mage kaṭe [bhi]khūna[m] ca bhi[khun]īnaṃ cā ti [p]utapa[po]tike caṃ[da]m[as-ū]ri[yi]ke ye saṃghaṃ bh[ā]khati bhikhu vā bhikhuni vā* ...
>
> Die Einheit des Saṃgha ist (wieder) hergestellt, des Mönchs- wie des Nonnen-Ordens. (Auf daß dies bleibe, so lange) Söhne und Enkel (von mir regieren und) Mond und Sonne (scheinen), ist dem, der (künftig) den Saṃgha spalten wird, es sei Mönch oder Nonnen, weiße Kleidung anzulegen ...

However, in this case the translation of the particle *ti* is also problematic.

[49] It should be noted that if the scribe of Sarnath was a local man (but of this we cannot be absolutely sure, as appears from the signature in Kharoṣṭhī script below the text of Brahmagiri)

Aśoka and the Buddhist community

From the evidence discussed above it follows that even in Aśoka's time the *uposatha* had become a purely ceremonial affair: issues which, or persons who, might disturb the ceremony were dealt with beforehand. It is an indication of the dependence of the Buddhist *saṃghas* on public support, as this unanimity, or at least the semblance of unanimity, was an absolute necessity. Unanimity was reached by careful prior selection of the monks who were to participate in the communal ceremonies and by driving away those monks who lived within the boundaries of the *saṃgha* but were suspected of being troublemakers. In enforcing its decisions at this stage the *saṃgha* seems to have depended on the assistance of the worldly authorities and powerful lay followers who were prepared to protect 'their' *saṃgha* against a take-over by strange monks. The ceremonial recitation of the *prātimokṣasūtra* by the community served as a formalization of its hard-won unanimity.

The Schism Edict is to be seen as an attempt to help the *saṃgha* attain unanimity. These attempts were concentrated on the procedures of the community at the end of the dry season when all kinds of monks were seeking shelter in permanent establishments. In the edict Aśoka dictates a formula to be recited by the monks when they are confronted by a quarrelsome colleague. It stipulates—and sanctions—a most effective means of getting rid of a quarrelsome monk, namely to declare that he is not a proper monk (according to the rules of 'this' *saṃgha*) and drive him away from the area. In the second part of the Sarnath version Aśoka instructs his *mahāmātras* to apprise themselves of the situation, with which no doubt he means them to assist the community when a monk refuses to leave.

It is clear that the particular measures against potential dissenters described in Aśoka's edict could indeed only be effectively implemented with the help of the worldly authorities. If the *saṃghas* did have similar rules, without help from the strong arm they were probably largely ineffective.

In this connection I will return to the difference between the edict, on the one hand, and the corresponding *prātimokṣasūtra* on the other. While the edict stipulates immediate expulsion of a quarrelsome monk, the *prātimokṣasūtra* outlines a less direct course of action. The *prātimokṣasūtra* instructs the monks to try to resolve the matter internally by repeatedly admonishing the monk to give up his stubbornness. If all that fails the monk loses his voting right in the communal ceremonies. The possibility of reinstatement is, however, left open. There is not a word about actually driving him away. It should be noted, however, that taking away a monk's voting right amounts to exactly the same thing, without bringing the controversy into the open; unless, of course, the monk feels confident enough to leave of his own accord. In this connection it should be noted again that Aśoka's rule was effective at the time of admission of monks, when physically removing a monk was still an option. Once a monk is admitted and allowed to participate at the *prātimokṣasūtra* recitation the community can no longer allow controversies to come to the open by actually banishing a monk. Apart from that, the main purpose of the *prātimokṣasūtra* recitation was not to judge cases and mete out sanctions, but to confirm agreement on what constituted an offence and the appropriate sanctions.

Bechert has argued that the measures outlined by Aśoka had nothing to do with the schism responsible for the origin of the Theravāda. Instead, Aśoka would be instructing local *saṃghas* on how to deal with dissenters. Bechert's argument runs approximately as follows: *saṃghabheda* is a concept from Vinaya, and Vinaya deals with local, individual *saṃghas*. I think, however, that there is some further evidence supporting this conclusion.[50]

From RE XIV, quoted above, and other edicts, Aśoka emerges as a political pragmatist. He refrained from imposing one uniform model of administration on his realm, allowing for local adjustments to be made to the rules and regulations he issued. Moreover, it is unlikely that, for instance, each version of MRE I and II in the South has been copied from an independent copy dispatched directly from Pāṭaliputra; it is more likely that the edict was passed on from the one centre to the next. We may assume that communication did not take place from the capital to each centre separately but was passed on from one to the other along the long-distance trade routes which formed the backbone of Aśoka's empire.

Aśoka's main concern was to keep the lines of communication open and to prevent interruption of this flow somewhere along the line because of conflicts in one of the localities. He did so by fostering cohesion and unanimity on a local level: each district has its own type of rules and regulations as long as everybody agrees. There is no attempt on Aśoka's part to force 'national' issues: what does not suit locally may be omitted.

His attitude towards the *saṃghas* will have been derived from this policy. In any case, it is unlikely that he tried to do to the *saṃghas* what he did not do in the sphere of local government, or ever seriously tried to force one particular form of Buddhism on the *saṃghas*, which could only result in conflict. At the same time it would be clear why Aśoka was in particular concerned with *saṃghabheda*. The real danger of *saṃghabheda* is that it may give rise to a new, competing, *saṃgha* from the original one. It all depends on the numerical strength of the dissenters. As pointed out by Bechert, the Vinaya makes a distinction between *saṃghabheda* and *saṃgharāji*. Both refer to disputes—the difference is that in the case of *saṃghabheda* the disagreeing member is able to win over a sufficiently large number of the monks among those present to be able to start a *saṃgha* of his own. Such a division of a *saṃgha* into two independent communities must have been a source of conflict, which in turn interrupts the smooth flow of trade.

Typically, the pragmatism shown by Aśoka is also shown by the Buddhists. Thus, the Buddhist 'canon' presents a mirror image of Aśoka's edicts. Both were translated into the various regional languages or, to account for their translation into Sanskrit, into the languages which were most prestigious in the different areas. Apart from that, both sets of texts show in their various versions traces of all kinds of intervention, such as omissions and additions. The situation in the Buddhist canon has been justified by tracing it back to the Buddha himself, who would have permitted his followers to recite his words *sakāya niruttiyā*. Whatever the exact meaning of the words in question (Norman, 1973; 1980; Brough, 1980), as far as the transmission of his own words is concerned the Buddha is presented as a pragmatist here like the emperor Aśoka.

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he must at some time have seen an actual, written copy of the text found in far-away Tōprā. May we assume that manuscripts were circulating containing the complete set of edicts?

[50] I do not know what to think of Bechert's other conclusion, namely that *saṅghabheda* is merely a matter of discipline. He concludes that 'als Ursache für Sanghabheda nur Angelegenheiten der Ordenszucht in Frage kamen' (Bechert, 1961: 33). The Vinaya passage quoted earlier does not support Bechert's conclusion. Among the 18 grounds for *saṃghabheda* it enumerates, beside matters of Vinaya, disputes about the *dhamma* and the words spoken by the Tathāgata. In this connection it should be noted that the first efforts to establish a canon took place in the course of an *uposatha* ceremony. Also, the recitation of the Vatthuprakaraṇa in the course of the *uposatha* ceremony may well be a relic from disputes involving various views on doctrinal issues. It is another thing that the main cause of differences of opinion will indeed have been matters of discipline.

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188/14

The *Feng-tao k'o* and printing on paper in seventh-century China

One of the arguments for supposing that the 'world's earliest printed book', the *Diamond Sūtra* in the Stein collection in London, is actually the outcome of a long process of development relies on the very high quality of the images contained in the frontispiece. It is possible, of course, to point to much more crudely formed Buddha images stamped on paper from the same source at Tunhuang, but the dated examples that have been studied are actually later than the Stein *Diamond Sūtra* itself.[1] The practice of printing Buddha images on paper and silk in India is attested in 792 by the *Nan-hai chi-kuei nei-fa chuan* 南海寄歸内法傳 of I-ching 義浄 who was in India 673–85, and Paul Pelliot for one was prepared to believe that this practice, using Chinese materials, was originally derived from China itself.[2] Frustratingly enough, however, no Chinese source has so far been identified which clearly mentions printing on paper at any point earlier than I-ching's text, which itself does not antedate by more than half a century or so the earliest printed materials we actually possess, notably in the form of a *dharaṇī* from Korea.[3]

This lack of early sources remains true despite the posthumously published researches of Michel Strickmann, whose unparalleled knowledge of Buddhist and Taoist sources of the period enabled him to identify some extremely interesting references to printing from seals: unfortunately, none of the cases of printing seals on paper which he discovered may be securely dated to any earlier than I-ching, however early they may claim to be.[4] Taoist sources are, of course, often rather hard to assign to any narrowly defined period, and even some fairly well-known works still excite considerable debate between scholars as to their dates of origin. The work now known as the *T'ai-hsüan ling-pao san-tung feng-tao k'o-chieh ying-shih* 太玄靈寶三洞奉道科戒營始, often abbreviated to *Feng-tao k'o* in modern scholarship, is a particular case in point.[5] It is first cited, in the view of most scholars, in works of the early eighth century, though since the text as we now have it is incomplete, despite the retrieval of some lost fragments from Tunhuang, it may possibly be that a certain *San-tung k'o* cited in a late seventh-century encyclopedia compiled by the Taoist priest Wang Hsüan-ho 王懸河 refers to the same work, despite the lack of any passage corresponding to this citation in any surviving materials.[6]

As to the date of its composition, intuitive guesses based on style and on the picture it presents (albeit as a norm to be aimed at, rather than as a reality) of a mature, well-organized Taoist monasticism parallel to established Chinese Buddhism, tend to favour the seventh century.[7] The real or imaginary author, a figure known as Chin-ming ch'i-chen 金明七眞, is, however, referred to in two or three other texts which have been construed as containing indications of date equivalent to 552, the point at which the Southern Liang dynasty was sliding into chaos after half a century of prosperity. Chin-ming ch'i-chen is represented in these sources as a saviour in a time of mounting chaos, and the texts ascribed to him claim a talismanic quality.[8] This is not, however, the case with the *Feng-tao k'o*, and though the most recent and meticulous survey of the Chin-ming ch'i-chen literature by Liu Tsun-yan accepts the hypothesis that it was inspired by the fall of the Liang, the assumption that the entire corpus bearing this name all dates to the same period of composition is explicitly (and surely rightly) questioned.[9] It might equally be said, of course, that the assumption that the corpus was compiled over an extended period—that a messianic earlier portion preceded a text like the *Feng-tao k'o* concerned more with promoting stability and good order—is also open to question, in that religious movements are often broad enough to span differing tendencies at any one point in time. Even so, 552 seems to serve as a reliable *terminus post quem*. Any earlier date may in any case be ruled out by the organized nature of Taoist canonical literature as quoted by our text: research on the formation of the canon places this degree of organization independently at about A.D. 550.[10] There would, on the other hand, seem to be no reliable means of pushing the date of composition any later. It is true that material from the *Feng-to k'o* is not included among the copious citations of Taoist literature in the late sixth-century *Wu-shang pi-yao* 無上秘要, but it is not unique in this respect: an even earlier southern text with messianic overtones, conspicuously 'taken up' by the T'ang rulers in the late seventh century, the *Tung-yüan shen-chou ching* 洞淵神呪經, is similarly ignored in this compendium.[11]

As for the *terminus ante quem*, I have shown in a recent publication that this may be pushed back to 688, the date of death according to good epigraphic evidence of Yin Wen-ts'ao 尹文操, who, according to an excerpt in the eighth-century encyclopedia *Ch'u-hsüeh chi* 初學記, cited the *Feng-tao k'o* in a lost work of his entitled the *Ch'ü-huo lun* 祛惑論, or 'Treatise on the Elimination of Doubts'.[12] Since this title implies a polemical work, it most probably dates to the era of Buddho-Taoist controversy between 658 to 668, though we cannot be absolutely sure of this.[13] At any rate, it would seem virtually impossible that the *Feng-tao k'o* cited by Yin could date to any later than I-ching's trip to India, and this has important implications for the history of printing.

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[1] Marie-Rose Séguy, 'Images xylographiques conservées dans les collections de Touen-houang de la Bibliothèque nationale', in Michel Soymié (ed.), *Contributions aux ètudes sur Touen-houang* (Geneva and Paris: Librarie Droz, 1979), 119–33.

[2] cf. J. Takakusu (tr.), *A record of the Buddhist religion as practised in India and the Malay Archipelago* (London: Clarendon Press, 1896), 150, and Paul Pelliot, *Les débuts de l'imprimerie en Chine* (Paris: Adrian Maisonneuve, 1953), 18.

[3] Described e.g. in Denis Twitchett, *Printing and publishing in medieval China* (London: Wynken de Worde Society, 1983), 13–14, and illustrated in pl. 1, p. [4].

[4] Note especially p. 43 of Michel Strickmann, 'The seal of the law: a ritual implement and the origins of printing', *Asia Major*, Third Series, vi, 2 (1993), 1–83.

[5] Text number 1117 in the Taoist Canon in the enumeration of the *Harvard-Yenching Index*; text number 1125 in the more recent Schipper enumeration.

[6] One of the earliest citations of this text known so far occurs in a ritual work by the early eighth-century Taoist Chang Wan-fu: see Charles Benn, *The Cavern-Mystery transmission: a Taoist ordination rite of A.D. 711* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 72–3, 177, which notes the value of the manuscripts listed in Ōfuchi Ninji, *Tonkō Dōkyō- mokuroku hen* (Tokyo: Fukutake Shoten, 1978), 115–21. For the possible earlier citation, see Florian C. Reiter, *Kategorien und Realien im Shang-ch'ing Taoismus* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992), 11.

[7] The controversy between Japanese scholars on this point is succinctly summarised in Benn's note, p. 177 (see preceding note); he himself follows the view of Yoshioka (see following note).

[8] Thus Yoshioka Yoshitoyo, *Dōkyō to Bukkyō* III (Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 1979), 77–159. Pp. 161–219 provide a translation of the *Feng-tao k'o* itself into Japanese.

[9] Liu Ts'un-jen (Tsun-yan), '*San-tung feng-tao k'o-chieh i-fan*, chüan ti-wu: P. 2337 chung "Chin-ming ch'i-chen" i-tz'u chih t'ui-ts'e', *Han-hsüeh yen-chiu* 4.2 (December, 1986), 505–31, especially pp. 512–13 for the date, and pp. 513–20 for the character of other parts of the corpus.

[10] The *Feng-tao k'o* seems to envisage a canon in three sections with four supplements: according to Ōfuchi Ninji, on p. 267 of 'The formation of the Taoist canon', in Holmes Welch and Anna Seidel (ed.), *Facets of Taoism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), such a canon probably came into existence during the Liang.

[11] A complete analysis of all citations in the *Wu-shang pi-yao* may be found in John Lagerwey, *Wu-shang pi-yao: Somme taoïste du vi^{e} siècle* (Paris: EFEO, 1981). Christine Mollier, *Une apocalypse taoïste du v^{e} siècle* (Paris: Collège de France, 1990), 27–9, covers the copying under imperial auspices of the *Tung-yüan shen-chou ching* in 664, and the probable reasons for this, which are also explored by Tso Ching-ch'üan, '*Tung-yüan shen-chou ching* yüan-liu k'ao; chien-lun T'ang-tai cheng-chih yü Tao-chiao chih kuan-hsi', *Wen-shih*, 23 (November, 1984), 279–85.

[12] T. H. Barrett, *Taoism under the T'ang* (London: Wellsweep, 1996), 34, citing Hsü Chien (comp.), *Ch'u-hsüeh chi*, 23 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1962), 552, and Wang Ch'ang, *Chin-shih ts'ui-pien* (Sao-yeh shan-fang ed.), 71.5a–6a for Yin's life.

[13] This period is treated in *Taoism under the T'ang*, 31–2.

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For on looking through the draft of a forthcoming monograph by Professor Florian C. Reiter of Berlin introducing the *Feng-tao k'o* to Western readers, I was surprised to find a clear and unambiguous reference to printing Taoist icons on paper tucked away at the end of a list of Taoist iconographic media.[14] To the modern reader it is perhaps even more surprising to find this reference listed in a ragbag of miscellaneous methods for producing icons, item 18, including iconic snowmen, ivory (literally, 'carved teeth') icons and other exotica, when the other 17 (presumably preferable) methods include not only metal casting and painting but also embroidery, epigraphy and other (to us) minor art forms.[15] The mention of printing right at the end naturally raises the possibility that the reference may be an interpolation, later in date than the body of the work. Unfortunately, this passage does not fall within any portion of the work covered by Tunhuang fragments, while for that matter the dates of these fragments themselves are unknown. But what the Tunhuang portions of the *Feng-tao k'o* do suggest is both that (as noted above) the text has lost rather than gained material in the course of its transmission since the time of these manuscripts, and that during the same period of time no significant interpolations were made.[16] And while it is possible that the reference to printing represents an interpolation earlier than the period of the manuscripts, printing icons on paper is mentioned first in the eighteenth category, rather than tacked on right at the very end, and thus was in all likelihood part of category 18 from the start. This category in turn is likely to have been original: medieval Taoism does include other lists of 18 (18 heavens, for example), but not, to my knowledge, lists of 17 items.[17]

The existence, then, of the practice of printing images on paper in Taoist circles imitative of Buddhism before the time of I-ching confirms entirely the Buddho-Taoist background to printing suggested by Strickmann, and allows us to read I-ching's remarks in a somewhat different light. He was, after all, not writing a travelogue pure and simple, but noting systematically Indian practices which might justify Buddhist norms in China.[18] The news that an existing means of replicating images (and, implicitly, texts, which in Buddhism were equally manifestations of the body of the Buddha) was in fact not a heterodox innovation of low prestige but something practised by Indians, may well have come as a matter of some interest to I-ching's monarch, the Empress Wu. But that is a matter for a separate inquiry of wider scope; what the foregoing remarks hope to establish is simply the value of the *Feng-tao k'o* as a source for the history of printing.

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[14] The same scholar has already published an account of Taoist conceptions of iconography drawing on a number of sources, including the *Feng-tao k'o*: Florian C. Reiter, 'The visible divinity: the sacred icon in religious Taoism', *Nachrichten der Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkund Ostasiens/Hamburg*, 144 (1988), 51–70.

[15] In the *Tao-tsang* edition, p.2.1a; p. 177 in the translation by Yoshioka listed above, n. 8. I am most grateful to Professor Reiter not only for showing me his work on the *Feng-tao k'o* in advance but in particular for drawing my attention to the structure of this list in subsequent discussion. A full English translation of the passage in question will be included in his forthcoming monograph.

[16] This may readily be seen from the collation notes comparing the manuscripts with the text in the current (Ming) Taoist canon in the catalogue of Tun-huang manuscripts already cited above, n. 6.

[17] Note K. M. Schipper, *Index du Yunji qiqian*, I (Paris: EFEO, 1981), 56, for some examples of sets of eighteen.

[18] This aspect of his work is made perfectly plain by I-ching himself, and is picked up by at least some modern scholars, e.g. Ch'en Shih-ch'iang, *Fo-tien ching-chieh* (Shanghai: Shanghai ku-chi ch'u-pan she, 1992), 911–12.

189/14

THE ANCIENT WORLD

AMÉLIE KUHRT: *The ancient Near East c. 3000–330 B.C.* (Routledge History of the Ancient World.) 2 vols. xxviii, 381 pp.; xix, 782 pp. London and New York: Routledge 1995. £85.

This 2-volume work contains a wealth of historical information, which is clearly organized on geographical and chronological criteria into sections and subsections. Concerning geographical scope, *c.* 40% of the historical survey concerns Mesopotamia, *c.* 20% Syria and the Levant, *c.* 20% Egypt, and *c.* 12% Anatolia, with a study of the Achaemenid empire closing the work. Volume I covers the period from *c.* 3000 B.C. to *c.* 1200 B.C. and vol. II from *c.* 1200 B.C. to 330 B.C.

In the preface the author states that the book is intended as an introduction to ancient Near Eastern social and political history, concentrating on the periods and areas usually studied in universities. The author's careful scholarship and practical experience of teaching ancient Near Eastern history at university level have resulted in a work that is reliable, informative and enjoyable. Inevitably, given the nature of the work, evidence cannot be discussed in great detail, but references to more specialized material are given for readers keen to investigate further. The book is primarily aimed at undergraduates and classical ancient historians but deserves a wider audience. Both volumes are illustrated by figures, maps and tables, but the quality of the drawings is disappointing.

In the introduction, the author outlines some of the problems implicit in such a study, including the vast geographical and chronological scope, incomplete and selective archaeological evidence, inexact terminologies and the uneven distribution of textual sources according to area, period and genre. Regarding the chronology of the Near East in the second millennium, which pivots on the dates of Hammurabi of Babylon, the author generally follows the so-called 'Middle Chronology', whereby Hammurabi's reign is dated at 1792–1750 B.C. However, other chronologies are also discussed and examined at key points.

The first volume consists of two parts. In Part 1, 'The development of states and cities (*c.* 3000–*c.* 1600)', the social and political history of Mesopotamia and Egypt during the early periods is surveyed. In the Mesopotamian study, the author shows a healthy scepticism towards earlier attempts to treat texts such as the 'Sumerian King List' and the Uruk epics as detailed historical sources. A general feature of the book soon becomes apparent: on disputed issues the author concisely summarizes scholarly debate, reports on current opinion, and does not shrink from pointing out that, as is so often the case in this area of scholarship, no certain conclusion can be reached. The limitations of the evidence are recognized and respected. On p. 34 Sumerian terms for 'ruler' are discussed and it may be of interest to note a possible interpretation of the writing of the title ensi with the signs PA.TE.SI. PA with the value ugula has the meaning 'supervisor' and TE with the value temen has the meaning 'temple platform, temple enclosure'. The sign SI can be taken as a phonetic complement indicating the reading of the two preceding signs as énsi. Thus, PA.TE.SI may originally have signified 'supervisor of the temple enclosure'.

In Part 2, 'The great powers (*c.* 1600–*c.* 1050)', the geographical compass is increased, with studies of Egypt, the Hittites, Syria and the Levant, and Mesopotamia. In the discussion about the retrieval of Marduk's statue from Elam by Nebuchadnezzar I (pp. 377–8), the author states that, as well as allusions in the omen literature, there are four extant literary texts celebrating this achievement. However, more such sources are known: the fragmentary text in letter form published as *VAS* 24.87, the bilingual poetic text partially preserved in five copies, including IV *R* 20, no. 1; and probably the fragmentary poetic text DT 71 published by J. Hehn (idem, *BA* 5, 1906, 326–7 and 386–8). There is also the evidence of Nebuchadnezzar's charter published as *BBSt.* no. 24, which includes a brief account of his victorious expedition to Elam and recovery of Marduk's statue.

Volume II contains the third and final part of the book, 'Political transformation and the great empires (*c.* 1200–330)', and closes with the bibliography and index for both volumes. Part 3 is divided into chapters on the Levant, the Neo-Assyrian empire, Anatolia, Babylonia, and Egypt, with a final chapter on the Achaemenid empire. The author is to be praised for covering such a wide geographical and chronological scope in a concise and lucid fashion. The bibliographies are useful, extensive and up-to-date, but their arrangement is a little cumbersome. A general bibliography arranged thematically, e.g. 'Textbooks on Egyptian history', 'Basic technology', 'Religion and mythology', accompanies the introduction, which is referred to as Chapter 0. This is followed by individual bibliographies for each chapter. All the bibliographies are grouped together at the end of vol. II.

The reviewer herself teaches broad survey courses in ancient Mesopotamian history to undergraduate students and this book is a welcome and valuable addition to the available literature.

FRANCES REYNOLDS

in Pali 'Mahosadha'. In the *Sutta piṭaka* he is the hero of the *Great Tunnel Jātaka*, the penultimate and longest of the Pali recension,[4] who proves his wisdom at the age of seven by answering 19 problems set by King Vedeha. He becomes the great minister of the king, survives the jealous plots of the other ministers and, as a climax to his career, saves king and country by tunnelling into the heart of the enemy's camp. This science fiction expedient takes the Jātaka near to the realms of romance, but it is fundamentally a judgement tale collection set in a narrative frame: in addition to the first 19 problems, Mahosadha is given ample further opportunities to display his wisdom. Another Middle Mekong text, the *Lokavinaya*, versions of which have been found in Keng Tung, Nan and Luang Prabang, takes its inspiration from the *Great Tunnel Jātaka*.[5] This post-canonical Jātaka[6] expands the canonical references to Dhanañjaya, king of the Kuru, so that his life story parallels every stage of Mahosadha's exemplary career. Dhanañjaya, too, becomes a solver of problems and a general capable of defeating aggressors 'by dhamma' without shedding blood. He also is equipped with a wise and beautiful wife resourceful enough to deal robustly with importunate admirers. Such romantic narrative plays no part in our text. Its invocation of Mahosadha is as the personification of judicial wisdom, rather than the subject of romantic biography. Section 89 sets out the author's agenda:

> The following discussion concerns the different ways of judging cases. Some cases should be judged: (1) ignoring the original conditions (2) in the context within which the events occurred (3) on the evidence of witnesses (4) according to the law of the land (5) according to dhamma (6) according to prior agreement (7) on internal evidence [inference] (8) on external evidence [obvious, visible] (9) on the evidence of external witnesses (10) according to time and place. The different conditions will be illustrated in the following stories.

If I can reconstruct the rest of the text so that it fulfils this agenda, it should reveal the degree to which the author expected Northern Thai dispute settlement to be legalistic. Because the chronicles use 'judging' as a synecdoche for 'ruling', the king's political and legal activities are conflated. Our text advises the king on how to 'judge': does it restrict him to considerations of justice and dhamma?

Section 87 concludes with the words 'The Thammasart ends here' and section 106 concludes the whole manuscript with the words 'The law of the world and the law of dhamma, the Dharmasastra of Mangrai and the traditions of King Mahosot are respectfully ended.' Therefore sections 88–106 must comprise *The traditions of King Mahosot* and my first step must be to cut out all those sections which do not advance the programme outlined by section 89. The preamble (§88), which contains proverbs and some numerical lists, can certainly be dispensed with. The proverbs are obscure to the point of surrealism—'Support eight bald-headed men. Conduct oneself like a folded umbrella. Hit when spread'—but the lists are clear enough. They enumerate the three Vedas, the six things that bring prosperity to the king and the five principles of natural justice or *agati*. The preamble gives us 'a list of lists', which I have identified elsewhere as the typical contents page of Mon and Burmese dhammathats.[7] It would look perfectly at home in front of a collection of rules, but looks odd as the preamble to 13 judgement tales. I suspect that it has been inserted here from some more conventional law text on the free association principle. Section 82, a couple of pages earlier, has told the story of the snake that stung the tiger. The preamble has been moved from elsewhere because it refers to that story: 'Examples [of the five agati] are found in the tale of the snake that stung the tiger, the tiger that was sleeping that day in the forest of the Himalayas' (§88). Much the same has happened with section 106, the Envoi. The final sentence of section 105 refers to the story of Vithun Brahmin's trading expedition to Phalahara nagara. A copyist has added section 106 as a footnote to list the main incidents of the story.[8]

There are four sections (§97–100) in the middle of the text which I would also discard. They explain Pali legal technicalities in the field of family and criminal law. Section 100 glosses four Pali words for different punishments, and adds some interesting remarks on the relationship between kammic and secular sanction.[9] In sections 98 and 99 five Pali terms for different kinds of divorce and four Pali terms for children are translated and explained. Section 97 contains a very long sermon on divorce. It states that innocent love (which is kammically neutral) must be distinguished from lust without trust (which is what prevents the non-enlightened from achieving *nibbāna*). When a wife stops living with her husband, the preacher continues, this is not always tantamount to a divorce. In six situations, which the preacher illustrates with Jātaka stories, a break in cohabitation did not terminate the marriage. I can identify five out of the preacher's six stories. The wife who runs away through lack of love is Pabhāvatī, the wife of ugly King Kusa in Jātaka no. 531. The wife who runs away in fear is Manoharā, the semi-divine wife of Sudhana in the best-known of the South-East Asian post-canonical Jātakas.[10] The wife who has been paid for but left uncollected is the prostitute tested by Indra in the *Kurudhamma Jātaka* (no. 276).[11] The wife who was soft to the touch but otherwise disfigured is Pañcapāpā whose story is told as part of the *Kuṇāla Jātaka* [no. 536]. And the wife who was deserted up a fig tree and is free to marry again is Udumbarā, divorced by the unlucky Piṅguttara and remarried to King Vedeha in the *Great Tunnel Jātaka* itself (no. 546, §347). It may be this reference to Mahosadha's own Jātaka which has has caused sections 97–100 to be inserted here. Or perhaps a bundle of leaves has been misplaced during copying: the four sections would be perfectly at home as part of the previous text. I am confident that the sermon on lust and divorce does not belong to *The traditions of Mahosadha*.

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[4] *Mahā-ummagga Jātaka* (no. 546). Cowell, VI, 1907, 156–246.

[5] A. Huxley, 'The Kurudhamma: from ethics to statecraft', *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*, 2, 1995, 191–203; 200.

[6] Hallisey would prefer to describe such Pali stories as 'allegedly non-canonical' rather than 'apocryphal' or 'counterfeit': C. Hallisey, '*Nibbānasutta*', *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, 18, 1993, 97–130; 97, n. 2. I sympathize with his intention, but to English legal ears his alternative formulation sounds odd. Within the Mahāvihāra tradition a Jātaka is defined widely to mean any story of any prior birth of the Buddha. (See Sāriputta's *Sāratthadīpanī* as quoted in A. Mirando, *Buddhism in Sri Lanka in the 17th and 18th Centuries*, Dehiwalala: Tisara Prakasakayo, 1985, 98). The 547 former births in the canonical verses and the 50 births in the various *Paṇṇāsā Jātaka* recensions barely scratch the surface: on the night of his enlightenment, the Buddha remembered more than 100,000 of his births (M,I,22)!

[7] A. Huxley, 'Buddhism and Law: the view from Mandalay', *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 18, 1995, 47–95; pp. 66–7.

[8] His allusions—to borrowing eyeballs and small white pigs, to killing cranes and filling wells two metres deep with crystal—have not enabled me to identify the source of the story.

[9] A. Huxley, '*Sanction in the Theravada Buddhist kingdoms of S. E. Asia*', *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin*, 58/4, 1991, 335–70; 352.

[10] P. S. Jaini, '*The story of Sudhana and Manoharā: an analysis of the texts and the Borobudur Reliefs*', *BSOAS*, 29/3, 1966, 533–58.

[11] Section 97 gives its own provenance for this story: 'Where can this precedent be found? In the *Atthathamma* in the section *Pariyathappa [Yoithi?]*.' This does not sound like a citation to the Jātaka. The story can be found in the Laotian dhammathat known as the *Code de Vientiane* (A. Raquez, *Pages laotiennes*, Hanoi: Schneider, 1902, 414). This could be a hint that its Middle Mekong readership knew the *Code de Vientiane* under the title *Atthathamma* ('The meaning of dhamma').

The sermon tells stories which are identifiably canonical or quasi-canonical, while the *Mahosadha* stories are folksy and, even when taken from the Jātakas, not credited as such. This drastic surgery leaves me with sections 89–96 and sections 101–5 as the rump of the text. Section 89 promises ten stories illustrating ten modes of judging: the remaining sections tell 13 stories, some of which are explicit about the mode of reasoning they represent, others of which explicitly illustrate modes that section 89 did not mention. It is likely that three of these stories are *de trop*, but we must understand the author's intentions before we can identify the three interpolations. What is he trying to tell us about the nature of legal reasoning?

Analysis of the stories

The start of our analysis is relatively easy: the first two stories illustrate the first two modes of judging listed in section 89. We start (§90) with a child custody dispute. As a newborn baby is being bathed in the Ganges, a huge fish swallows it. The fish is caught down river and sold in the market to a couple who discover and adopt the baby. The child shall belong to both claimants and spend half the year with each. 'This case was decided according to dhamma', says the Nan text, but the story must illustrate the first type of decision where a case is judged 'ignoring the original conditions'.[12] Biological parentage is the relevant original condition here. We are being told that its claims must sometimes cede to the greater interest of justice. As Western lawyers would put it, we must not make a naive equation between fact and value: what is natural may not be the same as what is just. The second story (§91) describes itself as illustrating 'judgement according to the truth'. The great elder Anuratha orders Sumana, a novice, to fetch him some of the health-giving water from the Anomata pool. Sumana politely asks the naga king who guards the pool for permission, but the cobra-king spreads his hood 300 miles wide to cover the pool, bares his fangs and hisses 'Come and get it!'. Calling on the eight gods of the cardinal points to bear witness, Sumana stamps on the naga's hood. In the ensuing confusion he scoops up some water and makes his escape, hotly pursued by the naga shouting 'Stop, thief!' Anuratha hears the accusation of theft, and judges that Sumana is not guilty since he had been expressly invited to 'come and get it'. This could be described as a 'judgement according to truth' in several senses. In one sense Sumana has prevailed by his Act of Truth: by calling on the deities to witness his purity, he forced a miracle. In another sense the Buddha's truth has prevailed: members of his order are exalted above deities and earth-spirits and should have first claim on resources. In a third sense, the judgement turned on a literal interpretation of the naga's words. I.B. Horner suggests that in some contexts *sacca* (truth) can refer to the virtue of keeping one's word.[13] I would be pained if the Great Elder was resorting to this playground level of argument. The surrounding context makes it plain that the naga king was not inviting Sumana to help himself.[14] I would prefer to take this as an illustration of the second mode of judging 'in the context within which the events occur'. The author would then be implying that laudable ends justify dubious means: to get medicine for the Great Elder, it is permissible to use a low trick on a naga. If I am right, both of the first two stories illustrate cases where a strong argument is outweighed by an even stronger one. The biological parents have strong claims, but they do not always prevail over foster-parents. The legal trickery inherent in literal interpretation is abhorrent, but there are situations where it may justifiably be used.

The third and fourth stories make up an obvious pair, since they both deal with women disputing ownership of what floats down the river. In the first of the pair (§92), a newborn baby has been placed in a jar and consigned to the river. Downstream two women see the jar bobbing their way. One says, 'I'll have the jar.' The other says, 'I'll have whatever is inside it'.[15] They quarrel, and appear before the king. He upholds their prior agreement: the first woman gets the jar, the second gets the baby.[16] The moral here is a simple *pacta sunt servanda*: agreements, provided they are properly evidenced, will be upheld. Section 93 tells a variation on this theme concerning not a potential son but a potential husband. Kelitissa wishes to return to lay life after four years as a monk. Since he has no lay clothes available, he jumps into the river and clambers onto a tree trunk. Downstream two women make a similar agreement. Sumana says she will have the tree trunk, her friend says she will have whatever is on it. Seeing that Kelitissa, her prize, is naked, she rushes home to get him some clothes. But she gets back too late: Sumana has scooped up her naked fiancé and married him herself. The judge rules that prior agreement must yield to the *fait accompli*: 'Since you made the agreement they have become husband and wife'. This decision is characterized as one 'according to the laws of the world'. Why should this case be an exception to the general rule that contracts should be honoured? The two stories draw a distinction between the predictable maternal urge and the unpredictable sexual urge. Either woman will be a good-enough-mother to the newborn baby, and therefore their agreement should be honoured. But the success of a marriage cannot be predicted in advance (least of all before the prospective spouses have seen each other!) and therefore the agreement is worthless. 'Love laughs at locksmiths' and at contracts, too. However, I doubt that the second story was inserted in order to make such an elementary point about human motivation. There is a distinctly legal aspect to Kelitissa's and Sumana's romance which is indicated by calling the decision 'worldly' or, as I would prefer to translate it, 'secular'. In Buddhist cultures judges must be aware of the boundaries of their jurisdiction. If a case concerns monks, then it must be dealt with by the local sangha, advised by its nearest expert in monastic discipline. Only when a monk has irrevocably left the monkhood does he come within the lay judge's remit. There are plenty of tales of monks who left their monastery with the intention of returning to lay life but were dissuaded by supernatural intervention.[17]

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[12] The story is also found in a Burmese rajathat: *ROB*, 28-1-1795, section 60, giving Kosambi and Benares as the cities rather than the Nan text's Kosamiyia and Anurath. The Burmese tale is told to illustrate the moral 'Decisions depend on motives and circumstances'. Than Tun has traced the canonical sources for most of the rajathat, but failed here. See further Than Tun 1983 'The Royal Order (Wednesday 28 January 1795) of King Badon', *JAAS*, 26, 1983, 153–201. The Nan text describes the source of the story as 'the *Tikanibat*'. Steven Collins suggests (personal communication) that this means the third Nipata of the Canonical Jātaka.

[13] I. B. Horner, *Ten jataka stories each illustrating one of the ten pāramitā with Pali text* (London: Luzac, 1956, xix). This playground rhetoric is a standard folklore motif: Stith Thompson *A motif index of folk literature* (6 vols. Copenhagen: Rosenkilde & Bagger, 1955–58), 4: J1161, 'Literal pleading: the letter of the law has been met'.

[14] When we use expletives such as 'Slap me!' the context makes it plain that we do not wish to be interpreted literally.

[15] This rather odd conversation follows a model in the *Kuṇāla Jātaka* (Cowell, 1907), v, 239.

[16] A slightly different version of this tale, in which the woman who wins the baby must pay the price of an extra jar to her companion, appears in a collection of 12 Laotian judgement tales attributed to Grandfather King, the Ven. Chenla Bodhisatta: J. Brengues, 'Contes judiciaires laotiens', *La Revue Indochine*, 2, 1904, 124–8.

[17] e.g. B. C. Law, *The history of the Buddha's religion (Sāsanavaṃsa)*, (London: Luzac, 1952), 118–20. The monk who was later to win the title 'Tilokalankara' decided in the early seventeenth century to leave the order when aged about 25. An encounter with a mysterious, possibly supernatural, young woman changed his mind.

Intention to give up monastic orders must be accompanied by appropriate acts—either by a formal ritual in the sangha, or by committing a *pārājika* offence which automatically causes a defrocking. Assuming that Sumana and the naked Kelitissa consummated their union before the other woman's return,[18] Kelitissa has broken his vow of chastity, committed a *pārājika* offence and is no longer subject to monastic jurisdiction. He has crossed the Rubicon, defined technically as penetration (even to the extent of a sesame seed) of the female organ, the moist region where even the wind does not reach,[19] and is henceforth subject to lay law. The author has supplied the judge with a useful conflict of laws rule about the boundary between vinaya and lay law.

The next two stories are both taken from the *Great Tunnel Jātaka* itself. The tale of the stolen cow (§94) is the second and the tale of the rival mothers (§95) the fifth of the 19 cases which Mahosadha solves to establish his credentials as a wise counsellor.[20] The tale of the stolen cow is told to illustrate decisions 'according to internal evidence'. The rival claimants to ownership are asked what the cow last fed on. After they have given discrepant answers, Mahosadha administers an emetic and the cow vomits up its conclusive evidence. To call this way of judging 'internal' is to emphasize that the judge has set up a situation where, rather than imposing his judgement on the facts, he extracts the true state of affairs from the facts themselves. In the early history of dispute settlement such techniques—trials by ordeal, by truth drug, by oracle, by determinative oath—played a large role. Until state organizations capable of backing up verdicts by force developed, the judge had to tread carefully, for fear that either or both parties would reject his solution. Techniques that cast him as an impartial stage manager of a decision that has been reached by others are extremely useful. In this story the judge's bovine emetic is, in a sense, a truth drug. Though it acts on the subject of the dispute rather than the disputants, it makes the hidden truth, the internal truth, manifest to all. Who among the audience could dispute such a theatrical coup? The concern here is with rhetoric, not logic. This story does not demonstrate the process of inference from circumstantial evidence, but the desirability of turning a court case into a satisfying drama that concludes with general endorsement of the judge's wisdom.

The other story from Jātaka no. 546, wherein rival claims to motherhood are settled by a tug-of-war utilizing the disputed child, does not appear at home here. Some copyist must have felt that the Judgement of Solomon motif was too good a story to leave out. Having incorporated one story from Jataka no. 546, he could not bear to omit the most popular one. And in its new position in section 95, he gave it a fake moral—'This decision is according to justice'—so that it could blend in with its surroundings. Originally, I think, the 'stolen cow' story was paired with the 'poisoned mango' tale (§104) as a contrast between judgements based on internal and external evidence. The gardener found a windfall fruit beneath the golden mango tree. It was a perfect enough specimen to be sent to the King's table. But when the king's taster tried a bit he fell down dead, and the gardener was accused of attempted poisoning. A clever minister asked for a stay of execution so that the case could be reconsidered and the events reconstructed. With the whole court watching quietly, a mango-shaped stone was put under the tree just where the fatal mango had been found. Immediately a cobra emerged from hiding and bit the stone, thus revealing itself as culprit. The cobra was killed and the gardener freed. The cobra's activities were overt and in one sense external, as opposed to the hidden 'internal' contents of the cow's stomach. But that is not the contrast intended by the author. I think we are meant to contrast the reconstruction of a crime (which can reveal things that did not emerge in cross-examination) with the process by which, after careful cross-examination, the truth is cajoled into revealing itself.

The story of the three students rocking the boat (§96) is said to illustrate 'judgement according to dhamma'. The three students are being ferried upstream on a passenger boat. The first student says 'This tree would be good for making a guitar.' Whereupon the second student starts imitating the sound of a guitar: 'nyaaaah diddly diddly dang'. Which causes the third student to start dancing. Who is responsible for the boat upsetting? The wise judge assesses the matter thus: the first student must pay 20%, the second student 30% and the third student 50%.[21] Anglo-American judges, who spend much of their time making similar allocations of responsibility in the context of multi-car collisions or multi-contractor building projects, would be surprised to learn that they are deciding 'according to dhamma'. What is dhammic about topics such as contributory negligence and joint tortfeasors? The Buddha would reply that everything about those topics is dhammic: 'If you know my concept of causation, you know dhamma, and vice versa.' (M,I,191) A good example of the operation of codependent origination in the legal sphere was given earlier in the Nan text. As between a failed suicide who jumped off a cliff and the mat-maker who broke his fall, the judge must allocate responsibility for the mat-maker's death:

> The king ordered that the amount of the compensation be divided in three and [the suicide] pay one third. The kamma of the mat-maker was great. [§86]

In deciding such matters, judges can draw on a millennium of applied Buddhist ethics. The vinaya-dhara, the monks who specialize in monastic discipline, have built up a rich literature on these topics. For example:

> A monk wishes to kill a particular person by digging a booby-trap in the path which he frequents. After digging the first spadeful, he is guilty of a third degree offence. If anyone is injured by falling into the trap, the monk is guilty of a second degree offence. And if the victim dies, the monk has committed a full *pārājika* offence.[22]

or:

> A senior monk has three pupils, called Tom, Dick and Harry. He decides to steal something, and orders Tom to tell Dick to tell Harry to steal it. When the senior monk speaks to Tom, he commits a third degree offence, which becomes a second degree offence when Dick speaks to Harry. When Harry steals the thing, the senior monk and all three of his pupils become guilty of a full *pārājika* offence.[23]

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[18] A different version of the story says that they had: 'This is a just decision because the man and woman have already slept together ...'; A. Leclère, *Contes laotiens et contes cambodgiens* (Paris: Leroux, 1903), 104–5.

[19] V, III, 28; *Smp.*, 195 = VII.31.

[20] Cowell, 1907, vi:160–1 and vi:163.

[21] Leclère (*Contes laotiens et contes cambodgiens*, 9–12) compares four other versions of this tale, two each from Laos and Cambodia. He comments on the fact that these different versions divide up responsibility in different ratios: 1/6:2/6:3/6 or 1/5:1/5:3/5 or 4/9:3/9:2/9: 'Les variantes sur ce point sont plus importantes parce qu'elles apprécient différement les responsabilités et constituent trois motions d'appréciation.' Now that we can add the Nan text's ratio of 2/10:3/10:5/10 as a fourth mode of division it becomes clear that the precise numerical quantification is not the point. What makes all these decisions just is that some attempt has been made to split responsibility.

[22] *Smp.*, 324–5 = XI.47. Buddhaghosa mentions that this point was discussed by three of the commentaries on which he based his work.

[23] *Smp.*, 271 = X.2.

A judge faced with allocating degrees of responsibility can draw on this Vinaya literature for inspiration, and is therefore 'deciding according to dhamma'.

After the interpolations of sections 97–100, the next story concerns a sealed bag full of diamonds (§101). One businessman has deposited the bag with his friend for safe-keeping. But when he returns and opens the bag, its seal still intact, the diamonds have been exchanged for less valuable stones.[24] The wise king handles the case more as a private investigator than as a judge. From the circumstances of the crime he infers the existence of a master craftsman capable of invisibly mending a hole in the bag. Then he plots a ruse to discover where the craftsman lives.[25] The story is about the cleverness of an investigator rather than the wisdom of a judge, but the Nan text adds a particular pro-mediation spin to the tale. Having forced the culprit to admit his guilt in private, our hero puts the world to rights without punishing anybody. 'When you have the stones back, love your friend as before. Do not let there be anger between you.' This story does not specifically claim to exemplify a type of judgement, but it appears to illustrate a preference for mediated over zero-sum settlements. As mediation is not listed in section 89 as one of the ten topics, I suspect that this tale is an addition to the original work.

In the next two sections we are introduced to reasoning about quantum. How much compensation or blood-money will the plaintiff insist on getting? How little will the defendant offer? The South-East Asian judge had an economic role. He had to act as an honest broker between the disputants when persuading them to agree on a financial bargain. He had to lessen the gap between the sum proferred and the sum demanded by appealing to local written tariffs hallowed by tradition. Such tariffs are found in all the codes and dhammathats of Buddhist South-East Asia. But often the parties will dispute the sum mentioned in the tariff by claiming that considerations particular to the instant case should drive the price up or down. Such arguments, in modern legal parlance, concern the quantum of damages. The two partners who stole each other's gold (§102) were at first ordered to pay the same sum in damages. The local deity was so disturbed by the injustice that it set fire to the forest with hot coals and turned the judge's rice into sand. A wise hermit who happened to be in the vicinity ordered the stolen gold to be assayed by a goldsmith. The expert reported that one of the partners had high quality, and the other very low quality gold. When the judges differentiated the fines to reflect this valuation the local deity signalled approval by showering the hermit with flowers. But what if the expert valuers disagree? This seems to be the point raised by the somewhat garbled story of the buried jar (§105). A thief stole a buried jar full of coins. Since the thief's identity is known and admitted, the only question is how many coins were in the jar. One person estimates 3,000, another 10,000 and the judge settles on 8,000. This, explains the text, is 'judgement according to the evidence of the average'. Between these two stories comes a passage of direct exposition (§103) which enables us to identify the ultimate source of the discussion. Our text reads:

> Section 103, *Factors in arriving at a judgement.* The next is judgement according to the time. Consider whether it is a decision in the morning or evening, day or night; whether the goods stolen are cheap or expensive, let the fine be according to the value. Such as when the monk stole *phraphloengphlaw* [reference unknown] from Chomphu and took it to Lanka.

Clearly the author was working from a list of factors relevant to the quantum of damage. And anyone acquainted with the Pali Vinaya will recognize what that list was.

A peculiar facet of the Buddha's law against theft is that quantum is built into the definition of liability. If you steal something valued at less than five *māsaka*, you have not committed the full *pārājika* offence. Vinaya scholarship has therefore paid great attention to the quantum question—not in order to ascertain damages payable by the culprit but to ascertain whether the culprit remains a monk. By Buddhaghosa's time, five crucial factors had been isolated and enshrined in verse form. As the ancient *gāthā* says:

> The Elders ask what kind of thing it is.
> What time? What place? And was it still brand new?
> *De minimis non curat lex*—five cents.
> And thus they judged the pains that must accrue.[26]

The ten paragraphs which follow this verse in *Samantapāsādikā* examine these factors in detail. Nothing more is said about the five *māsaka* rule, since it is subsumed by the other four: the reason we must examine thing, time, place and use is to see whether what was stolen was worth less than five *māsaka*. This is one of the points where Buddhist and Hindu influence on South-East Asian law can be distinguished. The *Manusmrti* mentions a twofold analysis of place and time[27] which is reproduced in an Angkorian inscription of 889 A.D.[28] *Samantapāsādikā*'s fourfold analysis has influenced most of the South-East Asian kingdoms including, for instance, Burma[29] and Chiang Mai.[30] In relation to 'thing' and 'place' Buddhaghosa illustrates his meaning by quoting Vinaya precedents—decisions of an actual vinaya-dhara in a real-life case. For example, the 'place' factor is exemplified by a decision made at the Mahāvihāra in Ceylon during the reign of King Bhātika Tissa (A.D. 143–67). A monk was accused of theft for helping himself to a coconut-shell goblet which a fellow monk had carved and left in an abandoned monastery on an island in the midst of the ocean.[31] Godha, an expert in the Abhidhamma, 'solved' the dispute by cross-examining the manufacturer to establish that the local value in mid-ocean of materials and labour was less than five *māsaka*. Whereupon the assembled monks acclaimed his wisdom so loudly that the king enquired about the noise, heard the whole story and commended Godha. That the king has been dragged into this account is the necessary price to be paid for the sangha's anarchic structure. When the Supreme Court or Cour de Cassation give judgement, we do not need to add that the king commended their wisdom, or that the deity strewed them with rose-petals. But the sangha has no such judicial hierarchy, and so a vinaya precedent must be accompanied by a signifier letting us know whether it is especially good or especially bad. Hence the appearance of King Bhātika in the 'place' precedent and hence the 'thing' precedent ends: 'The defaulting bhikkhu, when he listened to the words of the vinaya-master, rejoiced in body and mind, like one who has obtained the taste of nectar.' Such signifiers bring vinaya precedents nearer to judgement tales. The South-East Asian appetite for such tales can feed off the vinaya and its commentaries as well as off the Jātaka and its imitations. Buddhaghosa's discussion of the five factors affecting quantum in theft cases is the model for the author of the *Traditions of King Mahosot*. Originally Section 102–5 would have discussed thing, place, time and use by updating the *Samantapāsādikā* analysis to include considerations like:

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[24] The same story may be found in Leclère, *Contes laotiens et contes cambodgiens*, 47–51: 'Le diamant volé'.

[25] cf. A. Conan Doyle 'The adventure of Black Peter', in *The complete Sherlock Holmes* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), 558–72.

[26] My versification of: *Smp.*, 234 = VIII.64.

[27] *Manu*, VIII, 126.

[28] Y. Ishizawa, 'Remarks on the epigraphy of Angkorian Cambodia' in (ed.) M. Hooker *The classical laws of S. E. Asia* (Singapore: Butterworths, 1986), 1: 205–40; 221–2.

[29] Bhummajeya, 'Manugye Dhammathat', 1755, (tr.) D. Richardson, *The Damathat, or the Laws of Menoo* (Moulmein: American Baptist Mission Press, 1847), 13–15.

[30] Sections 19 and 73 of the Nan manuscript translated in Aroonrut *The Laws of King Mangrai*. The first is from the part of the text called 'Worldly law and the Law of Dhamma', which is a title shared with many texts from Chiang Mai. (See further n. 33.) The second is from three legal lists which bring the 'Laws of King Mangrai' section to a close. Mangrai is the founder and culture hero of Chiang Mai.

[31] Could the story of the monk who stole *phraphloengphlaw* from Chompu and took it to Lanka refer to this Vinaya precedent? *Phraphloengphlaw* cannot, I understand, be easily translated. Might it be a copyist's error for a phrase meaning 'coconut shell goblet'?

> If the country is in turmoil, such as during a war, everything is up for grabs. Afterwards, an owner who manages to trace his property shall get only half their value as compensation.[32]

The Northern Thai author has widened out Buddhaghosa's treatment. What started as an analysis of theft cases has been widened into a general discussion of quantum.

Conclusions

Let us now revisit the list of modes of judgement in Section 89. How much of what that section promised has been delivered by the text? Eight of the stories pair off together. The first two forms of judgement

(1) ignoring the original conditions = section 90
(2) in the context within which the events occurred = section 91

involve the trumping of a strong argument by an even stronger one. The third ground is problematic, and I leave it to one side for the moment. The next pair is

(4) according to secular law = section 93
(5) according to dhamma = section 96

We now know that the authors of the Lanna legal literature were particularly fond of this contrast between secular law and dhamma: many of the newly discovered texts bear the name *Khadilok khadidham*.[33] Temporarily leaving aside the sixth ground, the next pair is

(7) on internal evidence = section 94
(8) on external evidence = section 104

which terms refer to strategies of judicial investigation. 'Internal evidence' means something akin to Popper's definition of scientific reasoning: we cross-examine the parties to establish a proposition which can be falsified experimentally. 'External evidence' means the strategy of reconstructing the crime. The final pair refer to quantum:

(9) on the evidence of external witnesses = section 102
(10) according to time and place = section 103

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[32] My paraphrase of a passage in section 103.

[33] Aroonrut Wichienkeeo, 'Lanna customary law', in A. Huxley (ed.), *Thai law: Buddhist law: essays on the history of Thailand, Laos and Burma* (Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996), 31–42; see 32, 41.

I would prefer to translate (9) as 'on the evidence of expert witnesses'. The point is that neither the parties nor the judge have the unbiased expertise to put a proper value on the goods. (10) may originally have included references to the other vinaya headings 'use' and 'thing'. This leaves us with (3) and (6). How did they fit into the original scheme? There is no difficulty in linking (6) to a story:

(6) according to prior agreement = section 92

But in regard to (3) I must admit defeat:

(3) on the evidence of witnesses = ?

The phrase could be interpreted in two ways. It could refer to the point preached by the biblical story of Susannah and the Elders. The judge, in other words, must proceed 'like Daniel come to judgement': he must question witnesses in isolation from each other and spot discrepancies.[34] Alternatively, he is being advised to settle the case by determinative oath. The disputant who has most witnesses prepared to swear a terrifying oath will be the winner. Unfortunately, neither of these options is to be found among our text's remaining unallocated stories. I assume that the copyists have not just interpolated extra stories: they have also excised at least one of the original stories.

Why, where and when was it written?

In what circumstances might our text have been composed? Burmese developments tended towards a professional judiciary in which judges were often ex-lawyers. Siam developed a bureaucratic judiciary in which the typical judge was a government minister. In the smaller, relatively isolated, kingdoms of the Middle Mekong, attitudes to law remained patrimonial; the typical judge would be the Thai-speaking king or one of his close relatives. The intended audience for *The traditions of Mahosadha* must be the royal family. Its author was most probably a monk, since monks appear to have monopolized Northern Thai literary production. The text is short enough to be read aloud at one sitting; those in the audience who were not edified by its contents would at least be amused by its judgement tales. I imagine, therefore, that it was composed in the following circumstances: one of the two or three monks closest to the palace was asked to provide a 'talk on dhamma' for a specific public occasion—perhaps a coronation or royal wedding, perhaps the inauguration of the monk as sangharāja, perhaps the rebuilding of a pagoda. One copy of his sermon would have been presented to the king, to be placed in the palace store-room and forgotten, while the author's own copy would find its way into a monastic book chest, to be copied and incorporated into other manuscripts by future students. There is no indication of whereabouts in the Middle Mekong this scenario took place. Judging by the tales our author chose and the frequency with which they appear in other collections, I would, if pressed, guess a provenance somewhere to the east (Nan, Luang Prabang or Vientiane) rather than the west (Chiang Mai, Chiang Sen or Keng Tung). Nor is there any internal evidence of the date of composition: any date between the fifteenth and the nineteenth century is plausible.

One other work on legal reasoning has survived from Buddhist South-East

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[34] Many such stories are known in the South-East Asian legal literature. For instance a tale of four (or five) brahmins whose fabrications are exposed when cross-examined out of each others' hearing appears in the earliest datable Burmese dhammathat (*Dhammavilasa* c. A.D. 1200), in Kaingza's *Maharajathat* (c. 1637) and Bhummajeya's *Manugye* (c. 1752).

195/14

Asia. This text comes from seventeenth-century Burma, but is unfortunately too corrupt to allow more than a vague impression of its aims and strategies. It is part of the *Maharajathat*, written by Kaingza, Minister for Law Reform to King Thalun (1629–48). King Thalun has asked about an old tradition of 'eight investigators' or possibly 'eight modes of investigation'. Kaingza answers with two lists (credited to 'writers of olden times') of eight situations where direct testimony is inconclusive. One traveller, for example, murders his companion and hides the stolen property far away. Or a nobleman denies that he borrowed money and denies his own noble status. Or a child is kidnapped when very young and then sold into slavery. It is not clear whether these are judgement tales, or reports of real-life cases or generalizations of particular types of 'trouble cases'. These stories were so familiar to the textual transmitters that they could refer to them by shorthand abbreviation, as we might refer to 'The Merchant of Venice story', meaning Portia, Shylock and the pound of flesh. Compared with *The Traditions of Mahosadha*, Kaingza's analysis of judging seems technical: it is designed for the further instruction of semi-professional judges and forms part of Kaingza's overall programme for modernizing Burmese legal procedure.[35] The Burmese work concerns the search for technical procedures that will produce the truth, while the Northern Thai work is more concerned with the ethical pursuit of a solution acceptable to the disputants. This difference relates to the more developed nature of the Burmese state. In Burma the judiciary has a confident centralised apparatus ready to enforce its verdicts: a true fact in Burma is what can be discovered by adopting best judicial practice. In the Middle Mekong, the judge may have more of a struggle to get his version of the truth accepted by the litigants: procedures for determining truth have to be mixed with rhetorical procedures for persuading others of your truth. *The Traditions of Mahosadha* has two functions, analytic and rhetorical. It delineates a canon of acceptable forms of legal reasoning within which the judge may safely operate. And it provides him with a judgement tale that he can usefully expound to the litigants in order to win their support.

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[35] R. Okudaira, 'The role of Kaingza Manuraja', *JAAS*, 27, 1984, 180–86.

Notes and communications

More magic spells and formulae[1]

Plates I–IV

A new text edition usually stimulates further publications and evaluations of similar texts. This situation particularly applies to J. Naveh and S. Shaked, *Magic spells and formulae* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1993), since much new material has come to light in recent years. The present article consists of additional texts which have special relevance to the above mentioned volume (see my review of Naveh-Shaked in this issue). Two magic bowls which appeared at Sotheby's (London) in 1985 were copied by me and sent to Naveh and Shaked for study and publication. One bowl in Jewish Aramaic script (Text A) was also copied by the present writer, but the bowl was not easily legible, and Naveh and Shaked chose not to include it within the corpus of bowls, because neither the photographs nor the hand copy were sufficiently reliable. Since the present owner and location of the bowl is unknown, I have included my hand copy of the bowl here, with an attempt to read as much as is reasonably legible, in the hope that eventually the bowl will reappear and corrections to these readings can be made, through collation of the original. A second bowl, in Syriac script, was edited by Naveh and Shaked (Bowl 17), but since they chose not to publish the hand copy of the bowl, it is given below (as Text B).

Finally, a unique amulet on lead written in Aramaic with ink is copied and edited as Text C. It differs from the Mandaic lead amulets, which are etched into the lead, as are other Aramaic amulets on silver or other metals. Since the text is similar to the magic bowls, it is included here as belonging to this genre of texts. It is not clear why an incantation would have been written on lead rather than on a clay bowl, since no explanations of the associated rituals or uses of these objects have been preserved except for various references to amulets and praxes in the Babylonian Talmud, which may or may not be relevant to these objects.

Text A: *Jewish-Aramaic Bowl (Sotheby's)*

The following Jewish-Aramaic bowl (see pls. I, II) was copied by me while it was in Sotheby's (London). The copy of the bowl is offered here since there is enough which is legible and understandable to be usable for comparative purposes, and the text itself is interesting in that it mentions both demons Ashmodai and Abraxas. Furthermore, the bowl contains divorce formulae which are known from other bowls.

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[1] I would like to thank Professors Shaul Shaked and Joseph Naveh and Christa Müller-Kessler for suggestions and significant corrections of the readings of the amulet and magic bowls published here, and to my student, Mr Dan Levene, with whom I read these texts.

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196/14

THE GODDESS MAHĀCĪNAKRAMA-TĀRĀ (UGRA-TĀRĀ) IN BUDDHIST AND HINDU TANTRISM[1]

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It is well known that some goddesses are worshipped in both the Buddhist and Hindu Tantric traditions. A form of the Buddhist Vajrayoginī, accompanied by Vajravarṇanī and Vajravairocanī, is the prototype of the Hindu Chinnamastā accompanied by Ḍākinī and Varṇinī. Forms of Ekajaṭā and Mañjughoṣa were adopted from the Buddhist pantheon into the Hindu and worshipped by the same name. Usually it is not easy to trace how and when these adaptations took place. In the case of Mahācīnakrama-Tārā, a special form of Tārā, it has long been suspected that the goddess was imported from the Buddhist Tantric pantheon into the Hindu pantheon.[2] In this paper I demonstrate, on the basis of clear textual evidence, how the goddess's description in a Buddhist *sādhana* was incorporated into the Hindu *Phetkāriṇītantra* which was then quoted as an authoritative source regarding the goddess by later Hindu Tantras. I further examine representations of the goddess in art, and provide a new edition and translation of two *sādhanas* of Mahācīnakrama-Tārā.

The Tārā in the tradition of Mahācīna[3] belongs to the varieties of dark Tārās. She is described in two Buddhist *sādhanas*, which form part of the three major *sādhana* collections in Sanskrit and Tibetan:

1. the unedited **Sādhanaśataka*, which contains only the second *sādhana*, 65 (= PTT 4194), translated into Tibetan by Don yod rdo rje and Rin chen grags of Ba ri in the eleventh century;
2. the unedited **Sādhanaśatapañcāśikā* 54 (= PTT 4020) and 55 (= PTT 4021–22), translated into Tibetan by Tshul khrims rgyal mtshan of the Pa tshab clan in collaboration with Abhayākaragupta, who lived from the second half of the eleventh century to the first quarter of the twelfth century; and
3. the *Sādhanamālā*/*Sādhanasamuccaya* 100 (= PTT 4315) and 101 (= PTT 4316), translated into Tibetan by Grags pa rgyal mtshan in 1286.

The first *sādhana* is rather short and, except for one verse (probably a quote), written in prose. We do not know the author. The second one, composed in *anuṣṭubh* metre, is attributed to Śāśvatavajra, who is identified with Prajñārakṣita, a disciple of Nāropa, in the Tibetan tradition. It must have been composed some time in the eleventh century.

The goddess Mahācīnakrama-Tārā, also called Ugra-Tārā, the fierce Tārā, is described as standing on a corpse in the *pratyālīḍha* stance, with the left leg stretched out and the right retracted.[4] She holds in her right hands the sword and the cutter (*kartri*) and in her left hands the blue lotus and skull (cup). She is of dark (*kṛṣṇa*/*nīla*) complexion and short, with a protruding belly; her face has terrible fangs, three eyes and a lolling tongue. The goddess has a single tawny-coloured knot of hair with Akṣobhya, one of the five Tathāgatas, on her hand. She wears a tiger hide as her garment, is adorned with the eight snakes, has a garland of severed heads around her neck and wears the five (bone) ornaments ('seals'), called the *pañcamudrā*.[5] She utters extremely loud, frightening laughter.

The Hindu Tantric compendium *Mantramahodadhi* (4.39–40), composed by Mahīdhara at Varanasi in 1589, gives a similar description of Ugra-Tārā. She is visualized on a white lotus in the water covering the universe at the time of the Great Dissolution (*mahāpralaya*).

viśvavyāpakavārimadhyavilasacchvetāmbujanmasthitāṃ
kartrīkhaḍgakapālanīlanalinai rājatkarāṃ nīlabhāṃ /
kāñcīkuṇḍalahārakaṅkaṇalasatkeyūramañjīratām
āptair nāgavarair vibhūṣitatanūm āraktanetratrayām // 4.39

piṅgograikajaṭāṃ lasatsurasanāṃ daṃṣṭrākarālānanāṃ
carma dvaipi varaṃ kaṭau vidadhatīṃ śvetāsthipaṭṭhālikām /
akṣobhyena virājamānaśirasaṃ smerānanāmbhoruhāṃ
tārāṃ śāvahṛdāsanāṃ dṛḍhakucām ambāṃ trilokyāḥ smaret // 4.40

'One should recall Tārā, who stays on a white lotus which manifests itself in the middle of the water covering the universe, whose hands are shining with the cutter, sword, skull (and) blue lotus, whose colour is dark, whose body is adorned by friendly excellent snakes that have become (her) girdle, ear-rings, necklace, bracelets, shining armlets and anklets, who has three reddish eyes, who has a single tawny-coloured fierce knot of hair, whose beautiful tongue flashes, whose face is terrible because of fangs, who wears at (her) hips an excellent tiger-skin, whose forehead has a diadem of white bone, whose head is shining with Akṣobhya, whose lotus face is smiling, who has the heart (= chest) of a corpse as seat, whose breasts are firm (and) who is the mother of the three worlds.'

Ugra-Tārā described here also has Akṣobhya on her head, but wears a diadem of white bone (*śvetāsthipaṭṭa*) as opposed to the five (bone) ornaments. Akṣobhya is specified as the seer (*ṛṣi*) of her *mantra*. The surrounding deities, such as Vairocana and Amitābha, worshipped in her *yantra* and the *mantras* used in her worship, such as *yathāgatā* (for: *tathāgatā*)*bhiṣekasāmagrī me huṃ phaṭ*[6] or *akṣobhya vajrapuṣpaṃ pratīccha svāhā*,[7] leave no doubt that the goddess is an adaptation from the Buddhist Tantric pantheon.

About a century later, *c.* 1670,[8] the Tantric encyclopedia *Tantrasāra* by Kṛṣṇānanda Āgamavāgīśa (p. 269. 1–8), very popular in eastern India, gave a similar description, quoted from the '*Phetkārīya*'.

While searching the passage from the '*Phetkārīya*' quoted in the *Tantrasāra* in the edition of the *Phetkāriṇītantra* (*PhT*), I discovered that *Śāśvatavajra's*

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[1] A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 204th Meeting of the American Oriental Society, Madison, Wisconsin, on 21 March 1994.

[2] e.g., Bhattacharyya (1932: 184–57). But van Kooij (1974: 170) argued that 'It is not necessary to think that Ekajaṭā came first to be adopted in Buddhism and from there in Hinduism.'

[3] Cīna and Mahācīna are usually regarded as identical. Tucci (1971: 549–50) identified Cīna with Kanawar in the upper Sutlej valley. Bharati (1965: 61, 79) held it to be included in the entire region to the north of the Himālayas, Tibet and at least parts of Mongolia and western China. Bagchi (1939: 46–7) thought it to refer to Mongolia, while Lévi (1905–1908, I, 347 and cf. also Shastri, 1922: 11 and Weller, 1927: 446) held that it refers to China. Sircar (1971: 103–[illegible] interpreting *Śaktisaṃgamatantra* 3.7.48–9, identified Cīna with Tibet and Mahācīna with China.

[4] cf. the descriptions in the Tibetan translations of the *sādhanas*, *PTT* 4020–21, 4194, 4315–16. In the *ālīḍha* stance the right leg is stretched out and the left retracted.

[5] These are the diadem (*cakrī*), ear-rings (*kuṇḍala*), necklace (*kaṇṭhī*), bracelets (*rucaka*) and belt (*mekhalā*) (cf. *SM*, p. 447.10–13; 461.4).

[6] This *mantra* is given in Mahīdhara's autocommentary on *Mantramahodadhi* 4.66.

[7] For this *mantra*, cf. Mahīdhara's autocommentary on *Mantramahodadhi* 4.93.

[8] For this date, cf. Sircar (1972/1973: 187).



Fig. 5: Ugra-Tārā (Hindu). Lithograph first published in the edition of the *Mantramahodadhi* by R. Prasāda (Lucknow: Smarahimsakadatta Press, 1872), appendix, f. 4a. The upper right hand holds a trident with a banner attached to it and a pair of scissors. The goddess is shown in a sitting position on a corpse, which in turn rests on a lotus on a boat.

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**Sādhanaśataka*: see Bühnemann (1994).

**Sādhanaśatapañcāśikā*: see Bühnemann (1994).

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198/14

'The wise (man), having meditated on the rosary of bones[104] in the place of the sword, should repeat the best *mantra* with the emitting and withdrawal *yoga*.'[105]

Thus (ends) the *sādhana* of the noble Tārā according to the tradition of Mahācīna.

The sādhana *of Tārā in the tradition of Mahācīna* (2)

(1) Ugra-Tārā destroys the stupidity of the three worlds, having placed (it) in the skull, she who has placed (her) foot in the *pratyālīḍha* stance on the heart of a corpse,[106] who possesses frightening, loud laughter, she, the highest one, who has the sword, blue lotus, cutter and skull placed in her hands, who has arisen from the seed syllable *hūṃ*, is short, dark, fat and has a mass of tawny-coloured matted hair (and) is adorned with terrible snakes.

(2) Having bowed to Tārā in the tradition of Mahācīna, who saves from the triple states (of existence), I shall describe her *sādhana* according to the preceptor's instruction.

(3) In an *ekaliṅga*[107] place or a burning ground or in an empty building the *yogin*, at all times, staying in that (place) should perfect the *vidyā* (= mantra), which liberates from the triple states (of existence).

(4) Sitting on a soft cushion or having resorted to other soft[108] seats, he would accomplish the highest success.

(5) The very attentive (*yogin*), having visualized quickly three diamond sceptres in the three places[109] with the *yoga* of form (*ākārayoga*), should then emit a light ray.

(6) Having pervaded the beings moving in the triple states (of existence), he should bring (the light ray) back and in the withdrawal (*saṃhāra*) he should again visualize everything as completely empty.

Then:

(7) He should recite the Jina's (= Buddha's) *mantra*, consisting of (the words) *oṃ śūnyatā*, etc.[110] Then he should visualize a red lotus (transformed) from the syllable *āḥ* in the intermediate region.

(8) Again, on top of it he should visualize a 'lotus vessel' (= skull) (transformed) from the syllable *tāṃ*; in its centre he should again visualize the dark syllable *hūṃ*.

(9) Then he should visualize a cutter adorned with the seed syllable ⟨*hūṃ*⟩ arisen from the syllable *hūṃ*; he should visualize himself as transformed from the cutter (and) identical with the Saviouress.

(10–14) He should visualize her in the *pratyālīḍha* stance, frightening, having a garland of (severed) heads hanging down (from the neck), dwarfish, big-bellied, terrible (and) adorned with a blue lotus. She has three eyes, one head, is divine, terrible with frightening, loud laughter, is extremely excited, has mounted a dead body, is adorned with the eight snakes,[111] has red round eyes and a tiger-skin spread over (her) hips. She is endowed with fresh youth, adorned with the five (bone) ornaments, has a lolling tongue, is very terrible, is conspicuously dreadful with (her) fangs, has a sword and cutter in the hands on the right (and) holds the blue lotus and skull in the left (hands). She has a tawny-coloured, fierce, single topknot (and) is adorned on the head with Akṣobhya. At the completion (*niṣpatti*) of the power of the meditation the *yogin* would become a great poet.[112]

(15) Even if he were a senseless fool, he who is entirely devoted to the essence of meditation, obtains an agreeable speech through the repetition of a hundred thousand *mantras*.[113]

(16) That three-syllabled great *mantra*, ending in *phaṭ*, which stays in the heart (of the goddess?), possessed of 'the five light rays' (*pañcaraśmi* = *oṃ*)[114] burns the fuel of nescience.

(17) I shall explain the procedure of extraction of the (*mantra* from the alphabet) in accordance with the practice of spiritual discipline:[115] first, having pronounced that (syllable) which follows *sa* (i.e., *ha*), adorned with the fourth vowel (= *ī*),

(18) mounted on '*r*', shining, blazing, possessed of the 'moon dot' (= *anunāsikā*), he should then pronounce the syllable *traṃ* adorned with the same fourth (vowel = *ī*).

(19) Again he should employ the syllable *haṃ* joined with the long letter *ū*, and then he should pronounce the syllable *phaṭ*: The *siddhamantra* is complete (= ⟨*oṃ*⟩ *hrīṃ trīṃ hūṃ phaṭ*).

(20) 'The wise (man), having meditated on the rosary of bones in the place of the sword[116] while emitting (rays), should repeat the best *mantra* with the emitting and withdrawal *yoga*.'[117]

(21) He should imagine with a firm mind that he is a learned great poet. By practice of perpetual meditation he becomes (a poet) doubtlessly.

(22) Whatever merit I have accumulated, having composed Tārā's *sādhana*, may thereby beings become learned in the Jina's (= Buddha's) teaching.

(23) This is Śāśvatavajra's composition, which effects intelligence. May kindhearted, profound scholars forgive (defects, if any) in this.

The *sādhana* of Tārā in the tradition of Mahācīna is complete.

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[104] According to *SM*, p. 261.7 the sword held by the goddess is transformed into a rosary (*akṣamālā*) during the visualization process. *SM*, p. 267.9 and 268.23 specify that the *akṣamālā* is made of bone (*niraṃśukasahitā akṣamālā; niraṃśukākṣamālā*. For the meaning *niraṃśu(ka)* bone, cf. *Hevajratantra* II.3.56; *asthyābharaṇaṃ niraṃśukam*.

[105] In this practice, light rays are emitted and withdrawn while reciting the *mantra*. (This is apparently a quotation. For the first line, cf. also *SM* 127 (p. 266.15). The same verse appears in the second *sādhana*, 20.)

[106] The compound *pratyālīḍhapadārpitāṅghriśavahṛd* is grammatically irregular.

[107] Probably a lonely isolated place. *Ekaliṅga* is explained in *Tārābhaktisudhārṇava*, p. 139.30–140.1 as a place where only one *liṅga* (landmark or *śivaliṅga*?) is found within an area of five *krośas*:

> *pañcakrośāntare yatra na liṅgāntaram īkṣ⟨y⟩ate |*
> *tad ekaliṅgam ākhyātaṃ tatra siddhir anuttamā ||*

This definition seems a later interpretation that is inappropriate here. For similar occurrences of the term *ekaliṅga*, cf. *Guhyasamājatantra* 12.34ab: *catuṣpathaikavṛkṣe vā ekaliṅge śivālaye* / and 14.54: *mātṛgṛhe śmaśāne śūnyaveśmani catuṣpathe | ekaliṅgaikavṛkṣe vā abhicāraṃ samārabhet* ⟨/⟩.

[108] According to the *Tantrasāra*, p. 266.14–18 (quoting *Śrīkrama* and *Nīlatantra*) *komala* refers to the corpse of a child less than five years of age. The Hindu tradition specifies that the practitioner perform the *sādhana* sitting on a corpse.

[109] i.e., in the triple states of existence mentioned in verses 2 and 6.

[110] The *mantra* is: *oṃ śūnyatājñānavajrasvabhāvātmako 'ham* (cf. e.g., *SM*, p. 193.11–12, 195.12). '*Oṃ* I am of the nature of the diamond-like knowledge of emptiness.'

[111] The verse 11cd is also found in *SM*, 123, p. 257.20.

[112] The verse 14ab is also found in *SM* 123, p. 257.22 and 14cd in *SM*, 127, p. 266.17.

[113] The verse 15cd is also found in *SM* 127, p. 266.18.

[114] I take *pañcaraśmi* here to refer to the syllable *oṃ*; cf. *Mantrābhidhāna*, 5.6; *Bhūtaḍāmaratantroktabījābhidhāna*, p. 64.16; *Varṇabījakoṣa*, p. 26, printed in A. Avalon (ed.), *Tantrābhidhāna* (Delhi: Caxton, 1983 [repr.]). The syllable *oṃ* as part of the *Tārāmantra* is also given in *sādhana* 1. *TS*, p. 263.23–4 explains *pañcaraśmi* with *varnapañcakam* ('five-coloured'). There are occasional references to five-coloured rays in the *SM*, cf. p. 254.21; 268.4 and 268.20; however, this meaning is less plausible here. The *Pradīpodyotana* commentary on the *Guhyasamāja*, 218.19–20, explained *pañcaraśmayaḥ* as five-coloured rays of the seed syllables *ya-ra-la-va-ha*, symbolizing the elements wind, fire, earth, water and ether. *Śrīvidyārṇavatantra* vol. 2, p. 262.20 explained *raśmipañcaka* (appearing in a quote from the '*Matsyasūkta*') as *varnapañcaka*, in the case of Ekajaṭā, and as the syllable *oṃ*, in the case of Nīlasarasvatī. Oṃ is also understood in *Śrīvidyārṇavatantra* vol. 2, p. 263.10.

[115] Manuscript K reads: according to the Yogatantras.

[116] The sword held in one of the goddess's hands is transformed into a rosary of bones, cf. also *SM*, p. 261.7. cf. also n. 104, above.

[117] The rays of light are emitted and withdrawn by the practitioner. (This is apparently a quotation. The same verse appears in *sādhana* 1. Only the first line appears in *SM*, p. 266.15.)

raktavartulanetrāṃ ca vyāghracarmāvṛtām[79] kaṭau[80] /
navayauvanasampannāṃ pañcamudrāvibhūṣitām // 12
lalajjihvāṃ mahābhīmāṃ sadaṃṣṭrotkaṭabhīṣaṇām[81] /
khaḍgakartrikarāṃ savye vāmotpalakapāladhām[82] // 13
piṅgograikajaṭāṃ dhyāyān maulāv akṣobhyabhūṣitām /
bhāvanābalaniṣpattau[83] bhaved yogī mahākaviḥ // 14
jaḍo 'pi yadi mūrkhaḥ syād bhāvanārasatatparaḥ /
labhate mañjuvāṇīṃ[84] tu lakṣamantrasya jāpataḥ // 15
tryakṣaro[85] 'sau mahāmantraḥ phaṭkārānto[86] hṛdi sthitaḥ /
pañcaraśmisamāyukto ajñānendhanadāhakaḥ // 16

tasyoddhāravidhiṃ[87] vakṣye yogācārānusārataḥ[88] /
prathamaṃ saparaṃ[89] dattvā caturthasvarabhūṣitam // 17
rephārūḍhaṃ sphurad dīptam indubindusamanvitam /
traṃkāraṃ[90] ca tato dadyāt caturthenaiva bhūṣitam // 18
dīrghokārasamāyuktaṃ[91] haṃkāraṃ[92] yojayet punaḥ /
phaṭkāraṃ[93] ca tato dadyāt sampūrṇaṃ siddhamantrakam[94] // 19
niraṃśumālikāṃ dhyātvā khaḍgasthāne vicakṣaṇaḥ /
sphuratsaṃhārayogena saṃjapet mantram uttamam // 20
kalpayet sthiracittena paṇḍito 'haṃ mahākaviḥ /
ajasrabhāvanābhyāsād bhavaty eva na saṃśayaḥ // 21
tārāyāḥ sādhanaṃ kṛtvā yan mayopacitaṃ[95] śubham /
bhavantu prāṇinas tena paṇḍitā jinaśāsane // 22
kṛtiḥ śāśvatavajrasya seyaṃ medhāprasādhanī /
agādhāḥ paṇḍitā[96] atra[97] kṣantum arhanti sādhavaḥ // 23
mahācīnakramatārāsādhanaṃ[98] samāptam //

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[79] A, B 1, 2, K, M 1, 2, 3, *SŚP*, T 1 °*vṛtā*, N °*vṛta*.
[80] A *kartri*, B 1, 2, K, M 2, 3, N, *SŚP*, T 1 *kaṭiṃ*, M 1, 2 *kaṭi*.
[81] K °*nāṃ mukhām*.
[82] *SŚ*, *SŚP* °*dharāṃ* (one additional syllable).
[83] Bh, M 1, 3 °*nācalani*°.
[84] A °*varṇam*.
[85] A, M 1, 3, T 1 *akṣa*°.
[86] Bh *huṃkā*°, C *huṃkārāntā*, *SŚP phaṭkārāntāṃ*.
[87] Bh *tasya dvāravidhiṃ*.
[88] K *yogatantrānu*°.
[89] Bh *haparaṃ*, A, N, C *maṃ paraṃ*, *SŚP masaraṃ*.
[90] C *uṃ*°.
[91] Bh *dīrghākāraṃ sa*°.
[92] Bh *huṃkāram*.
[93] Bh, T 1 *haṃkāraṃ*.
[94] *SŚP siddhi*°.
[95] A, N *mama*°.
[96] *SŚ* °*tās*.
[97] *SŚ tatra*.
[98] B 2, M 2 *iti śrīmahā*°.

........vyāghracarmāvṛttāṃ kaṭau // 31b
navayauvanasampannāṃ pañcamudrāvibhūṣitām // 31cd
caturbhujāṃ lalajjihvāṃ bhīmarūpāṃ varapradām // 32cd
khaḍgakartṛdharāṃ pakṣe[99] vāmotpalakapālinīm /
piṅgograikajaṭāṃ dhyāyed maulāv akṣobhyabhūṣitām // 33
bhāvanārasasampanno bhaved yogī mahākaviḥ // 36cd
jaḍo 'pi yadi mūrkhaḥ syād bhāvanāvaśatatparaḥ /
labhate 'bhimatāṃ vāṇīṃ mantrasya lakṣajāpataḥ // 37
tryakṣaro 'yaṃ mahāmantraḥ phaṭkārānto hṛdi sthitaḥ /
pañcaraśmisamāyukto 'py ajñānendhanadāhakaḥ // 38

tasyoddhāravidhiṃ vakṣye mama sārvajñyakāraṇam /
prathamaṃ saparaṃ dattvā caturthasvarabhūṣitam // 39
rephārūḍhaṃ sphurad dīptam indubinduvibhūṣitam /
stṛṃkāraṃ ca tato dadyāt caturthasvarabhūṣitam // 40
dīrghokārasamāyuktaṃ haṃkāraṃ yojayet tataḥ / 41ab
phaṭkāraṃ tu tato dadyāt sampūrṇaṃ siddhimantrakam // 41

kalpayet sthiracittena paṇḍito 'haṃ mahākaviḥ /
ajasrabhāvanābhyāsād bhaved devo na saṃśayaḥ // 42

The sādhana *of the noble Tārā according to the tradition of Mahācīna* (1)

After the meditation on emptiness according to the previously prescribed procedure, having visualized the dark noble mistress Tārā on a red lotus, which arises from the red syllable *āḥ*; in the 'lotus vessel' (= skull),[100] which arises from the white syllable *tāṃ*; from the transformation of the cutter, which is accompanied by the seed syllable (*hūṃ*),[101] which arises from the dark syllable *hūṃ* resting on the sun (which in turn rests in the lotus vessel),

(Tārā,) four-armed (and) with one head, who has three eyes, is dwarfish and big-bellied, whose face is terrible because of fangs, who has mounted a dead body with the *pratyālīḍha* stance, has the eight snakes as ornaments, is clothed in a tiger-skin, has a garland of (severed) heads hanging down (from her neck), is adorned with the five (bone) ornaments, holds with the right hands the sword and cutter, holds with the left hands the blue lotus and skull, has a mass of tawny-coloured matted hair with the leader Akṣobhya (and) has a terrible form with extremely frightening, loud laughter,

one should repeat the *mantra oṃ hrīṃ* ⟨*trīṃ*⟩[102] *hūṃ phaṭ* with reference to the understanding of the objects (?) (*viṣayaprajñādhikāreṇa*).[103]

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[99] Suggested emendation with *sādhana* 2, 13c: *savye* or: *dakṣe*.
[100] For *padmabhājana* = skull, cf. *Hevajratantra* II.3.58 and parallel passages, such as *SM*, p. 260.12, where *kapāla* is mentioned.
[101] Verse 1 of *sādhana* 2, states that Tārā arises from the syllable *hūṃ*.
[102] The second *sādhana* includes *trīṃ* as part of the *mantra*, which is absent from Bh and *SŚP*; cf. also *SM* 127 (p. 266.14).
[103] The meaning of the compound *viṣayaprajñādhikāreṇa* is unclear. PTT 4315 omits *viṣaya* altogether, while PTT 4020 reads *viṣa*°—poison, which is meaningless here. The reading *mantraviṣayaprajñādhikare* in M 1, 3 yields the meaning: with reference to the insight into the topic of *mantra*.

200/14

Mahācīnakramatārāsādhana (2)
(**Sādhanaśataka* 65, fols. 31b.2–32a.4, PTT 4194, **Sādhanaśatapañcāśikā* 55, fols. 73b.2–75a.2, PTT 4021–4022, *Sādhanamālā*/*Sādhanasamuccaya* 101, PTT 4316)

pratyālīḍhapadārpitāṅghriśavahṛd ghorāṭṭahāsā[62] *parā*
khaḍgendīvarakartrikharparabhujā[63] *hūṃkārabījodbhavā* /
kharvā nīlaviśālapiṅgalajaṭājūṭogranāgair yutā
jāḍyaṃ nyasya kapālake trijagatāṃ[64] *hanty ugratārā svayam* // 1[65]
mahācīnakramāṃ natvā tārāṃ tribhavatāriṇīm /
tatsādhanam ahaṃ vakṣye yathā gurūpadeśataḥ // 2
ekaliṅge śmaśāne vā śūnyāgāre ca sarvadā /
tatrasthaḥ sādhayed yogī vidyāṃ tribhavamokṣaṇīm[66] // 3
mṛdumasūrakaṃ[67] *āsīno 'nyeṣu komaleṣu vā*[68] /
vistareṣu samāśritya sādhayet siddhim uttamām // 4
jhaṭity ākārayogena trivajraṃ susamāhitaḥ /
triṣu sthāneṣu taṃ dhyātvā raśmiṃ visphārayet tataḥ // 5
tribhavacāriṇaḥ sattvān avabhāsyānayet punaḥ /
saṃhāre ca punar dhyāyāc chūnyaṃ viśvaṃ samantataḥ // 6
tataḥ [redacted]
pathej jinamantrakam oṃ śūnyatādisvabhāvakam /
antarīkṣe[69] *tato dhyāyād āṃkārād*[70] *raktapaṅkajam* // 7

bhūyas tasyopari dhyāyāt tāṃkārāt[71] *padmabhājanam* /
tasya madhye punar dhyāyāt hūṃkāraṃ nīlasaṃnibham // 8
tato hūṃkārajāṃ[72] *paśyet kartrikāṃ bījabhūṣitām* /
kartripariṇataṃ dhyāyād ātmānaṃ tāriṇīsamam // 9
pratyālīḍhapadāṃ ghorāṃ muṇḍamālāpralambitām /
kharvalambodarīṃ[73] *bhīmāṃ nīlanīrajarājitām*[74] // 10
tryambakaikamukhāṃ divyāṃ ghorāṭṭahāsabhāsurām /
suprahṛṣṭāṃ[75] *śavārūḍhāṃ*[76] *nāgāṣṭakavibhūṣitām* // 11

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[62] A *ghorā hṛṣṭā ca*, T 1 *ghorā hṛṣṭā hāsā* [illegible]
[63] Emended with *PhT* (cf. also PTT 4316: *thod pa phyag bsnams*), since this reading accoun
for the fourth attribute: °*kartrikārpitabhujā* B 1, 2, Bh, K, M 1, 2, 3, *SS*, *SSP*, T 1, 2.
[64] A, M 1, 3 *ti*°.
[65] Metre: *Śārdūlavikrīḍita*.
[66] M 1, 3, *SSP* °*mokṣiṇīm*.
[67] B 1, C, *SS* °*macūlakam*, *SSP* °*macūlakasam* (one additional syllable), suggested emenda
tion: °*ke*.
[68] *SS ca*.
[69] Bh °*kṣam*.
[70] A, K, M 1, 3, T 1, 2 *ākā*°, PTT 4194 *aka*, *SSP āṃkā*°.
[71] Bh, *SS*, *SSP tām*°.
[72] Bh, *SS*, *SSP* °*jam*.
[73] B 1, 2, Bh, K, M 1, 3, T 1 °*ām*.
[74] K *nīlanīlābjasaṃnibhām*.
[75] A *prahṛṣṭāṅge*.
[76] A *cārūḍhām*.

Phetkāriṇītantra (*PhT*) 11.9–42

pratyālīḍhapadārpitāṅghriśavahṛdghorāṭṭahāsā parā
khaḍgendīvarakartṛkharparabhujā hūṃkārabījodbhavā /
kharvā nīlaviśālapiṅgalajaṭājūṭogranāgair yutā
jāḍyaṃ nyasya kapālake trijagatāṃ hanty ugratārā svayam // 9
mahācīnakramāṃ natvā tārāṃ tribhavatāriṇīm // 10cd
tatsādhanavidhiṃ vakṣye mama sārvajñyasādhanam[77] / 11ab
ekaliṅge śmaśāne ca śūnyāgāre catuṣpathe /
tatrasthaḥ sādhayed yogī tārāṃ tribhavatāriṇīm // 24
mṛducūḍakam āsīno 'py anyeṣu komale 'pi vā /
vistareṣu samāśritya sādhayet siddhim uttamām // 26

..........śūnyaṃ viśvaṃ vicintayet // 27b

antarikṣe tato dhyāyed āṃkārād raktapaṅkajam /

bhūyas tasyopari dhyāyet tāṃkārāt śvetapaṅkajam // 28
tasyopari punar dhyāyed ikāraṃ[78] *nīlasaṃnibham* /
tato hu⟨ṃ⟩kārajāṃ paśyet kartṛkāṃ bījabhūṣitām // 29
kartṛkopari tāṃ dhyāyed ātmānaṃ tāriṇīmayam /
prayālīḍhapadāṃ ghorāṃ muṇḍamālāvibhūṣitām // 30
kharvāṃ lambodarīṃ bhīmāṃ ...... / 31a

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[77] Emended with *PhT* 11.39b *mama sārvajñyakāraṇam*: *PhT sarvajña*°; Kha, Gha °*sādhakam*.
[78] Suggested emendation with *sādhana* 2, 8d: *hūṃkāram*.



Fig. 3: Ugra-Tārā, Pahāḍī painting, eighteenth century (?), Delhi National Museum 82.463 (A
Mookerjee Collection).



Fig. 4: Poet-painter Mola Ram worshipping Tārā. From a series of paintings of the Mahāvidyās by Mola Ram, Garhwal, dated 1811, preserved in the Bharat Kala Bhavan, Varanasi, no. 113129.

Mahācīnakramāryatārāsādhana (1)

(**Sādhanaśatapañcāśikā* 54 (73a2–73b2), *PTT* 4020, *Sādhanamālā*/*Sādhanasamuccaya* 100, *PTT* 4315)

pūrvoktavidhānena śūnyatābhāvanānantaraṃ rakta-āḥkārajaraktapadmopari[48] *sitatāṃkārajapadmabhājane*[49] *sūryasthanīlahūṃkārajasabījakartripariṇāmena*[50] *kṛṣṇām*[51] *āryatārābhaṭṭārikāṃ caturbhujaikamukhīṃ trinetrāṃ kharvalambodarīṃ*[52] *daṃṣṭrākarālavadanāṃ pratyālīḍhapadena*[53] *śavārūḍhāṃ*[54] *nāgāṣṭakabhūṣaṇāṃ vyāghracarmavasanām*[55] *avalambamānamuṇḍamālāṃ pañcamudrāvibhūṣitāṃ khaḍgakartridhāridakṣiṇakarām utpalakapāladhārivāmakarāṃ sākṣobhyanāthapiṅgalajaṭājūṭām*[56] *atighorāṭṭahāsabhīmarūpāṃ niṣpādya oṃ hrīṃ* ⟨*trīṃ*⟩[57] *hūṃ phaṭ iti*[58] *mantram*[59] *viṣayaprajñādhikāreṇa*[60] *japet* /

niraṃśumālikāṃ dhyātvā khaḍgasthāne vicakṣaṇaḥ /
sphuratsaṃhārayogena saṃjapen mantram uttamam //

iti mahācīnakramāryatārāsādhanam[61] //

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[48] PTT 4020 °*aḥkāra*°, B 2, K, T 2 °*ākāra*°. [49] B 1, Bh, SŚP °*tāṃ*°.
[50] A °*karttā*°, K 1, M 1, 2 *kartti*°. [51] A, N *kṛṣṭām*.
[52] Emendation °*rīṃ* with the text of the second *sādhana*: B 1, 2, Bh, K, M 1, 2, 3, *SŚP*, T 1, 2, °*rāṃ*.
[53] B 1, 2, K, M 1, 2, 3, T 2 °*pada*, A, N °*padāṃ*. [54] A *pañcaśavā*°.
[55] K, *SŚP*, T 2 °*carmaṇī*°. [56] A °*jūṭī*.
[57] Suggested addition in accordance with the *mantra* given in the second *sādhana*.
[58] N *abhi*. [59] M 1, 3 *mantra*.
[60] PTT 4020, *SŚP viṣapra*°, PTT 4315 *prajñā*°; A °*kāram*, B 1, 2, M 1, 2, 3, N, T 1, 2 °*kāre*, K °*kāra*.
[61] *SŚP* °*kramatārā*° [illegible]

202/14



Fig. 1. (Buddhist?) *Maṇḍala* of Ugra-Tārā from a book of pictures otherwise containing Hindu images and *yantras*, of Nepal, dated 1765. Gouache on paper, 37 × 37 cm. Preserved in the Bhārat Kalā Bhavan, Varanasi, acc. 10054. Photographed by the American Institute of Indian Studies, Ramnagar/Varanasi, no. 3–46.



Fig. 2. Mahācīnatārā (Buddhist), first published in Bhattacharyya (1958), plate XXVII (b).

The importance of the case of Mahācīnakrama-Tārā lies in the fact that we can gain a clear understanding of the adaptation process of a goddess from a Buddhist Tantric text into a Hindu Tantra. Further comparative study of Buddhist and Hindu Tantric texts may elucidate similar processes in the case of other deities shared by both the Buddhist and Hindu pantheons.

Text and translation of the sādhanas *of Mahācīnakrama-Tārā*

The following presents the newly edited texts and translations of the two Buddhist *sādhanas* of Mahācīnakrama-Tārā. The passages in the *Phetkāriṇītantra* (*PhT*) which correspond to the second *sādhana* are printed on opposite pages. They are reproduced from the printed edition, which refers to readings in manuscripts as Kha and Gha.

The edition is based on Bhattacharyya's (Bh) *Sādhanamālā*, which refers to manuscript readings as A, C and N. In addition I have used the manuscripts of the **Sādhanaśataka* (*SŚ*) and **Sādhanaśatapañcāśika* (*SŚP*)[43] published in Bühnemann (1994) and the following manuscripts:[44]

B 1	(Vīrapustakālaya 1966) National Archives, Kathmandu, no. 3–387, fols. 79b.6–81a.4
B 2	(Vīrapustakālaya 1966) National Archives, Kathmandu, no. 3–603, fols. 73b.10–75a.9. This manuscript is very faulty; it was used in part by Bhattacharyya (labelled as Na); cf. *SM*. preface, vol. I, xiiif.
K	Kyoto University Library no. 119 (Goshima/Noguchi, 1983), fols. 135a.1–136b.6
M 1	University of Tokyo Library no. 451 (Matsunami, 1965), fols. 78a.3–79a.6
M 2	University of Tokyo Library no. 452 (Matsunami, 1965), fols. 54b.9–55b.5
M 3	University of Tokyo Library no. 453 (Matsunami, 1965), fols. 78b.1–79b.6
T 1	Takaoka Collection no. CA 26 (Takaoka, 1981), fols. 94b.6–95b.7
T 2	Takaoka Collection no. KA 30 (Takaoka, 1981), fols. 95a.3–96b.4

Obvious scribal errors have usually not been noted.

The available Tibetan translations have also been consulted, but their readings were included in the apparatus only in exceptional cases. For reasons of space the five Tibetan translations have not been edited here.

In my edition I have used the *anusvāra* instead of the more correct *anunāsika* in the *mantras* for reasons of printing. I have emended the spelling of the syllable *huṃ* in Bhattacharyya's edition to the more correct *hūṃ*, which agrees with the analysis of the *mantra* in the text itself. I have chosen the reading *tāṃ* (Tārā's seed syllable) over Bhattacharyya's reading *ṭāṃ*. The metre in the second *sādhana* is defective in many places; no attempt was made to rectify this.

I have attempted, in the following translations, to render the Sanskrit texts as faithfully as possible. The iconographical description extracted from the second *sādhana* had earlier been translated by Foucher (1905: 76–7).

The first *sādhana* presupposes a knowledge of the practices on the part of the reader, and the mental creation of the goddess by the *yogin*, her physical characteristics and the *yogin*'s repetition of the *mantra* are described in a very concise manner. The second *sādhana* is slightly more elaborate. It consists of the following parts:

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[43] The manuscript of the **Sādhanaśatapañcāśikā* was partly used by Bhattacharyya and referred to as manuscript B in his edition.

[44] I wish to thank Ms. R. Sakuma, Nagoya, for providing copies of the relevant manuscript sections.

203/14

- — description of the goddess in the form of a *dhyāna* verse (1)
- — introductory verse (2)
- — suitable places for the *sādhana* (3)
- — suitable seats for the *sādhaka* (4)
- — the process of mental creation of the goddess (5–14), including the description of the goddess's characteristics (10–14)
- — the repetition of her *mantra* (15–20), including the extraction (*uddhāra*) of the letters of her *mantra* from the alphabet (16–19)
- — beneficial results of the repetition of the *mantra*: poetic skills and eloquence (21)
- — concluding verses (22–2).

The mental creation of the goddess is described as follows: The *yogin*

1. visualizes three diamond sceptres (*vajra*) pervading the triple states of existence with their rays performing the benefit of beings;
2. he withdraws the rays and contemplates emptiness (*śūnyatā*), reciting the *mantra oṃ śūnyatājñānavajrasvabhāvātmako 'ham* (*Oṃ* I am of the nature of the diamond-like knowledge of emptiness);
3. he visualizes the red syllable *āḥ*[45] in the sky, which transforms into a red lotus;
4. the white syllable *tāṃ*[46] appears on top of the lotus and transforms into a skull cup;
5. in its centre, on a sun, the dark seed syllable *hūṃ* appears;
6. it transforms into a cutter adorned with the seed syllable *hūṃ*;
7. the cutter transforms into the *yogin* who identifies with Mahācīnakrama-Tārā.

The goddess's *mantra* is given as *oṃ hrīṃ trīṃ hūṃ phaṭ*. The Hindu tradition has preserved the variant *strīṃ* for *trīṃ*. The same *mantra* is employed for Ekajaṭā, who shares many iconographical characteristics with Mahācīnakrama-Tārā, as appears from the *sādhanas* in *SM* 125 to 127. Bhattacharyya's edition of the *SM* occasionally omits the syllable *oṃ*. The above *mantra* is termed the 'root' (*mūla*) mantra of Ekajaṭā in *SM* 123, p. 258.19, while the same *mantra* appended with the syllables *hūṃ svāhā* is termed her 'heart' (*hṛdaya*) *mantra*. The *upahṛdaya mantra* is said to be the 'root' *mantra* without the final *phaṭ*. The *mantra* is said to grant eloquence and turn the *yogin* into a great poet. This must be the effect of the seed syllable *hrīṃ* contained in it, which, according to the passage *SM* p. 269.24, produces similar results when recited by itself. According to Śrīharṣa's *Naiṣadhīyacarita* 14.88–9 the syllable *hrīṃ* is considered as representing Śiva's Ardhanārīśvara form; when repeated it grants similar results.[47]

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[45] The variants *aḥ* and *a* are also preserved by the texts.

[46] I have chosen the reading *tāṃ* over the reading *ṭāṃ* in the edition of the two *sādhanas*, since *tāṃ* is commonly the seed syllable (*bīja*) of Tārā.

[47] cf. *Naiṣadhacarita of Śrīharṣa*, (tr.) K. K. Handiqui (Poona: Deccan College, 1964), 215 and 580 (s.v. *cintāmaṇimantra*). I wish to thank T. C. Cahill for providing this reference.

Painting 1.5 shows Ugra-Tārā bearing on her head Akṣobhya, who sits on a snake. The distribution of attributes is as in 1.1–1.3, except that the attributes in the left hands are interchanged. The goddess is shown with fangs and a lolling tongue. The rather peculiar kneeling pose of the goddess is probably due to the influence of the painting of Kālī in the Mahāvidyā series by Mola Ram.

2. *Icons from Nepal*

The following six representations from Nepal all show the same distribution of attributes as in 1.1–1.3. The cutter (*kartri/kartrī, kartrikā, kartarī*) appears as a kind of dagger with a diamond sceptre on its handle, in contrast to its representation as a pair of scissors in the paintings from the Punjab Hills. In modern Indian languages, such as Hindī and Marāṭhī, the word is also understood as a pair of scissors.

2.1. *Maṇḍala* of Ugra-Tārā (cf. fig. 1) from a book of pictures dated 1765. Since the remaining images show Hindu deities, one would assume the Hindu Ugra-Tārā to be shown. The surrounding deities in the *maṇḍala*, however, do not correspond to those prescribed by the Hindu Tantras. Ugra-Tārā, with Akṣobhya on her head, stands on a corpse in the pericarp of a lotus on a downward pointing triangle inside an eight-petalled lotus. The surrounding deities on the lotus petals are the four Tathāgatas in the four cardinal directions: Vairocana (W), Amoghasiddhi (N), Ratnasambhava (E) and Amitābha (S). Their consorts (*prajñā*) in the intermediate directions are Pāṇḍurī (for: Pāṇḍarā) (NW), Tārā (NE), Māmakī (SE) and probably Locanā (no inscription) (SW). It is peculiar that Vairocana's consort is Pāṇḍurā, who is usually assigned to Amitābha. The directional guardians on the periphery are Varuṇa (Western gate), Vāyu (NW), Kubera (Northern gate), Īśāna (NE), Indra (Eastern gate), Agni (SE), Yama (Southern gate) and Nairṛtya (SW); the zenith (*ūrdhva*) is indicated between SW and W and the nadir (*adhaḥ*) between NE and E. The colours of the directions are white (W), green (N), yellow (E) and red (S);

2.2. the Hindu Ugra-Tārā, eighteenth century, paper, Los Angeles County Museum of Art, no. M. 81.206.8 (gift of Dr. and Mrs. Robert S. Coles); first published in Pal (1985: 266, P 33); figures of small snakes are visible on the head. The goddess stands over a dead body on the funeral pyre;

2.3. a sketch of Mahācīna-Tārā from the painter's model book, first published in Bhattacharyya (1958, pl. XXVII (a); the figure of Akṣobhya is absent);

2.4. line drawing of Mahācīna-Tārā with Akṣobhya on her head, first published in Bhattacharyya (1958, pl. XXVII (b); cf. fig. 2);

2.5. line drawing of Mahācīnakrama-Tārā from a painter's model book; first published in Chandra (1984, pl. 17; details of the goddess's topknot are unclear);

2.6. copper statue labelled as Mahācīna-Tārā, fifteenth century, Galerie Marco Polo, Paris, first published in Schroeder (1981, no. 99 E). The goddess stands on a dead body on a *yantra* consisting of a triangle inside a lotus. Details of her crown are unclear, as is the attribute (lotus?) held in her upper left hand.

Bhattacharyya (1958: 76) and Bharati (1965: 60–61) inform us that the Vajrayoginī temple at Sāṃkhu in Nepal contains a statue of Ugra-Tārā.[41] It seems, however, that it is a two-armed benevolent statue holding a sword and a lotus.[42]

204/14

3. *Icon in the Tibetan tradition*

A line drawing of Mahācīna-Tārā is preserved in the manuscript entitled *Zhu fo pusa sheng xiang zan*, ascribed to an unnamed Zhang Jia Hutuktu, preserved in the National Library of China, Beijing and published by Clark (1937, II, no. 229). The manuscript illustrates Buddhist deities based on Tibetan sources. The goddess is surrounded by a halo of fire and crushes a figure under her left foot. The attribute in the upper left hand, if any, is unclear and the figure of Akṣobhya is missing.

4. *Icon from West Bengal*

A sculpture of the Hindu Ugra-Tārā from the village Śikārpur was published in Bhattasali (1929, pl. LXXI (a)). It shows five miniature images above the goddess's head. According to Bhattasali they are reminiscent of the five Tathāgatas and represent Śiva (centre), Brahmā (to the right), Kārtikeya and Gaṇeśa (to the left). The remaining figure may be that of Viṣṇu. Except for the sword, the attributes cannot be seen clearly from the photograph.

5. *Icon from Amarāvatī/Andhra Pradesh*

A sculpture of the Buddhist goddess in limestome measuring 13" × 7" × 3" was found in Amarāvatī and published by Murthy (1989, pl. 5 (2)). The attributes agree with those in 1.1–1.3, but details of the crown are not clear.

Conclusion

In this article I have provided compelling evidence that Śāśvatavajra's *sādhana* of Mahācīnakrama-Tārā/Ugra-Tārā (eleventh century) was almost completely incorporated in the Hindu *Phetkāriṇītantra* (thirteenth century?), including not only the iconographical description of the goddess but also the typically Buddhist Tantric visualization pattern. The goddess's description was adopted by a large number of Hindu texts from the *PhT*'s version. The Hindu tradition retained the description of Akṣobhya on the goddess's head but interpreted him as Śiva, who was said to adorn the goddess's head in the form of a snake. The dead body on which Ugra-Tārā is standing was interpreted as Śiva's body in many paintings. The bone ornaments (*pañcamudrā*) of the goddess were interpreted as a garland of five skulls on her forehead by some authorities. While the Buddhist *sādhanas* do not refer to special worship practices of the left-hand Tantric tradition, the Hindu tradition includes the goddess among the deities worshipped with some of the *makāras*, meat, fish and enjoyment of women, and enjoins that the practitioner perform the practices sitting on a corpse. Through the name Mahācīna, Tārā is linked with the practice (*ācāra*) of Mahācīna, which is described as using wine, meat and women and is said to have been introduced to India by Vaśiṣṭha, who received the transmission from Viṣṇu in the form of Buddha in Mahācīna.

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[41] cf. also S. Lienhard: 'Religionssynkretismus in Nepal', in H. Bechert (ed.), *Buddhism in Ceylon and studies on religious syncretism in Buddhist countries: Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung. I. Report on a Symposium in Göttingen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978), 146–77, 167.

[42] cf. Zanen, M.: 'The Goddess Vajrayoginī and the Kingdom of Sankhu (Nepal)', *Puruṣārtha*, 10 (Paris: Centre d'Études de l'Inde et de l'Asie du Sud, 1986), 125–66, esp. 127–8, 155. Cf. also the discussion of the image in Slusser (1982, II, 331 and illustration 199).

mahācīnakramatārāsādhana (*SM* 101) is quoted almost in full in the beginning of chapter 11 of the Tantra. The chapter is written in the form of a dialogue between Śiva and Pārvatī. After some introductory verses we find the following parallels:

SM	*PhT*
No. 101, verses 1–2	chapter 11, verse 9
101.3	11.10cd–11ab
101.4	11.24
101.5	11.26
101.6–7c	—
101.7d	11.27b
101.8ab	—
101.8cd–11c	11.28–31a
101.11d–13a	—
101.13b–d	11.31b–d
101.14–15ab	cf. 11.32cd–33
101.15cd–20	11.36cd–41
101.21	—
101.22	11.42
101.23–24	—

The *PhT* has been assigned to the thirteenth century by Bharati (1965: 60), for unknown reasons. The earlier Tantric compendiums, such as the *Prapañcasāra* (before the latter part of the eleventh century)[9] and the *Śāradātilaka* based on it, do not describe Tārā at all.

It can thus be established that Śāśvatavajra's *mahācīnakramatārāsādhana* was incorporated in the Hindu *PhT*, which was then quoted as authoritative on the description and worship of this form of dark Tārā, called Mahācīnakrama-Tārā or Ugra-Tārā in a number of Hindu Tantric texts, such as the *Tārābhaktisudhārṇava*[10] (second part of the seventeenth century),[11] the previously mentioned *Tantrasāra*,[12] *Bṛhannīlatantra*,[13] *Śrīvidyārṇavatantra* (*c.* seventeenth century)[14] attributed to Vidyāraṇya Yati[15] and *Puraścaryārṇava*.[16] The description of Ugra-Tārā in *PhT* 11.9 even appears in *Śrītattvanidhi* 1.69, compiled by Mummadi Kṛṣṇarāja Wodeyar III, King of Mysore, who ruled from 1799 to 1868, quoted from the '*āmnāya*'. Similar descriptions of the goddess also appear in Brahmānandagiri's *Tārārahasya* (beginning of the sixteenth century) 3.134–36 and *Merutantra* 23.738–40. *Kālikā-Purāṇa* 63.64–8 differs in that it describes her as standing with one foot on a corpse and the other on a lion; there is no mention of Akṣobhya.[17]

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[9] For this date, cf. V. Dviveda, introduction to his edition of the *Nityāṣoḍaśikārṇava*, Varanasi: Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya (1968: 41), and the discussion by Goudriaan in Goudriaan and Gupta (1981: 131).

[10] cf. pp. 201.29–202.3–*PhT* 11.9; 4.7–11–*PhT* 11.39cd–40; 139.28–9–*PhT* 11.24.

[11] For this date, cf. P. Bhaṭṭāchārya, introduction to his edition of the *Tārābhaktisudhārṇava*, 3.

[12] cf. p. 269.1–8–*PhT* 11.30–35ab.

[13] cf. p. 2.43–50–*PhT* 11.27cd–34.

[14] The lower limit for the composition of the work is the year 1589, i.e., the date of composition of the *Mantramahodadhi*, which is quoted in it, and the lower limit is the year 1726, i.e., the date of a manuscript.

[15] cf. vol. 2, p. 267.8–11–*PhT* 11.30–33.

[16] cf. p. 780.10–21–*PhT* 11.1–7ab; 781.2–6–*PhT* 11.39cd–41; 781.25–6–*PhT* 11.38; 788.18–21–*PhT* 11.9.

[17] For a discussion of this form, cf. van Kooij (1974).

203/14

The Buddhist Mahācīnakrama-Tārā is iconographically identical to one of several existing forms of Ekajaṭā/Ekajaṭī, described in *sādhanas*, such as *SM* 124 to 126.[18] The same mantra is employed for both goddesses. A *white* Ekajaṭā who is *not identical* to Mahācīnakrama-Tārā is described in *SM* 127. The colophon of this *sādhana* in Bhattacharyya's edition states that Nāgārjuna took the tradition of the goddess from the inhabitants of Bhoṭa (*bhoṭeṣu uddhṛtam*). Bhattacharya[19] identified Bhoṭa (Tibet) with Mahācīna and concluded that the goddess Ekajaṭā or Mahācīnakrama-Tārā, worshipped by native inhabitants of Tibet probably professing the Bon religion of Tibet, entered the Buddhist pantheon with the Tantric Nāgārjuna in the seventh century. Against this it can be argued that *SM* 127 refers only to the white Ekajaṭā, not to the dark Mahācīnakrama-Tārā. Also, *SM* 127 is not part of the earlier *sādhana* collections **Sādhanaśataka* and **Sādhanaśatapañcāśikā* and that—as Kane[20] has already pointed out—not all manuscripts of the *Sādhanamālā*/*Sādhanasamuccaya* contain this part of the colophon. It is, however, part of the Tibetan translation of the collection, which was completed in 1268.

The Buddhist Mahācīnakrama-Tārā bears the Tathāgata Akṣobhya on her head. This is because the deities of the Vajrayāna pantheon are considered emanations of one of the five *Tathāgatas*, viz., Amitābha, Akṣobhya, Vairocana, Amoghasiddhi and Ratnasambhava. In Hindu icons, however, the mention of Akṣobhya on Ugra-Tārā's head is unusual and requires explanation. '*Akṣobhya*' was interpreted as an epithet of Śiva. The *Toḍalatantra* 1.5–6[21] explains that Śiva is called 'unshakeable' (*akṣobhya*), because he drank the deadly *Hālāhala* poison without agitation (*a-kṣobha*). Kṛṣṇānanda stated in his *Tantrasāra* (p. 269.8) that Akṣobhya on the goddess's head has three shapes and the form of a snake;[22] perhaps he had a three-headed snake in mind. This explanation reiterates remarks from earlier texts, such as the *Bhāvacūḍāmaṇi*,[23] *Mantracūḍāmaṇi*[24] and *Brahmasaṃhitā*,[25] which describe Akṣobhya as having the form of a snake. Accordingly, images of the Hindu goddess show either a snake on Ugra-Tārā's head (cf. fig. 3) or Akṣobhya sitting on a snake on Tārā's head (cf. figs. 4, 5), while the snake is absent from the Buddhist images (cf. figs. 1,[26] 2). In the Hindu tradition Akṣobhya also figures as the seer (*ṛṣi*) of Ugra-Tārā's mantra. According to the *Śaktisaṃgamatantra* (last part of the sixteenth century or first half of the seventeenth century),[27] Ugra-Tārā was the *Chuang-Tzu*. This evidence also strongly suggests the possibility that they are the products of the same lineage, or of several closely related master-disciple lineages. If this is true, then it supports the hypothesis that there is a common practice of inner cultivation that links together the three aspects of early Taoism enumerated above, and that this practice served as the distinctive 'technique' (*shu* 術) around which early Taoism formed. This further suggests that the early Taoists were more a community of practitioners who wrote philosophy to elucidate, define and transmit their practice than a group of philosophers who thought about the world as an object of intellectual inquiry. The larger implications of this, of course, are that Taoism is a relatively continuous tradition without the 'great gap' between philosophical and religious forms which may have only arisen because a rather restricted view of the nature of early Taoism became the accepted canon.

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[18] cf. *SM* 124 (p. 260.16–261.10); *SM* 125 (p. 263.15–20) and *SM* 126 (p. 265.4–9).

[19] cf. the introduction to vol. 2 of his edition of the *SM*, CXI.

[20] cf. Kane (1968–77, v: 1033. n. 1665).

[21] *samudramathane devi kālakūṭaṃ samutthitam /*
sarve devāḥ sadārāś ca mahākṣobham avāpnuyuḥ // 1.5
kṣobhādirahitaṃ yasmāt pītaṃ hālāhalaṃ viṣam /
ata eva maheśāni akṣobhyaḥ parikīrtitaḥ // 1.6

[22] *akṣobhyo devīmūrdhanyas trimūrtir nāgarūpadhṛk*

[23] Quoted in *Puraścaryārṇava*, p. 789.3–5: *atrākṣobhyo nāgarūpaḥ / akṣobhyo devīmūrdhanyas trimūrtir nāgarūpadhṛg iti (bhāvacūḍāmaṇi-)vacanāt*; similarly, cf. *Tārābhaktisudhārṇava*, p. 202.9–10.

[24] Quoted in *Tārābhaktisudhārṇava*, p. 201.10 and *Puraścāryārṇava*, p. 787.5: *akṣobhyanāgasambaddhajaṭājūṭāṃ varapradām /*

[25] Quoted in *Puraścaryārṇava*, p. 715.19: *akṣobhyo devatā proktas trimūrtir nāgarūpadhṛk //*

[26] Figure 1, which shows Akṣobhya on Ugra-Tārā's crown, is from a Nepalese book containing images of Hindu deities. However, the surrounding deities are the four *Tathāgatas* and their consorts (*prajñā*), suggesting that the image is Buddhist.

[27] cf. *Śaktisaṃgamatantra* 4, also called *Akṣobhyatārāsaṃvāda*, ch. 5. For a discussion of the date, cf. Goudriaan and Gupta (1981: 69).

206/14

'The Traditions of Mahosadha': legal reasoning from Northern Thailand

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Introduction

Twenty years ago hardly any legal texts from the Middle Mekong region were known. Now more than a 150 legal manuscripts have been borrowed from monastery book-chests, cleaned and microfilmed. Only one of these discoveries has been translated into a non-Thai language, but that is a substantial and important text. Aroonrut Wichienkeeo's and Gehan Wijeyewardene's *Laws of King Mangrai* translates a manuscript from 'The Elephant Supported Temple' in Nan which Richard Davis arranged to be copied.[1] Reviewing it in these pages[2] I suggested that the MS has jumbled together four distinct works in two broad categories. The bulk of the text consists of rules about family, theft and compensation drawn from works called *Worldly law and the law of Dhamma* (§1–49) and *Mangrai's Dhammathat* (§50–76). The rest of the MS deals with legal precedents rather than rules and can be divided into a collection of judgement tales (title unknown) (§77–87) and *The traditions of King Mahosot* (§88–106). There are corruptions, lacunae and interpolations throughout, but the earlier sections can at least be checked against other recensions of Northern Thai law. That is not possible for the last 20 sections: there is nothing in the surviving literature remotely similar to *The traditions of King Mahosot*. In this paper I attempt to reconstruct the original intentions of its author on contextual grounds: knowing what we do about Middle Mekong legal culture, what is the most plausible reconstruction of this damaged, but fascinating, work? My main aim will have been met if I can make the text more accessible to legal and political historians. The demarcation line between these disciplines separates government action based on 'legal reasoning' from that based on 'reasons of state'. This work should enable us to see where the line was drawn in the Northern Thai cultures prior to the nineteenth century. My secondary aim is to remind historians of the neglected riches in Aroonrut's and Gehan's edition. Wyatt's 1994 Presidential address is an example of such neglect.[3] It is a strikingly successful analysis, or psychoanalysis, of the Nan self-image, but it could have been even more cogent had Wyatt examined Nan's law texts along with its chronicle literature and religious art.

King Mahosot, whose traditions are evoked by the title of our text, is spelt

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[1] *The Laws of King Mangrai*, (ed. and tr.) Aroonrut Wichienkeeo and Gehan Wijeyewardende (Canberra: Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1986). Unadorned section numbers (§ 89), refer to this edition.

I use the following abbreviations in this paper: *ROB*, day-month-year = Than Tun, *The Royal Orders of Burma* A.D. *1598–1885*, vols. 1–10 (Kyoto: CSEAS, 1984–90); *BSOAS* = this journal: *JAAS* = the [Japanese] *Journal of Asian and African Studies*; citations in the form V, II, 49 = the Pali *Tipiṭaka* following the conventions established by the *Critical Pali dictionary*; citations in the form *Smp*., 177 = VI.61 refer to Vin.a, Buddhagosa's commentary on the Vinaya known as *Samantapāsādikā*. Since I am using P. Bapat's and A. Hirakawa's translation of the Chinese version (*Shan-Chien-p'i-p'o-Sha*, Bhandarkar Oriental Series, 10, Poona, 1970) the page number of their translation is followed by the equivalent chapter and paragraph of the Pali original. Cowell, followed by volume number and date = *The Jataka stories of the Buddha's former births translated from the Pali by various hands under the editorship of E. B. Cowell* (Cambridge, 1895–1913, 6 vols.).

[2] A. Huxley, *BSOAS*, 51/3, 1988, 609–10.

[3] D. Wyatt, 'Presidential address: five voices from Southeast Asia', *Journal of Asian Studies*, 53, 1994, 1076–91.

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born in a lake named Cola[28] to the Western side of Mt. Meru. Śiva in the form of a sage at the northern side of the lake was the first to repeat her *mantra* and became the *mantra*'s seer. Ugra-Tārā is visualized in the water covering the universe (*viśvavyāpakatoya*) in the region of Cīna (cf. 4.5.142–7). In fig. 3 from the Punjab Hills, the dead body on which the goddess is standing is that of Śiva, who can be identified by the crescent moon[29] on his head and his three eyes. This accords with the belief that Śiva is a corpse (*śava*) without the power of Śakti. Kālī is depicted on Śiva in a similar fashion and Tripurasundarī uses Śiva as her mattress while four deities function as supporting legs of her throne.

Kṛṣṇānanda (p. 269.9–10) further explained the five bone ornaments ('five seals', *pañcamudrā*) adorning Tārā, which originally belonged to the Kāpālika tradition, as five skulls having four plates of white bone between them (i.e., one plate between any of them)[30] on the authority of the *Tantracūḍāmaṇi*, which states that the goddess is adorned with five skulls connected with plates of white bone,[31] and the authority of the Śaṃkarācārya of Gauḍa (North Bengal) (p. 269.8–13).[32] Apparently the *pañcamudrā* ornaments have been taken as the *pañcakapāla* (five skull) ornament adorning the forehead of some deities. The explanation accounts only for the diadem (*cakrī*), one of the five bone ornaments (*mudrā*).

The Hindu Tantras stress that the worship of this form of Tārā follows not the established 'Vedic' pattern, but the left-hand (*vāma*) Tantric path. *PhT* 11.11 f. states that no restrictions apply as to the place or time of the goddess's worship. The practitioner, sitting on a corpse, recites the *mantra* in a ritually impure state without having bathed, after eating substances such as meat and fish, and seeing, touching and enjoying women. References to such practices are absent from the Buddhist *sādhanas* of Mahācīna-Tārā. Through the name Mahācīna (cf. *PhT* 11.10ab), Tārā was linked with the practice (*ācāra*) of Mahācīna, which is expounded in chapters 9 to 10 of the *Nīlatantra* and mainly in the *Mahācīnācāratantra* (*Ācārasāratantra*, *c.* 1700).[33] These texts, however, do not provide us with an iconographical description of the goddess. References such as the following in Hindu Tantras to Vaśiṣṭha receiving the *mahācīnācāra* tradition in Mahācīna from Buddha in the form of Viṣṇu are additional indications that the Hindus imported Mahācīna-Tārā from the Buddhists.

The *Rudrayāmala* 17.106 ff.[34] narrates that Brahmā's son Vaśiṣṭha, who worshipped the goddess with austerities unsuccessfully for a long time, is advised by the goddess herself to go to the Buddhist country Mahācīna and follow the 'Atharvaveda' practice. In Cīna he encounters the Buddha surrounded by women, drinking wine, eating meat and engaging in sexual acts, and is initiated in the *kula* path. Although the word *cīnācāra* is not used here, references to it appear elsewhere in the text.[35]

A place named Vaśiṣṭhāśrama, Vaśiṣṭha's hermitage, where it is claimed that Vaśiṣṭha performed austerities, is located about 10 miles east of Gauhati/Assam.[36] According to another tradition, Vaśiṣṭha, after meeting the Buddha in Cīna, had a vision of Tārā in Tārāpīṭh and made his residence there.[37] Tārāpīṭh (previously Chandipur), a village in Bhirbhum district, *c.* 290 miles north of Calcutta, claims the status of one of the 51 'seats of śakti' (*śaktipīṭha*). Satī's eye is said to have dropped here. Another 'seat' (*pīṭha*) of the goddess Ugra-Tārā is her temple on the banks of the Sugandhā (Sunandanā) river in the village Śikārpur, 13 miles north of Barisāl, Bākarganj district, West Bengal.[38] It is said that Satī's nose dropped down here.[39] Representations of the goddess in painting and sculpture give further evidence of the goddess's popularity in northern India, Nepal and Tibet.

1. *Icons from the Punjab*

Ugra-Tārā was a goddess popular in the Punjab Hills, as appears from Pahāḍī paintings in which she is often included in the group of goddesses called the Mahāvidyās.[40] The illustrations which came to my notice date from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries:

1.1. painting of the goddess from Guler (*c.* 1745–60), first published in Lentz (1986, no. 5);

1.2. Pahāḍī painting of Ugra-Tārā, preserved in the National Museum Delhi 82.463 (Ajit Mookerjee Collection) (cf. fig. 3);

1.3. painting showing Raja Pratap Chand (1827–1864) of Lambagraon (Kangra) worshipping the goddess. Nahan, *c.* 1850; published in Archer (1973, vol. II: 331, no. 12; from the ancestral collection of a Raj family, Sirmur, Nahan);

1.4. painting of the Mandi School, *c.* eighteenth century, labelled as Kālī, published in Mookerjee (1988: 107);

1.5. painting from the series of Mahāvidyās by the poet-painter Mola Ram (1760–1833) of Srinagar/Garhwal, showing Mola Ram worshipping Tārā, Garhwal, dated 1811; preserved in the Bharat Kala Bhavan, Varanasi, no. 113129 (cf. fig. 4).

Illustrations 1.1–1.3 are very similar in detail and style and show the following distribution of attributes, which agrees with the description in the Buddhist *sādhanas* and the *PhT*, *right*: sword, pair of scissors; *left*: lotus, skull cup.

The goddess is ornamented by a snake on her head and is shown standing on the body of Śiva. The scenery is a burning ground with jackals. Painting 1.4 shows the attributes, *right*: lotus, skull cup; *left*: sword, knife (?). The goddess has a snake on her head and is standing on two corpses (possibly the body of Mahākāla that rests in turn on that of Niṣkala-Śiva).

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[28] In a similar passage from the unpublished *Svatantratantra* the lake is called Colana/Colanā. cf. the quote in N. N. Vasu: *The archaeological survey of Mayurabhanja* I (Calcutta, 1912: rep. Delhi: Rare Reprints, 1981), LVII: *meroḥ paścimakūle tu colanākhyo hrado mahān / tatra jajñe svayaṃ tārā devī nīlasarasvatī //.*

[29] i.e., the sixteenth lunar digit (*indukalā*), containing nectar and symbolizing divine power.

[30] *lalāṭe śvetāsthipaṭṭikācatuṣṭayānvitakapālapañcakabhūṣitām ity arthaḥ.*

[31] *śvetāsthipaṭṭikāyuktakapālapañcaśobhitām iti tantracūḍāmaṇau.* The following line from the *Mantracūḍāmaṇi* is quoted in *Tārābhaktisudhārṇava*, p. 200.18: *vicitrāsthimālāṃ lalāṭe karālāṃ kapālam ca pañcānvitaṃ dhārayantīm iti //.*

[32] The quote is from the *Tārārahasyavṛttikā/°vārtikā* by Śaṃkara Āgamācārya of Bengal, written before 1630. For this date, cf. Goudriaan in Goudriaan and Gupta (1981: 153).

[33] For this date, cf. Meisig (1988: 12).

[34] A similar story appears in the *Brahmayāmala* (cf. Woodroffe, 1927: 127–8 and Bharati, 1955: 69–70).

[35] cf. 16.25a, 64.55–65 and 64.113.

[36] cf. Kakati (1984: 32, 34).

[37] cf. Morinis (1984: 166–7).

[38] cf. Bhattasali (1929: 205–6 and plate LXXI (a)); and Bakarganj Gazetteer, 161 (J. C. Jack, 1918. Bengal District Gazetteers, Bakarganj. Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Book Depot).

[39] cf. Kalyān 31 (= *Tīrthānk*). (1957: 189.)

[40] *Muṇḍamālātantra*, part 1, 6.152cd–154ab lists the ten Mahāvidyā goddesses as Kālī, Tārā, Ṣoḍaśī, Bhuvaneśvarī, Bhairavī, Chinnamastā, Dhūmāvatī, Bagalā, Mātaṅgī and Kamalātmikā.

) Some Jātaka tales were also motivated by the same virtue and intention to illustrate the application of ahiṃsā in daily life.

NOTES

Cf. K.C.Bhattacharya The Jaina Theory of Anekānta in his Studies in Philosophy I, Calcutta 1956. § 30, p.343.

The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda VIII. 3rd ed., Calcutta 1959, p.92.

Max Weber Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie II.Hinduismus und Buddhismus. Tübingen 1921, pp.170-250. (Cf. a recent English translation.)

J.Krishnamurti Meditations, Madras 1980, p.6.

My main Yugoslav work on "the medians of Asian philosophies" (Razmeda azijskih filosofija I, Part 2 on "Jainism and Buddhism", chapter 5 a-c, pp.173-95. Ed. "Liber", Zagreb 1978) contains a survey of Pāli texts on the Buddha's discussions with Jains and some texts characteristic of his attitude to brāhmans.Suttas most characteristic of the sharpness of their controversy are: M 56 Upāli, M 58 Abhaya-rājakumāra, and M 104 Sāmagāma (on the occasion of Mahāvīra's death). Discussions and critiques of the Jaina doctrines of unlimited and always present absolute knowledge of a tirthakaraḥ (kevala-ñāṇam) and the extreme limits of ascetic restraint (saṃvara) are described in M 71 Tevijja-vacchagotta, M 76 Sandaka, M 101 Devadaha and some minor texts in Aṅguttara and Saṃyutta-nikāyas. Characteristic of the Buddha's ironic rebuke of brāhmans are, amongst others: M 51 Kandaraka - on the four types of men (the first, "torturer of himself" is the Jain ascetic, the third, "torturer of both himself and others" is the brāhman performing sacrifices for a king and the king himself); D 31 Sigālovāda (the stupidity of literal understanding of ritualistic texts), and D 4 Soṇadaṇḍa (the self-conceit of a mighty brāhman).

Most of the specific penances practised by the Buddha immediately before his spiritual awakening at Uruvelā were specifically and peculiarly according to the Jain tradition. They are described in M 12 Mahā-sīhanāda-suttaṃ and other texts from the same period of his struggle for awakening. The similarities of both teachings, Jain and Buddhist, are most strikingly presented in two beautiful poems included in the Sutta-nipāta: "The Rhinoceros" (Khaggavisāṇa) and Muni suttas - describing the ascetic attitude of a Jain muni (silent sage) as opposed to the traditional and institutionalised Buddhist "priest".

This and some of the preceding quotations are from Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli's The Life of the Buddha (BPS, Kandy 1972). Underlinings are mine.

The texts in the sequel are taken from H.Jacobi Jaina Sūtras, SBE 22 and 45, 2nd ed., Delhi 1964. Discrepancies between translations from Prākrit and Pāli in analogous texts are partly due to my impossibility of consulting original Prākrit editions.

Cf. T.W.Rhys Davids, SBB, Part III, p.198. PTS, London 1921.

208/14

UDDAKA RĀMAPUTTA AND RĀMA

Peter Skilling

The story of the Bodhisatta's quest for Enlightenment is related in identical terms in four Pāli discourses of the Middle Collection: the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (Ariya-pariyesana- sutta), the Greater Discourse to Saccaka (Mahā-saccaka-sutta), the Discourse to Prince Bodhi (Bodhi-rāja-kumāra-sutta) and the Discourse to Saṅgārava (Saṅgārava-sutta). (Majjhima Nikāya 26, 36, 85 and 100.[1]) An important section of this account deals with the Bodhisatta's meeting with and study under two contemporary teachers of yogic or ecstatic techniques, Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta. The similarities of the accounts of these meetings in the Pāli have led several translators to gloss over important differences between them and treat them as virtually identical, with a mere substitution of names. Such is entirely the case with the late I.B.Horner's English translation of the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (Middle Length Sayings I, PTS 1967, pp. 207-210), and, to a lesser degree, with Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli's translations of the Discourse to Prince Bodhi and the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (A Treasury of the Buddha's Words, Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, Bangkok: I pp.73-6, III pp.201-4 - see book review on p.117).

The main difference is one of tense change: while in the account of the first meeting Āḷāra Kālāma is spoken of in the present tense, in the account of the second meeting Uddaka Rāmaputta is spoken of in the present, but Rāma is spoken of in the aorist or past tense. This tense change makes it clear that Uddaka Rāmaputta and Rāma are not one and the same person, as given in the above-mentioned translations, but that Uddaka is the disciple, either the spiritual or real son (putta) of the deceased teacher Rāma.

In the passage in question, the Buddha relates how he, as a bodhisatta, met Āḷāra Kālāma, mastered his teaching - the attainment of the plane of nothingness - and then, because it did not lead to Enlightenment, rejected it. He then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta; on being accepted into Uddaka's community, he quickly mastered the teaching verbally and intellectually. The Buddha then goes on to relate - the whole account is in the first person - as follows: "I, then thought, 'It was not out of mere faith that Rāma taught (pavedesi/pavedeti[2]) this dharma, saying "I dwell having attained, having realised by my own direct knowledge"; I am certain that Rāma dwelt (vihāsi/viharati) knowing and seeing this dharma'. I then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta and asked, 'What is the extent, sir (āvuso, vocative), of the dharma that Rāma (Rāmo, nominative[3]) taught, having attained it, having realised it by his own direct knowledge?' On being asked this, Uddaka Rāmaputta instructed me in the plane of neither perception nor non-perception.

I then thought, 'Rāma had (*ahosi*/*atthi*) no monopoly on faith: I too possess faith; Rāma had no monopoly on energy, mindfulness, concentration or wisdom: I too possess energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom. Let me then exert myself in order to realise the dharma that Rāma taught, saying "I dwell having attained, having realised by my own direct knowledge".' And not long afterwards, indeed quickly, I dwelt having attained to that dharma, having realised it by my own direct knowledge, I then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta, and asked, 'Is this the extent, sir (*āvuso*, voc.), of the dharma that Rāma (Rāmo, nom.) taught, having attained it, having realised it by his own direct knowledge?' When he answered in the affirmative, I said, 'I too dwell having attained to this dharma to the same extent, having realised it by my own direct knowledge'. (And Uddaka Rāmaputta said,) 'It is a blessing, sir, it is indeed a blessing that I should meet with a companion in the spiritual life such as you! You now dwell having attained to, having realised by your own direct knowledge, the dharma that Rāma taught, having attained to it and having realised it by his own direct knowledge ...the dharma that Rāma knew (*aññāsi*/*jānāmi*), you know...as was (*ahosi*/---) Rāma, so are you....Come then, sir: may you lead this community!'"

A difference in status between the two individuals, Āḷāra and Uddaka, is revealed in the concluding parts of the accounts of the two meetings, where another important difference occurs. When the Bodhisatta informs Āḷāra Kālāma that he has mastered the latter's teaching, Ālāra, after proclaiming the Bodhisatta to be his equal, says, "Come then, sir: let *the two of us* lead this community together". In his narration of this event, the Buddha remarks, "Thus *Ālāra Kālāma, my teacher* (*ācariya*), set *me, his disciple* (*antevāsin*) on equal footing with himself, and honoured me with the highest of honours". In the account of the second meeting, however, after Uddaka has proclaimed the Bodhisatta to be the equal of Rāma, he says, "Come then, sir: may *you* lead this community" (see translation above). Of this the Buddha remarks, "Thus *Uddaka Rāmaputta, my companion in the spiritual life* (*sabrahmacārin*) established me in the position of teacher (*ācariyaṭṭhāne*), and honoured me with the highest of honours"[4]. This implies that, while Āḷāra was accepted as a teacher in his own right, Uddaka was simply the leader of a community through succession, by virtue of his teacher's death.

The relationship between Uddaka Rāmaputta and Rāma is borne out by two accounts of the second meeting preserved in Chinese. The first, from a discourse of the Sarvāstivādin school, describes Rāma as the father of Uddaka; the second, from the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptaka school, describes Rāma as Uddaka's teacher, and states specifically that Uddaka started teaching after the death of his teacher, Rāma (both passages translated and discussed by A.Bareau in *Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha dans les Sūtrapiṭaka et les Vinayapiṭaka anciens* I, EFEO, Paris 1963, pp.23-27).

209/14

Of the extant Sanskrit texts dealing with the Bodhisatta's meeting with Uddaka, who is variously referred to in Buddhist Sanskrit texts as Udaka, Uddaka, Udraka and Rudraka, the Mahāvastū of the Lokottaravādin school, in what is certainly an ancient passage, also makes this relationship clear. While the Bodhisatta addresses Uddaka as "bho Udraka" [5]("good Udraka"), the latter speaks of "the good Rāma" in a way that clearly implies that Rāma was his teacher. Thus he says, "Just so much, good Gautama, was attained, realised and taught by the good Rāma (*bhavatā Rāmeṇa*): the plane of neither perception nor non-perception". When the Bodhisatta announces that he has also attained to this plane, Uddaka replies, "Then the good Gautama knows that same dharma which the good Rāma (*bhavaṃ Rāmo*) knew (*jānāti*: third person, "historical present"). (*Mahāvastu Avadāna* 2, ed. R. Basak, Sanskrit College, Calcutta 1965, pp.167-9.) Unfortunately, the English translation of this passage is faulty, and implies that Uddaka and Rāma are one person, as do the translations from Pāli (J.Jones *The Mahāvastu* 2, SBB, London 1952, p.116-7).

The account given in the Lalita-vistara (ed.P.Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga 1958, p.180-1) seems to have undergone the same confusion as that of some modern translators. When the Bodhisatta asks Uddaka (here Rudraka), "Who is your teacher, whose teaching do you profess?", the latter replies, "I do not have any teacher: I have realised (this teaching) correctly by myself and on my own". This account differs widely in style and content from the Pāli, Chinese and Mahāvastu accounts, which are generally similar, and is clearly later.

Two accounts, virtually identical in their translated form, are preserved in Tibetan translation in the Abhiniṣkramaṇa-sūtra of an unknown school (but, because of the close agreement of this and other passages with the following, presumably Sarvāstivādin or Mūla-sarvāstivādin) (P 967, vol.39, p.16.3.4f.) and in the Vinayavastu of the Mūla-sarvāstivādins (P 1030, vol.42, p.34.4.1f: ch.17, Saṃgha-bheda-vastu). Although older than that of the Lalita-vistara, and closer in style to the other early accounts, the narration of the two meetings in these texts fails to preserve any differences: the two meetings are described identically, the only difference being the names and attainments of the two teachers.

Of the extant texts as a whole, the concluding portions of the Pāli version bring out the difference in status between the two individuals the most clearly. The Mahāvastu version, though briefer than the Pāli, is also quite clear. There the Buddha relates that Āḷāra Kālāma suggested that the two of them lead the community of disciples together, and thus set the Bodhisatta on equal footing with himself (*samānārthatāye sthāpayet*), while Uddaka asked the Bodhisatta to take over the community of disciples, and thus established the Bodhisatta in the position of teacher (ācārya-sthāne sthāpaye)[6]. The two Chinese versions are less clear, but still preserve some differences. The Lalita-vistara, in its account of the second meeting, combines elements from both meetings, generally using the vocabulary of the Mahāvastu: Uddaka says, "Come then, let you and I lead this community", thus setting the Bodhisatta on equal footing with himself (samānārthe sthāpayati) and establishing him in the position of teacher (ācārya-sthāne sthāpayati).The Abhiniṣkramaṇa-sūtra and the Vinayavastu again fail to preserve any difference whatsoever.

Finally, it should be noted that Uddaka Rāmaputta is never addressed or referred to as Rāma, as is given in the English translations of the Pāli and implied by the English translations of the Mahāvastu: in Pāli he is addressed simply as āvuso, in the Mahāvastu as bho Udraka or simply Udraka, in the Lalita-vistara as mārṣa; in Pāli he is referred to as Uddaka Rāmaputta, in the Mahāvastu as Udraka Rāmaputra, and in the Lalita-vistara as Rudraka Rāmaputra or simply Rudraka. Elsewhere in Sanskrit texts he is referred to as Udraka, not Rāma (Divyāvadāna, ed.P.Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga 1959, p.250; Śikṣāsamuccaya, ed.C.Bendall, Indo-Iranian Reprints, The Hague 1957, p.105.17; etc.). In the Pāli commentaries as well he is referred to simply as Uddaka (Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā, Mahāmakuta Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok, Vol.1, p.77; Buddhavaṃsa-aṭṭhakathā, Bhūmibalo Bhikkhu Foundation, Bangkok 1979, pp.12, 34, 529.)[7]

The material given above is sufficient to make it clear that Uddaka Rāmaputta and Rāma were two different persons, and that Rāma, Uddaka's teacher, had died by the time of the Bodhisatta's meeting with Uddaka; it does not, however, tell us whether or not Uddaka was the actual son of Rāma, as implied by his name and one Chinese translation. It is also not clear whether or not Uddaka had himself attained to the plane of neither perception nor non-perception. The texts that treat Uddaka and Rāma as different persons, and give the difference in status between Āḷāra and Uddaka, imply that he had not: otherwise, why the difference in status? Thus the sub-commentary on the Pāli version of this passage states that only Rāma had attained to this samāpatti, not Uddaka[8]. The other texts imply that Uddaka, as a teacher in his own right, had attained to the state that he taught; on their side is the fact that in Indian yogic systems attainment is held to be one of the prerequisites of teaching. Later Sanskrit Buddhist traditions certainly held that Uddaka had attained, and give him as an example of one who had reached the summit of existence (bhavāgra = the plane of neither perception nor non-perception) and been reborn there, but was bound, because of past karma, to fall once more into the realm of Māra, to the animal- or even the hell-planes. For example, the Saundarananda-kāvya of Aśvaghoṣa states that "even though the sage Udraka attained to the formless summit of existence, he will depart from there when his karma is exhausted, and fall to the animal-plane" [9].

21u/14

As regards the age of the passages studied here, the Pāli and the Mahāvastu accounts are clearly the oldest; the latter, as simpler and less stereotyped, may be the older of the two. The Lalita-vistara, like the Mahāvastu in general, contains material from various strata mixed with verse; thus the bulk of the account of the meeting with Āḷāra, given in the first person, is quite early in style, and strongly resembles that of the Mahāvastu, while the account of the meeting with Uddaka, given in the third person and opening with an explanation of how the Bodhisatta studied under Uddaka only as an expedient (upāya), in order to demonstrate that mundane meditations do not lead to release (laukika-samādhīnām-aniḥsaraṇatā), is clearly much later. The accounts of the Abhiniṣkramaṇa-sūtra and the Vinayavastu, though preserving a relatively ancient style, underwent alteration at a later date.

NOTES

1 In the PTS edition only the account of the Ariya-pariyesana is given in full; the others are virtually abbreviated out of existence. The Thai, Burmese and Nālandā editions give the account in full in each case. M 26 omits the sections on the three similes and the austerities.

2 In order to show the difference of tense clearly, the past forms of the verbs in the account of the second meeting are given in parentheses, followed by the present forms that occur in the account of the first meeting, that with Āḷāra.

3 In the account of the first meeting, Āḷāra is addressed in the vocative by his gotta name as āvuso Kālāma: cf. Papañca-sūdanī (Mahāmakuta Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok, Vol.2, p.229): Āḷāroti nāmaṃ...Kālāmoti gottaṃ. Unfortunately, the commentary does not give any such information for Uddaka.

4 While Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli has translated this portion of the narrative correctly, I.B.Horner has simply repeated the passage dealing with Āḷāra with the names changed.

5 The text of the Mahāvastu is somewhat corrupt. In Basak's edition, p.166.12, correct bho Udrakena to bho Udraka; at p.169.1 correct samjñānāsamjñāyatanam to naiva-samjñā-nāsamjñāyatanam: the whole phrase should probably read yam-idam naiva... (cf. 168.13). A lacuna occurs in the account of the meeting with Ārāḍa, p.166.8-10, and should be corrected on the basis of the account of the meeting with Udraka, p.168.8-11; cf. also Lalita-vistara 174.19-22.

6 This portion of the narrative has been mistranslated by Jones (loc.cit.):

samāna here is a present participle belonging with the preceding *tathā-darśanaṃ ca* (cf. 167.6 where *samāna* occurs twice: *evaṃ-darśanaṃ ca samānaṃ* (= pres.part.) *samāna* (= equal) *arthatāye sthāpayet*, and 173.9 *sa khalvahaṃ bhikṣavaḥ tathā-darśana-samāno*....)

7 The Thai script versions of the passage dealing with Uddaka are corrupt, and do in fact give the vocative *Rāma* in place of the nominative *Rāmo*; furthermore, the aorist *pavedesi* occurs as the present *pavedeti*. Other verbs, however, remain in the aorist: *vihāsi*, *ahosi*, *aññāsi*. According to the notes on variant readings in the Burmese script Chaṭṭha-saṅgīti-piṭaka, the vocative also occurs in the Sinhalese and Khmer script versions, as well as in some Burmese versions (Mūla-paṇṇāsa-pāḷi, p.221, n.4; Majjhima-paṇṇāsa-pāḷi, p.281, n.4, and Nānā-pāṭhā, p.451). The note given at the first occurrence of the variant, that is M 26, is by far the lengthiest note in the entire Burmese script Majjhima, which demonstrates that the confusion of the identity of Uddaka and Rāma is one of the major textual problems of that collection. The full text of this valuable and interesting note is as follows: "Āvuso Rāma: Sīhalapotthake, Syāma-potthake, katthaci Maramma-potthake dissamāna-pāṭho. Mahāsatto Rāmaputtaṃ-eva avoca, na Rāmaṃ. Rāmo hi tattha gaṇācariyo bhaveyya, tadā ca kālaṅkato asanto. Tenevettha Rāmāyattāni kriya-padāni atīta-kāla-vasena āgatāni. Udako ca Rāmaputto mahāsattassa sa-brahmacārī-tv-eva vutto na ācariyo-ti. Ṭīkāyaṃ ca 'Pāḷiyaṃ Rāmasseva samāpatti-lābhitā āgatā na Udakassā-ti' ādi pacchābhāge pakāsitā." (Mūla-paṇṇāsa-pāḷi, p.221, n.4). Unfortunately I did not obtain the Burmese script edition until after the article was completed, so could not refer to this note in the body of the text. Another point worthy of note is that the Burmese and Thai editions prefer the spelling Udaka, which is one of the variant spellings of the Mahāvastu.

8 Mūla-paṇṇāsa-ṭīkā, part 2, Burmese script ed., Rangoon 1951, p.139.

9 *The Saundarananda of Aśvaghoṣa*, ed. and tr. by E.H.Johnston, repr.Delhi 1975, p.155 (note at text verse 56) and translation p.65, note at verse 56. Although Johnston excludes verses 56 and 57 from the body of the text as "undoubtedly spurious", I see no cogent reason for doing so. The two verses fit the context admirably, and *bhavāgra* is not, as Johnston would have it, particularly "a late word": it occurs at least once in the Pali Canon in the same meaning as in the later non-canonical Sanskrit texts: *atthāvuso neva-saññā-nāsaññāyatanūpagā devā: idaṃ bhavānaṃ aggaṃ* (A III p.202). Cf. also Suvikrānta-vikrāmi-paripṛcchā, in Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 17, ed.P.Vaidya, Darbhanga 1961, p.60.

2 11/14

THE THREE SIMILES

Peter Skilling

After leaving Uddaka Rāmaputta, the Bodhisatta went to Uruvelā, where, on the banks of the Nerañjarā river; three similes (*upama*) occurred to him. These similes are given in three of the afore-mentioned discourses of the Middle Collection: the Greater Discourse to Saccaka, the Discourse to Prince Bodhi and the Discourse to Saṅgārava (M 36, 85, 100)[1]. Here an error in the romanised Pāli text (M I p.241), though noted by the editor himself (*ib.*, p.550), has led to errors of translation. The initial reason for assuming that there is an error is one of context: three different similes are given, but the applications of the first two similes are exactly the same, with only the last being different. The error in fact occurs in the application of the second simile, which fits neither the simile itself nor the progression of thought. Another problem involves variant readings in different versions of the Pāli text; here it is less simple to speak of "error", a point which will be discussed below. To start with, a translation of the corrected Pāli text, in which some of the variant readings have been adopted, will be given, with the correction and the variants underlined.

"Three similes, Aggivessana, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously:
(i) Suppose there is a piece of wet, sappy[2] wood lying in the water, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think that he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of wet, sappy wood, lying in the water?"

"Certainly not, good Gotama, for that piece of wood is wet and sappy, and, more than that, is lying in the water: the person in question would only end up wearying and frustrating himself."

"Such is the case, Aggivessana, with *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* who *dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn[3] from sense-pleasures*, and whose tendency towards sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, infatuation with sense-pleasures, thirst for sense-pleasures, and burning for sense-pleasures is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued: even if, as a result of their striving[4], these respected *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, they will be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aggivessana, is the first simile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."

(ii) "Then, Aggivessana, another, a second, simile, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously. Suppose there is a piece of wet, sappy wood, lying well away from the water on dry land, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think that he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of wet, sappy wood, lying well away from the water on dry land?"

"Certainly not, good Gotama: even though it is lying well away from the water on dry land, that piece of wood is wet and sappy: the person in question would only end up wearying and frustrating himself."

"Such is the case, Aggivessana, with *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* who *dwell only physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures*, but whose tendency towards sense-pleasures...(as above)...is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued: even if, as a result of their striving, these respected *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* undergo unpleasant feeling , sharp and harsh, they will be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aggivessana, is the second simile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."

(iii) "Then, Aggivessana, another, a third, simile, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously. Suppose there is a piece of dry, sapless[5] wood, lying well away from the water on dry land, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of dry, sapless wood lying well away from the water on dry land?"

"Indeed he would, good Gotama, for that piece of wood is dry and sapless, and, more than that, is lying well away from the water on dry land."

"Such is the case, Aggivessana, with *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* who *dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures*, and whose tendency towards sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, infatuation with sense-pleasures, thirst for sense-pleasures and burning for sense-pleasures is both inwardly well-abandoned and well-subdued: even if, as a result of their striving, these respected *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, they will be capable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be capable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aggivessana, is the third simile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."

212/14

In the application of the second simile, the PTS edition reads, as in the application of the first simile, *kāyena c'eva kāmehi avūpakaṭṭhā viharanti*, "and do not dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures"; however, as noted by Trenckner himself and as given in the Thai edition, the reading should be *kāyena c'eva kāmehi vūpakaṭṭhā viharanti*, "and dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures". This is demanded by the context: here the piece of wood, the mind, though still wet, saturated with sensual desire, is on dry land, that is, withdrawn physically from sense-pleasures. This error in the PTS edition has given rise to faulty translations in I.B.Horner's *Middle Length Sayings* I (*op. cit.*, p.296) and in A.Bareau's *Recherches*... I (*op.cit.*, p.42-3).

The second problem, that of variant readings, is more complex. The Thai script edition and the corrected PTS edition give the part of the applications of the three similes under discussion as follows:

(i) do not dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures (*kāyena c'eva kāmehi avūpakaṭṭhā viharanti*)
(ii) dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures (*kāyena c'eva kāmehi vūpakaṭṭhā viharanti*)
(iii) = (ii)

This suits the context and could stand as it is; however, the Burmese and Nālandā editions, introducing a further element, read as follows:

(i) dwell neither physically *nor mentally* withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāyena c'eva *cittena ca* kāmehi avūpakaṭṭhā viharanti)
(ii) dwell both physically *and mentally* withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāyena c'eva *cittena ca* kāmehi vūpakaṭṭhā viharanti)
(iii) = (ii)

Here again, only the first and last statements fit the context: "not being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures", in the first simile, summarises "their tendency towards sense-pleasures...is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued"; "being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures", in the third simile, summarises "their tendency towards sense-pleasures...is both inwardly well-abandoned and well-subdued". But in the second application, "being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures" contradicts "their tendency towards sense-pleasures...is *neither* well-abandoned *nor* well-subdued, and further contradicts the simile itself, for the piece of wood, the mind, is still wet, that is saturated by sensual desires.

Equivalent Sanskrit-Tibetan texts (according to A.Bareau, *op.cit.*, p. 43; the Chinese texts studied by him do not give the passage on the three similes) give the following readings:

. Lalita-vistara (*op.cit.*, p.181-2, Sanskrit; the Tibetan translation gives the same readings)
  (i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (*kāmebhyo'navakṛṣṭa-kāyā viharanti sma kāmebhyo anavakṛṣṭā-cittāśca viharanti sma*)
  (ii) dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (*kāmebhyo vyapakṛṣṭa-kāya-cittā viharanti*)
  (iii) = (ii)

. Mahāvastu 2 (*op.cit.*, pp.169-173, Sanskrit only)
  (i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (*kāmehi avyapakṛṣṭa-kāyā viharanti avyapakṛṣṭa-cittā*)
  (ii) dwell physically withdrawn but not mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (*kāmehi vyapakṛṣṭa-kāyā viharanti avyapakṛṣṭa-cittā*)
  (iii) dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (*kāmehi vyapakṛṣṭa-kāyā viharanti vyapakṛṣṭa-cittā*)

. Abhiniṣkramaṇa-sūtra (*op.cit.*, p.18.5.2f, Tibetan) and Vinayavastu (*op.cit.*, ch.17, p.37.1.2, Tibetan)
  (i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn (*thag sring ba*-*vyapakṛṣṭa*?) from sense-pleasures
  (ii) dwell having abandoned (*spong ba*-*prahīṇa*?) sense-pleasures physically but not mentally
  (iii) dwell both mentally and physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures.

Firstly, it may be noted that all Sanskrit-Tibetan versions give both ody and mind, as do the Burmese and Nālandā editions; the Lalita-vistara agrees ntirely with the latter two texts - with the same vocabulary but different hrasing - and thus does not solve the problem of the application of the second imile. The Mahāvastu, the Abhiniṣkramaṇa-sūtra and the Vinayavastu versions, owever, fit both the context and the progression of thought: in the second imile, "physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures" is equivalent to "on dry and", out of the "water" of sense-pleasures; "mentally not withdrawn from ense-pleasures" corresponds to the piece of wet wood, the mind still saturated y sensual desires.

The main problem now becomes whether or not the Pāli text should include he phrase "(not) mentally withdrawn" in addition to "(not) physically withrawn", and if so, how to resolve the application of the second simile. It may e argued that the addition of "mentally withdrawn" is redundant, since it is ifficult to take it as anything other than an equivalent of the list of near-synonyms beginning with "tendency towards sense-pleasures". However, redundanies abound in both Pāli and Sanskrit texts; it is given in the majority of

213/14

texts studied and may be further supported by other canonical texts, which, both in Pāli (D III 285 = A IV 152; S V 67) and Sanskrit (Daśottara-sūtra, ed. K.Mittal, in *Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im älteren Buddhismus*, Berlin 1957, p. 84), mention physical and mental withdrawal (*kāya*-, *citta*-. *vūpakāsa*/ - *vyapakarṣa*) together. Non-canonical texts of the Sanskrit traditions also deal with these two, but give them broader definitions (cf. Abhidharma-kośa, Bhāṣya and Vyākhyā, 6:6a; Artha-viniścaya-sūtra-nibandhana, ed. N.Samtani, Patna 1971, p. 202; Śrāvaka-bhūmi of Asaṅga, ed. K.Shukla, Patna 1973, p.362). Further, one of the Pāli discourses that contains this passage, the Greater Discourse to Saccaka, opens with the question of "physical and mental development" (*kāya*-, *citta*--*bhāvanā*). Thus it seems likely that both physical and mental withdrawal should be included in the Pāli text.

It is, however, difficult to include both in the application of the second simile as it stands. Adhering as closely as possible to the extant manuscript tradition, the only possible reading would be *kāyena v'eva na cittena kāmehi vūpakaṭṭhā viharanti*, which sounds uniodiomatic. The only acceptable solution for the time being is to omit the reference to mental withdrawal in the application of the second simile, a solution which is not entirely satisfactory, but at least can be supported by available manuscripts. Thus we get, as translated above,

(i) *kāyena c'eva cittena ca kāmehi avūpakaṭṭhā viharanti*
(ii) *kāyena c'eva kāmehi vūpakaṭṭhā viharanti* (see PTS ed. p.550 and Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, *op.cit.*, Vol.3, p.195, notes, for other suggested readings; Ñāṇamoli suggests the same readings as here for (i) and (iii))
(iii) *kāyena c'eva cittena ca kāmehi vūpakaṭṭhā viharanti*.

Numerous other differences occur in the various versions of this passage. While the Pāli texts situate this incident at Uruvelā, Senānigama, on the banks of the Nerañjarā river, after the Bodhisatta has left Uddaka Rāmaputta and before his practice of self-mortification, the Abhiniṣkramaṇa-sūtra and the Vinayavastu situate it "south of the Gaṅgā" (Abhiniṣkramaṇa, doubtless an error for the following) or "south of Gayā" (Vinayavastu), at Uruvilvā-Kāśyapa's (Kāśyapa, given by both texts, probably an error) Senā-nigama, by the Nairañjanā river, after the practice of austerities (Abhiniṣkramaṇa) or after the practice of the bulk of the austerities (Vinayavastu). The Mahāvastu and the Lalita-vistara situate the event on Gayāśīrṣa mountain, after the Bodhisatta has left Uddaka Rāmaputta; after the three similes have occurred to him he then proceeds to Uruvilvā Senāpatigrāma(ka) and the Nairañjanā river, and begins his practice of austerities.

The latter two texts, which agree with the Pāli in situating the three similes before the austerities, give a passage, not found in Pāli, after the similes but before the austerities, which connects the two: "Then, O monks, I thought, 'I dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures, and have thoughts about sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, burning for sense-pleasures and attachment to sense-pleasures well under control (*prativinīta*): even if I should undergo unpleasant feelings - acute, harsh and racking, that torment the self and torture the body - I will yet be capable of knowledge, insight and understanding of that which transcends the human state'" (Mahāvastu 2, *op.cit.*, p.173; Lalita-vistara gives a similar passage, worded differently).

Another difference is in the string of synonyms for sensual desire, beginning in Pāli with "tendency towards sense-pleasures", and in the participles denoting their (non-) relinquishment; these differ from text to text, but need not detain us here as the differences do not affect the meaning. The similes themselves are also worded differently in the various texts; the only significant difference here being that in the Abhiniṣkramaṇa and Vinayavastu the first two similes are exactly the same - "a piece of wet, soggy wood, taken from the water and placed on dry land" - which raises the reverse of the main problem dealt with above: the same simile with two different applications. Another difference which does not affect the meaning concerns the order of the material: while the Pāli, the Abhiniṣkramaṇa and Vinayavastu give the similes first, followed by their applications, the Mahāvastu and Lalita-vistara give the "applications" first, followed by the similes, then by a repetition of the applications (the Mahāvastu gives the text in full throughout, with one omission in the first simile, probably a lacuna or misprint, while the Lalita-vistara abbreviates the second and third similes considerably). Further, in the Pāli and the Mahāvastu, no doubt the most ancient versions, the narrative is in the first person; in the other texts it is related of the Bodhisatta in the third person.

All the texts studied here give a follow-up passage, after the practice of self-mortification, that refers back to the applications of the three similes. The Pāli version (M I, p.246.20) reads as follows, "Then, Aggivessana, I thought, 'This is the limit (*etāva-paramaṃ*) of unpleasant feeling - acute and harsh, resulting from striving - undergone by any *samaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* in the past, the future, or the present: there is nothing beyond this'" (summarised translation). The Mahāvastu (p.182.3) reads "Then, monks, I thought, 'This is the limit of unpleasant feeling - acute, severe and harsh, that torments the self and tortures the body - undergone by any respected *śramaṇas* or *brāhmaṇas* in the past or at present: no one is capable of surpassing this'".[6]

The one major difference that occurs in the applications of the similes

is that all Sanskrit-Tibetan versions mention only that, even should the *śramaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* be tormented by pain as a result of their self-mortification, they will or will not be capable of enlightenment, while the Pāli version alone introduces a second alternative: *whether or not* they are tormented by pain as a result of their self-mortification, they will or will not be capable of enlightenment. Although the Pāli version cannot be rejected offhand, it seems unnecessary to include this second alternative. The general application of the similes, here as well as in other contexts (cf. M 119, III p.95; M 126, III pp.141-144; Peṭakopadesa, p.1-2) is impossibility/ possibility: in this context only when the mind, the piece of wood, is both physically and mentally withdrawn or removed from sense-pleasures can it give birth to the "spark of enlightenment"; thus the practice of self-mortification can only be effective when the practitioner is so withdrawn. It would seem that, had the Bodhisatta further realised that enlightenment could be realised without the practice of self-mortification - the second alternative to the third simile in the Pāli - he would not have embarked upon such practice, for no less than six years, according to common tradition. That at that point the Bodhisatta believed the practice of austerities to be necessary, is clearly given in one of the Pāli discourses that contains the passage in question, the Discourse to Prince Bodhi (M 85, II p.93), where the Buddha introduces the narration of the quest for enlightenment and the practice of self-mortification with the statement, "before my enlightenment, when I was an unenlightened bodhisatta, I thought that 'happiness is not to be attained by means of happiness: happiness is to be attained through suffering'". The relation of the austerities itself confirms this: it is only when the Bodhisatta realises that he has reached the limit of suffering to be attained through self-mortification that he sees that this practice has not led him to enlightenment. Wondering if there is another path to enlightenment, he reflects upon a past experience of meditation (*jhāna*, *dhyāna*), and realises that this is the path. He then reflects, "Why should I fear a happiness that is free of sense-pleasure and free of unhealthy states of mind?", and goes on to reject self-mortification, adopt a healthy diet, practise meditation and attain enlightenment. (M I 246-7; the Sanskrit-Tibetan texts studied here all contain this passage, with the usual differences of phrasing.) Thus the second alternative given in the Pāli seems unlikely, and may well be a later interpolation; it brings to mind the interpolations in the Lalita-vistara, where it is said that the Bodhisatta already knew the futility of self-mortification but practised it to the limit in order to demonstrate this futility (*op.cit.*, p.182-3, etc.).

In this case the Mahāvastu seems to give the most ancient and the clea[illegible]est version of this event; the other versions all present difficulties and [illegible]ear to have become corrupted with the passage of time.

NOTES

As in the case of the discourses dealing with the meetings with Āḷāra and Uddaka, only the first discourse of the PTS edition (M 36) gives the text in full; the Thai, Burmese and Nālandā editions all give the full text in each case.

After the commentary, Papañca-sūdanī (Vol.2, Mahāmakuṭa Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok, B.E.2463, p.387): sa-snehan-ti sa-khīraṃ.

Papañca-sūdanī, loc.cit.: avūpakaṭṭhā-ti anapagatā; cf. Kośa 6:6a vyapakarṣa = dūrīkaraṇa.

Papañca-sūdanī, loc.cit.: opakkamikā-ti upakkama-nibbatthā.

Papañca-sūdanī, p.388: kolāpan-ti chinna-sinehaṃ nivāpaṃ.

The Mahāvastu is here very corrupt; see Edgerton's suggested corrections, which are followed here (Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, repr. Delhi 1972, p.155b, ettāvat). Whatever the original may have been, the general idea is confirmed by the Pāli, Lalita-vistara (p.192.25), Abhiniṣkramaṇa (19.1.7) and Vinayavastu (37.5.2), and Jones' rendering (op.cit., p.125) is certainly wrong. I.B.Horner's translation from the Pāli (op.cit., p.301), though perhaps not literally wrong, is unhappy and fails to bring out the meaning clearly; Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli's rendering (op.cit., Vol.1, p.280, Vol.3, p.191) is much preferable.

ABBREVIATIONS AND TEXTS USED

Pāli: the PTS (Pali Text Society, London), the Burmese script Chaṭṭha-saṅgīti (Rangoon), the Thai script (Mahāmakuṭa Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok) and the Nālandā (Nālandā, Bihar) editions have been consulted for the passages dealt with here; of these the Burmese gives the best readings, which are mainly followed by the Nālandā edition, which adds modern punctuation. References to other Pāli texts, except when otherwise noted, are to PTS editions, with standard abbreviations.

Tibetan: the Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka (P), Suzuki Research Foundation reprint, Tokyo-Kyoto, has been used; references are to catalogue number, followed by volume number, page, folio and line.

Names: for the sake of consistency, the Pāli forms (bodhisatta, Uddaka, etc.) have been used, except in direct citations from the Sanskrit.

215/14

NEWS & NOTES

Conference on Hīnayānist Sanskrit Literature

The third conference sponsored by the Kommission für buddhistische Studien der Akademie der Wissenschaften was held in Göttingen between 13th-16th July 1982. The occasion was also made to coincide with the 85th birthday of Emeritus Prof. Ernst Waldschmidt, the doyen of researchers in Central Asian literature.

An indication of the scope of the proceedings is provided by the titles of those papers (all of which will be published in 1983) which are likely to prove of most interest to our readers: S.Dietz "Zur Frage der Schulzugehörigkeit der Fragmente des Abhidharmaskandhapādaśāstra und der Lokaprajñapti", E.Mayeda "Schools of the Chinese Four Āgamas. Studies in Japan", Bhikkhu Pāsādika "Bericht über die Sammlung von Kanon-Zitaten aus dem Abhidharmakośa", M.Schmidt "Stand der Arbeiten am Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der Turfan-Funde", L.Schmithausen "Verschiedene Versionen einzelner kanonischer Lehrreden und das Problem ihrer Schulzugehörigkeit", D.Seyfort Ruegg "Über die Nikāyas der Śrāvakas und den Ursprung der philosophischen Schulen des Buddhismus" and Ch.Tripathi "Saṅgītisūtra, Nipāta II und Ekottarāgama-Parallelen hierzu".

IABS

The fifth conference of The International Association of Buddhist Studies was held at Hertford College, Oxford, between 16th-21st August 1982, under the presidency of Ven.Dr Walpola Rāhula. It had been organised by the local Secretary (and Hon.Secretary of the Pali Text Society), Prof.Richard Gombrich.

All aspects of Buddhology were covered, including special sessions on Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, Art and Iconography, Anthropology of Buddhism, Tibetan Religious and Philosophical Thought, and Contemporary Japanese Buddhism. Reports were received on the Critical Pāli Dictionary, Pāli Tipiṭakaṃ Concordance, Pāli-English Dictionary (proposed revised edition) and the Journal of the PTS (proposed revival)(by the Editor-in-Chief of the CPD and President of the PTS, K.R.Norman), Hōbōgirin (French-language encyclopaedia of Buddhism based in Kyoto - Hubert Durt), "Sanskrit Dictionary of Buddhist Texts from the Turfan Finds" (Siglinde Dietz), Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (Akira Yuyama - who presented the same report in German in Göttingen), and "Group for Buddhist and Jain Philological Studies" in France (Gérard Fussman).

The papers included Thich Thiên Chau "The Literature of Pudgalavāda", S.Collins "Friendship as a Buddhist Virtue", L.S.Cousins "Samatha-yāna and Vipassanā-yāna", S.Dietz "Some Problems concerning two Abhidharma Fragments from Gilgit", Mirko Frýba "Applications of Dhamma in Western Therapy", B.G.Gokhale